

THE LIFE
OF
COLIN CAMPBELL, LORD CLYDE



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OF
COLIN CAMPBELL, LORD CLYDE

ILLUSTRATED BY EXTRACTS FROM HIS DIARY
AND CORRESPONDENCE

BY
LIEUT.-GENERAL SHADWELL, C.B.

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I.

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXI

P R E F A C E.

SOME of Lord Clyde's friends being under the impression that he had prohibited the publication of any of his papers, I desire to say a word in explanation.

The impression is a mistaken one, although it cannot be denied that his consent was given with reluctance, as will be seen presently.

It must be very well known to those who were on intimate terms with Lord Clyde, that he was an exceptionally modest man. Modesty was his characteristic from his youth, and became more confirmed, instead of being lessened, by age, rank, and honours. He shrank from every kind of notoriety, and nothing but his remarkable sensitiveness in that respect caused the unwillingness he evinced to let his papers be used for a Memoir.

Notwithstanding this, in his Will he leaves it to the discretion of the trustees to dispose of his papers, adding: "It may possibly become their opinion that some short Memoir should be drawn up. If this

should appear to them to be absolutely necessary and indispensable (which I should regret, and hope may be avoided), then it should be limited, as much as possible, to the modest recital of the services of an old soldier."

The trustees have hitherto been unwilling to disregard Lord Clyde's apparent objection to a Memoir; but, after a lapse of seventeen years, they consider that no sufficient reason now exists for leaving such a distinguished soldier altogether unnoticed, and they feel justified in exercising the discretion which he has left them.

The more intimately Lord Clyde's true character and services are made known to his countrymen, the greater reason will they see to admire him and to honour his memory. Accordingly, the trustees have allowed the compilation of this simple Memoir, which, without trespassing much beyond the limits prescribed by Lord Clyde, endeavours to give a faithful impression of the man, while it affords, at the same time, a most encouraging example to all young soldiers, who will see in it to what the humblest and most friendless of them may aspire, when animated by that noble sense of duty which seemed to influence every act of his eventful military career.

General Shadwell had been many years in the same regiment with Lord Clyde and myself. He

was with him in China in 1842, at Chin-kiang-foo, and before Nankin. He was on his staff in the Punjab campaign of 1848-49—at Chillianwala and Goojrat—accompanied him to the Crimea—and was on his staff at the Alma and in front of Balaklava. Long and intimately associated as he had been with Lord Clyde, and favoured with his friendship and confidence, he is better qualified than any one else I am acquainted with, to place our old chief's character in its natural and true light before his countrymen.

Consequently, such material as was available for the purpose was confided to General Shadwell, and these chapters are the result of his labour.

HENRY EYRE.

26th July 1880.

To the foregoing, I wish to add the following remarks :—

Of his early years, though Lord Clyde frequently alluded to them in conversation with me, I learned few details from him. For the information regarding his parentage, birth, and education, I am indebted to the kindness of his lordship's cousin, Mr P. S. Macliver, M.P., who from the first has taken great

interest in this work, and who has rendered me valuable assistance, for which I beg to tender him my grateful acknowledgments.

Not having had the good fortune to accompany Lord Clyde to India, on his being summoned thither in the summer of 1857, I was unable to approach this portion of his career with a personal knowledge of the incidents which marked it. Abundance of materials, however, in the shape of correspondence, reports, general orders, and other official documents, existed amongst the papers intrusted to me; but as Lord Clyde ceased keeping his journal on his arrival at Calcutta in August 1857, I was constrained to look elsewhere for assistance in tracing the narrative of events, in which he was the chief actor, during the time he held the supreme command in India.

The kindness of friends has supplied the deficiency. Sir Archibald Alison, who accompanied Lord Clyde to India as Military Secretary, and who happens, moreover, to be one of his trustees, placed in my hands his admirable account of Lord Clyde's proceedings, from the time of his reaching Calcutta to the end of February 1858, when, disabled by a serious wound, he was compelled to quit the side of his chief and return to England. This trustworthy record, acknowledged to be a masterpiece of military writing, was published in the October number of 'Blackwood's Magazine,' in the year 1858. I have

therefore had no hesitation in following it closely; the more so, as its accomplished author desired me to make any use I liked of it, and supplemented this favour by confiding to me the original letters, which formed the basis of his narrative.

The journal kept in his official capacity by Captain (now Major-General) George Allgood, C.B., who accompanied Lord Clyde as Assistant-Quartermaster-General with headquarters in the campaigns of 1857, 1858, and 1859, and which was included amongst Lord Clyde's papers, has been of invaluable assistance to me. By it I have been enabled to trace the daily movements of Lord Clyde in the field with a confidence which has materially lightened my labours. For its copious use, I might almost say its reproduction, as well as for the plans executed by Captain Allgood himself, who has kindly allowed them to be engraved for the purpose of accompanying this work, I have to thank this old friend.

To Sir Henry Norman I am under the deepest obligations. He had been Lord Clyde's staff officer during his command at Peshawur, and had accompanied him in his expeditions against the hill tribes. He again joined him prior to the relief of Lucknow. As he was discharging at headquarters the duties of Adjutant-General of the army, he not only possessed Lord Clyde's entire confidence, but was an eyewitness of, as well as an actor in, the several campaigns

which his chief personally conducted during the suppression of the Mutiny. Sir Henry Norman not only has supplied me with much valuable information and advice, for which I cannot be too grateful, but I have taken advantage of an interesting lecture on the Relief of Lucknow, delivered by him at Simla in 1867, to reproduce many points connected with that episode in Lord Clyde's career, which otherwise might have escaped my notice.

The late Lord Sandhurst at the outset kindly proffered me his aid and counsel. Though, unfortunately, I was debarred by his premature death from reaping the full advantage of an offer, which, had he been spared, would have been of inestimable service to me, Lady Sandhurst has, with great consideration, allowed me access to her husband's papers, in order to clear up one or two points, regarding which I have been in doubt.

Colonel Metcalfe, who, as aide-de-camp to Lord Clyde, never quitted his chief's side, from the time he joined him in Calcutta till the latter left Paris on his return to England in 1860, has afforded me much information, which I could not otherwise have obtained. To him and such other of my friends, not mentioned by name, who were admirers of Lord Clyde, and who have kindly rendered me assistance, I take this opportunity of returning my sincere thanks.

Believing that letters written to the subject of a memoir are, in many cases, of as much service in elucidating personal character, as those written by the individual in question, I have not scrupled to introduce, amongst others, including some from Sir Charles Napier, the late Lord Lawrence, Sir James Outram, Sir Patrick Grant, &c., many of Lord Canning's letters to Lord Clyde. For this I have the sanction of Lord Clanricarde, to whom my warm acknowledgments are due.

This correspondence not only shows the points on which the Governor-General and his Commander-in-chief were at variance, and which, as demonstrated by the logical consequence of events, added, in Lord Clyde's opinion, to the difficulties of the task imposed upon him, but they are valuable as an evidence of how men in high position may agree to differ, without any diminution of personal regard, when the one object in view is the furtherance of the public service.

Lord Clyde was the first to acknowledge the entire success of Lord Canning's policy, whatever opinion he may have held as to the method of its execution; but his loyal subordination to the head of the Government, for whom he entertained the sincerest respect and affection, was a marked feature in his relations with Lord Canning, besides being eminently characteristic of the man himself.

By the insertion of this correspondence, I have been solely actuated by the desire to do full justice to the memory of these distinguished public servants.

LAWRENCE SHADWELL.

SOUTHCOTE LODGE, READING,
1st September 1880.

Note.—In these volumes no attempt has been made to reduce the spelling of Indian topographical names to a rigidly uniform system. The popular orthography of the despatches and plans of the time has been generally followed ; and though it may not have the merit of strict accuracy, it will enable readers to identify places which, perhaps, would have been unfamiliar in a transliterated form. L. S.

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LIFE OF LORD CLYDE.

CHAPTER I.

MOTTO — PARENTAGE — BIRTH — EDUCATION — FIRST COMMISSION — SAILS FOR THE PENINSULA — VIMIERO — SIR JOHN MOORE'S ADVANCE AND RETREAT — EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN — GIBRALTAR — BATTLE OF BARROSA — JOINS LORD WELLINGTON'S ARMY — BATTLE OF VITORIA — SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN — FORLORN-HOPE — WOUNDED — NARRATIVE OF FAILURE OF FIRST ASSAULT — PASSAGE OF THE BIDASOA — AGAIN WOUNDED — PROMOTED IN THE 60TH REGIMENT.

*“Durch die Geduld, Vernunft, und Zeit,
Wird möglich die Unmöglichkeit.”*

*“By means of patience, common-sense, and time,
Impossibility becomes possible.”*

These lines, which were inscribed by Lord Clyde in the year 1832 on the fly-leaf of one of the memorandum-books kept by him at uncertain intervals, have been selected as the motto of this biography, inasmuch as they contain the moral of his professional life; for it was by the exercise of patience and common-sense, under the influence of time, that he won for himself

a coronet and the baton of a Field-marshall, and that he was honoured after death by a public funeral in Westminster Abbey.

Colin Macliver, better known as Colin Campbell, was the eldest child of John Macliver and Agnes Campbell, who were married, as certified by the register of Glasgow, in that city on the 29th January 1792. John Macliver was born on his father's estate of Ardnave, in the island of Islay in Argyleshire. This gentleman, the grandfather of the future Lord Clyde, had followed the Pretender in the famous rising of 1745; and having, by this act, forfeited his property, he removed with his family to Glasgow, where John, Lord Clyde's father, who followed the trade of a carpenter, settled after marriage. Agnes Campbell, Colin's mother, was a daughter of a respectable family, who had settled in Islay near two centuries ago with their chief, the ancestor of the present Earls of Cawdor. Colin Campbell's kinsmen had often served in the army; and one uncle, after whom he was called, fell as a subaltern in the war of the American Revolution.

Colin, the subject of this memoir, was the eldest of four children, two sons and two daughters, and was born on the 20th October 1792. His sister Marjory Alicia, to whom frequent allusion will be made hereafter, was born two years later.

Colin was educated in the High School, then the principal educational institution in Glasgow. In the class-books his name appears as Colin Macliver

No. 1, owing to a cousin who bore the same name being in the school with him. At the age of ten he was removed from Glasgow by his maternal uncle, the late Colonel John Campbell (who thenceforth took charge of the boy), to an academy at Gosport, where he remained till he was fifteen and a half years old, when he received his commission on the 26th May 1808 in the 9th Regiment of Foot. At the Horse Guards he had been previously introduced to the Duke of York, the Commander-in-chief, by his uncle. The Duke supposing the boy, as he remarked, to be "another of the clan," entered him as Colin Campbell, and from that day he assumed his mother's name. This is the explanation of a change which has puzzled many, and has given rise to various surmises. Upon leaving the Duke's presence with his uncle, it is said that he made some remark upon the subject, which was met by telling him that "Campbell" was a name which it would suit him, for professional reasons, to adopt. On the 29th June, five weeks from the date of his first commission, Colin Campbell was promoted to a lieutenancy in his regiment.

In a memorandum-book dated 1813, he thus records the commencement of his service : "Appointed to an ensigncy in the 9th,¹ May 26, 1808, then in

¹ His battalion was the 2d, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir John Cameron, K.C.B., of whom, as a commanding officer and friend, Colin Campbell ever spoke in terms of affectionate regard. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron had served in the 43d Regiment, under Sir John Moore, at Shorn-

the Isle of Wight. Received an order on the 14th July to proceed instantly to join the regiment, being under orders for embarkation. Left the Isle of Wight on the 15th July, and arrived in Canterbury on the 17th.¹ Marched on the evening of the 19th for Ramsgate; on the 20th embarked, and sailed in company with the 2d battalions 43d and 52d, under the command of General Anstruther. *August 19th.*—Off the Bay of Peniché, where we landed in the evening. Lay out that evening the first time in my life. *20th.*—Joined the army, then encamped at and about the village of Vimiero. *21st.*—Was engaged at the battle of Vimiero.” It was at the commencement of this battle that a circumstance occurred to the young subaltern, to which in after-years he was wont to refer with the deepest feelings of gratitude. Colin Campbell was with the rear company of his battalion, which was halted in open column of companies. His captain, an officer of years and experience, called him to his side, took him by the hand, and leading him by the flank of the battalion to its front, walked with him up and down the front of the leading company for several minutes, in full view of the enemy’s artillery, which had begun to open fire on our troops whilst covering his attack. He then let go the boy’s hand (Colin was not yet sixteen), and cliffe. He was the father of Lieutenant-General Sir Duncan A. Cameron, G.C.B.

¹ There is apparently some mistake in these dates, for it seems improbable that the battalion could have accomplished the movement between the 15th and 17th.

told him to join his company. The object was to give the youngster confidence, and it succeeded. In after-years, though very reticent of his own services—for Lord Clyde was essentially a modest man—he related the anecdote to the writer of this memoir, adding, “It was the greatest kindness that could have been shown me at such a time, and through life I have felt grateful for it.”

After the battle of Vimiero, which resulted in Marshal Junot’s defeat and the Convention of Cintra, by the terms of which the French evacuated Portugal, Colin Campbell was transferred to the first battalion of the 9th, in quarters at Quelus, near Lisbon, and again found himself under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, who had himself been moved to the same battalion. It was one of those selected to form part of the army under the command of Sir John Moore, who was instructed to advance into the north of Spain, open communications with the Spanish generals (who at that time were holding with their armies the line of the Ebro), and frame the plan of the campaign with a view to the expulsion of the French from Spanish territory.

It is not necessary to recapitulate in this memoir the circumstances attending Sir John Moore’s advance to Salamanca, or the reasons which induced him to forgo his original intention of retiring on Portugal when he found that the armies which he had come to support were no longer in existence, and that he himself was without magazines or money. Suffice

it to say, that after Sir John Hope had joined him with the cavalry and artillery, which had moved by the devious route of the valley of the Tagus, he conceived the bold and generous idea of advancing upon the enemy's line of communication, in order, by attracting the attention of the French towards himself, and by relieving the Spaniards of the presence of superior numbers, to afford them breathing-time to organise the defence of the southern provinces.

On the organisation of Sir John Moore's army in divisions, Colin Campbell's battalion formed part of Major-General Beresford's¹ brigade, under the divisional command of Lieutenant-General Mackenzie Fraser. The British force, increased by a division under Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, which had landed at Coruña from England, and had marched through Galicia, advanced to Sahagun on the 21st December, with the intention of falling upon Soult's corps, which was unsupported. But no sooner did Napoleon hear at Madrid of the movement, than he set in motion 50,000 men with incredible rapidity, and leading his columns through the passes of the Guadarama, which were blocked with snow, put himself in communication with Soult, —too late, however, to crush his foe, for Sir John Moore had anticipated him by twelve hours, and was in full retreat across the Esla, pursued by Soult.

Then followed the memorable retreat to Coruña.

¹ Afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount Beresford, G.C.B.

In this terrible operation, conducted in midwinter, young Campbell bore his share. His battalion suffered considerable loss—1 officer and 148 men having died on the road, or been made prisoners in consequence of their being obliged to halt from exhaustion. On reaching Coruña, the 9th was stationed in the town, and was not engaged in the action of the 16th January, in which Sir John Moore met a glorious end; but it furnished the fatigue-party which dug his grave on the ramparts, where his remains were interred in a somewhat hurried manner by the officers and soldiers justly dear to him, on the morning of the 17th, the sound of the enemy's guns, which had opened a heavy fire during the sad ceremony, mingling with the words of the solemn burial-service—a scene which never can be forgotten so long as Napier's History and Wolfe's poetry are read. The result of the action of Coruña enabled the British force to effect its embarkation, which was completed on the 18th under cover of Beresford's brigade forming the rear-guard.

To give some idea of the discomforts of the retreat, Lord Clyde used to relate how that, for some time before reaching Coruña, he had to march with bare feet, the soles of his boots being completely worn away. He had no means of replacing them, and when he got on board ship he was unable to remove them, as, from constant wear and his inability to take them off, the leather had adhered so closely to the flesh of the legs, that he was obliged to steep

them in water as hot as he could bear, and have the leather cut away in strips—a painful operation, as in the process pieces of the skin were brought away with it.

The 1st battalion 9th landed at Plymouth and Portsmouth, and moved thence to Canterbury. On the 17th July, Colin Campbell marched with his battalion to Ramsgate, to join the magnificent force under the Earl of Chatham, which had been designated to proceed up the Scheldt, attack Antwerp, then but feebly protected, and destroy the French fleet moored under its walls—the intention being to create thereby a diversion in favour of Austria.

The 1st battalion 9th was brigaded with the 38th and 42d Regiments, under the command of General Montresor. It disembarked on the island of South Beveland, opposite that of Walcheren, whence the expedition took its name, where it remained above three weeks during the operations against Flushing. Lord Chatham losing sight of the primary object of the expedition, delayed so long in the reduction of that place, that the enemy was afforded the opportunity of concentrating troops for the defence of Antwerp, and of taking measures for the removal of the fleet above that fortress. The object of the imposing armament sent forth by England proved abortive ; and the troops succumbing to malaria, the result of exposure to the pestilential atmosphere of the marshy islands of the Scheldt, the main body of the land forces, including Colin

Campbell's battalion, returned to England before the end of September. The 1st battalion 9th resumed its old quarters at Canterbury. Seven thousand out of the 40,000 originally embarked had perished on the spot; and the remainder, both officers and men, brought away with them the seeds of disease which affected them more or less for the rest of their lives. It will be seen, during the course of this memoir, how severely Colin Campbell suffered in this respect.

He was next transferred to his original battalion, the 2d-9th, then stationed at Gibraltar. From this post he was detached, with the flank companies of his battalion, to join, towards the end of February 1811, a British force of over 4000 men, which, starting from Cadiz under the command of Sir Thomas Graham,¹ had disembarked at Tarifa, for the purpose of operating, in conjunction with a Spanish force of more than three times that number under General La Peña, upon the rear of Marshal Victor's corps, at that time blockading Cadiz. On the 5th March, a severe engagement took place at Barrosa, the brunt of the action falling on the British force, which was left unsupported by La Peña. Thus, owing, as Napier terms it, to the "heroic vigour of Graham's attack," Marshal Victor was defeated, with the loss of an eagle, six pieces of artillery, two generals, and more than 2000 men killed and wounded. As, however, La Peña kept aloof during

¹ Afterwards General Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B.

and after the action, and as our troops were unable from exhaustion to follow up the victory, the result of the expedition proved fruitless. Graham retired to Cadiz; and the French, taking heart, finally resumed the blockade of the place. In a memorandum attached to the statement of his services in the records of the 21st Fusiliers, in which regiment he subsequently served, Colin Campbell thus speaks of his part in the action—"At the battle of Barrosa in 1811, when the present Lord Lynedoch was pleased to take favourable notice of my conduct when left in command of the two flank companies of my regiment, all the other officers being wounded." Amongst these was his dear friend William Seward, with whom Colin Campbell maintained intimate relations until the death of the former, who, after attaining the rank of major in the 9th Regiment, retired upon half-pay in 1835, and died in the Channel Islands in 1857.

Seward, like Colin Campbell, had no private means. Their scanty pittance of pay was all they had to depend upon, yet they were equally firm in their determination to avoid debt. In this they were successful, though in after-years Colin Campbell would frequently narrate the temptations to which they were exposed, and the narrow straits in which they oftentimes found themselves in their endeavours to effect their honourable purpose.

The next service in which he was engaged was with an expedition, under Colonel Skerrett, to succour

Tarragona, besieged by Marshal Suchet. It arrived in the roadstead off that fortress on the 26th June 1811 ; but as the troops did not land, and the place fell two days afterwards, the expedition returned to Gibraltar. In the autumn and winter of that year Lieutenant Campbell was attached to the Spanish armies under the orders of General Ballasteros, and was present at the affairs of Coin and Alhaurin, in the valley of Malaga. Later on, when Ballasteros was driven under the walls of Gibraltar, many good Spanish families availed themselves of the protection of that fortress—affording the opportunity, which the young English subaltern eagerly seized, of mixing with them, and of improving himself in the French and Spanish languages. He was present also with the light company of his battalion at the latter part of the siege of Tarifa, in December 1811, when the efforts of the French under General Laval to assault the place signally failed, through the vigorous defence of the garrison, which was mainly composed of British troops.

The year 1812 was passed quietly at Gibraltar, but in January 1813 a draft of upwards of 400 men was sent from the 2d battalion to join the 1st battalion 9th in Portugal. Lieutenant Campbell accompanied that detachment, and at the end of the march, again found himself under the command of his original chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron.

After the retreat from Burgos, the Anglo-Portuguese army had gone into winter-quarters at the

end of November 1812, and the 5th division, in which the 1st battalion 9th was brigaded, was located in the vicinity of Lamego, on the Lower Douro. When Wellington advanced in the spring of 1813 towards the Ebro, turning at the outset the French line of defence on the Douro, his left wing, under Sir Thomas Graham, was directed to march through the mountainous districts of Tras os Montes on Braganza and Zamora, and effect a junction with the centre and right of the Allied army. The former was conducted by Wellington in person, the latter by Hill. Of the part which his battalion took in this advance, eventuating in the battle of Vitoria and the retreat of the French across the Bidassoa, Colin Campbell kept a daily record, which he preserved with his papers. On many days nothing worthy of transcript is recorded—merely the features of the ground, the state of the roads, and the distance of each day's march being noted, with a minuteness that evidences the interest which he took in all matters connected with the operations in which he was engaged.

The movement commenced by the passage of the Douro on the 14th May. After an ineffectual attempt to cross the Esla on the 31st May, in which operation young Campbell acted as orderly officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Crawford of the 9th, in command of the flank companies of the 3d and 5th divisions, the passage of that river was effected at Almandra; and although the enemy had already been felt by our

advanced parties, and some skirmishing had ensued, no serious collision occurred until the Ebro had been crossed.

"*Journal, 18th June.*—Through Astri to Osma, where a large body of the enemy was met unexpectedly [this body was Sarrut's division of Reille's corps]. The meeting was as great a surprise to them as to us. They placed themselves on the heights of Astalitz, evidently with a view to effect their retreat. The light companies of the 1st brigade, with a portion of the 8th Caçadores, were employed against the enemy, and were supported in the first instance by the fire of a brigade of Royal Artillery. Colonel Cameron sent a battalion company to support his own light company [to which Lieutenant Campbell had been posted]. This being our first encounter this campaign, the men were ardent and eager, and pressed the French most wickedly. When the enemy began their movement to the rear, they were constrained to hurry the pace of their columns, notwithstanding the cloud of skirmishers which covered their retreat. Lord Wellington came up during the day about half-past three. We continued the pursuit until dark, when we were relieved by the light troops of the 4th division. The half of our brigade [consisting of the 3d battalion Royal Scots, the 1st - 9th and 38th Regiments] came up to Astalitz, where it remained until dusk. The regiment encamped near Carranca. The ground on which we skirmished was so thickly

wooded, and so rugged and uneven, that when we were relieved by the 4th division, and the light companies were ordered to return to their respective regiments, I found myself incapable of further exertion from fatigue and exhaustion, occasioned by six hours of almost continuous skirmishing."

On the 20th, Graham completed his last movement with the left wing of the Allied army, prior to the battle of Vitoria, which was fought on the following day. The French army was posted in front of the town of Vitoria, situated in a plain behind the small river Zadora. The right, under Reille, extending to the northward across the Zadora, rested on some heights above the village of Abechuco and Gamara Mayor, which were protected by field-works. Sir Thomas Graham's column, consisting of nearly 20,000 men, with 18 guns, was directed against Reille, with the object of forcing the Zadora at Gamara Mayor and turning the French right.

"*Journal, 21st June.*—The column, composed of the 1st and 5th divisions, Major-General Anson's brigade of British cavalry, and Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry, moved from Murgua and Vitoriano along the highroad from Bilbao to Vitoria about twelve o'clock; and before approaching the village of Abechuco, the 4th Caçadores of Pack's brigade and the 8th Caçadores of the 5th division moved towards the hills on the left of the road in extended order, against the enemy on

the heights in front of Gamara Mayor. They were supported by two battalions of Pack's brigade, followed by our division and Anson's brigade of cavalry, having their left covered by Longa's division of Spaniards, which moved towards Gamara Menor. Both the villages of Gamara Mayor and Menor are upon the Zadora, which runs through the valley of Vitoria. In this movement I was detached with the light company to cover the right flank of the brigade in ascending the heights. As soon as the enemy was driven from the heights, he retired through Gamara Mayor to the other bank of the Zadora, and our people halted upon the ground from which the enemy had been driven. From this ground the whole valley of the Zadora, upon the left bank of which the enemy was posted, covering Vitoria, was to be seen, and the progress of the battle to be observed.

"While we were halted—waiting, it was said, for orders—the enemy occupied Gamara Mayor in considerable force, placed two guns at the head of the principal entrance into the village, threw a cloud of skirmishers in front amongst the corn-fields, and occupied with six pieces of artillery the heights immediately behind the village on the left bank, which covered the approaches to it in all directions. They showed also heavy masses of infantry close behind, as supports to the troops in the village. About 5 P.M. an order arrived from Lord Wellington to press the enemy in our front. It was the

extreme right of their line; and the lower road, leading to France, by which alone they could retire their artillery and baggage, ran close to Gamara Mayor.

"The left brigade (General Robinson's) moved down in contiguous columns of regiments, the 4th being in the centre, the 59th upon the right, and the 57th upon the left. Our light companies (1st brigade¹) were sent down to extend and cover the right flank of this attack. The regiments, although exposed when they approached the village to a most severe fire of musketry and artillery from behind garden-walls and the houses, which the enemy had occupied, did not take a musket from the shoulder until they carried the village. The enemy brought forward his reserves, and made many desperate efforts to retake the village, but he could not succeed. This was repeated till the bridge became so heaped with dead and wounded that they were rolled over the parapet into the river underneath. Upon the first effort of the enemy to repossess themselves of the village, our light companies were closed to the left upon the 9th, and brought into the village to support the 2d brigade. We were not long in the village before we were ordered to the left, to cover that flank of the village. We moved through and occupied the bank of the river, upon the opposite side of which was the enemy. During our stay the enemy relieved his skirmishers three times. After three hours' hard fighting the enemy retired, leaving

¹ Commanded by Major-General Hay.

his guns in our possession. Crossing the Zadora in pursuit, we proceeded about a league after them, and encamped near Metauco."

Hill had turned the enemy's left, and the attack of the British centre had been crowned with success. Indeed, it was in consequence of some of our cavalry that had reached Vitoria having passed through the town and appeared upon Reille's rear, that the latter was compelled to retire from any further contest with Graham, who was patiently awaiting the development of the other attacks. The battle was won, and the confusion of the enemy great—his movements being seriously impeded owing to the road to Salvatierra and Pampeluna, his only line of retreat, being blocked with carriages and fugitives, the highroad to Bayonne having been previously occupied by Graham. The French carried away only 2 guns, leaving 143 in our possession, and their army was for the moment completely wrecked by the loss of their artillery, ammunition, stores, equipages, treasure, and papers.

On the 23d, Graham was detached with his corps to Guipuscoa, leaving the 5th division at Salvatierra. Thence it marched on the 26th with the 6th division across country to Logroño, with the object of intercepting Clauzel, who, at the head of 14,000 men, had approached Vitoria to succour Joseph. Apprised of his danger—for Wellington had put in motion against him, in addition to the 5th and 6th divisions, two brigades of light cavalry,

and the 3d, 4th, 7th, and light divisions of infantry—Clauzel retreated by forced marches upon Saragossa, and finally fell back upon Jacca. The 5th division had nearly reached La Guardia when it received counter-orders, and returning to within a mile of Vitoria, proceeded along the royal route *via* Montdragon and Tolosa to join Graham, who had in the meanwhile invested San Sebastian.

As a consequence of his successful advance from Portugal, Lord Wellington had shifted his base of operations from Lisbon to Coruña and Santander, so that San Sebastian, situated on the Bay of Biscay, near to the French frontier, had consequently become of primary importance to him, on account of the many advantages its harbour was likely to afford him during his ulterior operations. Unwilling to have two sieges on his hands at the same time, Lord Wellington had decided on blockading the important fortress of Pampeluna with a corps of Spaniards; whilst Graham, with the 1st and 5th divisions of Anglo-Portuguese, prosecuted the siege of San Sebastian—the remainder of the Allied army being employed under his personal direction in covering these operations.

Prior to the battle of Vitoria, San Sebastian had been of no account as a fortress. It was all but dismantled, and had been denuded of many of its guns, required for battering-trains, and for use elsewhere. The day after the battle, the place had been entered by General Emanuel Rey with the escort of the con-

voy that had left Vitoria on the 20th June. Rid-
ding himself of the Spanish emigrant families and
the members of Joseph's Court that had accompanied
the convoy, he sent them to France, and proceeded
to put the place into a state of defence. Foy, in
his retreat along the royal road, had thrown in
a reinforcement, and the garrison was further in-
creased by 300 troops from Gueteria, and by a de-
tachment of gunners from St Jean de Luz, thus
bringing up the numbers to 3000 men. Owing
to the deficiency of British cruisers on the coast, a
strict blockade by sea could not be enforced, so that
French vessels with supplies were enabled to enter
the harbour at night.

San Sebastian is situated on a peninsula, having
the harbour on its southern, and the small river
Urumea on its northern side. It is approached by a
sandy isthmus, defended by a line of works, with a
hornwork in front; and 600 yards in advance of
this work, and near the neck of the isthmus, is a
range of heights, on which stood the convent of San
Bartolomeo, with the suburbs of San Martin at its
foot. In rear of the town is the Monte Orgullo, on
which is situated the castle of La Mota. The
Urumea was fordable at low water, and on its
northern side were some sandhills called Chofres,
along which the road between the suburb of Santa
Catalina and the small port of Passages was con-
ducted over a wooden bridge across the Urumea.
The French had fortified the convent, and connected

it with a redoubt placed on the heights of San Bartolomeo—a second redoubt, formed of casks, having been constructed midway on the road between the convent and the hornwork, as a support to and means of connection with the outwork.

Lord Wellington visited the trenches on the 12th July, and on the following day Sir Thomas Graham undertook the siege with the 5th division, under General Oswald, and with Wilson's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades,—the whole force, inclusive of some seamen from the *Surveillante* frigate, amounting to nearly 10,000 men.

The side towards the Urumea being deemed the weakest, was selected for attack; but as a preliminary to the assault on the body of the place, it was considered necessary to gain possession of the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo, against which two batteries had been constructed on the night of the 10th. On the 14th, Colin Campbell records in his journal that “the gun which had been placed in the battery of the convent was silenced,” and on the 15th, that “an attack was made on the convent by the 4th and 5th Caçadores, to ascertain what number the enemy kept in his works.” This attack was repulsed with great loss.

On the 17th the attack on the convent and redoubt was made in two columns. The right, consisting of a detachment of Portuguese, supported by three companies of the 9th under Lieutenant-Colonel Crawford, with three companies of the Royals in reserve, was

directed by Major-General Hay against the redoubt. A Portuguese detachment, supported by three companies of the 9th under Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, formed the left column, which, under the command of Major-General Bradford, was destined to attack the convent. Colin Campbell with his own, the light company, accompanied the right column. The Portuguese detachments, which respectively led the attack of either column, moved forward so slowly on the signal being given, that the soldiers of the 9th dashed through them ; while those on the left, or Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron's party, pushed forward with such impetuosity, that the garrison, apprehensive of being cut off from the suburbs, abandoned the redoubt. The grenadiers of the 9th perceiving this, assaulted both the convent and the suburbs : the former was carried at once, but the troops that had been driven out of the convent joining those in the suburb, a terrific struggle ensued, the issue of which was doubtful, till the remaining companies of the 9th, which Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron had sent for, came up and drove the French out of the suburb of San Martin. The effect of this tough contest, under the personal leading of Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, who received a severe contusion in the leg, facilitated the capture of the redoubt by the right column with few casualties ; but, excited by its success, that body passed beyond the suburb, contrary to the orders of the divisional commander, and throwing itself against the cask redoubt, was repulsed with serious loss.

In this affair, according to the records of the regiment, the 9th had upwards of 70 officers and soldiers killed and wounded.

Sir Thomas Graham, in his despatch to Lord Wellington of the 18th, after thanking the general officers engaged, adds,—“ But I beg, in justice to the officers, whose gallantry was most conspicuous in leading on their men to overcome the variety of obstacles that were opposed to them, to mention Major Snodgrass, Captain Almeyra, and Lieutenant de Queiros (severely wounded), of the Portuguese service, and Lieutenant Colin Campbell of the 9th Foot.”

It was not till the commencement of 1836 that Sir John Cameron saw, for the first time, Sir Thomas Graham’s despatch. Being naturally surprised and hurt at no mention of the part taken by the left column having been made in it, he wrote to Colin Campbell, and after recounting in detail the gallant behaviour of the 9th in the left attack, he added,— “I had the advantage of a good view of everything that passed from the redoubt to the convent, and I am sure there must have been very few men in the redoubt when you entered it; indeed Crawford told me as much, though I was not able to extract much from him when he came to the convent. At the same time, I must do him the justice to say that he spoke most highly of you, adding that you were the first to enter the redoubt.” Colin Campbell replied as follows: “ You are quite right, my dear Sir John; it was the guns pointed at the redoubt, and the co-oper-

ation of the left attack, that facilitated the possession of that post. The former caused the enemy to leave the ditch before the 9th (three companies) took the lead of Major Snodgrass's people (Portuguese), and the firmness of those in the work itself was shaken by our attack on the left; for when the three companies under Colonel Crawford passed forward as a whole, by Major Snodgrass's desire, the resistance was of a much less effective character than had previously been opposed to Snodgrass's people. Since the receipt of your last letter I have read the report of Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Wellington. It is some twenty odd years since I first saw this report. You are therein represented only as being in support; whereas not only did you lead the left attack all the while, but made it with your own regiment, unassisted by other troops. I can therefore readily enter into your feelings on perusing this despatch."

The entry in the journal on the 17th contains the brief remark—"Convent taken." On the 20th, all the batteries being completed opened on the town. On the 24th the town was on fire, and the journal narrates that the French could be seen feeding the fire near the breach which had been made in the eastern flank wall, and which was considered practicable; but in consequence of the fire, the attack was deferred till the following day.

The storming-party was composed of the 3d battalion of the Royals, destined to storm the great breach; the 38th to assail the lesser breach which

had been made on the 23d to the right of the main breach ; and the 9th, to act in support of the Royals.¹

The assault took place before daylight, and failed. The darkness, the narrowness and the difficulty of the ground to be traversed before the breach was reached, the insufficient destruction of the defences—in short, the neglect of Lord Wellington's instructions, and the deviation from the original plan of the siege, arising from the desire to save time, all contributed to the disaster. The troops reached the breach straggling and without order, and were there met with so destructive a fire that they recoiled ; and notwithstanding the heroic courage of many officers, who endeavoured to rally them, they failed to effect a lodgment. All further efforts became hopeless, and the storm-

¹ In reference to the order of attack, Colin Campbell, who delighted in honouring the memory of his former chief, narrated the following anecdote, in the presence of the writer of these pages, to Sir John Cameron's eldest son, the present General Sir Duncan Cameron, G.C.B., when that officer, in command of the 42d Highlanders, joined the Highland Brigade in Turkey in the spring of 1854, and first made the acquaintance of his father's old subaltern :—

Sir John Cameron having established the character of a rigid disciplinarian, as well as of an intrepid regimental leader, of which he had furnished frequent proofs during the previous Peninsular campaigns, had earned for himself amongst the soldiers of the 5th division the *sobriquet* of "the Devil." When it became known to them that the assault was to be made right in front with the Royals leading, and not left in front with the 9th leading, they gave vent to their disappointment by remarking, in their plain but expressive language, that they wished it had been left in front, and "the Devil" to lead them. "That, sir," remarked Colin Campbell, when subsequently recounting this anecdote to another friend, "was a compliment of which any man might be proud, and which I should prefer to the most elaborate epitaph on my tombstone."

ing-party abandoned the attempt, having suffered serious loss.

This day's work is represented in Colin Campbell's journal by the single word "Storm!" but there fortunately exists a letter from him, of the 10th April 1836, to Sir John Cameron, in which he gives a detailed account of his share in the assault.

"I did not," he says, "accompany my friend Harry Jones of the Engineers on the 25th July. I was placed in the centre of the Royals with twenty men of our light company, having the light company of the Royals as my immediate support and under my orders. I was accompanied also by a party with ladders, under Lieutenant Machel of the Engineers, with orders, on reaching the crest of the breach, to turn to and gain the ramparts on the left, proceeding on to the demi-bastion, from thence along the curtain to the high work in the centre of the main front, and therein establish ourselves.

"It was dark, as you know, when ordered to advance. All before me went willingly enough forward, but in a very straggling order, arising, in the first instance, from the order of formation previous to attack, in being extended the whole length of the parallel in a front of fours, which it (the parallel) would admit of by packing when halted, but was not of sufficient width for troops to maintain that front when in movement. We thus debouched from the mouth of the opening made from the parallel, which was not quite so wide as the latter, in twos

and threes. The space we had to traverse between this opening and the breach—some three hundred yards—was very rough, and broken by large pieces of rocks, which the falling tide had left wet and exceedingly slippery, sufficient in itself to have loosened and disordered an original dense formation ; and the heavy and uninterrupted fire to which they were opposed in the advance, increased this evil,—these different causes combining to make our advance look more like one of individuals than that of a well-organised and disciplined military body.

“ On arriving within some thirty or forty yards of the demi-bastion on the left of the main front, I found a check. There appeared to be a crowd of some two hundred men immediately before me, opposite the front of this work—those in front of this body returning a fire directed at them from the parapet above, and which was sweeping them down in great numbers, and also from an intrenchment which the enemy had thrown across the main ditch, about a yard or two retired from the opening into it. I observed at the same time a heavy firing at the breach ; and as the larger portion of the right wing appeared to be collected, as I have described, opposite the demi-bastion, it was very manifest that those who had gone forward to the breach were not only weak in numbers for the struggle they had to encounter, but it was apparent they were also unsupported. I endeavoured with the head of my detachment to aid some of their own officers in urg-

ing and pushing forward this halted body. They had commenced firing, and there was no moving them. Failing in this, I proposed to Lieutenant Clarke, who was in command of the light company of the Royals, to lead past the right of these people, in the hope that, seeing us passing them, they might possibly cease firing and follow. I had scarcely made this proposition when this fine young man was killed; and several of my own (9th) detachment, as also many of the light company Royals, were here killed and wounded. In passing this body with the few of my own people and most of the light company Royals, some might have come away, but the bulk remained. Their halting there (opposite the demi-bastion) thus formed a sort of stopping-place between the trenches and the breach, as the men came forward from the former on their way to the latter. I think this important step originated with those men who had kept close to the retaining-wall of the hornwork in their advance, and who, on arriving at the opening into the main ditch, mistook it in the dark and in their ignorance for the main breach, and imagined it to be an opening through which they might find or force a way into the place; but on meeting with resistance from the defence thrown across the ditch, they returned the fire of the enemy, and thus offered an object for those who followed to halt and gather upon. In going along the base of the wall between the salient of the demi-bastion and the breach, the enemy threw over quantities of hand-

grenades, which, with musketry-fire from the side of the nearest round tower looking on the line on which we advanced, killed and wounded a good many. On arriving at the breach, I observed the whole lower parts thickly strewed with killed and wounded. There were a few individual officers and men spread on the face of the breach, but nothing more. These were cheering, and gallantly opposing themselves to the close and destructive fire directed at them from the round tower and other defences on each flank of the breach, and to a profusion of hand-grenades which were constantly rolling down. In going up I passed Jones of the Engineers, who was wounded; and on gaining the top I was shot through the right hip, and tumbled to the bottom. The breach, though quite accessible, was steep, particularly towards the top, so that all those who were struck on the upper part of it rolled down, as in my own case, to the bottom. Finding, on rising up, that I was not disabled from moving, and observing two officers of the Royals, who were exerting themselves to lead some of their men from under the line-wall near to the breach, I went to assist their endeavours, and again went up the breach with them, when I was shot through the inside part of the left thigh. . . .

“A good deal of firing was kept up by our un-wounded men from the bottom of the breach during the period of which I have been giving an account.

“About the time of my receiving my second hit,

Captain Archimbeau of the Royals arrived near the bottom of the breach, bringing with him some eighty or ninety men, cheering and encouraging them forward in a very brave manner through all the interruptions that were offered to his advance by the explosion of the many hand-grenades that were dropped upon them from the top of the wall, and the wounded men retiring in the line of his advance (the narrow space between the river and the bottom of the wall). Seeing, however, that whatever previous efforts had been made had been unsuccessful—that there was no body of men nor support near to him, while all the defences of and around the breach were fully occupied and alive with fire, and the party with him quite unequal in itself,—seeing, also, the many discouraging circumstances under which the attempt would have to be made, of forcing its way through such opposition,—he ordered his party to retire, receiving, when speaking to me, a shot which broke his arm. I came back with him and his party, and on my way met the 38th, whose advance became interrupted by the wounded and others of the Royals returning. As you were at the head of the 9th pressing forward among the 38th, and necessarily saw our return to the trenches, I here bring my relation to a close.

“I was then of opinion—and, if you recollect, so expressed myself to you on your visiting me in my tent after our return to camp—that one main cause of failure was the narrow front and consequent

length and thinness of the column in which we advanced. This necessarily became more loosened and disjointed by the difficult nature of the ground it had to pass over in the dark—a disadvantage which the heavy fire it was exposed to in that advance augmented—so that it reached the breach in dribblets, and never in such body or number as to give the mind of the soldier anything like confidence of success, or such as would be in the least likely to shake the firmness of the defenders.

“ If some means had been devised, just before the attack took place, of placing the Royals in one big honest lump, somewhere near to the extremity of the parallel, which might have been contrived without much difficulty or danger, and have started them in some such dense form with the 38th along the parallel, well packed up in a front of fours, their right close up to the Royals, and in readiness to start forward immediately after them, the stoppage opposite the demi-bastion would never have occurred, and some two hundred men at least of the Royals would have reached the breach in a compact body, and in the first instance; and as the breach was quite practicable, such a number would have forced bodily through all opposition. Even under all the disadvantages of the original bad arrangement and disposition of the Royals, and all the difficulties I have enumerated as having been encountered by them in their advance, I firmly and sincerely believe that, if they had moved forward in daylight, when

the officer could have seen and been seen by his men, and when the example of the former would have animated the exertions of the latter, the Royals would have gone up and over the breach in the line-wall of San Sebastian on the 25th July; for, as I have stated, it was perfectly feasible."

Lord Wellington, on hearing of the failure of the attack on San Sebastian, proceeded thither, and finding a lack of ammunition and other means of attack, he directed Sir Thomas Graham to suspend the siege, which was momentarily turned into a blockade.

Marshal Soult, who, on Joseph's defeat, had been appointed the Emperor's lieutenant, had in the meanwhile reorganised the French forces, and made a vigorous effort to relieve Pampeluna and San Sebastian by a combined attack on the position held by the Allies in the lower Pyrenees. The attempt proving unsuccessful, Graham was enabled to resume the siege of San Sebastian, the former attacks being renewed from the same points with a greater number of guns.

In the meanwhile, Colin Campbell had again been mentioned by Sir Thomas Graham in his despatch to Lord Wellington reporting the assault on San Sebastian, dated 25th July, and in the following terms: "I beg to recommend to your lordship Lieutenant Campbell of the 9th, who led the forlorn-hope, and who was severely wounded in the breach."

Notwithstanding his wounds, Colin Campbell continued his journal, though at uncertain intervals. No

mention is made of the second and successful assault, which was delivered on the 31st August; but he notes the fact of the French, who on the capture of the town had withdrawn into the castle of La Mota, asking for terms on their surrender, and the marching out of the garrison on the 9th September—"the English bands playing and a salute being fired as soon as they cleared the town, when the Spanish flag was hoisted on the castle ;" further remarking, "that all their guns were unserviceable, though there were plenty of provisions remaining."

Until Pampeluna had fallen, Lord Wellington did not attempt any offensive operation on a large scale. Preparatory, however, to his projected invasion of the south of France, he was anxious to push his left wing across the Bidasoa, so as to secure the descent of the Allied forces into France, whenever the time for the general advance should arrive. The French held a strong range of heights on the right bank of the Bidasoa, extending to the sea, the key of which was a steep mountain called La Rhune, opposite the pass of Vera. From this position Lord Wellington determined to dislodge them.

On the 24th September the 5th division marched, and encamped near Oyarzun. His wounds being still unhealed, Colin Campbell was left behind at San Sebastian. There is no entry in his journal between that date and the 6th October, on which day he rejoined his regiment. Hearing of the likelihood of an engagement with the enemy, he had left

San Sebastian, accompanied by a brother officer, who had also been wounded, and, like himself, not discharged from hospital. By dint of crawling and an occasional lift from commissariat and other vehicles proceeding along the road, they made their way to the 5th division, and were in action the following day. The entry on the 6th, which terminates abruptly, is the last entry in Colin Campbell's Peninsular journal. He records the midnight march of the 5th division to Fuenterabia, which it reached a little before daybreak, and concealed itself behind the banks of the Bidassoa until about 7 A.M., when a bugle from the steeple at Fuenterabia gave the signal to advance. The troops forded the river at low water; and the 5th division, advancing left in front, made straight for the strong heights of the Croix des Bouquets, which was the key of the right of the French position, and which was carried by a vehement rush and charge of the 9th, headed by the gallant Cameron. The operations on the side of Vera were equally successful, and Lord Wellington's object was accomplished. The loss of the 9th was heavy; and Colin Campbell, who commanded the light and leading company, was again badly wounded.

The breach of discipline he and his comrade had committed in leaving hospital before being discharged, did not escape the notice of their commanding officer. Colonel Cameron administered to them a severe reprimand, giving them to understand that their offence would not have been passed over so

lightly but for the good example they had set the men of their companies in the action of the 7th.

Although his name remained on the returns of the 9th Regiment until the following January, Colin Campbell did no duty with it after the 7th October, in consequence of his wound, from which he was long in recovering, and the effects of which caused him much subsequent inconvenience.

On the 9th November 1813 he was promoted to a company, without purchase, in the 60th Regiment.

CHAPTER II.

RETURNS TO ENGLAND—ATTEMPT TO JOIN SIR THOMAS GRAHAM IN HOLLAND—PROCEEDS TO NOVA SCOTIA—INVALIDED—GIBRALTAR—TRANSFERRED TO 21ST FUSILIERS—WEST INDIES—STAFF APPOINTMENT—SIR B. D'URBAN—PROMOTION AND RETURN TO ENGLAND—IRELAND—PURCHASE OF UNATTACHED LIEUTENANT-COLONELCY—ANTWERP—OPERATIONS AGAINST THAT PLACE—ENDEAVOURS TO RETURN TO FULL PAY—APPOINTED TO 98TH REGIMENT—SYSTEM OF COMMAND—CHARACTER AS COMMANDING OFFICER.

In December 1813, Colin Campbell returned to England, bringing with him a letter to the Horse Guards from Major-General Hay, “under whose immediate eye he had been during the last campaign,” recommending him “as a most gallant and meritorious young officer.”

Obtaining leave of absence, he found a home with his uncle, Colonel Campbell, during which period he appeared before a medical board in support of his claim to a pension for the wounds he had received at San Sebastian and the Bidassoa,—the result being that he was granted a temporary pension of £100 per annum—a substantial addition to the slender pay of a regimental officer, upon which alone he had hitherto had to depend.

Whilst he was on leave, Colonel Campbell had applied to Sir Thomas Graham for an appointment for his nephew on the staff of the expeditionary corps which had been sent under the command of his former chief to Holland, for the purpose of co-operating with the Allies in their attempt to liberate that country from the French. This application elicited from Sir Thomas Graham the following reply, proving the continued interest he took in young Campbell, to whose services, as has been seen, he had already accorded his public acknowledgments :

“HEADQUARTERS, GROOT HUNDORST,¹
25th February 1814.

“DEAR COLONEL,—In the hurry of business I forgot to answer your letter at first, and as the staff of the army was entirely filled up before I got the command, I wished to have had something to offer your nephew before I wrote. However, as I have no doubt of being able to provide for him soon, I have written to General Calvert to ask his Royal Highness’s leave for him to join this corps immediately; and you had better send him up to town, that he may himself apply at the Horse Guards to know the Duke’s determination. Should it not be favourable, it would then be of consequence to get his exchange into the Royals effected without loss of time, as I expect the 4th battalion to arrive im-

¹ Sir Thomas Graham was at this moment engaged in his preparations for the assault on the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, which was delivered on the 8th March 1814, and resulted in a disastrous failure.

mediately, and he would then join it as a matter of course.

“You may assure his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent that in my opinion no better officer could be brought into the Royal Scots.—I remain very faithfully and obediently yours,

“THOMAS GRAHAM.”

The authorities did not accede to this request, and Sir Thomas Graham conveyed their decision to Captain Campbell in terms which must have mitigated in some degree the young officer’s natural disappointment. Writing from Calmhaut on the 16th March 1814, he says :—

“I am sorry to tell you that my application to the Commander-in-chief for your having leave from the 7th battalion 60th, in order to hold a staff situation, has failed of success. The Adjutant-General writes to me that the service for which this battalion is destined will not admit of your being employed with me.

“The only chance there is now, therefore, would be your being able to effect an exchange into the Royals, or any other regiment. His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent is so desirous of bringing officers of distinguished merit into the Royal Scots, that I should hope your exchange would meet with his approbation ; and you may confidently refer to my warmest testimony in your favour, should you think

that such a recommendation would be useful to you on this occasion."

That Colin Campbell did think so, and that he took advantage of his old chief's kind offer, is apparent from the following certificate, found with his papers :

" HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, 25th July 1814.

" I hereby certify that Captain Colin Campbell, then Lieutenant of the 9th Foot, under my command, behaved with the utmost gallantry and intrepidity at the storming of the convent redoubt in advance of San Sebastian, and afterwards at the assault of that fortress, on both which occasions he was severely wounded ; in the action near Irun, at the forcing of the enemy from their strong and intrenched position on the Bidasoa, on the 7th October 1813, not three months from the date of the attack of the convent redoubt above mentioned.

" LYNEDOCH,
Commander of the Forces.

" To all concerned."

This certificate was accompanied by the following letter :—

" BRUSSELS, 25th July 1814.

" DEAR CAMPBELL,—I received yours of the 9th inst. and the 27th June only by the last mail. As no one can deserve better to be rewarded for his exertions, I have great satisfaction in sending you

annexed a certificate which I hope may be useful to you.—I remain faithfully yours,

“LYNEDOCH.”

Seeing no longer any hope of serving under Lord Lynedoch's command, Colin Campbell applied, with his uncle's sanction, for permission to join his regiment. The 7th battalion 60th Regiment, to which he was posted, had been raised in the previous autumn from the German prisoners of war in England, and was already serving in Nova Scotia, where a considerable force had been collected under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, in consequence of the hostilities that had broken out between Great Britain and the United States. Captain Campbell joined his battalion in October 1814, by which time the operations conducted against the Americans on the Penobscot, in the State of Maine, had been concluded. He did not remain many months in Nova Scotia, his health having suffered from his wounds to such an extent as to incapacitate him for the performance of his duties. He left Halifax at the end of July 1815, and in the following January appeared before a medical board in London for the purpose of obtaining a renewal of his pension. This was granted; and having been recommended to make use of natural warm baths in a southern climate, Colin Campbell proceeded to the south of France. As this treatment produced some improvement in his condition,

the continuance of a residence in a moderately warm climate was again prescribed towards the close of 1816, as the best means of insuring his complete restoration to health. It was during this period that Colin Campbell seized the opportunity of Paris being occupied by the Allies to pay a visit to that city.

On the expiration of his leave, Captain Campbell joined at Gibraltar the 5th battalion of the 60th, with which corps he remained till November 1818, when his battalion having been named for reduction, he was removed to the 21st Royal North British Fusiliers, serving at home. Prior to this transfer he appears to have memorialised the Duke of York—with what object, his papers do not show, but probably with the view of securing a continuance of employment on full pay—and to have supported his prayer with certificates from Sir John Cameron and Sir John Macdonald, then Deputy Adjutant-General, Horse Guards. Allusion is made to these certificates, which speak of him “as a most deserving officer, and an acquisition to any regiment,” merely to remove a popular fallacy that prevailed in later years, and according to which Colin Campbell was represented as an unknown and friendless officer up to a late period of his service; whereas it will have been seen that in early days he had won for himself powerful friends, through whom his merits must have been perfectly well known at headquarters.

In April 1819, Captain Campbell followed the 21st Fusiliers, which had embarked the month previously,

to Barbadoes, where he found himself under the command of Lord Combermere. Lord Lynedoch, ever constant to his young friend, wrote to him on the 20th April as follows :—

“ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,—I am sorry not to have seen you before your departure. I send you a note of introduction to Lord Combermere, in which I have spoken of you as, I think, you deserve. As people are apt to think we attend more to private recommendations from friends on the other side of the Tweed than to real merit, I trust, in justice both to yourself and me, that you will take an opportunity of assuring Lord Combermere that you never had any other recommendation to me than your own good conduct while under my command.—With best wishes, believe me ever faithfully yours,

“ LYNEDOCH.”

The next seven years, from 1819 to 1826, were passed by Colin Campbell in the West Indies—the first portion of the time at Barbadoes, whence seven companies of his regiment proceeded in 1821 to Demerara, in which colony he was appointed to act in the double capacity of aide-de-camp and brigade-major to General Murray, governor and commander of the forces. Though suffering from frequent attacks of fever and ague, the seeds of which had been contracted at Walcheren, Colin Campbell’s naturally vigorous constitution enabled him, notwithstanding

frequent trouble from his wounds, not only to bear up against a tropical climate, but to enjoy the pleasant society which, prior to the abolition of slavery, was to be met with in our West Indian colonies. His means at this period, augmented by his pay as a staff officer, were so easy as to render him careless about taking the necessary steps for the renewal of the pension which had been temporarily granted to him, and which consequently lapsed in the year 1821. Years afterwards he was wont to reproach himself for this neglect of his interests, in throwing away the chance of securing an annuity which, in his subsequent straitened circumstances, would have been of great value to him.

General Murray was succeeded in command of the troops in Demerara by Major-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban,¹ an accomplished soldier in every sense of the word, who had earned for himself well-merited fame in the Peninsular campaigns, throughout which he had served with high command in the Portuguese contingent of the Allied army. Between him and his brigade-major there forthwith sprang up an intimacy which soon ripened into mutual esteem and affection,

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban, originally a cavalry officer, and who had served on the staff in Ireland, attained his reputation as a distinguished leader of cavalry of the Portuguese contingent in the Peninsula. At the close of the war he was appointed Deputy Quartermaster-General in Ireland. He held the command in the Windward and Leeward Islands from 1825 to 1833, whence he was transferred to the Cape of Good Hope as governor and commander-in-chief. He afterwards commanded the troops in the West Indies, and died commanding the forces in Canada in 1849.

rendering Colin Campbell's position as a staff officer exceedingly agreeable. In his own regiment, as also in the society of the colony, he formed several endearing friendships, of which ample proof is afforded by repeated allusions to them in terms of warm affection in his later journals. Amongst his comrades of the 21st Regiment, the names of Doherty¹ and Sutherland are of the most frequent recurrence.

Thus the time slipped by till he was promoted, by purchase, to a majority in his regiment in November 1825. To make up the sum which it was necessary for him to contribute towards the furtherance of this object, Colin Campbell was indebted to the spontaneous liberality of a friend in the colony, who assisted him with a loan of £600, in addition to which he borrowed a sum of £200 from his agents. Being without means, and having taken upon himself, since he had attained the rank of captain, the obligation of assisting his father with an annual payment of between £30 and £40, the incurring of such a heavy liability, to be still further increased by the expense of a field officer's outfit, may appear at first sight a rash proceeding, and not warranted by his circumstances. On the other hand, the promotion was of the greatest professional importance to him, and may be regarded as the turning-point of his

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir R. Doherty was appointed captain in the 21st Foot in 1818, and became a lieutenant-colonel unattached in 1826. He was appointed to the 3d West India Regiment in 1838, and two years later was nominated lieutenant-governor of St Vincent. He became a major-general in 1858, and died in September 1862.

career. There remained the alternative of seeing younger men, more favoured by fortune, pass over his head, or of throwing up the service in disgust with the blankness of his prospects—to seek, as so many others similarly situated have done, an opening in some different line of life. Happily, Colin Campbell, actuated by an ardent love of his profession, and, it may be, prompted by the consciousness that he had that in him which he could turn to good account should the opportunity offer, elected to brave the apparent imprudence of the step he was about to take, feeling quite at ease, so far as his kind benefactor was concerned, as to the liquidation of the loan which had been so considerably imposed upon him.

His promotion required him to vacate his staff appointment, and leave the chief who had become so endeared to him. On his quitting the colony, Sir Benjamin D'Urban issued a valedictory order expressive of “the high opinion he held of Major Campbell's zeal, ability, and unceasing diligence in the performance of the duties of his office;” and as a further proof of his general's estimate of him, Colin Campbell was the bearer of the accompanying letter to Sir Herbert Taylor, the Military Secretary, which he presented to that officer on his arrival at home:—

“ *Private.*

“ KING'S HOUSE, DEMERARA,
23d January 1826.

“ MY DEAR TAYLOR,—This will be delivered to you by Major Campbell of the 21st Fusiliers, who is

desirous of expressing to you his thanks for all your kindness in his regard, and of asking you when it may be most proper for him to lay his humble gratitude for his promotion at the feet of his Royal Highness.

"He has now been seven years in the West Indies (five of them in this country) without quitting his post, and he has of late suffered so severely from periodical returns of the fever peculiar to Guiana, that if he had not been so fortunate as to be promoted now, he must have come home for a time on leave of absence, or his constitution would have been irrevocably injured. He will therefore now join the depot, where he will be very useful.

"I have already given you my opinion of this officer so fully, that it is unnecessary for me to add anything to it, except to say that he has continued to the end of the chapter a most attentive, zealous, and valuable staff officer, and has been of great assistance to me in this extensive district, where all the duties of an assistant adjutant-general have devolved upon him, and where he has, besides, performed many others beyond those of his immediate post.

"I recommend him to your countenance and protection.

"Major Campbell can give you an accurate account (and one on which you may rely) of all our proceedings here—of our health, discipline, and actual state in all regards.

"God bless you, my dear Taylor.—I am ever yours faithfully and affectionately,

"B. D'URBAN."

Major Campbell, on his arrival home, joined the depot of his regiment — anticipating by twelve months the return of the service companies, which reached England from St Vincent and Grenada in the winter of 1826-27, and were forthwith moved to Windsor, where the regiment remained till the spring of 1828.

His appearance may be gathered from a portrait of him taken in his uniform at this period. A profusion of curly brown hair, a well-shaped mouth, and a wide brow, already foreshadowing the deep lines which became so marked a feature of his countenance in later years, convey the idea of manliness and vigour. His height was about five feet nine, his frame well knit and powerful; and but that his shoulders were too broad for his height, his figure was that of a symmetrically-made man. To an agreeable presence he added the charm of engaging manners, which, according to the testimony of those who were familiar with him at this period, rendered him popular either at the dinner-table or in the drawing-room.

Whilst quartered at Windsor, he was an occasional guest at the house of the late Dr Keate, the well-known head-master of Eton, who also was a Canon of Windsor. It was at the table of this gentleman's

Eton house that the following circumstance, so characteristic of the subject of this biography as to deserve mention in it, occurred. A fellow-guest, aware of Colin Campbell's service in the Peninsula, somewhat bluntly, and in not very good taste, asked him how he felt when he led the forlorn-hope at San Sebastian. "Very much, sir, as if I should get my company if I succeeded," was the reply, which, it is hardly necessary to add, put an end to any further interrogation on that subject.

On leaving Windsor, the 21st Regiment proceeded to Portsmouth, and from thence to Bath. In the October following, it embarked from Bristol for Waterford, whence it marched to Fermoy. In June 1829 the regiment moved to Mullingar, and remained in Ireland till September 1831, when it was suddenly ordered from Dublin to England in consequence of the burning of Nottingham Castle. On reaching England it proceeded to Weedon. During his service in Ireland, Major Campbell was frequently employed in aiding the civil power to recover, by means of ejections and sales under military protection, the payment of tithes—a duty repugnant to his feelings, but one which he performed with such discretion as to elicit the approbation of his superiors.

Seeing no prospect of a vacancy in his own corps, he had, before leaving Ireland, made an effort to obtain promotion by the purchase of an unattached lieutenant-colonelcy; and with this object he had

solicited the good offices of Sir John Byng,¹ commanding the forces in Ireland, through the medium of Major-General Sir Edward Blakeney,² at that time in command of the Dublin district.

It can easily be imagined, from what has been stated regarding the purchase of his majority, that Colin Campbell was unable to contribute anything from his own means towards the sum necessary to be lodged for the attainment of this step. The deficiency, however, was made good through the kindness of a relation on his mother's side. Still, when the money was ready, the lieutenant-colonelcy was not forthcoming. He had to exercise his patience a little longer. From Weedon his regiment proceeded to Chatham in 1832, and from thence Colin Campbell again addressed Sir John Byng on the subject of the lieutenant-colonelcy. Sir John Byng considered it unnecessary to send him any letter of recommendation to the General commanding-in-chief, as he had himself "on more than one occasion written to the Horse Guards in high terms of approval of him." He expressed a strong opinion of his competency to command—recalling to Campbell's recollection the fact of his having been "frequently placed in command of troops upon some important occasions;" and adding, "that the two major-generals in whose districts he had served in Ireland had frequently reported very favourably of his conduct."

¹ Afterwards General Lord Strafford, G.C.B.

² The late Field-Marshal Sir Edward Blakeney, G.C.B.

In the meantime, Colin Campbell, hearing of a probable vacancy in the 65th Regiment, had applied for the lieutenant-colonelcy of that corps ; but Lord Fitzroy Somerset informed him that, “though Lord Hill was perfectly aware of his merits as an officer, and would be happy to have the means of recommending him for the purchase of promotion, he could not undertake to say that he would be able to select him for the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 65th Regiment.”

The spring and summer of 1832 passed without bringing the much-desired promotion ; but on the 5th October of that year, a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset reached him, conveying the notification that on his lodging £1300 in the hands of his agents, Lord Hill would submit his name to the King for the purchase of an unattached lieutenant-colonelcy. The money was duly lodged, and his promotion appeared in the ‘Gazette’ of the 26th of the same month. “Thus,” to use his own words, “making a period of nearly twenty-five years on full pay—viz., upwards of five years as a subaltern, nearly thirteen as captain, and seven as major.”

Anxious to employ his time and satisfy his active and energetic temperament, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell cast about for something to do, and the occasion shortly presented itself. Belgium, which, during the period of Imperial supremacy, had been absorbed into France, had passed, under the provisions of the treaty of 1814, from the dominion of that country to the rule

of the Netherlands ; but in September 1830, having risen in revolt against Dutch authority, she had been raised, under the protection of the great Powers, to the status of an independent kingdom, the crown of which was offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who became the first King of the Belgians. The citadel of Antwerp, however, which was garrisoned by a Dutch force under General Chassé, still held out ; and France, in agreement with the other protecting Powers, had sent a force under Marshal Gerard to assist the Belgians in reducing this important stronghold, which commanded the navigation of the Scheldt, and enabled the communications with Holland to remain free.

Colin Campbell determined to watch the operations ; and having obtained leave of absence, proceeded to Antwerp, where he found a party of English officers assembled for the same purpose. From this date he recommenced his journal. He kept separate memoranda of the siege, from which he compiled reports for the authorities at the Horse Guards ; but having lost them, he transcribed in his journal a letter addressed to his former general, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and sent from Marburg in Hesse Cassel on the 22d January 1833.

This letter, in which a minute description is given of the operations of the French from the beginning to the end of what he terms "this most extraordinary siege," though very interesting, is too long for reproduction, entering, as it does, into details of a tech-

nical character, which might weary any but the professional reader.

The great disparity between the besiegers and the besieged was one of the striking features of the contest. Indeed, the odds with which the Dutch had to contend were enormous. To hold the citadel and its immediate outworks on the right bank of the river, as well as three forts on the left bank—for all the other defences had been obliged to be abandoned at the outbreak of the revolution—"the brave old Chassé" could not muster more than 4500 men, supplemented by thirteen gunboats under the command of an energetic sailor named Kaufmann, by means of which the communication between the citadel and its principal outworks was maintained. The French force, composed of selected regiments of all arms under the command of Marshal Gerard, with General St Cyr as chief of his staff, amounted to not less than 73,000 men, and was further supported by the whole of the Belgian army. The French broke ground on the 29th November, and on the 4th December 1832 opened fire. Colin Campbell thus describes the scene: "The day was calm and still, and the sight beautifully grand, and never to be forgotten. The citadel was not slow in returning the fire; but in metal and number of guns the attack was overwhelmingly superior, and so manifestly so, that one common feeling of admiration was excited in all lookers-on at the intrepidity of the Dutch artillery in standing to and working their guns under the

storm of iron which was pouring upon them. A young French officer of cavalry standing close to me could not help expressing openly and warmly his admiration of the conduct of the Dutch artillery, observing, at the same time, that he viewed the position of a simple soldier in the citadel as more to be envied than that of Marshal Gerard ; for the latter could gain little honour in the capture of the citadel with the army and means placed at his disposal for that purpose—whereas the little garrison, by conducting itself bravely, carried with it the admiration and sympathy of the world.”

“ Chassé’s defence was very obstinate,” and “ Gerard,” Colin Campbell remarks, “ was disappointed in his expectations of early success in mastering the place. The Dutch repaired in the night the injuries done to their works during the day, opening their fire with renewed animation ; and so to the end of the siege did the brave Dutch artillery conduct itself, its fire diminishing as the siege approached to a conclusion, but never being silenced. From the moment the French gained the open ground, where the heads of their approaches could be seen from the citadel, until the end of the siege, every gabion they attempted to place in daylight was instantly knocked down by the Dutch artillery. They were obliged to do all their work by night—it was done by the flying sap—and the day was devoted to widening and improving the work of the previous night.” On the

occasion of the French capturing the lunette, which they had previously mined, fifty-eight of the Dutch fell into their hands. “I saw the prisoners,” Colin Campbell continues, “next morning, and to my great astonishment I found them to be a parcel of mere boys. Forty of the number had never shaved. The French were not proud of their prisoners, and evidently annoyed with the length of time they had devoted to the capture of a work occupied by such people.”

After a vigorous defence against an overwhelming attack, Chassé, on the 23d December, desired to capitulate, terms being agreed upon in the course of the day. “I was admitted,” Colin Campbell remarks, “into the citadel two days afterwards. No language can convey an idea of the picture of desolation which the interior exhibited. Every building destroyed, and the whole interior ploughed up in every direction with shot and shell. . . . The garrison, except the artillery, were wholly composed of young soldiers. Three-fourths of the whole were under twenty-two, and had not been in the service above two and three years—a great many a much shorter time. The defence was honourable to the garrison and the national character. With a garrison composed entirely of old soldiers, the defence, which had been of a passive character, might have been much more active and the operations of the French longer retarded; but having seen the terrific fire to which

these young people had been exposed for eighteen days and nights, and which they bravely and manfully faced, their conduct deserves all honour and praise.

“The officer commanding the little squadron of gunboats in the river, Captain Kaufmann, a true sailor and warrior, would not allow himself or his people to be included in the capitulation. With the six gunboats lying in the river, he attempted to pass down with the evening’s tide on the night of the 23d December. Unfortunately the moon was at the full, and only one boat succeeded in passing the Belgian batteries. The remainder returned to their anchoring ground. The crews threw their guns overboard, scuttled the vessels, and landed at the Tête de Flandres. Those boats which had passed into the inundation in front of the Tête de Flandres were set fire to and burned. All were destroyed with their colours flying at the masthead. As the navy had supplied the citadel and forts with flags, Kaufmann took possession of them all and burned them, to prevent their becoming a trophy to the enemy.

“To have been present at,” he concludes, “and to have witnessed the operations of a siege commenced and carried on *en règle* to the crowning the crest of the glacis and the establishment of the breaching and counter batteries thereon, and the descent of the ditch completed, has given me great satisfaction. The French army entered Belgium to

clear the Belgian territory of the Dutch occupation of the fortified places on the Scheldt. The object of the expedition remains uncompleted. The Dutch still hold Lillo and Leitkenhoek, which cannot be attacked, as the country for miles round both places has been placed under water.

“Every French officer with whom I spoke ridiculed the idea of the alliance between our countries continuing beyond the moment. They compared it to a quadrille, the figure of which required that we should join hands for an instant, but at the conclusion of which we should resume our natural and ancient positions of *des vis-à-vis*.”

Immediately after the capitulation of the citadel of Antwerp, Colin Campbell proceeded to Marburg, in Hesse Cassel, which he had visited in 1828 and 1829 when on leave of absence from the 21st Regiment. At this period he kept a journal of his daily proceedings, in which he records frequent returns of his old enemy fever and ague. He mixed freely in German society, his object being to acquire a knowledge of the German language, and to combine with this economy of expenditure. On the 5th March he records “the anniversary of the battle of Barrosa fought in 1811, the return of a day which always brings pleasing recollections.” From Marburg he proceeded to Dusseldorf, and thence to Bonn, where he appears to have spent a most enjoyable time in the society of intimate friends, making excursions to the places of interest, and “in July,” he records, “to

the right bank of the Rhine, to see the inspection of eleven batteries of artillery by Prince August, brother to the King of Prussia. He was most civil to me, and I had the honour to dine with him. I made acquaintance with Colonel von Kurzel of the 7th Uhlans, and the greater number of his officers, who messed at the Klotz, where I dined when not engaged. I shall always recollect with pleasure my stay in this neighbourhood. ‘Ich werde es nimmer vergessen.’”

“*Journal, October 11th.*—I had all my things packed up and in readiness to start for Marburg, there to pass my winter; for although I had made a little progress in reading German without the aid of a master during my stay at Bonn, still, having spoken nothing but French and English while there, I was anxious to get back to a place where I should have little opportunity of conversing except in German, and I hoped before the spring to have made progress sufficient to enable me to understand, if not to speak, with some facility. Whilst all these intentions were determined upon, arrived a very kind letter from —— of the 5th October, mentioning that he had that morning been at the Horse Guards, and had seen ——, who had begged him to say to me that if I could possibly make it convenient to come over shortly to England, I would in all probability serve myself essentially by doing so—that two or three occasions had arisen on which my name had been mentioned, and in all likelihood I would have been

employed had I happened to be on the spot. He did not exactly mean on full pay as lieutenant-colonel of a regiment, which must come nevertheless by-and-by, but on particular service, which, though temporary, helps to keep a man under the eyes of the public and men in office : such, for instance, as the other day—within this week, in fact—when six officers were suddenly thought necessary to be sent to the Portuguese frontier to watch the movements of the Spanish troops ; but it was requisite to make out their appointments all within forty-eight hours. I was wanted, but —— was forced to report that I was out of reach. This communication overthrew all my quiet arrangements which I had been contemplating to make during the winter, and I joyfully prepared to leave the following evening for England."

He accordingly started for England in company with the Reverend Wm. Jacobson,¹ who had been spending the long vacation at Bonn, and between whom and Colin Campbell an acquaintance, originally commenced in 1827 at that place, had ripened into affectionate intimacy, enduring through life.

"*Journal, October 25th.*—Saw Lord Hill. Received me very kindly. Thanked me for the reports sent to him from Antwerp ; told me that he was desirous of serving me ; that he would keep me in view and recollection."

¹ Afterwards Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, and now Bishop of Chester.

"October 29th.—Saw Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who received me very kindly ; shook hands with me, and thanked me for my reports from Antwerp. Remained in town until November 20th. During my stay dined frequently with my old friend and chief, Sir Benjamin D'Urban. He spoke to Lord Hill respecting me, as also to Sir John Macdonald, the Adjutant-General. The latter, when I waited upon him, was very civil to me." The remainder of this year was spent in visits to his relations the Coninghams and the family of Mr Clutterbuck, whose wife was a sister of Mrs R. Coningham, at Watford.

The year 1834 found Colin Campbell still unemployed. After paying a visit to Portsmouth and the neighbourhood, where, in the house of Admiral O'maney, he met his intimate friends William and John Barrow, he proceeded in April to join some other friends in Holland, visiting Leyden and Utrecht, a full description of both of which places he gives in his journal. At intervals he suffered from his old enemy fever and ague. The month of May he passed in London. At this time his spirits were depressed by the weariness of waiting for an opportunity of being brought on full pay, and he thus gives vent to his feelings : "During this month I dined frequently with my kind friends the Gledstanes, Robinsons, Cavans, and others. However grateful to one's feelings to have such kindness shown to me, it is not sufficient to satisfy me in my dependent position ;

and although they are most kind to me at the Horse Guards, still, their opportunities of obliging and serving me in my position and with my rank occur so rarely, that it is almost a hopeless case to indulge in the belief that they can employ me without paying the difference, which I have not to give. I was offered this month, in a most flattering manner, the 62d, upon paying the difference. It was most graciously made." All this time he was sending money to Islay for the support of his father; and as he had found it necessary to increase the annual amount, it must have made it a hard matter for him to meet his own expenses with the slender means of a lieutenant-colonel on half-pay.

In June he went to Oxford, "to pay a visit to his friend Jacobson, and to be present at the installation of the Duke of Wellington as Chancellor." In June he makes the following entry : "10th.—Dined with Mrs — ; a ball in the evening. There were two or three Poles and some Frenchmen, all adventurers, undistinguished by talent or even personal appearance, and all evidently in search of women with money. One of the number, a Pole of the name of — , a general of the age of fifty at least, paid marked attention to a young girl, daughter of — , about seventeen, having been induced to believe that she was possessed of considerable wealth. So overcharged with vanity was he, that he swallowed the bait; and as I did not dance, I was highly entertained by following the movements of this wily and

penniless adventurer, who, to conclude the farce, left the room before the party broke up, because one of his countrymen came there in the suite of some London guests of Mrs ——, who, he said, was not a Count, as he had represented himself to be, but had only been a *sous-officier* in the Polish service, from which he had been discharged for misconduct. What a commentary upon this appetite of our countrywomen for patronising foreigners !”

Towards the end of July his hopes of employment were raised, only to be dashed, by an unsolicited attempt on the part of a friend to obtain for him a vacancy expected in the 36th Regiment. “From the 26th July,” he records in his journal, “to the 1st August, the day upon which we became aware that the regiment would be offered to Spink, and that, in case of his refusal, there were many others, older lieutenant-colonels than myself, whom Lord Fitzroy deemed as having, from their standing, much more just pretension than myself, I was full of anxiety, as I had been indeed for the previous five or six weeks, for I had never been of opinion that they would have found a candidate to give the difference; and as I always believed that it would eventually be given without, I was always indulging and encouraging the hope that, through — and the favour of Lord Fitzroy, I might possibly be the fortunate person. It was very foolish of an old fellow like me to be giving way to such hopes, aware as I was that there were two hundred candidates before me upon the list.

I was much touched by the friendly and anxious interest displayed by some of my friends.

“*Friday, 22d.*—Dined with ——; a pleasant and agreeable evening. In passing to his house we met some officers of the Fusilier Guards. The dress reminded me of the sacrifice I had made in giving up my regiment for the unattached, and I gave utterance to these feelings. He recommended me to consider all that had occurred as for the best—that sooner or later something would turn up to compensate me for all my disappointments. I hope he may prove a true prophet.” A few days later, hearing that another opportunity of being provided for in the 76th Regiment had occurred without his name being brought forward, he thus gives vent to his disappointment: “I feel quite at a loss what to be about, or how to act. My means are wholly inadequate for London. I feel that it would be unwise and impolitic to absent myself from the occasional presence of the authorities, and I have not the means without assistance—considerable assistance—of proceeding to the Rhine.

“*Saturday, 27th September.*—Heard of the death of the governor of Sierra Leone. Applied to Lord Fitzroy Somerset by note to be considered a candidate for the appointment. The note in reply was most kind and flattering, assigning reasons for declining to recommend me, which I could not but approve.”

Lord Fitzroy Somerset’s answer was couched in

the following terms : “ I cannot reconcile myself to the idea of your going to Sierra Leone. The situation of the governor is a very arduous one, and is very ill paid ; and however long you may retain it, there is no chance of your gaining credit in the administration of the government, nor would you forward your professional views. I would therefore recommend you to abandon the notion of asking for such employment.” On the 3d October he “ saw Lord Fitzroy Somerset at his levee. He was very civil, and said he would like to see me with a red coat on again.”

Hope deferred had, in Colin Campbell’s case, made the heart sick, for on the 11th October the following entry occurs in his journal : “ It is exactly twelve months since I was called back to England from Germany, with a view to my employment with others on a particular service in Spain. It afterwards became unnecessary to send us ; and here have I been lingering on from week to week, and month to month, in the expectation and belief that some opening would offer which would enable them to employ me, always a prisoner to London or its immediate neighbourhood. It has been a sickening time to me ; and what makes it more disagreeable is the little appearance, even after twelve months of misery, of such a termination as would be satisfactory.” His patience required to be exercised for some months longer. In the meantime, he paid a visit to Cambridge, and was present at two lectures

delivered by Whewell and Sedgwick. Returning thence to London, his time was spent amongst his friends, as he describes it, "doing nothing and expecting nothing. Cavan and Gledstanes very kind to me. I can never forget the conduct of good Mr Gledstanes."

In January 1835 he was tempted, out of good-nature to a friend who was seriously embarrassed, to put his name, in conjunction with another, to a bill for six months for £412. That doing so was contrary to his principles and repugnant to his feelings, is evidenced by the comments he makes upon it in his journal. "I did that for him which I had never done, and most assuredly never shall again, except it were for ——, who is never likely to require such a proof of my friendship." As no further allusion is made to this matter, it may be assumed that he was relieved in due course of the liability to which he had lent himself.

Hearing, in February, that his old regiment the 9th was about to proceed to India, which would necessitate the appointment of a second lieutenant-colonel, Colin Campbell, in deference to the wishes and opinions of others, wrote to Sir John Cameron to beg him to recommend him for it. His old commanding officer complied with his request, informing him that "he thought he [Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell] stood a good chance of succeeding, though, under the present circumstances of the army, there must no doubt be claims of long standing."

In March he was “still in London, living on very scanty hopes of employment.” On the 16th he proceeded to Chatham, where the depots of his old corps, the 9th and 21st, were quartered. The former “paid him the compliment of asking him twice to dinner; and he was a frequent guest at the table of Sir Leonard Greenwell, the general officer in command, where he met numerous old comrades and friends. On the 1st April he “left Chatham for town, having passed a most agreeable fortnight with his old friend Sutherland.”

The remainder of the month of April he spent in town. “*Journal, Saturday, 25th.*—Rode —’s horse to Rosehill [the residence of Mr R. Coningham], followed by — in the coach. He announced, with the sanction of Lord Hill, the intention of appointing me to the 9th, and, at the same time, apprised me of the intention of offering to remove me to the 98th.¹ *Monday, 27th April.*—Wrote — a note, expressing my grateful acknowledgments for the great favour for which I was destined. The note was sent to Lord F., who was out of town, and returned with the following remark on the outside, ‘I wish he were not going so far off.’

“*Journal, May 1835.*—An eventful month. Sent for on the — by Lord Fitzroy. Found him with

¹ The service companies of this regiment, which was raised in 1823 at Chichester by Colonel (afterwards Lieutenant-General) Mildmay Fane, the old 98th having been reduced after the peace, were at this time stationed at the Cape of Good Hope.

Sir John Macdonald. He asked me if I had thought of this exchange. I told his lordship that at my age (forty-two), with the prospect of retaining my activity for a few years longer, I was free to confess that the command of a regiment in England for the next four or five years, and the certainty of employment in case of a European war, together with the chance of distinction to be gained therein, would be preferred by me to the mere acquisition of money in India ; but that I could not conceal from his lordship my apprehension respecting the probability of the reduction of the 98th, and my further dread that his lordship might not be in the way to pick me again off the highway, as he had so kindly done a few days ago. He declared that he knew nothing of any intended reduction, and Sir J. Macdonald observed that I could always fall back upon an Indian regiment ; but Lord Fitzroy remarked that would not be the 9th, in which I had been brought up. I was desired to give it a couple of days' consideration, and decide upon it.

“ In India for four or five years, say seven years absent from home, I had the prospect of laying by £5000 ; but then I must be confident of health, which I could not be—my old, miserable Demerara fever would certainly return, and permanently too, after a short stay in Bengal. The inconvenience” (arising from one of the wounds received at San Sebastian) “ would be perpetual, and my life would be miserable. I therefore determined to accept the

proposal of a removal to the 98th, which would give me five years of home service, a good deal of trouble in managing a home regiment, but the great likelihood of the preservation and enjoyment of the little health which has been left to me. In addition to all these reasons, there came to confirm, though not to influence me, my own inclinations. I hope I shall have decided for the best. In every case, I hope it will prove eventually for my own happiness. Beyond the desire to be independent of all pecuniary relief, I care not one straw for money, nor its accumulation.

“Gazetted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the gallant and good old 9th Regiment on the 8th May 1835, in which I had received my first commission on the 26th May 1808, and in which I served until promoted to a company in the 60th Regiment on the 9th November 1813.

“Purchased several good books for my barrack-room, such as Napier, Jones, and had an excellent telescope given me.”

Sir John Cameron was one of the first to offer him his congratulations. Writing from Devonport on the 11th May, he says, “It has given me real pleasure to know from you that you have succeeded in your application for the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 9th Regiment, an appointment which I was happy to see confirmed in the last ‘Gazette.’ I congratulate you most sincerely on the event, which I am very sure will be hailed with satisfaction by the corps in which

you so early distinguished yourself. Your old friend Seward will rejoice at your return, and I believe he is the only one now with it of whom you can have any recollection." A few days later, when he heard of Colin Campbell's transfer to the 98th, Sir John Cameron expressed his disappointment as follows : "I am truly sorry that you should have to exchange from the 9th Regiment, having hailed your return to it as an event which would, I was very sure, give great satisfaction to that corps. I am sure they will one and all feel the disappointment as much as I do: better had it not been gazetted at all, than that you should have had to leave us again. At the same time, you could not have done otherwise, considering the friendly manner in which Lord Fitzroy has acted towards you. The depot of the 98th is in this garrison, in good order, and commanded by a very intelligent officer, Major le Marchant,¹ son of the late general of that name killed at Salamanca."

As the service companies of the 98th Regiment had nearly completed their period of foreign service, it was not considered necessary to send Colin Campbell to the Cape of Good Hope. Leave of absence was granted him to remain at home pending the return of his battalion. Before leaving London for a trip to the Rhine, he records in his journal the settlement of an affair between Mr Sterling, the celebrated writer in the 'Times,' and Mr Roebuck, at that time representing Bath. "I could not," he

¹ The late General Sir J. Gaspard le Marchant, K.C.B., G.C.M.G.

says, “avoid or escape compliance with any request from Mr Sterling, but it was with aversion and dislike that I mixed myself up with disputes and quarrels in my position as commanding officer of a corps, and still more so with persons hotly engaged in political controversies, from which a soldier ought to keep as far aloof as he would from treason.”

His appointment to the command of a regiment appears to have exercised a most soothing influence on his spirits, for he characterises the “month passed on the Continent as one full of happiness and great enjoyment.”

Early in 1836, Colonel Campbell was elected a member of the United Service Club. “My debts and embarrassments,” he records, “indisposed me to entering it;” but an intimate friend insisted on his taking up his election, and by advancing the entrance-subscription, enabled him to do so. In accordance with the scrupulous feelings in regard to money matters which were characteristic of him throughout life, he immediately repaid half the amount. In the early days of his connection with the United Service Club, a circumstance occurred in which, rising superior to the narrow feelings of prejudice, he exercised his privilege as a member in a matter affecting the interests of certain officers of the East India Company’s military service. It having come to his knowledge that an attempt would be made at an approaching ballot to black-ball some candidate or candidates, for no other reason than because they

belonged to the Company's army, Colin Campbell, whose sense of justice revolted at such a proceeding, hastened to London, at some cost and inconvenience to himself, to support the election. It is believed that his efforts proved successful.

It was at this period that he first became acquainted with Captain Henry Eyre,¹ then commanding the depot of the 98th Regiment, and commenced a friendship which, though interrupted, as will be seen hereafter, by long intervals of absence, ripened into an intimacy of the most affectionate and enduring character. As soon as he knew that he was to have the 98th Regiment, Colin Campbell wrote to Eyre; and when the latter visited London, the Colonel sought him out, never missing a day whilst he was there without questioning Eyre regarding the minutest details, and evincing extraordinary interest in every matter connected with the depot and regiment. Already, though he had never seen an individual belonging to the corps except Captain Eyre, his attention seemed to be engrossed in it, and his inquiries were endless. No day passed, whilst Eyre was within his reach, without Colin Campbell going to the former "to be drilled," as he called it; and thus they became the greatest friends. When Eyre returned to the depot, Colin Campbell wrote to him almost daily. Nothing connected with the regiment seemed unworthy of his attention. Even at this early period of their acquaintance, Eyre felt that in its new

¹ Now General and Colonel of the 58th Regiment.

commanding officer the 98th had obtained a soldier of no ordinary ability; and he then formed the opinion that Colin Campbell was endowed with a military capacity which would not fail to develop itself more fully, should he be placed in higher command, where the exercise of tactical and even strategical skill would be required. Eyre often expressed to his brother officers this view of Colin Campbell's powers, in which opinion he was warmly supported by Sir Charles Napier, long before any opportunity had occurred of showing what Campbell's qualities as a leader were.

At this time it was undecided by the authorities whether or not Colonel Campbell should proceed to the Cape to join the service companies of his regiment. Several times he was under orders to do so, but on each occasion was countermanded, the result being that he remained at home on leave till the 98th returned to England in two divisions, when he joined the depot at Portsmouth during the summer of 1837. He then finally assumed command.

Having attained, in the command of a regiment, the object of his professional ambition, Campbell at once put in practice the principles on which he had been trained in the 9th Regiment. These were a part of the legacy of Sir John Moore to the British army. In the camp at Shorncliffe Sir John had introduced a system of instruction and interior economy, such as had produced in the regiments serving under his command an excellence, which had borne the test of trial

in the varied phases of the great Peninsular struggle, and had left a permanent mark on the service at large. The existing regulations of the army are founded on the principle of Sir John Moore's system; and it is not too much to assert that any body of British troops, instructed and commanded in like manner, will assuredly produce the same rich return for the care bestowed upon them, as did the noble regiments which had the good fortune to be trained under the hero of Coruña at Shorncliffe. Their traditions and *esprit de corps* survive to this hour, a fitting tribute to the memory of that accomplished soldier. There was no secret in his method. The officers were instructed, and shared their duties, with the soldiers; and, by the development of the company system, under which the captains and subalterns were brought into intimate relations with the non-commissioned officers and privates, a knowledge of each other was obtained, and a feeling of confidence engendered between the several ranks, which, far from producing familiarity, had the effect of creating an interest on the part of the officer in the soldier, and of calling forth a responsive and willing obedience from the latter, who soon learned to look upon his officer as the protector of his interests and his best friend. Crime was neither concealed nor magnified; every indulgence was extended to the steady and well-conducted soldier—the youngster who might have heedlessly given way to temptation being gently chided, and earnestly

warned of the consequences of a persistence in irregular habits, whilst the habitual offender was duly visited with the just penalty of his misdeeds.

Colin Campbell had good material to work upon. The four-company depot, according to the testimony of Sir John Cameron, no mean judge, was in excellent order; and the service companies, which had returned home in charge of Major Gregory,¹ a good, conscientious officer, had not been tried by the climate at the Cape of Good Hope. Liquor, however, was cheap there—the result being the presence in the ranks of some hard drinkers, whose example was naturally prejudicial to the young soldiers. On representing this evil to the authorities, Colin Campbell was granted special facilities for their discharge.

Stern in rebuke—for with the temperament natural to his Highland blood he was prone to anger when occasion stirred it—he was, on the other hand, gentle, nay indulgent, towards all such as manifested anxiety in the performance of their duties. Nor did he make any difference between ranks. Setting himself an example of punctuality and strictness with regard to his own duties, he exacted from his officers a like discharge of theirs in all that concerned the instruction, wellbeing, and conduct of the subordinate ranks. Though no doubt there were occasions on which, from an excess of zeal, he was apt somewhat

¹ Succeeded Colin Campbell in command of the 98th Regiment, and died on his way home from India in 1848.

to overstrain the machinery, of which he was the moving principle, yet he succeeded in establishing and maintaining such feeling and *esprit de corps* in all ranks, as made both officers and soldiers happy and proud of serving under his command. His endeavour was to make the 98th a sound, well-instructed, and serviceable regiment, such as any corps will be, commanded by an officer of energy and judgment in strict conformity with the regulations. How far he was successful in this object, the reader will judge for himself.

Frugal in his habits by nature and the force of circumstances, he laid great stress on the observance of economy in the officers' mess, believing that a well-ordered establishment of this kind is the best index of a good regiment. For this reason he determined not to sanction the use of any wine but port and sherry; the introduction of other wines he viewed as extravagance, and he set himself against any expenditure which he considered incommensurate with the means of his officers. Regarding the mess as one of the principal levers of discipline, Colin Campbell made a rule of attending it, even when the frequent return of his fever and ague rendered late dinners a physical discomfort to him. Cramped in his means, he denied himself many little comforts in order that he might have the wherewithal to return hospitality, and be able to set an example to his brother officers in the punctual discharge of his mess liabilities. His intercourse with his officers off

duty was unrestrained and of the most friendly character. He sympathised with them in their occupations and sports, and though the instruction and discipline of the regiment were carried on with great strictness, the best feeling pervaded all ranks, so that everything was done in good-humour.

CHAPTER III.

CONDUCT OF REGIMENT ON THE MARCH—INTRODUCTION TO SIR CHARLES NAPIER—NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE—CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING CHARTIST MOVEMENT — SUCCESS IN MAINTENANCE OF ORDER—CONDUCT APPROVED BY THE AUTHORITIES—CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIR CHARLES NAPIER—VISIT OF COLONEL BOOTH, 43D REGIMENT—INSPECTION OF REGIMENT—PRESENTATION OF COLOURS—SIR C. NAPIER'S ADDRESS—98TH MOVES TO IRELAND —UNDER ORDERS FOR THE MAURITIUS—EMBARKS FOR CHINA —CROWDED STATE OF VESSEL—OPERATIONS UP THE YANG-TSI-KIANG — TREATY OF NANKING — SICKNESS AND MORTALITY IN REGIMENT—98TH STATIONED AT HONG-KONG—LETTER REGARDING LOOT.

FROM Portsmouth the 98th proceeded in the ordinary tour of duty to Weedon, and from thence to Manchester, whence it moved to Hull. In the long marches which were made before the introduction of railways, the discipline of a regiment was severely tested. An officer who took part in them thus records his recollections : “One thing I may say, that the 98th Regiment was in such a high state of discipline in these marches through the length and breadth of the land, that none of those occurrences which have since been the subject of complaint took place. Day after day I have seen the regiment turn out without a

man missing ; and the drunkenness was very trifling, considering how popular the army then was, and how liberally the men were treated to liquor. The fact was, Colin Campbell appealed to the reason and feelings of the men, and made it a point of honour with them to be present and sober in their billets at tattoo, and at morning parade for the march. He could invite, as well as compel, obedience.”¹

In July 1839 the 98th Regiment was ordered from Hull to Newcastle-on-Tyne. For some time previous, the state of the manufacturing populations in the north of England had been a cause of anxiety to the Government; and what was termed the Chartist movement was, to all appearances, paving the way for insurrection, when the command of the northern district was conferred on Sir Charles Napier, who at the beginning of April of that year succeeded Sir Richard Jackson at Nottingham. Sir Charles Napier and Colin Campbell were at this time personally unacquainted. Official correspondence had passed between them for some little time before they met, and had enabled them, to some extent, to form an estimate of each other’s qualities. Their first meeting, however, as related by Colin Campbell to the writer of these pages, was so characteristic of Sir Charles Napier, and so complimentary to the former, as to demand notice. It, moreover, formed an important epoch in Campbell’s career. From that moment he conceived an esteem and respect for the noble soldier,

¹ Notes by General Sir E. Haythorne, K.C.B.

under whose command he had been so fortunate as to find himself placed, which speedily developed into a feeling of affectionate regard, wellnigh amounting to veneration ; for Colin Campbell, the most sensitive of men in all matters affecting his professional reputation, was deeply moved and honoured by the confidence which Sir Charles Napier, ever disposed to encourage zeal and military talent in a subordinate, forthwith extended to him.

The 98th, as has been said, had been ordered from Hull to Newcastle-on-Tyne, and was marching in three divisions. The headquarters had reached York on a Saturday, and were halted for the Sunday, as is the custom of the service, in that town, where accommodation had been provided in billets. Sir Charles Napier, who happened to be returning from a tour of inspection in the northern part of his district, arrived by the coach at noon, and descended, in his ordinary travelling-dress, at the inn, where dinner was provided for the passengers, and in which Colin Campbell was billeted. Seeing a bugler of the 98th at the door, he inquired if the commanding officer was inside, and on being told he was, at once introduced himself. Looking at his watch, and remarking that the coach stopped so many minutes, the appointed time, for dinner, he asked if it would be possible to collect the men under arms before the coach resumed its journey. Without any hesitation Colin Campbell replied in the affirmative, remarking that the billets were pretty handy,

and that it was just the hour when the officers would be visiting the men at their dinners. The “assembly” was sounded ; and as the men were being collected and formed up in front of the inn, Sir Charles Napier invited him to partake of the meal, cross-questioning Colin Campbell the while on various points connected with the interior economy of the regiment. He then inspected the troops ; and on finishing the last company, just as the horses were put to, he mounted the box, remarking, “That’s what I call inspecting a regiment.” It was what some commanding officers might term sharp practice, but it was a satisfactory test of the discipline and order, which Colin Campbell had perfected in the 98th Regiment.

No sooner had he arrived at Newcastle than he was brought into contact with the magistrates, owners of collieries, and many of the county gentlemen, who, in their apprehension of a rising of the Chartist, fell back upon him for assistance in the maintenance of order. In his dealings with these gentlemen he evinced much sober judgment, satisfying himself by personal observation of the real state of affairs, reasoning with such as were anxious to proceed to extremities, in the hope of putting an end to the prevailing anxiety, and reassuring the faint-hearted, in such a manner as speedily gained the confidence of all. He attended many of the Chartist meetings, and soon discovered that the movement included a large proportion of supporters who advocated moral rather than physical arguments for the attainment of

their objects—the result being that the local authorities were quick to recognise in the officer commanding the 98th Regiment a man who, notwithstanding that he held decided opinions of his own, could be depended upon in an emergency; and if, prior to his coming among them, they had entertained doubts and apprehension, such feelings were allayed, if not dispelled, after a short experience of Colonel Campbell and his mode of action. Above all, he was aided by unqualified support from Sir Charles Napier.

Having received an application from the magistrates of Durham for military assistance, Campbell sent a detachment thither, and in reporting the circumstance to Sir Charles Napier, thus unfolded his views of the situation. Writing on the 13th July, he says: “While expressing great apprehension and alarm of a general outbreak taking place among the pitmen and other workmen, the different gentlemen with whom I have communicated since my arrival here have admitted that a very large proportion of their people, considerably more than one-half, would prefer to remain quietly at their work, and aloof (if they could manage to do so with safety to themselves) from the meetings and other proceedings, in which they at present take part, and which they are induced to join from intimidation alone. I scarcely think a combination of this character can be made to break out generally and simultaneously, as the magistrates and other gentlemen of the town and neighbourhood seem to apprehend. I have been told, also, that the

delegates from the convention, as it is termed, have been trying all sorts of means to persuade the pitmen to destroy the machinery in the collieries. I do not find that an instance has occurred of this advice having been followed: they have sense enough to know that it would only be the occasion of depriving themselves and their families of the means of subsistence. From the quiet and orderly behaviour of the people whilst attending the demonstration meetings, which have taken place in town every night during the last week, and from what has been told me of the conduct of the people in the county districts, I am induced to believe that they have no idea themselves that they can obtain anything by force, and that they have no serious intention of trying it; but seeing, as they do, the state of alarm into which their masters and the authorities are thrown by their demonstrations, they continue them, I suspect, in hopes of extorting from their fears that which they have sense enough to know they cannot obtain by violence. The alarmed bearing of the magistrates, and others with whom I have communicated, has helped to confirm me in this opinion; for it invariably occurs, when I ask of these people for positive proof of anything, that I am answered by rumours, not by facts. The people are now aware that their petition, which was presented by Mr Atwood, has been rejected; and if nothing takes place in the course of the coming week in consequence of this disappointment, I am in great hopes that the excitement,

which has been kept up so long, and has been so active hitherto, will then gradually subside."

Sir Charles Napier unreservedly approved of the detachment being sent to Durham, and in his reply on the 17th July, tells Colin Campbell, "All you have done is right; but if the detachment remains at Durham, the magistrates must furnish a barrack with everything requisite for the men, and this barrack must be so situated that the communication with the country can be maintained,—that is to say, it must be in the suburb: *(town)* ^{oBarrack}, just in that manner. It must also be perfectly comfortable for the soldiers, and the officers' quarters attached to it. Under these conditions I can allow the detachment to remain for the present; but unless these conditions be complied with, you must inform the magistrates that I must positively order the detachment back to Newcastle. I will not leave troops in billets. Read this to them. I will let you have your men from the Isle of Man" (a company of the 98th was detached there) "when I can, but just now we are in a ferment at Manchester and its neighbourhood. The magistrates think I have two millions of soldiers! . . . Does it never come into their heads that they have constables, and may have special constables? However, I hope that your detachment has ere this returned to you from Durham."

The steadiness and good-humour of the soldiers, when so bitterly harassed by the incessant duties demanded of them, in consequence of the Chartist

movement, were beyond praise. This was due to the discipline established by Colin Campbell. Though he was satisfied from his own observations that the agitation amongst the pitmen and others would not culminate in a breach of the peace, he made every preparation for meeting such a contingency. The regiment was instructed in street-firing; and all such manœuvres as might require to be executed in the event of the troops being called upon to act, were diligently practised. The soldiers were impressed with the conviction that their commanding officer was not a man to be trifled with in the contemplated emergency; and, so far from allowing themselves to be tampered with, they let it be understood in their intercourse with the inhabitants that they were thoroughly loyal, and ready to obey any command they might receive from their officers. On one occasion the 98th cleared Sandgate, a well-known street in Newcastle, by coming to the charge, without actually using the bayonet. On another, the Chartist seized a small drummer-boy of the regiment, and putting him at the head of one of their processions, constrained him to beat a drum. At once the cry arose that the soldiers had joined the mob, and, at a late hour, up came a magistrate in hot haste to the barracks with his story. Colin Campbell immediately replied, "I will show you what the soldiers think, even though it be in the middle of the night." Directing the bugler to sound two of the company calls, followed by the

“assembly,” he took his friend to the barrack-room door. In five minutes the soldiers streamed out, fully armed and accoutred, and giving vent to loud imprecations, to which Colin Campbell directed the magistrate’s attention, especially to the observation of one soldier—a north-countryman too—who signified in homely language “his willingness to stick his own grandmother if she were out.”¹

Colin Campbell’s prognostications proved true: no rising took place, and after many weeks of doubt and anxiety, the excitement calmed down, men’s minds were reassured, and the district resumed its ordinary state of tranquillity. His conduct during this trying time did not fail to elicit the approbation of the authorities. On the 6th July, Mr Phillipps, the Under-Secretary of the Home Office, addressed him as follows: “Lord John Russell has directed me to express to you the satisfaction he has received from the report of the magistrates at Newcastle-upon-Tyne of the prompt and valuable services, which you have constantly rendered them since the commencement of their intercourse with you. Lord John Russell has not failed to make known to Lord Hill the testimony borne by the magistrates to your valuable services, and Lord John Russell requests you will accept his best thanks for your exertions, and for the zeal manifested by you in supporting the civil authorities, and in the preservation of the public peace.”

Two days later he received the following letter

¹ Notes by General Sir E. Haythorne, K.C.B.

from Sir Charles Napier : “ I have great pleasure in communicating to you the approbation of the Commander-in-chief and the Home Secretary, and I will not deprive you of their words, but will send you the originals. This I do through the Adjutant-General, as I do not imagine you would enjoy them the more for paying 10s. or 12s. postage ! I thank myself very much for putting you where you are, and it shall not be my fault if any senior officer supersedes you.” The enclosure, from Lord Fitzroy Somerset, conveyed Lord Hill’s satisfaction in knowing “ that his conduct had met with the unqualified approbation of her Majesty’s Government.” This was followed on the 24th August by a resolution of the county magistrates, tendering their acknowledgment of the cordial and efficient manner, in which he and the troops under his command had co-operated with the civil power in the preservation of the public peace.

Ever vigilant in his protection of the soldier’s interests, and prompt in securing for him the full measure of his rights, Colin Campbell was equally careful of the health of his men. With this object in view he saved them, as far as he could, from all unnecessary duty in the way of guards, diminishing any sentries that he did not consider absolutely necessary for the protection of public property or the general requirements of the service. His endeavour to carry out this principle in the Isle of Man, where a party of the 98th was about to relieve a detachment of the same corps stationed there, gave

rise to a correspondence which produced the following characteristic letter from the humorous pen of Sir Charles Napier :—

“ NOTTINGHAM, 7th September 1839.

“ I think you had better send a company of the same strength to the Isle of Man, as that which it relieves, unless Captain Wallace (98th) can show good cause why we should send more than fifty-six. I am out of all patience with the Governor for having a sentry at his door, and will give him a strong hint that either the sentry or the servant must be given up. Glory or convenience must go to the wall ! I am not aware that a Governor of the Isle of Man has any right to a servant. However, right or no right, we must give the detachment less duty ; for it never did, and never will do, to give men hard duty without occasion. I see no need of a sentry over the Governor, nor of one over the jail. We have a jail here : I allow no guard or sentry to it. Let the civil power make their jail strong ; and as to the castle, why should it have a sentry ? Some one lives in it, and let the inhabitant take care of his house. I see no need of any sentries but the one at the barracks, and I beg you will ask Captain Wallace to tell me what can be urged in favour of the Governor’s ‘ sentrification.’ Wallace, if I may judge of his letter, with a beautiful sketch he sent me—and for which I beg you will thank him—is a sensible man and a good soldier, and if he says any

one of the three sentries is necessary, I will admit of it; but he must give me his reasons. . . . However, as —— is Governor, he must be dealt cautiously with, or he might prove too strong for me, and keep his sentries; so I will write to the Horse Guards to know his powers in this particular. Ask Wallace if there be any need of soldiers at all in that great kingdom? I feel half inclined to take the detachment away altogether! I should think an old cannon of Queen Elizabeth's time and an invalid bombardier would be quite enough to regulate the price of potatoes and all other garrison duties. Seriously, though, let Wallace give me his opinion in writing, through you, whether a detachment is needed or not, and what civil force there is—I mean constables. There seems to be a rage now for having soldiers everywhere, to the great disparagement of our discipline. I shall look for your answer and Wallace's opinion with impatience.

“P.S.—If —— has a daughter, and Wallace has any *tendresse* for the Princess of Man, and thinks of standing sentry himself, of course you must not tell him how lightly I talk of that great kingdom !!!”

On the 20th September the Mayor of Newcastle, Sir John Fife, in forwarding some resolutions of a complimentary character, in acknowledgment of the services rendered by Colonel Campbell and the officers and soldiers under his command, addressed him as follows: “The time having now arrived when the

civil power seems, by itself, enabled to enforce the law, and to afford protection to life and property, my brother magistrates and I feel desirous of expressing to you our gratitude for your services during the recent period of disorder and tumult, when by your promptitude, and the admirable conduct of the officers and men under your command, we were so effectually supported in our efforts to vindicate the authority of the law. It is not only to you as the commanding officer of the garrison that we now offer our thanks, but we must ever gratefully remember the alacrity with which you attended our meetings for the purpose of organising the constabulary force, the important assistance you afforded, and the unwearied vigilance with which you watched night after night, for many weeks, those arrangements which we jointly made to secure the peace of the town."

The opinion Sir Charles Napier had formed of the 98th Regiment may be inferred from the subjoined extract of a letter, written in reply to a desire expressed by Colin Campbell of proceeding with Major Eyre on leave of absence into Norfolk, and in which Sir Charles Napier refers to their first meeting at York :—

“ NOTTINGHAM, 4th October 1839.

“ The colliers at Poynton in Cheshire are obstrep-
erous, and may possibly delay my inspections longer
than I wish, which is to begin them directly—i.e.,

about the 10th, which would bring me to you about the 20th, I suppose. Now, perhaps your best way would be to be off with Major Eyre at once. Send me your formal application for leave to whatever time you want it, and I will write to you in Norfolk a few days before I reach Newcastle, so that you can meet me there for the inspection, and go back to your sport the day after, for 'tis a pity to lose this fine month. You know that it is not the three manœuvres and a half, all smartly got up for inspection, that shows the state of a regiment: my inspection of the 98th was made when I asked you to a *tête-à-tête* dinner at York! When I know the commanding officer I know the regiment, and the contrary. Gregory's detachment at Sunderland told me what he is. So now, if you like, you and Eyre may be off; or if you like it better to wait, you may reckon upon me about the 25th at furthest, barring accidents."

He did not take advantage of the offer to proceed at once, for on the 14th November Sir Charles Napier wrote to him again on the same subject: "You may go when you please, but with the understanding that in case of alarm you must get back to Newcastle in double-quick. The sooner you go the better, for I doubt our being much longer quiet. I am not afraid of the temporary command being with either Gregory or Eyre, because they are soldiers. If I did not think so, I could not let you

stir. You have the reins in hand, and that is everything—the work of prevention being, in my opinion, our chief affair. It is fear *for* them, not *of* them, that gives anxiety. I hope they will profit by the lesson at Newport. God knows! meetings are going on, and trade everywhere declining, so that hundreds are out of work, and the winter rapidly coming on. Round Birmingham the arming continues, Thorn tells me, with illegal secret meetings bound by oaths. These things don't look well. . . . I advise you not to wait for —, but be off and take your sport while we are quiet. Just as I was writing the word 'quiet,' in came post and brought me the enclosed from the King of Man. You see he is a diplomatist. I asked him plump to take off the sentry at his own gate and that on the prison, but you perceive he don't say a word about this armed Mordecai sitting at the king's gate. There are funny fellows in this world. Let me have the letter back, and tell me what sentries are taken off and what left on. He refers to you, because I said that you were anxious as well as myself on this point. Present my compliments to your officers. I said all I could about Gavin in my confidential report, and copied your own words about Gregory and Eyre. It is no use for a man to have good soldiers under his orders if he does not push to make them known. I wish I had the power to serve them better. Unfortunately, one must take the displeasure of punishing without the means of rewarding."

The resolutions of the local authorities, in acknowledgment of Colin Campbell's services during the Chartist agitation, were no idle compliment, accompanied, as they were, by numerous offers of hospitality and proffers of friendship towards him. Notwithstanding his being unmarried, and that he had passed the greater portion of his career in the hut and the barrack, so that social intercourse in its domestic sense was in a great measure unknown to him, he eagerly availed himself of these introductions to the county families, thoroughly enjoying the visits to their houses, and the relief which these afforded him from the monotony of barrack-life. His lively and agreeable conversation, as well as his conspicuously delicate and refined manners, especially towards women, made him a remarkable favourite with ladies both young and old. Children were his especial delight, and amongst the families with whom he was most intimate he numbered many sweethearts of tender age. At no period of his career was he happier; and during the subsequent portion of his life, he was wont to express himself to that effect. Indeed everything tended to make him so. He was proud of his regiment, considered his officers second to none, was honoured by the confidence and good opinion of his general, and could not but be flattered by the manner in which his society was courted by the gentry of the county and town, amongst whom he found several old comrades and friends, with whom he enjoyed much

pleasurable intercourse, and with whom he fought many of the battles of his early days over again. Nor was his brief sojourn in the north without some romance in it, the recollection of which was a frequent source of pleasure to him in after-years. The popularity he had acquired for himself was extended to his officers, who experienced similar hospitality ; and that the 98th left an agreeable and enduring impression behind it, is proved by the hearty welcome again proffered to all ranks by the town and county when, after a lapse of twenty-eight years, it found itself quartered again at Newcastle, under the command of an officer¹ who had originally joined the regiment under Colin Campbell at that place.

Being very anxious to have the detachment of the 98th brought back from the Isle of Man, Colin Campbell suggested to his friend Lieutenant-Colonel Freeth, Assistant Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards, the desirability of its being accommodated in Tynemouth Castle. The reference of this request to Sir Charles Napier produced from him the following letter, which was found amongst Colin Campbell's papers :—

“ 1st March 1840.

“ Pray tell Campbell he has no conscience. I am daily fighting battles with the cavalry for keeping two headquarters at Leeds to preserve the command

¹ Major-General Peyton.

for him at Newcastle [Colin Campbell was junior to the officers commanding these cavalry regiments], and now he growls about his company at the Isle of Man ! Ask him to tell me where I am to put the 33d depot ? Disposable ! Yes, it would be so, as far as I know. But the thing I want to know is, where is it to be disposed ? Two depots are already jammed up at Hull ; and though patience and spittle, they say, will do wonderful feats, they cannot shove a third depot into Hull ! These colonels of regiments think I can raise barracks at pleasure, that I have the wonderful lamp of Aladdin ! There are — and — ready to eat me because they must go into Leeds together ; but they must, nevertheless, for I want to keep Campbell at Newcastle. So tell him to be quiet and not growl, and trust to me for doing all I can for my friends of the 98th. His officers are right good, but so would they be in any regiment that he commanded. Send him this letter, for I have no time to abuse him myself, and he cannot expect a civil letter.”

Colin Campbell’s explanation is not forthcoming ; but if his sensitive temperament was affected by the remarks in the foregoing letter, Sir Charles Napier’s reply must have soothed him. Writing to him on the 7th March from Manchester, Sir Charles Napier says : “I was not serious in my abuse of you to Freeth, but I really am hard up to stow away the large force we have. I have, since my arrival in the

district, contrived to stow away above 1000 men without cost to the Government. I found many infantry in billets, and now there are none ; and I have the 10th, 79th, and 8th Hussars, more than I found here. To do this requires some management, and is very troublesome ; but I will do my best to give you your company from the Isle of Man, if I can. . . . However, I fear I shall not be able to keep you long together and in command, as I wish ; for it is no flattery to say that both Ross¹ and I feel safe while you are at Newcastle, and it may any day become a very dangerous part of the district in a trice ! The 96th melt away by degrees to New South Wales, and they threaten to take the 20th. However, I assure you I am most anxious to keep your beautiful regiment together as long as I can fairly do so. . . . Every dragoon lieutenant-colonel is your senior, which is provoking. You say you are not a grumbler though you have the appearance of one. I have sixteen regiments under my command, and wish every one was commanded by such a grumbler ! ”

This drew from Colin Campbell the following reply :—

“ March 9, 1840.

“ I have just received your note of the 7th. I assure you no one can feel more sensibly the kind

¹ Colonel Sir Hew D. Ross, R.A., stationed at Carlisle, to whom, as senior officer, Colonel Campbell reported direct in cases of emergency. He ultimately became a Field-Marshal and G.C.B., and died in 1868.

consideration you have always shown to my regiment, as well as to myself personally, or be more grateful for it; but I beg of you not to allow for one instant my standing to interfere with the convenience of the service or your own arrangements. There is no disposition of yours that will not be most agreeable to me, and any one you send here will find me attending to his wishes with as much heartiness, zeal, and cordiality as if you yourself were on the spot, and in the immediate command of Newcastle. Pray therefore, my dear general, do not think of me for one moment, but make whatever arrangement may be most convenient to the service and to yourself. My great and principal object is to have the regiment as much united as possible for some time to come. Between Newcastle and Sunderland we are, as it were, together. The two places are so near to each other that I can move officers and men without trouble to any authority, expense to the country, inconvenience to the service, or even to the individuals themselves. Sunderland is an excellent place for the recruits, and is so come-at-able by means of the railroad, that the commanding officer might visit them daily if it were necessary. The being left here would be a matter of the greatest moment and advantage to the regiment, until the large body of recruits now under instruction has become fit for the ranks; and we shall be all glad to remain here, as long as you can allow of it with fairness to others and to the service. As to the forty or fifty

men at the Isle of Man, I must be content to forget them for the present ; for unless they were sent to Tynemouth, I should find a difficulty in making room for them, as we are now complete. I am quite satisfied to have nine out of ten companies so conveniently posted and so near together.”

Sir Charles Napier having occasion to communicate with Colin Campbell a fortnight later, on a matter concerning the accommodation for troops at Newcastle and Sunderland, refers, in a postscript, to the letter just quoted. “I had,” he says, “no time to answer your letter; but while I know that the soldier-like spirit which makes you so ready to serve under a senior officer is strong within you, I will not put one, if I can help it, over you. I may be obliged to do so, but it will be against the grain.”

Colin Campbell having expressed a hope that Sir Charles Napier would obtain the honorary colonelcy of a regiment then vacant, received the following reply :—

“CHESTER, 12th June 1840.

“I cannot let a post go without thanking you for your most kind letter of yesterday. I am much too poor to be indifferent about a regiment, especially as I fear I have lost all I had in the world in the Yankee funds ; and I am almost as much vexed that they should get it as at having lost it myself ! However, I will never make the least stir or attempt

to get a regiment from Lord Hill, whose kindness to me has been great; and I feel perfectly well assured that, when I have a claim beyond others, he will give me one, and I ought not to have one before. I see many a man before me now in my estimation of claims, and so let matters stand till his lordship's good pleasure sees fitting; and when that time comes, I shall sing, 'Oh be joyful!' for the devil take the sixpence I can save in this command, and do not know how my predecessors managed, if they did. I wrote a note to you yesterday, to know Sir F. Montresor's address, and sent you your own note to show you that you had not told it to me, lest you should suspect me of humbugging. The fact is, when a man is in a hurry he forgets these trifles—at least I do. One cannot count farthings when spending £1000.

"This attempt to assassinate the Queen is very disgusting. I do not like capital punishment, but I should hang such chaps. God help us if anything happened to the Queen. . . . She seems to have shown right good pluck, and so has Prince Albert. I doubt whether your friend —— would have been so cool."

On the 20th August, Sir Charles Napier tells Colin Campbell, in reference to the state of affairs in the Mediterranean: "I wish they would send me with the 79th, the Rifles, your chaps, and the 10th, to try Mehemet Ali's metal. I was eleven years in the

Levant, know the language and climate, and can bear heat like a salamander; but I fear I have no chance of such luck, and must be content to remain dry-nurse to ‘special constables’ and grouse-shooting magistrates as the only glory I can attain. A melancholy futurity !”

On the 28th November, Colin Campbell received the following from Sir Charles Napier : “ Many thanks for your note of the 26th. As you are to go to Ireland in the spring, I will not chop you up now. The 68th depot must jog on, or rather jog off (for they desert terribly), till you go. I am very sorry to lose you, my dear Colonel, but at all events I will do my best to keep you together while you are with me, so that Blakeney may see what you are. I had no intention of moving your Newcastle companies ; and now, from what Sir Willoughby Gordon tells me, I am resolved not to move your Sunderland companies. The Syrian business is well done, and glorious. I pity the poor Egyptian fellows, slaughtered and blown up in Acre, because they are wretched fellows, driven into the ranks ; but still the vagabonds ought to have made a better resistance. I think Ali is in as bad a way as his predecessor Pharaoh, when he got such a bellyful of sea-water ! After all, it is astonishing—a fortress like Acre taken in three hours by ships alone. Well, our sailors are noble fellows ! John Turc, too, seems to have shown good pluck ; indeed he never wanted that, to do him justice. I hope, but do not expect, that we shall be

as prosperous in India.¹ — may do well with you. It was not all east wind that made me give them the benefit of three inspections ! But this is between you and me. Matters now go on better. —'s father is quite right to put him with you. If I had a son, he should be with you in a week out of any regiment in the army."

A newspaper called the 'Northern Liberator,' which was a Chartist organ at Newcastle, having ceased to appear, the authorities in London inferred therefrom that the Chartist feeling was declining. Sir Charles Napier being of a different opinion, applied to Colin Campbell for information regarding it.

"CHESTER, 4th January 1841.

"Many thanks for your New Year's good wishes towards me and mine, all of which I return to you and yours, including your 98th children. . . . Be so good as to make inquiries for me into the real cause of the 'Northern Liberator' coming to an end. I do not quite understand the why of this matter. Lord Normanby thinks it arises from a decrease of Chartism : I am of opinion, and so is Wemyss,² that Chartism is increasing (not physical-force men) in number. I am strongly disposed to think that it is poverty among the poor classes—who formerly, when excited, were the purchasers—not principle, that produced the paper in question. How-

¹ In allusion to the expedition to Afghanistan.

² The senior officer at Manchester.

ever, you are in the place where this can be most easily traced, and it is very important to know. As to magistrates, I don't give sixpence for their opinion ; nine out of ten are not worth a straw. Ask your old soldier—I forget his name (Austin or some such)—and at the office itself, why this paper died. They will lie, but their lie will have a hole in it to look through. Perhaps you have some sergeant with double-jointed wits in his skull who could pick up what is said. In short, find out if you can."

On the 14th, Colin Campbell replied :—

" This cursed old enemy of mine, the ague, has been regularly getting the better of me. I have been scarcely out of my bed for the last four days. It was an advantageous offer for the purchase of the printing establishment and property of the 'Northern Liberator' by a joint-stock company, to publish a general advertising paper for the north of England upon some new system, which led the proprietors of it to dispose of the property, and to get rid of a concern which had not yielded them that return for the money invested, which they had originally anticipated.

" Although the paper enjoyed, for a considerable period during the Chartist disturbances, and until the termination of the trials of the Chartist leaders, a very extensive circulation, and which included amongst its subscribers at that time many of the better classes of this neighbourhood, who took it for

curiosity, it was not supported by advertisements ; and I am told that unless a newspaper be employed as an advertising medium, especially by the commercial and trading parties of the community in which it has circulation (and it did not extend much beyond this district of the country), it cannot pay its expenses, and yield at the same time a suitable return for the money invested. This was the case of the 'Northern Liberator.' As a mere trading speculation it failed, and therefore the readiness of the proprietors, who were not persons of large capital, to accept the offer of the joint-stock company. The extinction of this paper is not received by any one in this neighbourhood, acquainted with the working classes, as any proof of any change in their opinions on the subject of Chartism. Since the failure of the Chartist to carry out their views and wishes by violence, and which entailed upon so many of their leaders such heavy punishments, they have become very quiet and subdued ; but there has been no change of opinion. Let the troops be reduced in number in this immediate district, and a general stir among the Chartist in other parts of England take place, and you will soon be made sensible that Chartism hereabouts is not upon the decline. I have not been able to get out to see Austin, who is some eight miles from the barracks. I have taken so much bark, that I feel I shall be all right again in a few days.

"P.S.—I was terribly grieved in finding myself

obliged to bring a grenadier to trial for theft. The thing was too distinct and palpable, as it appeared to me, to be got rid of. This is the first man tried for theft from a comrade since I joined the 98th. I have had some very suspicious cases brought before me in that time, but the parties were recruits, except one old soldier. Although that kind of crime does not exist in the regiment, still theft from a comrade is a crime which no commanding officer can allow the men to suppose can be dealt with otherwise than by court-martial. It was the first time that —— had been before the commanding officer as a defaulter, yet I felt that it would have been dangerous, and that I should have acted wrongly, if I had disposed of the case in any other manner."

On such principles did Colin Campbell uphold discipline in his regiment.

Nor did it bear a character for discipline alone. To its handiness in the field General Sir E. Haythorne contributes the following testimony : "It was when the regiment was at Newcastle that it was so beautifully drilled—so steady, so perfect in battalion movements, so rapid and intelligent in light-infantry exercise. Colin Campbell did wonders with it. I recollect Colonel Booth, commanding the 43d, a celebrated drill, came to see us, as the guest of our chief. We went out on the moor. The open column, as if by instinct, accommodated itself to the features of the ground, obstacles, &c., without noise

or confusion,—all of which was noted by Colonel Booth. Presently the bugle sounded the ‘regimental call’ and ‘skirmish.’ The old style—1, 2, 3 companies skirmishing; 4, 5, 6, supports; the remainder reserve. A change of front obliquely was executed by a sound from the bugle, and a complete change to a flank by a new line of skirmishers, also by sound of bugle. Skirmishers were next reinforced, until the whole regiment was mixed up, company with company, and the line charged. It then formed a rallying-square, and finally each company was withdrawn, and all by sound of bugle. Though not altogether a service movement, it was one which showed Colonel Booth how perfectly the individual instruction of both officers and men had been effected; and I recollect Colonel Booth volunteered afterwards to tell us at mess that there was nothing the 43d did, which the 98th could not do—a great compliment, considering the character the 43d of that day bore for smartness.” It was at Newcastle too that Colin Campbell taught the 98th to advance firing in line—a difficult movement at any time, especially with the old “brown Bess” of that period, but which on two subsequent occasions he turned to good account against the enemy. This manœuvre he had learned from his old commanding officer, Sir John Cameron, who had reduced it to a system in the 9th Regiment during the Peninsular war.

The period was now approaching for the removal of the 98th from Newcastle, where it had been station-

ed an unusually long time, to Ireland. Sir Charles Napier had to make his half-yearly inspection early in May; and it was arranged that, at the same time, he should present the new colours about to be issued to the regiment. With reference to this he wrote to Colin Campbell from Calvelly Park on the 18th April:

" You can have all your people together for the ceremony except the Manxmen, and I fear the Secretary at War would not stand my sending them round by Carlisle to Newcastle to come south, where I must bring your chaps, much against my grain; but cut you up I must. I had a rather broad hint yesterday about the ' Newcastle Rangers,' so I felt that I must victimise you, or I shall have the others crying out. However, you are able to stand being cut up; but I wanted to turn you over to Blakeney¹ in the state you now are. You must relieve the 78th immediately after inspection, and I would much rather lose you at once, now I cannot fight off the mischief beyond inspection. Lords Hill and F. Somerset are at Egerton, within six miles from this, which takes my time up. You remain with me till a regiment comes from America. I am going to a great dinner to morrow at Liverpool, given to ' Black Charlie.'² I hear that it will be a grand sight, their rooms being so fine.—Yours truly,

C. J. NAPIER.

¹ Sir E. Blakeney, commanding in Ireland.

² Admiral Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B.

"P.S.—I dined the day before yesterday at Egerton, and I could not but feel very sensible of the kindness of Lord Hill to me. One feels pleased to find one's work gives satisfaction, though one does it out of principle, and therefore independently of any man's approbation. After dinner we got back to the Peninsula; and he described one or two of his actions there with all the minuteness of the charmed head, of the hand, in short, which did the deeds. He is not failing, depend upon it. It is his quiet, modest way that makes people think so. No failing mind could describe actions as he did."

On the 12th May new colours were presented to the 98th by Sir Charles Napier, in presence of a large assembly of people, who had collected in front of the stand of the Newcastle race-course to witness the ceremony. The usual forms common to such occasions having been completed, Sir Charles Napier, who, amongst his varied accomplishments, possessed the power of speaking to soldiers in no ordinary manner, delivered the following address:—

"Soldiers of the 98th, it is a proud thing to present 600 British soldiers with those splendid standards, under which they are to fight the battles of their country—a country that will bear no baseness, a people that exult in the achievements of their warriors. These colours, I well know, will never be abandoned by the 98th. The first colour is that of the Queen, which represents the honour of the

British crown, and of the navy and army, which has guarded its glory untarnished and resplendent for a thousand years. Now let me speak of your regimental colour. As the Queen's colour represents the general renown of the whole army, so does the regimental colour represent the immediate and particular glory of the regiment. In the history of ancient times we read of the phalanx and the legion; they were the distinguished bodies to which nations intrusted their military honour. Our ocean empire, widely spreading over the globe, obliges us to divide our army into smaller portions, called regiments. It is true that the war in Spain created those noble divisions, whose fame equalled that of the phalanx and legion. But these divisions were temporary creations; they had no standards. Like the body of man, they perished, but, like his spirit, their fame is immortal.

"Regiments are therefore the real constant and integral parts of which the British army is composed. To these celebrated battalions has England confided the honour of her arms. Bravely have they responded to the trust reposed in them, and more so in this, than in any former age; for never before did they encounter so noble and fierce a warrior as Napoleon, never before were they led by so great a general as Wellington. In presenting to you these colours, soldiers, it may not be out of place to observe that we all enter the British service of our own free will. We are not slaves forced into the

ranks by a despot ; we are free men, who enlist from a spirit of enterprise, loyalty, and patriotism. We swear before God and man to be true to our colours, round which we are bound to rally. To break such a solemn oath is to dissolve the ties of military society. A deserter is a scoundrel, who betrays his God, his Queen, his country, and his comrades. He betrays his Creator, because he swears in the presence of the God of truth to be true, and he is false. He betrays his Queen, because he swears to stand by his colours, and he abandons them. He betrays his country, because she pays him, she feeds him, she clothes him, she arms him, and he deserts. He betrays his comrades, because by desertion he throws that duty upon them, which he has sworn to do himself.

“ Soldiers ! it is incumbent upon those sensible and right-headed men whom I have the honour to address, to admonish the young and thoughtless against the disgrace of desertion. I say ‘ disgrace,’ because no honourable man can think without shame and sorrow of seeing the British uniform paraded in a felon’s jail. That noble red uniform, so admired by our friends, so dreaded by our enemies ! — that uniform which Wolfe, and Abercromby, and Moore shed their life’s blood to honour ! — shall this be seen herding with felons in a jail ? The very thought of it is disgusting to the heart of a soldier, and I will turn from it to a subject that is more grateful to my feelings, and speak of the beautiful regiment which is

before me; and in truth I know of nothing which makes a perfect regiment that the 98th does not possess. Young and hardy soldiers, steady and resolute non-commissioned officers, enterprising and honourable officers, the whole well knowing and well doing their duties; and above all—because it is the mainspring of the machine—an able and experienced soldier at your head. When I say this, I pay no vain and empty compliments. It is not in my disposition to say such things without foundation.

“Of the abilities for command which your chief possesses, your own magnificent regiment is a proof. Of his gallantry in action, hear what history says, for I like to read to you of such deeds and of such men; it stimulates young soldiers to deeds of similar daring.” [Taking the book from the orderly officer in attendance upon him, Sir Charles Napier read the account of Colin Campbell’s attempt to mount the breach of San Sebastian with his chosen detachment on the 25th July 1813, given in his brother’s History, vol. vi. pp. 81, 82.] “Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins; the intrepid Jones stood there a while longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid, but none came, and he and those with him were struck down. The engineer Machel had been killed early, and the men bearing the ladders fell or were dispersed. Thus the rear of the column was in absolute confusion before the head was beaten. It was in vain that Colonel Greville of the 38th, Colonel Cameron of the 9th, Captain Archimbeau

of the Royals, and many other regimental officers, exerted themselves to rally their discomfited troops and refill the breach ; it was in vain that Lieutenant Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins—twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around him died.' There," continued Sir Charles Napier—"there stands Lieutenant Campbell ; and well I know that, should need be, the soldiers of the 98th would follow him as boldly as did those gallant men of the glorious 9th who fell fighting around him in the breaches of San Sebastian.

" Soldiers ! young, well drilled, high-couraged as you all are, and led by such a commander as Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, I must and I do feel proud to have the honour of presenting you with these splendid colours, confident that if the day of trial comes, and come I think it must, they will be seen waving victoriously in the smoke of battle, as the 98th forges with fire and steel its onward course through the combat.

" War is to be deeply regretted ; it is a scourge and a curse upon nations. It falls not so heavily upon soldiers—it is our calling ; but its horrors alight upon the poor, upon the miserable, upon the unhappy, upon those who feel the expense and the suffering, but have not the glory. War is detestable, and not to be desired by a nation ; but if it comes, then I will welcome it as a day of glory for the young and gallant army of England, and among the

rest, for those brave men who will fight under the consecrated banners which I have this day the honour of presenting to the 98th Regiment.”

In the evening Sir Charles Napier was entertained at the mess. Towards the close of dinner he looked up and down the table, and having engaged the attention of all present, remarked, “I suppose none of you young gentlemen will care to drink wine with ‘old Fagin,’ because there is no champagne on the table.” He was aware of the *sobriquet* he bore in the regiment on account of his arched nose, of a Jewish type, which corresponded in some degree with Cruikshank’s etching of the Jew in ‘Oliver Twist,’ at that time a recent and popular work. Drinking to the health of the officers, Sir Charles Napier seized the occasion of remarking on the wisdom of the rule limiting the mess wines to port and sherry, which he considered reflected credit alike on the commanding officer and the members of the mess.

Colin Campbell having asked for a copy of the address, Sir Charles Napier sent him one, remarking,—“I scribbled down my recollections, and think you will find it nearly word for word what I said, for in writing my words came back. I have made the clerk copy it fair. I recollect perfectly saying, ‘Colonel Campbell, salute your new colours.’ I might have said something else, but it certainly was not, ‘and stand by them.’ If I added anything, it was, ‘I am sure the regiment will always stand by

them;’ but this was not any part of the address. As you have thought what I said worthy of being inserted in your records, perhaps Edie [an officer of the regiment who possessed a printing-press] will some idle day, if he ever has one, print your account of the ceremony, and give me a copy? For I was not lying when I said I was proud of the honour of presenting the colours to the regiment. Some men laugh at these matters. To me they appear of the highest importance, and to be the foundation of that spirit to which we owe Waterloo and all the rest.”

In July the 98th received the route for Dublin, but on its way thither was detained a fortnight at Manchester, in consequence of apprehended election riots. On reaching Dublin it marched without halting to Naas and Newbridge, and from thence to Carlow, where a considerable force under the command of the senior officer present, Colonel Jackson¹ of the Carabineers, was concentrated, for the preservation of order at the approaching election for the county, as O’Connell had thrown the whole weight of his influence into the scale in favour of the Liberal candidates, one of whom was a member of his family, and had further excited the population by his presence at the scene of the contest.

Having been informed of the probability of the 98th, which had nearly completed its tour of home service, being destined for the Mauritius, Colin

* ¹ The late General Sir James Jackson, G.C.B., K.H.

Campbell obtained leave in the middle of August, for the purpose of seeing his friends before proceeding on so distant a voyage. He states in his journal that, while in London, "I made a strong effort to get the destination of the corps changed to Bermuda, as the state of our relations with America, respecting the imprisonment and trial of Macleod, made it more than probable that a war would ensue between the two countries. Bermuda in this case would become a point of the first importance, where the regiment could not fail of being very actively and prominently employed. These considerations led me to press my wish for the change from the Mauritius to Bermuda very urgently upon my friends who could be of any use to me in forwarding my views. My friend —, unsolicited, wrote to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, then absent from town in Kent. His lordship, however, was of opinion that, as stations had been assigned to the regiments then under orders for service, to alter the arrangement already made would not be fair. This decision of his lordship appeared to fix our destiny, and I tried to reconcile myself to it accordingly with the best grace possible. Upon the return of Lord Fitzroy to town I saw his lordship. He was very kind, and expressed in the warmest terms his regret at my removal to such a distance as the Mauritius. I told him I had one favour to ask of him, which was that, in case of troops being required for service in India or China, he would have the goodness to hold in his recollection the pleasure it

would give us all to be actively employed. He gave no direct reply, but again repeated his own regret, and that of Lord Hill, that I was going so far out of the way. A few days after this, his lordship sent for me to say that if, upon my arrival at the Mauritius, I should find the lieutenant-colonel of the 87th Fusiliers disposed to exchange with me, that Lord Hill would approve of such an arrangement, and would be glad to see me return home in command of that corps." On his return to London from visiting his friends, on the 25th September, Colin Campbell records : " Some observations made by my friends at the Horse Guards caused me to suspect the regiment was destined for service in China. I did not, however, ascertain positively until the middle of October, when I learned that the six service companies of the regiment had been placed at the disposal of Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, for service in China. Lord Fitzroy Somerset gave me unsolicited a note of introduction to Lord Ellenborough, who received me very warmly and kindly. He spoke much of the nature of the service upon which the regiment was about to be employed, and regretted that he could not be of the party. I told his lordship I trusted the conduct of the regiment in China would be such as to induce him to retain the corps under his own orders in India when the campaign in China had terminated."

The 98th, in the meantime, had been moved round to Plymouth, where Colin Campbell rejoined it on

the 23d November, and busied himself in completing the arrangements for its embarkation in H.M.S. Belleisle, 74-gun line-of-battle ship, armed *en flute*, which had been commissioned for troop service by Captain J. Kingcome,¹ with a complement of 280 officers and men. The number of troops actually accommodated in this vessel was half a company of Royal Artillery, commanded by Captain Greenwood —55 officers and men; 98th Regiment, 810; women and children, 116,—making, together with the ship's complement and naval supernumeraries, a total of 1274. In addition to the foregoing, Major-General Lord Saltoun, appointed second in command of the China expeditionary force, with his staff, consisting of Captain J. Hope Grant,² 9th Lancers, brigade-major, and Captain A. A. T. Cunynghame,³ 60th Foot, A.D.C., took passage in the Belleisle.

The crew occupied the main deck. The lower and half of the orlop-decks were appropriated to the troops, the after part of the lower deck being apportioned to the women and children. It was originally intended to have accommodated the whole company of the artillery in the Belleisle; but the general officer commanding the district, being of opinion, with Colin Campbell, that the space was too limited, considering the length of the voyage—at least six months, if not more—a representation was made

¹ The late Vice-Admiral Sir John Kingcome, K.C.B.

² The late Lieutenant-General Sir J. Hope Grant, G.C.B.

³ General Sir A. A. T. Cunynghame, G.C.B.

which led to an inspection of the ship by the local naval authorities. These came to the conclusion that, by removing fifty men of the Royal Artillery, with a proportion of the women and children belonging to that company, to the other two troop-ships forming part of the convoy, ample accommodation would be provided for the 98th and the remaining half of the artillery, with the women and children of the respective corps. Officers, whose experience of troop-ships and transports has been gathered from voyages made since the commencement of the Crimean expedition, in the magnificent vessels of the various ocean steamship companies, and, more recently, in the Indian troop-ships, can have but a faint idea of the over-crowding on board the Belleisle, the burden of which vessel did not exceed 1750 tons.

On the 20th December the Belleisle sailed for Hong-Kong, in company with the Apollo and Sapphire, on board of which were detachments of the 26th, 49th, and 55th Regiments. The squadron touched at Teneriffe, Rio de Janeiro, Simon's Bay, and Singapore, and the Belleisle finally dropped anchor in the harbour of Hong-Kong on the 2d June 1842. During the detention of the vessels at Simon's Bay, Colin Campbell seized the opportunity of visiting Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who, after having held the government of the Cape Colony, was living in retirement at Wynberg. The meeting with his former chief, whom he loved so well, afforded Colin Campbell great pleasure, and formed a bright episode in this

otherwise tedious voyage ; for he was a bad sailor, and ill calculated to bear the restraint of a life on board of a man-of-war. It was on his return from Wynberg that he expatiated on Sir Benjamin D'Urban's professional capacity, which he considered to be of the highest order ; and he was wont to remark that he looked upon him and Sir Charles Napier as the two general officers in the British army best qualified to handle 40,000 men in the presence of the enemy.

Orders were awaiting the 98th, on its arrival at Hong-Kong, to proceed to join Sir Hugh Gough's force in the north of China. The town of Ningpo, which the Chinese had unsuccessfully attempted to recapture in the early part of 1842, had been vacated by the British forces on the 7th May ; but a small force was left at Chinhae, at the entrance of the Ningpo river, as well as in the island of Chusan, whilst the main body proceeded to attack Chapoo, in Hang-chow Bay, which town was held by a Tartar garrison. Chapoo was carried on the 18th May. From thence the expeditionary force moved to the Rugged Islands, off the mouth of the Yang-tsi-kiang —remaining at that anchorage a fortnight, to give time for the surveying and buoying of the bar. On the 13th June it entered the river and proceeded to Woosung, the point where the Yang - tsi - kiang is joined by the Shanghae river. On the 16th the line of defensive works at Woosung was carried ; and on the following day a naval force, composed

of the lighter vessels, proceeded to Shanghae, causing the Chinese troops to evacuate that town. Measures were taken for the survey of the Yang-tsi-kiang, preparatory to the advance upon Nanking; and it was during the interval occupied in the execution of the latter part of these operations that the Belleisle made the passage up the coast, joining the expeditionary force at Woosung on the 21st June.

Here the 98th was posted to the 1st brigade, under Lord Saltoun, and formed a portion of the third division of vessels in the ascent of the river. The surveying officers having prepared the way, the expedition left Woosung on the 6th July, with the object of advancing on the important cities of Chin-kiang-foo and Nanking—the former situated at the junction of the imperial canal with the Yang-tsi-kiang, and better known to the Chinese as King-kow, or “mouth of the capital,” from its position on the high water-way connecting Tien-tsin, the port of Peking, with the southern provinces. On the 19th July the Belleisle arrived off Chin-kiang-foo. The following day was occupied in reconnoitring; and a plan of attack having been arranged, the troops disembarked at an early hour on the morning of the 21st. The 98th, on landing, moved off under Lord Saltoun against a body of Chinese who had taken up a position a few miles from the right bank of the river, and to the right of the city—the assault and capture of which were effected by the remaining

portion of the force. The 98th had little or no opposition to contend with. A feeble fire from jingalls was opened by the Chinese upon the regiment, whose advance was covered by the light company in skirmishing order, together with a detachment of a mountain-battery served by Madras European artillery. A few discharges, however, from these guns quickly dispersed them. But a foe of far more formidable character had now to be encountered. The heat soon told on the 98th. Unprovided by the authorities with an equipment suitable to the climate, the regiment landed in its ordinary European clothing—a costume ill adapted for the fierce summer-heat of China. Many men were struck down by the rays of that terrible sun—amongst the number Colin Campbell himself, who, however, happily rallied under the timely influence of a little brandy administered by a brother officer.¹ Thirteen men perished on the spot, seven of whom were amongst the number of 240 soldiers who had been berthed for six months in the fore part of the Belleisle's orlop-deck. From this moment the effect of overcrowding gave a rapid impulse to the seeds of latent disease,—for on the night following the disembarkation, several fatal cases of cholera occurred; and this, coupled with the simultaneous outbreak of fever and dysentery, soon thinned the ranks of the 98th. By the end

¹ Ensign H. Dallas, who died of fever at Hong-Kong in 1843, and whose memory is affectionately cherished by such of his brother officers as survive him.

of the month fifty-three soldiers had succumbed, and the Belleisle rapidly became a floating hospital.

A body of troops under Major-General Schœdde was left in occupation of Chin-kiang-foo, and the expedition resumed its advance to Nanking, off which city it arrived on the 9th August. As soon as the ground had been reconnoitred, such of the 98th as were fit for duty were transhipped from the Belleisle, and conveyed in the Phlegethon steamer to Kwan-yin-mun—situated on an arm of the river about fifteen miles from the part of the city opposite which the expedition had anchored. Colin Campbell was unable to accompany his regiment, being detained on board sick; but he rejoined it in a few days, only to be laid low again with fever.

In the meantime, just as the preparations for the attack on Nanking were completed, negotiations which had been commenced between the Chinese Government and Sir Henry Pottinger, H.M.'s Plenipotentiary, put a stop to further offensive operations. A treaty of peace was concluded on the 26th August; and the object of the expedition having been obtained, the squadron retraced its steps down the Yang-tsi-kiang. On the 15th September, the worst cases of the 98th having been removed to another transport, the Belleisle weighed anchor from Nanking, and after touching at Chusan, reached Hong-Kong at the end of October.

It can be imagined with what distress Colin

Campbell contemplated the wreck of the regiment of which he had been so proud. Writing to his sister on the 18th December 1842, he says:—

“The want of sufficient barrack accommodation in this place obliges the authorities to keep us on board until barracks can be built to receive us. We (the 98th) remain, therefore, in this ship—of which a twelvemonth’s residence has most heartily sickened me—and I see little prospect of a release from our prison for the next five or six months.

“The regiment has lost by death up to this date 283, and there are still 231 sick, of whom some fifty or sixty will die; and generally, of those that will remain, there will be some seventy or eighty men to be discharged, in consequence of their constitutions having been so completely broken down as to unfit them for the duties of soldiers. This is the history of the 98th Regiment, which sailed from Plymouth in so effective a state in all respects on the 20th December last year,—and all this destruction without having lost a man by the fire of the enemy! I am well myself, but this melancholy overthrow and ruin of the corps under such circumstances makes me very miserable. The force is still here—having been detained in expectation of orders from India, which not having arrived, all are to sail to-morrow, save those to form the garrison at Hong-Kong.

“A row has taken place at Canton within the last ten days, during which the houses of some English merchants were destroyed by fire, and their property

plundered by the mob. The merchants look upon the disturbance as a proof of the intention of the people to prevent the Government carrying into effect the provisions of the treaty of peace recently concluded with the English. If these suspicions or opinions should prove correct, there may be something further to be done before long in this immediate neighbourhood. If all remains quiet at Canton, and no further row of a serious character takes place, I propose to pay it a visit, for there alone are to be purchased curiosities of this country, as also the silks, which, by the by, are quite as dear as in England. I shall get Crawford Kerr to send you a dress when I next pay him a visit.

“I believe I have already told you that I did not take any loot—the Indian word for plunder—so that I have nothing of that kind, to which so many in this expedition helped themselves so bountifully at Chin-kiang-foo and near Nanking. Tell, therefore, —, with my kindest remembrances, that although I visited many private dwellings of rich people, full of costly and curious things (in the apartments of the ladies particularly), I did not take anything. Not that the desire to possess was not upon me as with others, but that I foresaw the certainty of being called upon to punish others for the same proceeding if the war had continued, and I wished to stand right with my own conscience, and to prevent the possibility of reproach from others while enforcing discipline by the orders of my supe-

riors. It was in the palace of the emperor that I promised to plunder and rob, to please —, but although in many houses belonging to his Celestial Majesty's highest officers, I did not get into one of his own abodes. The opportunity, therefore, has not offered for the performance of my promise. It may yet arrive, however, and I shall not forget it."

CHAPTER IV.

COMMAND AT CHUSAN—98TH TRANSFERRED THITHER—EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS EFFICIENCY—REFLECTIONS IN JOURNAL—FRENCH DIPLOMATIC MISSION—METHOD OF ADMINISTERING CHUSAN—ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS EVACUATION—EXCHANGE OF CIVILITIES WITH CHINESE COMMISSIONERS—LETTER TO COLIN CAMPBELL—EVACUATION OF CHUSAN—VOYAGE TO BATAVIA—ARRIVAL AT CALCUTTA—OFFERED COMMAND OF A BRIGADE IN PUNJAB—ACCOMPANIES REGIMENT TO DINAPORE—INSPECTION—EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL—LEAVES REGIMENT—PROCEEDS TO LAHORE—INTERVIEWS WITH LORDS HARDINGE AND GOUGH—COMMAND AT LAHORE—PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SURPRISE—EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL—VISIT TO SIMLA—COLONEL LAWRENCE LEAVES FOR ENGLAND—SIR F. CURRIE, RESIDENT—OUTBREAK AT MOOLTAN—MOVEMENT OF TROOPS—EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL—COMMUNICATIONS WITH COLONEL CURETON.

ON the breaking up of the China expeditionary force on the 20th December, Lord Saltoun was left in command of the troops—Colin Campbell, as the next senior officer in Hong-Kong, assuming the commandantship of that island. He now concentrated all his energies on the care of the survivors of his regiment. The worst cases were transferred from the Belleisle to the hospital-ship, the less serious finding accommodation in a permanent hospital which had recently been erected on the outskirts

of the town. The temporary quarters allotted to the 98th at Chuck-Choo (Stanley) having been reported ready, the residue of the corps—some 350—disembarked in February, and occupied that post. Colin Campbell received the notification of his nomination to the Companionship of the Bath, and of his appointment as Aide-de-camp to the Queen, the latter carrying with it the rank of colonel,—this after thirty-five years' service, of which upwards of thirty-two had been passed on full pay. He remained at Hong-Kong till January 1844, when, by virtue of seniority, he succeeded Major-General Sir James Schœdde, K.C.B., as brigadier of the second class, in command of the garrison of Chusan, on that officer being ordered back to India with his own (the 55th) regiment. Captain Haythorne,¹ 98th Regiment, who had graduated under Colin Campbell, accompanied him as major of brigade.

The climate and the quiet of his life at Chusan were a great relief to him after the depression from which he had suffered so severely at Hong-Kong whilst watching, without being able to alleviate, the mortality of his regiment. This continued its fatal progress all through the year 1843; and Campbell himself was a frequent sufferer from attacks of intermittent fever. From the 21st July 1842, on its first landing at Chin-kiang-foo, up to February 1844—a period of little more than eighteen months—the unfortunate 98th had lost by death alone 432 out

¹ General Sir E. Haythorne, K.C.B.

of a strength of 766 non-commissioned officers and men. Whilst at Chusan, the ordinary routine of his life was varied by occasional visits from the flagship and men-of-war on the station. With Sir Thomas Cochrane,¹ the Admiral, and with Captain Chads,² of the Cambrian, he exchanged much friendly intercourse ; and on the former paying his periodical visits of inspection to the north, Colin Campbell seldom failed to accompany him to Ningpo and Shanghae. With our consuls at these ports he was in frequent correspondence and on intimate terms, and under their roofs he could always reckon on a hearty welcome.

Struck with the healthiness and efficiency of the troops, both European and native, under the influence of the bracing climate of the north, he had not been many months in his command before he conceived the idea of obtaining the sanction of the military authorities to the removal of the 98th from its unhealthy quarters at Hong-Kong to Chusan. With this object in view, he put the case before Major-General D'Aguilar, K.H., who had in the interim succeeded Lord Saltoun in the China command ; and finally, after a lengthy correspondence, his heart was gladdened by a compliance with his wish. This was at the commencement of the year 1845, when he recommenced his journal, which had been interrupted, with the exception of a few weeks

¹ The late Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Thomas Cochrane, G.C.B.

² Afterwards Sir Henry Chads, K.C.B.

in the autumn of 1841, ever since 1837, the date of his appointment to the command of the 98th.

In the meantime, he had made good the opportunity offered by the substantial increase of his professional emoluments since his arrival in the East, to relieve himself of his most pressing liabilities (for he left England, as has been seen, heavily embarrassed), as well as to make provision for his sister and the support of his father, in the event of his dying before them. At the same time, he dispensed hospitality with a free hand ; and should the eye of any of his surviving guests light on these pages, they will call to recollection the many pleasant social gatherings at Colin Campbell's table in the town of Tinghae.

“Journal, January 26th.—I have now been in Chusan exactly one year. My time, upon the whole, has passed agreeably enough, as compared with the miseries I have previously endured in the various trying situations in which I have been placed with my regiment since its departure from England : the climate also more favourable than that of Hong-Kong ; and, as I am obliged to remain in this country, I feel grateful to the Disposer of all goodness for my good fortune in having been so much favoured in being sent to Chusan. My expenses during the year, from unavoidable causes, have been greater than I could wish, or feel to be consistent with the object I have in view—viz., of making a little purse, and passing the remaining years of my life in retire-

ment and quiet. I will try and accomplish this object of saving as much as possible, and also of getting away as speedily as I can."

"*February 9th.*—The desire to save is not founded upon avarice, but upon the love of that independence which frugality now may procure for me hereafter, when I must yield to a younger officer, for I cannot always remain young and effective."

Colin Campbell was a self-improving man when he had the opportunity of obtaining books which interested him, especially such as treated of professional subjects. The entries in his journal at this period show that, on his major of brigade leaving him to command his company in cantonments, on the arrival of the 98th at Chusan, he devoted most of his solitary evenings to reading, and to an active correspondence with his friends at home. Nor was his taste confined to professional literature. Shakespeare engaged his attention, and he was fond of poetry, especially Scotch, having committed to memory many passages from the works of Allan Ramsay and Burns. One stanza from the latter poet's "*Epistle to a Young Friend*" he was never tired of quoting to those most in his confidence at that period, its burden being in unison with the one great object he had propounded to himself:—

"To catch dame Fortune's golden smile,
Assiduous wait upon her;
And gather gear by every wile
That's justified by honour:

Not for to hide it in a hedge,
Nor for a train attendant,
But for the glorious privilege
Of being independent."

The first detachment of the 98th reached Chusan on the 14th February. From that moment Colin Campbell spared himself no trouble in administering to its requirements, not only as regarded its comfort and interior economy, but also by supervising with his presence on parade the instruction of the officers and men, of which latter the largest proportion were comparatively recent drafts of recruits from England.

"*Journal, 23d February.*—Fixed upon a house to be fitted up for me in the cantonment, so as to be near the regiment, where the presence of some superior officer in the corps, who really takes an interest in its wellbeing, is very much wanted. This will cost me some money; but for an object of so much importance to the interests and welfare of the corps, I must make some sacrifice of more than ordinary moment in the present miserable plight of my unfortunate regiment."

On the 26th April the headquarters of the 98th arrived under the command of Colonel Gregory, the former major of the corps, who had been promoted to the unattached list on the 98th leaving England, and who, on the augmentation of the regiment to the Indian establishment, had been appointed to it as junior lieutenant-colonel. His arrival was a great

pleasure to Colin Campbell, whose active aid in restoring the corps to its former state of efficiency was warmly appreciated by the former. Upon Colonel Gregory's health, however, the climate of China had already begun to tell unfavourably. Colin Campbell had also been ailing, and anxious about himself; but by abstinence, and strict attention to diet, he recovered his health, though he never relaxed his exertions in pushing forward the instruction of the regiment, seldom missing a parade, of which, till the sun became too hot for exposure at mid-day, there were three daily. The officers were kept at it as close as the men—leave of absence, except on medical certificate, being refused to those who had originally accompanied the regiment from England, on the ground that their experience was imperatively necessary to form instructors out of the comparatively raw material of the depot. The officers of the garrison staff all performed their regimental duty.

On the 16th June he reports progress in his journal : “ Parades as usual in the morning and the evening : men improving, but still a great want of individual correctness in carriage, facings, motions of the firelock, &c. ; but they move in line and open column very fairly, and I confidently expect, before the end of the year, to have them more perfect than any battalion in this part of the world.”

The frequent result of his relentless enemy, ague, was to render him depressed and irritable ; and his mind, in sympathy with his body, would on such oc-

casions indulge in the expression of morbid thoughts. The following is an instance :—

“ *Journal, 3d July.*—Some little possibility of the island being retained until the gates of the city of Canton are opened to us. I am led to entertain this suspicion from the wording of an official document and public notification by Mr Davis¹ (H.M.’s Plenipotentiary in China), declaratory of his intention to have Canton placed, as regards free admission of foreigners into the city, on the same footing as the other ports. This would keep me another year or six months longer at Chusan. The bare possibility is disagreeable to contemplate. I have only one thought and one wish left, and that is for repose ; for my spirit has already been sufficiently broken by disappointment, and as all I wished to have pleased have sunk into the grave, success or miscarriage in the struggles of professional life have become empty sounds.”

“ *22d July.*—Yesterday being the anniversary of our landing at Chin-kiang-foo, the men who had been present on that occasion asked and obtained leave from their officers, with the sanction of their commanding officer, for an advance of two rupees = four shillings. Much fear was entertained by the commanding officer, Gregory, in which I also shared, that they would forget themselves, and that drunkenness would ensue. All, however, but one, were present and sober at tattoo. This says a great deal

¹ Sir John Davis, Bart., K.C.B.

for the good feeling existing among the old soldiers of the regiment, and is an evidence how much they may be trusted upon particular occasions. They had afforded me many proofs of this when a larger number were in existence. Dined at mess : a feeling of coldness comes over me now at that table. So few remain of those who came out originally with the corps ; and the necessity of being very strict with the young ones since appointed, leads them to look upon me as a very particular old gentleman, towards whom the prevailing sentiment is one more of fear than of liking, and I am too old to enter into the amusements and conversation of youths of their age."

"25th.—This is the anniversary of the first assault of San Sebastian—did not think of it until late in the evening — thirty-two years since. Time flies very fast, and few of those who were with me then are now alive."

As a counterpoise to the indulgence of these morbid feelings, augmented by his extremely sensitive temperament, Colin Campbell derived much pleasure from a visit in September of two friends, for whom he entertained sincere regard. The Honourable Frederick Bruce, the late Lord Elgin's brother, who eventually died as British Minister at Washington, was at that time Colonial Secretary of Hong-Kong ; and having proceeded to the north of China for change of air, he found himself the guest of Colin Campbell at Chusan. The other, Mr Robert Thom, a native of Glasgow, and a profound Chinese scholar,

was the British Consul at Ningpo, with whom Campbell, as the chief British authority at Chusan, was in the habit of holding frequent official intercourse. He was a man of great erudition, and by the charming simplicity of his character won the esteem of all such as enjoyed the privilege of his acquaintance.

Early in October the French frigate *Cléopâtre*, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Cecille, and having on board Monsieur de Lagrené, Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of France, empowered to negotiate a treaty with China, arrived at Chusan. He was accompanied by Madame de Lagrené and two junior members of his family, as well as by a large suite, amongst whom were a number of delegates representing the principal industries of France. In the entertainment of these guests Colin Campbell took a leading part, not merely on account of the position he held, but because his knowledge of the French language enabled him to converse fluently with his guests. Under his auspices they visited the island and its environs; and after proceeding to Ningpo and Shanghae in a small steamer placed at their disposal by him, they finally rejoined the *Cléopâtre*, and left for the South on the 11th November.

Towards the close of the year the health of the regiment, which had been slightly affected by the summer heat, was quite re-established, and its instruction had progressed sufficiently to admit of the intelligence of the officers and men being tested in

something more than the ordinary mechanical evolutions of the parade-ground. For this purpose Colin Campbell selected suitable positions in some of the passes and elevated ground of the island, where, dividing the regiment into an attacking and defending force, he pitted one against the other, so as to accustom it to the use of cover and the practical exercise of skirmishing on broken ground. The result was satisfactory, and his spirits being cheered by the authoritative intelligence from England that the 98th would proceed to India on the settlement of affairs in China, Colin Campbell took advantage of the Admiral's invitation to accompany him at Christmas to Shanghae and Ningpo, whence he returned to Chusan before the expiration of the year.

It must not be inferred, from the foregoing, that Colin Campbell's duties at Chusan were limited to the command of his brigade. The entire civil charge of the island, as large as the Isle of Wight, was confided to him. His principle was to leave the inhabitants as much as possible to themselves. He never interfered with their concerns or customs, unless called upon to arbitrate in matters which the headmen of the district were unable to settle, and which they voluntarily referred for decision to a military officer acting as magistrate under Campbell's orders. At the same time, he was jealous of any interference on the part of the Chinese officers resident on the mainland ; and on more than one occasion he vindicated the authority vested in him by seizing several

naval *employés* who had crossed over from the mainland, for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction in the island. The attitude he assumed soon convinced the mandarins that their best policy was to refrain from a repetition of similar acts, and for the remainder of the British occupation no renewal of such attempts occurred. The understanding of the troops (European as well as sepoy) with the inhabitants was excellent—the latter, in the rare cases that called for the intervention of the brigadier, soon discovering that in their temporary ruler they possessed an officer who dispensed justice without regard to race or respect of persons.

At the commencement of the year 1846, Colin Campbell expresses a hope in his journal that “it may be the last year he will spend in China.” Colonel Gregory’s health having compelled him to take leave of absence, Campbell redoubled his exertions in perfecting the field exercise of the 98th, his never-flagging interest in which was producing its reward. Many of his entries at this period tend to mark his satisfaction with its progress, and his conviction that “a few drills under his own command would be sufficient to enable it to go through such a review as no corps in the East could surpass.” He was “therefore quite at ease as to the appearance they would make on landing in India.”

“*Journal, 21st February.*—I should like very well to be kept here to the end of the year, and then leave for good. . . . The regiment is now in first-rate

order, and I hope to land them in India in that state, should we go there shortly. The longer I remain here, the more likely I shall be of a command in India, supposing that I find it necessary or advisable to remain in that country, which I hope I may not be obliged to do."

"*5th March.*—Anniversary of Barrosa ! An old story—thirty-five years ago. Thank God for all His goodness to me ! Although I have suffered much in health and in many ways, I am still as active as any man in my regiment, and quite as able as the youngest to go through fatigue. I am only obliged to be most careful in my diet. I must dine early, and I dare not taste wine without inconvenience. These are trifling matters, and only felt on account of my position, which obliges me to dine frequently at mess and in society."

"*13th March.*—The Catholic clergyman called on me yesterday to tell me of a rumour being in circulation on the other side, that a *délégué*, sent by the emperor, was on his way to retake Chusan, and that he was to have 3000 chosen men for this service. I wish it would prove true." This rumour, no doubt, originated in the measures that the Chinese Government were preparing for the reoccupation of the island on its approaching evacuation by the British troops, in accordance with the treaty of Nanking.

About this time Commissioners had been nominated by the Chinese Government to receive over Chusan ; but in consequence of difficulties connected with the

opening of the gates of Canton to foreigners, the British Plenipotentiary (Sir John Davis), had postponed the evacuation of the island. Colin Campbell now came into communication with these officers, having been directed to transmit them a copy of Sir John Davis's letter to Keying, the emperor's High Commissioner, giving his reasons for the delay. The points under discussion having been agreed upon in the form of a treaty between Sir John Davis and Keying, and the formal approval of the emperor having reached Canton, Keying's headquarters, Colin Campbell received orders on the 29th May directing him to admit Heen-ling and the other Commissioners into Chusan.

Whilst these negotiations were pending, Colin Campbell invited the Commissioners to pay him a private visit. Three of them accepted the invitation, and were entertained with great formality, a review of the troops being held for them, and a banquet given in their honour. They were much pleased with their reception, which was all the more gratifying because, whilst on the island, they received the news of the settlement of the diplomatic difficulty. A few days later, Colin Campbell crossed to Ningpo to return the Commissioners' visit. On the 13th May he dined with them. "The reception was most distinguished. Music playing as we entered the courtyard; three guns being fired as we approached the grand entrance, and the whole of the mandarins in their full dress coming to meet us at the outer

entrance, from whence, after much ceremony, we were conducted to a sort of reception-room, and were served with tea. Shortly afterwards we were ushered into a large open hall, in which a long table, or rather succession of tables of the same size were joined together, on each of which were twenty dishes very beautifully and symmetrically arranged. We all sat on one side, and the mandarins at both ends. We had chopsticks, with which I managed to eat, and finally made a hearty dinner, during which I tasted more dishes than I had ever done at any one time before in my life. These first dishes, which we found on the table on our arrival, were mostly cold, but were afterwards replaced by hot ones—birds'-nest soup, sharks'-fin soup, *bêche de mer*, and an endless quantity of other viands. I began to think the dinner would never terminate, as Thom [the consul] in vain tried to induce the mandarins to discontinue the supplies. At last, however, it came to an end, and we got up, holding our chopsticks in our hands, and bowed, as an acknowledgment of our sense of the kindness we had received at the entertainment. We were accompanied to the outer door of the house, and on our departure there were music and the three guns, as on our arrival."

The steamer Nemesis having been placed at the disposal of the Chinese Commissioners, they reached Chusan on the 5th May. At their first official interview, Colin Campbell records: "I remained at home, and received them at my gate as a mark

of respect. They thanked me through Mr Thom, H.M.'s Consul at Ningpo, for the mildness and equity of my rule during my command in Chusan, and for the kind treatment of the inhabitants, of which, they said, the people had spoken. They afterwards dined with me." On the 10th, the mandarins received over charge of the gate of the city, from which date they resumed the jurisdiction of the island. The interval between this and the arrival of the transports was occupied in the transaction of business with the Commissioners, varied by mutual entertainments and reviews of the troops, &c.—great readiness being exhibited on the part of the Chinese authorities to meet Colin Campbell's wishes on various points submitted for their consideration. Arrangements were made for the enclosure and protection of the European burial-grounds; and the names of such natives as had compromised themselves with their own Government by services rendered to the English, prior and subsequent to the peace of Nanking, were prepared for the information of H.M.'s Plenipotentiary, the individuals themselves having been previously sent to Ningpo and Shanghai, under the protection of the British consuls at those ports.

On the 7th July, Sir John Davis arrived at Chusan; and a few days later, the whole of the transports destined to remove the garrison were assembled in the harbour. Pending the final arrangements for the reception of the troops, the Chinese Commis-

sioners addressed a letter to Colin Campbell, the translation of which, by Mr Gutzlaff, the Chinese Secretary, is here given :—

“ Since the conclusion of peace, in the 22d year of Taou Kwang (1842), between China and your honourable country, there has been a continuation of harmony and good feeling.

“ You, the Honourable Brigadier, took up your residence at Chusan in the 23d year of Taou Kwang (1844), and, whilst observing and maintaining the treaty, you behaved with the utmost kindness and the greatest liberality towards our own people, and restrained by laws and regulations the military of your honourable country. The sepoys, to the number of several hundreds, who were quartered in the city and mixed with the Chinese, lived with them on the best understanding, and no instances of insult or aggression ever occurred. The European soldiers stayed with you, the Honourable Brigadier, outside the walls ; and you, the Honourable Brigadier, kept them under such strict control, that they never ill-treated or annoyed the inhabitants.

“ Thus the very cottagers enjoyed for several years tranquillity and protection, and were not exposed to the calamity of wandering about without a home. All this is owing to the excellent and vigorous administration of you, the Honourable Brigadier.

“ We (the Commissioners) are all under deep obligations to you, and have already personally

expressed our sincere thanks. Hearing now, however, that you, the Honourable Brigadier, are about to return to your country crowned with honour, we draw up this letter, and forward the same for your consideration, whilst we wish you every happiness.

"This is the principal object of this despatch, addressed to the British Brigadier Campbell.

"TAOU KWANG, 26th year, 5th (intercalary month),
23d day—16th July 1846."

The troops embarked on the 21st, Colin Campbell making a point of giving over the barracks to the Chinese Commissioners, as he states in his journal, "in beautiful order," and receiving at the same time an acknowledgment from H.M.'s Plenipotentiary "of his public services, which he had so zealously and successfully rendered by his military rule in the island, and especially for the care which he had taken of the property and rights of the Chinese population, the best proof of which was the letter of acknowledgment he had received from the native authorities deputed to receive back Chusan."

The vessel in which Colin Campbell took passage to Calcutta being unable to clear the harbour on the 24th July, he once more landed on the island.

"*Journal, July 24th.*—Took a walk on shore in the evening—my last walk in Chusan, where I have passed many days in quiet and peace, and where I was enabled to save a little money, with which I hope to render my last days somewhat comfortable.

Whilst there, I was enabled also to assist others to a great extent. My health upon the whole pretty good; and altogether I have every reason to be grateful to God for sending me to a situation wherein I was enabled to accomplish so much for my own benefit and that of the comfort of others, whilst my duty kept me separate from them."

The following day the voyage to Calcutta fairly commenced. The master of the Lord Hungerford transport, selected by Colin Campbell for the conveyance of himself and the headquarters of the 98th, parted from the other vessels at starting, and, clearing the Chusan group by the northern passage, stood away by the Loo-choo Islands into the Pacific, in order to catch the south-eastern "trades" in the Moluccas, and passing through the Java Sea, enter the Bay of Bengal by that route, in preference to beating down the China Sea, in the teeth of the south-west monsoon, to Singapore. The Eastern Archipelago was entered by the Gilolo passage; and on passing through the Straits of Salayer from the Molucca into the Java Sea, Colin Campbell decided on calling at Batavia to replenish the supplies, which were beginning to run short, as well as to obtain fresh provisions, in consequence of symptoms of scurvy having appeared amongst the troops. Batavia was reached on the 20th September, the passage through the Moluccas being favoured by a fair wind; whilst the proximity to the islands presented a constantly varying outline of

landscape, mountainous and magnificently wooded, the gorgeous colours of which, lighted up by an Eastern sun, attracted the eyes of all, and rendered this part of the voyage, even by Colin Campbell's admission, enjoyable.

The time occupied in provisioning the ship afforded him a favourable opportunity of visiting some of the many natural beauties with which Java abounds. These, and the exchange of compliments with the Dutch authorities, who lost no opportunity of making the visit of the British officers agreeable, were a source of great pleasure to Colin Campbell,—the more so that the fresh provisions obtained on arrival told with immediate and happy effect on the health of his men.

On the 30th September the voyage was resumed ; and after a favourable passage up the Bay of Bengal, Calcutta was reached on the 24th October. Four days previously he recorded in Spanish, in his journal, the entry into his fifty-fifth year, adding, “I thank God most sincerely and devoutly for the favour He has been pleased to extend to me, and for enabling me to render assistance to those who had a right to expect it from me, when I had the means of affording them aid.”

The other detachments from the vessels, which had taken the route by Singapore, did not join the headquarters till the last week in November. In the meantime, Colin Campbell had, from his seniority, assumed the commandantship of Fort William,

delegating the command of the 98th to Colonel Gregory, who had rejoined at Calcutta from leave of absence. The regiment having had Dinapore allotted to it as its station, was inspected prior to its departure, Colin Campbell being a spectator. “The men,” he records, “moved tolerably well after their long confinement on board ship. Every one spoke of our steadiness, and moving so correctly by sound of bugle, our practice on board ship having made the men very perfect.”

“*Journal, 10th December.*—Received yesterday a very flattering letter from Colonel Wood, military secretary to Lord Hardinge,¹ the Governor-General, apprising me of his lordship’s intention to appoint me brigadier of the second class in the Jullundur Doab, if no insuperable difficulty should offer with respect to seniority. This is very flattering; but I would prefer remaining with my regiment, because, by the time I am determined to get home, I should be a richer man than if I were to go as a general officer to the Punjab.”

On the regiment commencing its march on the 18th December, Colin Campbell resumed command of it.

“*Journal, 1st January.*—Another year! How my heart has daily wished and wearied for release from my present life!” But rising superior to any morbid feeling, when contemplating the state of his regiment, for which he had laboured so earnestly, he adds with soldierly pride: “The march of the regi-

¹ The late Lieutenant-General Robert B. Wood, C.B.

ment has been conducted to my entire satisfaction, no men falling out, and the distance of sections so correctly preserved that their wheeling into line is like the operation of a field-day. Those who follow me will benefit by this order and regularity in conducting the line of march. The youngest officer and soldier must see the advantage of it."

On his arrival at Dinapore, Colin Campbell found his appointment in general orders as brigadier of the second class, to command at Lahore. Whilst preparing to start for that place the regiment was inspected, after which he took occasion to address it. In the following summary of his remarks, as entered in his journal, will be recognised the principle which ever regulated his treatment of the British soldier, whereby he insured discipline and military efficiency, while at the same time he won the confidence of the troops placed under his command.

"*2d February.*—Regiment inspected. Men steady as rocks; moving by bugle - sound as correctly as by word of command—equally steady, accurate, and with the same precision. Spoke to the regiment in the evening: complimented them upon their conduct and intelligence at the inspection, after a march of six weeks, following on a voyage of four months through the tropics—the same precision and accuracy in all that they did, as if they had been daily at drill. Told them that it was attributable to the original instruction of the soldiers being perfect; complimented them on their good conduct on the

line of march, which was orderly and compact, no man quitting the ranks without leave, and rarely a man falling out from sickness or inability to keep up with the column. Thanked them for the promptitude with which they had responded to the appeal made to them the day after the arrival of the corps, when they had been enjoying themselves with the 9th¹ [the regiment relieved by the 98th] on the first day of our arrival. Drunkenness had ceased, and perfect order and regular conduct restored, preparatory to their inspection, there not having been a single defaulter on the previous day. Told the corps that this circumstance was the strongest and best evidence of the high feeling existing among them. That it had its origin in the attention of the officers to their duty, in their looking after the wants of their men, in their care to procure for the soldier all to which he was entitled, and in sharing in every duty of every kind which the soldier was called on to perform. That it was owing to this system of there being but one rule for officers and soldiers in all and every circumstance. That the men had worked very willingly and cheerfully in helping the baggage over the difficulties we met with on the march, the officer assisting and being present in the rain and in the mud with the soldier. With this example of his officer there was no complaint—nothing but cheerfulness and good-humour; and so will it ever be during the continuance of this

¹ Colin Campbell's original regiment.

system, from which so much advantage has been derived in the diminution of crime, and by the attachment and respect felt by the soldier for his officer under such circumstances." It was nothing more than a rigid adherence to Sir John Moore's system, under which he had been trained in the 9th Regiment.

"*Journal continued.*—In the evening dined at the mess. The president, to my surprise, rose and proposed my health in connection with the inspection of the regiment, and the exertions that I had made, as senior lieutenant-colonel and commanding officer, to produce such results. The toast was received with great warmth and cordiality, for which I was unprepared, considering the attention and exertions I had exacted from all ranks in getting the regiment into order, and taking into account the number of officers of short standing in the service, who could not see the necessity of the pressure I had put upon them. I accepted the compliment upon public grounds, and took occasion to observe that the same care and attention which they had shown to their duty would always produce the same results, and that according to the manner in which the officers did their duty, so would it be performed by the non-commissioned officers of the corps. I could not speak with indifference, and my manner could not conceal my deep anxiety respecting a corps in which I had served so long. I begged that, if their old colonel had been sometimes anxious and impatient with

them, they would have the kindness to think of their exertions, and the satisfactory feeling which that recollection would occasion, and to forget the manner and impatience of one, who had no other thought or object in life but to add to their honour and reputation collectively and individually. I could not but feel complimented by the grounds offered for the mark of respect they had shown me; for up to the last moment of my command, when every one was aware that I was to leave them, I performed my duty in all its details, and exacted the same from every one, with the same strictness, as if I had not been about to leave the regiment."

Colin Campbell now commenced his journey to Lahore, "feeling," as he records, "more than he expected, when taking leave of the few officers who happened to be at his quarters at the moment of his departure." It was in the old days of palanquin-travelling; so that on reaching Cawnpore, where the 21st Fusiliers happened to be stationed, he was enabled "to pass the day with his dear old friend Sutherland." He expected to have found Hope Grant, at that time commanding the 9th Lancers at Meerut, but ascertained that he had gone to get married at Agra.

Hearing that the Governor-General was in movement from Kurnal to Meerut, Colin Campbell determined to meet him. "*Journal, 15th February.*"—Called on Colonel Wood (Military Secretary), by whom I was taken to Lord Hardinge, who received me very kindly. He spoke of all the officers with

whom I should be connected at Lahore : Colonel Lawrence¹ was the king of the country, clever and good-hearted, but hot-tempered,— told me that I should find him ready to afford me information, assistance, and advice whenever I required it ; mentioned Captain (afterwards Sir Herbert) Edwardes,² another of the politicals, clever, and a nice person. He gave me to understand that if any of the force should have to take the field, I should have to command it. His lordship said something also about the native troops,—of the loose way the European officers did their duty—of his having found one of them, when on guard, in bed, and the guards without any written orders. His lordship was kind and friendly in his manner. He spoke of the objection that had been made to my appointment, owing to my want of knowledge of the language, and stated other reasons, which he had overcome.”

Having taken leave of Lord Hardinge, Colin Campbell started for Saharunpore, at that moment the headquarters of Lord Gough, the Commander-in-chief.

“*Journal, 19th February.*—Lord Gough arrived to-day from his shooting excursion. Friendly and cordial in his greeting—dined with him. After dinner he desired me to write to him whenever I had anything to say to him. He asked me if he could do anything for me. I replied that I had no favour to ask for myself, but that his lordship would afford

¹ The late Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.B.

² The late Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

me pleasure to remove my regiment nearer to the frontier, and, as soon as possible, from its present location, which afforded so many temptations to the men to drink. Took leave of the headquarter people. Colonel Cureton¹ accompanied me to the *dāk* bungalow, and saw me off. He is a nice person, and has proved himself to be so by his kindness to me."

By invitation of Colonel Lawrence, Colin Campbell, on his arrival at Lahore, proceeded to the Residency, where he was "very cordially received," and asked to stay till he could obtain a quarter for himself. He found a pleasant chief in Sir John Littler, who put into his hands a copy of Lord Hardinge's memorandum of instructions for the occupation and defence of Lahore, as well as of the country on the right bank of the Sutlej—"a very comprehensive document." Sir John Littler also accompanied him round the works, followed by a large staff; but Colin Campbell was not satisfied with this. "To see and understand how the troops were posted with reference to the defence of the walls, as well as from an exterior and interior attack, he felt that he must go alone with the engineer." In the selection of his quarters, too, he was governed by the interests of the service, conceiving it "to be his duty to be with his troops, and not separate from them." He at once discovered a kindred spirit in Henry Lawrence, who won his heart, not alone by his personal

¹ Adjutant-General of the Queen's troops.

kindness, but by being ever ready to do good, and kind, and considerate acts to the garrison.

Lahore was at this time the most important military post in India, having regard to the delicate relations existing between the British authority and the native Government of the Punjab, which, though controlled by the Resident, still possessed a considerable army, sufficient at any moment to become the nucleus of revolt, and a rallying-point for the remains of that formidable host, which had so recently and so desperately measured its strength with the British power on the banks of the Sutlej. Sensible of this, Colin Campbell neglected no means within his power to secure the charge intrusted to him.

“Journal, March 3d.—Went out with Colonel Lawrence and his family to the Shalimar gardens, where we breakfasted. The Durbar had sent out the tents and canopies of Cashmere shawls and beautifully-worked silks from Moultan, the property of the Maharajah. They certainly were very superb and handsome. I never imagined I should have found myself walking on floors covered with shawls of Cashmere. All the garrison was invited; but it appeared to me proper to allow only half of the officers to be absent from their men, which I expect will be the occasion of remarks in print. If the Sikhs wanted to murder all the officers, they could not have an easier or a better opportunity of doing so, than when they were collected four miles from their men, enjoying themselves at a fête.”

Good reason existed for this precaution: A considerable Sikh force was located in and about Lahore, to say nothing of a large and somewhat turbulent population unaccustomed to British troops. With a view to any possible contingency, Colin Campbell prepared the most detailed instructions for the disposition of every corps and detachment on the occurrence of any alarm, so that every one might know at once where to go and what to do. A copy of these instructions was sent to the Governor-General, and met with Lord Hardinge's cordial approval.

Quick to resent unauthorised interference in matters affecting his own position, Colin Campbell was scrupulously careful in limiting himself to the discharge of his own duties; and from his instinctive love of discipline, he shrank from even the appearance of encroaching upon the prerogative of his superiors. In one instance, however, imagining that his zeal had carried him a little too far, with a nice sense of the respect due to his chief's position, he reproached himself for want of deference towards him.

*“Journal, March 11th.—I discovered, a few days ago, that the arrangement for the occupation of the works inside the town by the native regiments in the Rounie or *fausse braie* was originally for the eight regiments which had been already relieved by the five now here, and I directed the engineer to distribute the five corps now in the Rounie amongst the posts*

which had been formerly occupied by eight. This appeared to me very pressing, and requiring arrangement without delay ; and I told Sir John Littler of my having given the order to the engineer. I might be mistaken, but I thought his manner seemed to say, ‘ There is no necessity for this ;’ and it then occurred to me that the more judicious mode of proceeding would have been to have made the suggestion to him in the first instance. This would have been more respectful, and at any rate would have shown more deference. I had no intention to presume in any way. I shall be more thoughtful another time, for he is a nice person, and I should be truly sorry to give him occasion for displeasure or offence.”

Conscious, too, of his quickness of temper, Colin Campbell was in the habit of taking himself to task in his journal “ for having forgotten himself,” as he termed it—“ as he had come to Lahore with a determination to get on well with every one.” Even after a discussion with his brigade-major, Keiller, a fellow-countryman and valued friend, who possessed his entire confidence, he is found alluding to it. Here is an instance : “ Got very angry last night when speaking to Keiller about some officers who had been making remarks about quarters. I wish I had not allowed my temper to beat me ; but I am too old, I fear, to change my bad ways and habits, and this heat of temper has always told against me.” As a further evidence of his effort to curb this infirmity, he inserted as a motto on the fly-leaf of one of his

diary-books at this period the following quotation : “*Quelque chose que nous disions dans un moment d’emportement, il est bien rare qu’elle ne nous cause pas de regrets.*”¹

Though he had had several attacks of fever since his arrival at Lahore, Colin Campbell’s health had been generally good ; but in the middle of April he felt an alteration in his eyesight, which caused him to see double, and gave him great uneasiness. He put himself under medical advice ; and by a sparing use of his eyes, which seriously interfered with the active discharge of his duties, he gradually but slowly recovered from this affection, which was peculiarly distressing to him at a time when his physical and mental energies were concentrated on the measures he was adopting for the strengthening of his post. In the meantime, Sir John Littler had left Lahore for the Jullundur Doab.

“*Journal, 24th April.*—Colonel Lawrence called on me this morning to mention a report which had been made to him in secrecy by one of the hill chiefs, of an intention on the part of the principal Sirdars to rise against the English authority. I confess I was glad to hear of this report, for I had felt, from the moment of the general’s departure, that the precautions adopted by him were wholly insufficient in the position of H.M.’s 10th Regiment (in the citadel) ; and yet I did not like to take immediate

¹ “It is seldom that we have not cause to regret words spoken in a passion.”

measures, upon his departure, for the greater security of my position in the Hazarabagh and Musjid square, in which the 10th is quartered, for fear it might be said that in doing that, which the general had not done, I was making myself appear active and prudent to his disadvantage—and therefore this report came most opportunely to strengthen and render my position in the citadel less insecure than it was. The 10th Queen's Regiment, officers and soldiers, were completely at the mercy of the Sikh troops in the citadel, in which there were always 1000. They might come down upon the 10th, and all within the Hazarabagh, any night they pleased, and butcher the whole corps, officers and men, when in bed. Colonel Lawrence felt this also, as well as the necessity of having a watch at night on the top of the roof of the gateway, which had been converted into a mess-room for the 10th. I went, immediately after the departure of the colonel, with the brigade-major, Keiller, to examine the top of the gateway or tower: and I found that, with scarcely any expense or trouble, the place might be converted into a very strong post, giving one command, within half-musket-shot, of one of the principal and inner gates in the citadel, so as to prevent all communication between the outside and the inside in that direction; while, with the aid of ladders, we had only a descent of fifteen or seventeen feet into the interior of the citadel. To make the post quite secure, it was necessary to remove a build-

ing, seemingly of recent construction, which abutted on the roof of the gateway, and, completely commanding the tower, was higher even than the highest part of the gateway. I went again in the evening with the engineer, Captain Tremenheere,¹ to look at the capabilities of the place as a post. He agreed with me that a few additions would make it very strong, and one that would give us, in a great measure, the command of the citadel and its garrison, never less than 1000 men, but which might be increased without our knowledge, by the secret introduction of small parties of men to any amount. While we occupied this position, no body of men could move at night in the interior of the palace or citadel without being heard. As a precaution, I ordered a double sentry to be placed at the top of the gateway, between dark and daylight, to report any stir that might be heard in the citadel, or the tread of feet in numbers, like the march or movement of troops. This precaution will prevent our actually being taken by surprise, inasmuch as we may have time to fall in. I only want freedom from molestation for one week, when I hope to have my post completed at the top of the gateway, which places my head and shoulders inside their stronghold, with the advantage of their inability to move in the interior without my knowledge, and the further advantage of perfect security of access for my troops to the inside of the citadel whenever I like.

¹ Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.

"25th April.—Colonel Lawrence and Major Macgregor came this morning to look at the place on the top of the gateway, where I am anxious to have a post. Both concurred in its propriety; and the colonel said he would speak to the Durbar to break down or remove the house, which abuts upon the top of the gateway. I hope to have my post established before the end of the week, when I shall be quite at ease."

On the general's return to Lahore, he approved of his brigadier's proceedings; and Colin Campbell, whose relations with Colonel Lawrence had ripened into intimacy, invited himself to the Residency at Anarkullie for change of air. This visit was beneficial to his eyes, and he "enjoyed himself much."

"*Journal, 26th May.*—Commenced to-day my fortieth year of service. Colonel Lawrence told me to-day that he had been asked by Mr Elliot¹ whom he would like to have to command, if Sir John Littler and I went away. This looks as if they considered it not indispensable to have a major-general. Colonel Lawrence behaved to me in the most handsome manner, and told me that he preferred to have me here to any other officer, and had written accordingly to say so. He has behaved to me in the most kind and generous manner ever since my arrival here."

On Sir John Littler proceeding to Simla, Colin Campbell assumed the temporary command of the

¹ Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, afterwards Sir H. M. Elliot, K.C.B.

division, by which he was brought in close official connection with Colonel Lawrence, and spent much time in his society, never paying a visit to the Residency without recording the “pleasure he derived from it,” and the happiness “it was to him to be a guest under that hospitable roof.” On the 19th June, Sir Charles Napier, who had been kept informed by Colin Campbell of his proceedings at Lahore, replied to him from Kurrachee, expressing his approval of what the latter had been doing. After condoling with him about the affection of his eyesight, he says: “I am delighted at all your precautions against surprise. In India, we who take these pains are reckoned cowards. Be assured that English officers think it a fine dashing thing to be surprised—to take no precautions. Formerly it was an axiom in war that no man was fit to be a commander who permitted himself to be surprised; but things are on a more noble footing now! The Indian army wants great radical reforms, and most of all in the system of discipline rather than drill. I cannot now enter into these opinions. You are too able a soldier not to have seen this already. The Bombay army, and indeed all three, are full of good soldiers; but the regimental discipline requires improvement. I have tried to remedy this, as far as the Bombay army goes, but it can only be effectually done by a commander-in-chief. A general on the staff has not sufficient powers to effect reforms of this nature.”

Colonel Lawrence's health having suffered from the fatigue and anxiety inseparable from the arduous post he so worthily occupied, it was arranged that he should return to England on leave ; but before doing so, he proceeded to Simla on a visit to Lord Hardinge, his place being temporarily filled by his brother John, the late Lord Lawrence, who at that time was commissioner of the recently annexed district of the Jullundur Doab. Colin Campbell, who had frequently met him at the Residency, "was delighted at the prospect of John Lawrence remaining at Lahore during his brother's absence."

"*Journal*, 19th September.—Received a letter from Colonel Lawrence telling me that he had had much talk about me with the Governor-General ; that no general had yet been appointed ; and that he would not be surprised if Colonel Wheeler¹ and myself were left in independent command, but that this was mere surmise, and I was not to speak of it. Moreover, that in the event of any force moving out of Lahore, I should command it. That the Governor-General would tell me so when he saw me, but that he would not write upon the subject."

Early in October, Colin Campbell proceeded on a short visit to Simla, to pay his respects to Lord Hardinge, who was on the eve of returning to England.

"*Muttianah*, 18th October.—The Governor-General

¹ Afterwards Major-General Sir Hugh M. Wheeler, K.C.B., massacred at Cawnpore in 1857. He was at this time commanding a brigade in the Jullundur Doab.

came here to-day with his sons, Colonel Wood, &c. Very civil to me. Told me he had received pleasant accounts of me from Lahore. [I presume from Colonel Lawrence.] He further told me he intended to do something better for me before he went away, but not till then—that it might not be said it had been granted by any application of mine to his lordship. I presume he will make me a first-class brigadier; and this will make me my own master at Lahore, which will be very agreeable, besides adding something to my income. But my heart is not at Lahore. I cannot, however, get away for another year; and I must be content to remain unsatisfied till the beginning of 1849, when I shall be able to leave this country for ever."

"*Monday, 26th.*—Forgot to mention that Lord Hardinge told me last Saturday of his intention to make me a brigadier of the first class. I told his lordship of my ambition and desire to get home; but they tell me I must stay another year, if I do not wish to throw off all claims upon the service. I suppose I must submit, *bon gré mal gré moi.*"

Having taken part in the farewell entertainments given by the Commander-in-chief in honour of the Governor-General, and seen the latter off, Colin Campbell set out again for his post, taking Jullundur on his way, where he made Colonel Wheeler's acquaintance; and finding that Colonel Lawrence was at Umritzur, he took the opportunity of examining the fort of Govindghur, which was unarmed, visiting as well

the holy shrine of the Sikhs, and returning with his friend to Lahore. Colonel Lawrence, after remaining a few weeks at Lahore, gave up charge to his brother John, and finally left on the 1st December to join Lord Hardinge at Calcutta, Colin Campbell accompanying him the first stage on his homeward journey. From this period to the end of the year, he spent much time with John Lawrence, frequently accompanying him on shooting excursions. The pure air, the freedom from official work, and the society of his companion, appear to have afforded him more gratification than the sport, for he records in his journal the pleasure he derived from these outings, though he admits "his inability to hit a feather from the back of an elephant."

"*Journal, 9th January.*—Heard this morning from John Lawrence that Sir Frederick Currie was almost certain to come here, but only for a year. I am most sorry that John Lawrence is going away, because he is not only a nice, friendly, and honest fellow, but he is the sort of political authority with whom I should like to have to act if any disturbance were to arise during my stay in the Punjab."

Colin Campbell's anticipations with regard to being left, on the departure of Sir John Littler, in independent command of his brigade, were in like manner disappointed, for that officer, in giving up his divisional command on the 20th January, was succeeded by Major-General Whish,¹ an officer of

¹ The late Major-General Sir S. Whish, K.C.B.

the Company's service. Simultaneously with the arrival of this officer, the garrison of Lahore received an important addition in the Queen's 53d Regiment, which had been moved up from Ferozepore. In this corps the late Lord Sandhurst was then serving in the rank of captain, and in this manner first came under the eye of his future chief. At the same time Brigadier Wheeler paid a visit to Lahore, and during his stay was Colin Campbell's guest. From the first, that worthy old soldier appears, by his subsequent correspondence, to have entertained a sincere regard for Colin Campbell, who heartily reciprocated the feeling, and who, with excusable pride, had out, for his brother brigadier, his force, consisting of 7000 men of all arms, with 18 guns, on which occasion "the general complimented him on the mode and facility with which he handled the troops."

"*Journal, 16th March.*—This book filled up. I commenced it in Calcutta, and did not expect to have reached the end of it in India; but if I have not realised my hope of joining those I love so much at home, I have been enabled by my saving to contribute much to their comfort and happiness, and this knowledge must be my consolation. This time next year must see me, if alive, on my way homeward. May it be so."

Little could he foresee the grave events which were at hand, and which were to exercise so important an influence on his future career.

"*Journal*, 23d April.—Informed by the general that the movable brigade was to be held in readiness to move to Mooltan. 24th.—Met the general at Sir F. Currie's. Informed by the latter of the intelligence from Mooltan being very bad : fears entertained for the safety of Messrs Agnew and Anderson.¹ A report from the former, dated the 19th, had been received, giving an account of his having been cut down when leaving the fort or citadel of Mooltan, after the completion of the ceremony of its being handed over to him by Moolraj, Governor of the Doab of Mooltan, and of Lieutenant Anderson having been similarly treated. Sir F. Currie was of opinion that the citadel of Mooltan, described by Mr Agnew in his report as the strongest fort he had seen in India, would not be maintained by its garrison upon an English force presenting itself before it, but that the garrison would immediately abandon Moolraj. I was not of this way of thinking, feeling sure that a force without the means (artillery) of taking the place would be laughed at by the garrison, and that our troops must either remain there inactive until those means arrived

¹ These gentlemen—the former a member of the Bengal Civil Service, the latter a lieutenant in the Bombay Fusiliers—had been deputed, in the capacity of assistants to the British Resident at Lahore, to proceed to Mooltan, and superintend, under the authority of the Sikh Durbar, the substitution of Sirdar Khan Singh as Dewan or Governor of the territory of Mooltan, situated between the left bank of the Indus and the right bank of the Sutlej, in the place of Moolraj, who, after the death of Runjeet Singh, had succeeded his father as administrator of the province, subject to the authority of the Lahore Government.

from Lahore—the nearest station and support, distant 210 miles, or 18 marches, through a heavy country—or retire upon that place until a more suitable season for carrying on operations had arrived; that either result would have a bad moral effect, and encourage all the idle vagabonds of disbanded Sikhs to swarm to the standard of Moolraj, and to crowd round the British force thus isolated.

"*Monday evening, 24th.*—Met the general at Sir F. Currie's. Settled by them that a brigade, consisting of a wing H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, a regiment of irregular cavalry, two batteries field-artillery (one European, one native), H.M.'s 10th Regiment, three regiments of native infantry, and half a company Sappers and Miners, should march on the 26th. Sir F. Currie's instructions to General Whish declared the object of this force to be the capture of Moolraj, Governor of Mooltan, and his followers, who had attacked Mr Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson on the 19th. It was known that the citadel of Mooltan was very strong, and it was to be expected that on our arrival there Moolraj would shut himself up in his citadel; and if so, that we should be obliged to remain inactive while guns were being brought from Lahore—or, what appeared more probable, that nothing additional would be put in movement after us, but that we should be ordered to retrace our steps, and that we should be followed by all Moolraj's active and troublesome rabble, who would plunder our baggage, and keep us incessantly

on the alert. All this would happen, without taking into consideration the deadly effects of the sun in this month and May, and the probability of the rain setting in and rendering our movement impracticable, and making it difficult to find encamping-ground. Upon my return home I thought of these considerations, all of them being opposed to so feeble a demonstration, as well as of the season of the year being so unfavourable for military operations with European troops. I therefore got up at 3 A.M. and wrote my sentiments to the general, who had evinced no intentions of giving me written instructions upon this service.

“*Tuesday, 25th.*—Sent for by Sir F. Currie, whom I had seen early in the morning, when I could gather from his observations that he had his apprehensions about sending out the troops at this season of the year. When sent for the second time to the Residency, where I found the general, Sir F. Currie gave us an account of the attack made upon the mosque [at Mooltan], in which these poor young men [Agnew and Anderson] had taken up their quarters, and which had been fired upon by the citadel during the day of the 20th; of the garrison having come out and surrounded the mosque at night; of the escort having abandoned their trust of defending these poor fellows, and having gone over bodily to the enemy; and of these savage scoundrels having rushed into the rooms where the two wounded officers were lying, and having murdered them and mutilated their

bodies, which they afterwards exposed on the walls of Mooltan. The whole relation was very horrible and distressing. The news received to-day induced Sir F. Currie to abandon the idea of sending troops to Mooltan for the present, which I was not sorry to hear, for the sun is too hot for Europeans to bear without incurring a large loss of life as well as great sickness."

"*27th April.*—Publicly announced in orders that the movement upon Mooltan was countermanded. Very glad of this, for I foresaw no credit from our proceeding without guns to take the fort.

"*28th April.*—It would appear that Lord Gough has had pointed out to him by Sir F. Currie how desirable the march of a European force to Mooltan would be in a political point of view. I think his lordship will consider the season of the year and the near approach of the rainy season as objections to our moving before the cold season. I shall be very glad if I prove to be right in my opinion. I cannot stand the sun with impunity."

"*5th May.*—Sent for by Sir F. Currie to meet the general, the object being to inform us of the position of Lieutenant Edwardes, who had reached Leia,¹ on the Indus, from Bunnoo, and of intelligence having been received by him (Sir F. Currie) direct from Mooltan, to the effect that the troops with Edwardes

¹ Leia, a town on the left bank of the Indus, where Lieutenant Edwardes, one of the political assistants of the Resident, happened to be at this time with a small native force, engaged in the settlement of that portion of the territories of Mooltan.

were actually in treaty with Moolraj, and ready to join him upon a body of his retainers presenting themselves at Leia; that a force had been ordered to proceed from Mooltan on the 30th ultimo. Edwardes had reached Leia on the 25th; and it was feared that he would, not receive intimation of this treachery in his camp, and would not only himself be sacrificed, but that the fact of the defection of so large a body of Sikh troops would have the very worst possible effect upon the country, and render it probable that the troops under Major Lawrence at Peshawur might imitate the example, and murder, or permit the murder of, all the British officers in that direction. Sir F. Currie read also a correspondence between himself and the Commander-in-chief. He had urged upon the latter the great necessity, upon political grounds, of the revolt at Mooltan being put down, to which the Commander-in-chief in his reply pointed out the inexpediency and impracticability of carrying on operations at this season of the year. But while he stated these opinions, he was quite ready to comply with the instructions contained in a certain letter of Mr Secretary Elliot, which Sir F. Currie stated to be an order to his lordship to comply with any requisition for troops made to him by the Resident. It was very evident that both my chief and Sir F. Currie were uneasy about this place, and they determined to send for the following reinforcements from Ferozepore and Jullundur: A wing of H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons; a regiment irregular cavalry;

two regiments native infantry, the latter from Jullundur.

“*6th to 22d May.*—Nothing particular beyond a discovery made of one Khan Singh, with the Vakeel of the Ranee, being engaged in an attempt to seduce some of the sepoys. There was sufficient proof to show that both had communicated with different sepoyes, and had made promises to them if they would join in an outbreak which it was intended to make. These men having been seized, were tried, and condemned to be hanged, and were hanged accordingly. This act of vigour produced an immediate and good effect, by putting a stop to the blustering and vapouring of the idle people without employ, who were in the habit of taunting our servants and the sepoyes about the rising that was to take place, and which vapouring talk had the effect of frightening all the ladies, and of circulating reports of an apprehension which did not exist.”

Colin Campbell had kept both Henry and John Lawrence advised of these momentous occurrences, and had also communicated privately with Colonel Cureton, who was at Simla with the headquarters of the army, and from whom he received a “complimentary reply upon his views respecting the movement upon Mooltan.”

Colonel Cureton, writing on the 3d May, tells him : “Your most excellent detailed and very interesting letter of the 27th ultimo reached me this morning ; and it being the only intelligible account, to my knowledge, that has reached this, I knew it would

be so interesting to Lord Gough, that I did not hesitate reading it to him, and giving him, at his particular request, an extract from it. Lord Gough desires me to offer you his most sincere thanks for the clear, and the only clear, information it has afforded him of the late events, and to beg that you will, as far as you can, keep him aware of all that may be going on. It is little for me to say that I consider your view of the whole matter, as detailed in your letter to me, and in your official—which, as you desire, I herewith return—most just, clear, and soldier-like ; but that Lord Gough is entirely of the same opinion, I am sure will be gratifying to you—his first expression after hearing your letter being, ‘Thank God we had Campbell there.’”

Colin Campbell’s circumstances were by this time so much improved as to enable him to place his sister in a position of independence ; and this reflection produced a lightness of heart to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and “which, though it might be the cause of prolonging his stay in India, afforded him exceeding pleasure.”

On the 26th May he records the completion of his fortieth year of service, remarking that it was a long time to have served, and expressing his gratitude “that his health, under all circumstances, was wonderfully good, enabling him to go through as much exercise and fatigue as the youngest man in the force ;” and further, that “at that moment he was very nearly clear of debt, and of all pecuniary obligation.”

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS OF LIEUTENANT EDWARDES—MOOLRAJ SHUTS HIMSELF UP IN MOOLTAN—EDWARDES WATCHES MOOLTAN, AND AWAITS REINFORCEMENTS—COLIN CAMPBELL'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT NOT ACCOMPANYING GENERAL WHISH'S FORCE—EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL—PROGRESS OF THE REVOLT—SIEGE OF MOOLTAN—DEFECTION OF SHERE SINGH—SIEGE RAISED—COLIN CAMPBELL SECURES GOVINDGHUR—SHERE SINGH QUILTS MOOLTAN—PREPARATIONS FOR PUNJAB CAMPAIGN—APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL—JOURNAL OF EVENTS—RAMNUGGUR—SADOOLO-PORE—INDISPOSITION—JOURNAL—CHILLIANWALA—WOUNDS—COMMENTS OF INDIAN PRESS—REFUTATION OF CHARGES—LETTER OF ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

At the outset of these grave occurrences at Mooltan, an effort had been made to stem the revolt with the assistance of such native levies as were available at the moment. Lieutenant Edwardes's small force was in due time joined by a few thousand Sikhs and Pathans under Colonel Van Cortlandt¹ from Bunnoo, of which place they formed the garrison; and the Khan of Bhawalpore was called upon to threaten Moolraj's rear should a hostile movement be made

¹ Originally an officer in the Sikh army. He was subsequently made a Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab, and during the Mutiny raised and commanded a considerable force. For his services he was rewarded with the Companionship of the Bath.

from Mooltan against Edwardes. Cortlandt having joined Edwardes, the enemy was defeated on the 20th May; but the force under these officers was so small as to render its reinforcement by the troops from Bhawalpore—whose ruler responded loyally to the demands made upon him—an urgent necessity. Moolraj failed in his efforts to counteract this manœuvre, which was effectually executed—Edwardes and Cortlandt having crossed the Chenab on the 18th June and given battle to the advanced parties of the enemy, who were routed, and fell back upon Mooltan with a loss of six guns, their baggage, and stores. The motley force at Edwardes's disposal was now further augmented by a body of some few thousand men under the command of the Sheikh Imam-ood-deen, making, with the Bhawalpore allies, a total of about 18,000. Moolraj made a further but fruitless effort against the allied force on the 1st July, but his troops were driven back in disorder into the town with the loss of two guns. The result of this daring and brilliant enterprise on the part of this gallant and talented young officer was to shut up Moolraj in his fortress. Unprovided, however, with *matériel*, and with a force inadequate to undertake the siege of a place of such strength, Edwardes was constrained to sit down before it and watch the enemy. With this object he encamped in its vicinity, and applied to Lahore for reinforcements. The only troops despatched from Lahore up to this time were a body of 5000 Sikhs, which, on

the news of Edwardes's success on the 18th June reaching the capital, marched to Mooltan under the command of Rajah Shere Singh.

During the month of June affairs remained quiet at Lahore and in its immediate vicinity, the only exception being the despatch, under Colin Campbell's superintendence, of a small but lightly-equipped force across the Ravee in pursuit of one Bhaee Maharajah, a fomenter of rebellion, who, at the head of some four or five thousand followers, had made his appearance about 35 miles from Lahore.

“*Journal, June 30th.*—Wrote to Colonel Cureton about getting the command of the brigade proceeding to Mooltan. I hope for the appointment, and change of employment from a dull garrison-life, of which I am most heartily sick.”

“*July 7th.*—Called on Sir F. Currie in the morning. He showed me a letter from Lord Gough disapproving of any measures being undertaken by the regular army before the cold season. Told me he would not wait for the reference to Calcutta made by Lord Gough, but would move a brigade from here at once if circumstances should make it necessary. I do not think I can be put aside for another officer, if a brigade should go from this.”

“*July 9th.*—Received in the evening a note from Cureton, dated 5th, to tell me, by desire of Lord Gough, that it was his intention, if a brigade left this for Mooltan, that I should accompany it. I was also informed by Sir F. Currie that he had made

application to General Whish for a brigade to proceed to Mooltan with a siege-train—two regiments from this and two from Ferozepore—but that the general was going to order two brigades of infantry, with one of cavalry, and two troops of native horse-artillery, with a suitable number of foot-artillery to fight the heavy guns, and that the general himself intended to accompany the force. I could not reconcile this declaration with the assurance that I was to have a brigade, if one should leave this."

"*July 16th.*—Heard this morning of the general's application to be allowed to command the force having been acceded to, and that I was not to leave Lahore. This is a clear piece of jobbery. They have taken Colonel Harvey of the 52d Native Infantry."

Colin Campbell's disappointment was natural, as he had relied on the faith of Lord Hardinge's assurance, when he accepted the command, that he would be employed in the event of any portion of the Lahore garrison being required for field-service. This feeling was aggravated by the selection of two officers junior to himself for the command of brigades. But it soon passed away. Calm reflection enabled him to perceive, what the keen sagacity of Sir Charles Napier had originally detected as the weak point in the arrangements of 1846, that the policy of leaving Moolraj in possession of Mooltan would probably eventuate in another Punjab war. The occurrences at that place could only be regarded as the prelude to greater events—the spark

which ignited the train ; and in this view Colin Campbell comforted himself with the belief that the importance of Lahore as a military command, henceforth intrusted to his sole charge, would be enhanced during the general gathering of the impending storm.

The general progress of the revolt may be traced from the extracts which will now be given from the journal ; but to render the state of affairs more intelligible, it should be premised that General Whish, who had left Lahore on the 24th July with the column detailed from the garrison, reached Mooltan on the 18th August. The Ferozepore column joined him within the next few days, but the siege operations were delayed until after the arrival of the battering-train, which did not reach its destination till the 4th September.

“ *7th August.*—Dined at the Residency. A report that disaffection had been shown at Bunnoo, whence a party of troops were ordered to march with treasure. The cavalry portion had declared for Moolraj. They were brought to reason by the Mussulman commander. The regiment also of Sikhs, which had been discovered by Lieutenant Edwardes to have entered into terms with Moolraj when he was at Leia in the latter end of April, and which he sent in consequence to the rear to blockade a fort held by some Sikhs for Moolraj, had recently tried to join the troops in the fort, but were prevented by the Pathan chief who had the corps under his command. At the same time Captain Abbott, in Hazarah, reports

the regiment in that district to be very strongly in favour of Moolraj, and most anxious to join him or to move upon Lahore. I wish they would do so."

"*25th August to September 2d.*—Intelligence from the Hazarah country unsatisfactory. On the 26th, Chuttur Singh moved from his position, whilst his son was in the camp of Lieutenant Nicholson,¹ and driving the armed peasantry collected by Captain Abbott before him, marched in the direction of Hoosan Abdul. Lieutenant Nicholson, who was at that place, retired towards Attock on the 29th. Received information of these events yesterday, 1st September. Sir F. Currie desired me to request Brigadier Wheeler to hold his movable column in readiness to move in this direction. In the afternoon, when I informed him how bare he would leave the Jullundur if he should be obliged to call this brigade to Lahore, he desired me to limit the order of readiness to H.M.'s 61st Regiment, one regiment of native infantry, a troop or field-battery of artillery, and the regiment of irregular cavalry. This would leave Wheeler with one regiment of light cavalry, two regiments of native infantry, one troop or field-battery of artillery, and render it unnecessary, for the present, to send troops to the Jullundur from the rear stations of Loodiana or Umballa. My force here is sufficient, in my opinion, not only to provide for the protection and security of the city and can-

¹ The late Brigadier-General Nicholson, killed at the capture of Delhi in 1857.

tonment, but to admit of the employment of the following force in the field—viz., 300 sabres 14th Light Dragoons, 450 H.M.'s 53d Regiment, a troop of horse-artillery, and two regiments of native infantry. I have only to wish that circumstances should arise to render the employment of this little force necessary."

It has been seen with what a grateful feeling of relief Colin Campbell welcomed the happy moment which found him free from pecuniary embarrassment. The subject was constantly in his thoughts, frequent allusions to it occurring in his journal at this period; but from the entry on the 3d September, which is manifestly a reflection of his own feelings, it may be imagined how a sensitive temperament, such as his, must have fretted under a burden, which for so many years he had borne with honourable impatience. "The following observations," he remarks, "are so true respecting the state of mind of an honourable man when in debt, that I will here copy them: 'The life of an honourable man who is deeply in debt is a life of thraldom, frequently of despair, always of anxiety, and never of comfort. Contumely, and often insult, must frequently be borne with patience; and that resentment which nature invariably dictates, must be banished from the mind, provided the means of prompt payment be not at our disposal.'"

"9th September.—Reports from Peshawur and Hazarah to the 4th. One thousand Pathans, with an Afghan Sirdar, and Lieutenant Herbert, 18th Native Infantry, had been put into the fort of Attock, and the

boats removed to the right bank of the river. Chuttur Singh had retraced his steps to Hoosan Abdul, evidently satisfied that the fort was not to be gained. It is supposed his object now will be to try and release the garrisons of Gundur and Puklee, who are confined to these places by the armed peasantry."

"11th.—Heard a letter read to-day from Napier.¹ Opened his first parallel on the 7th. Eleven thousand men stated by him to be intrenching themselves between this parallel and the city wall. This bespeaks confidence in their own strength on the part of the enemy. Napier further represented the place to be much stronger than he had expected to find it.

"12th to 21st.—Heard on the 14th, by express, that the front of our approaches had been cleared by an attack in two columns, consisting of half our force. Attack successful; but from the private accounts, it would seem that the enemy were in no wise dismayed or discouraged by it. On the contrary, they came out and assailed in small parties our advanced position, just gained at the point of the bayonet. Beyond this position, and between it and the town, there was still an intrenched camp to be carried, behind which rose a high round mound, formerly a brick-kiln, upon which were mounted six field-guns (6-pounders), which completely covered and overlooked their intrenched camp. On the 14th, Rajah Shere Singh, with his troops, went over to the

¹ General Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., then serving with the Bengal Engineers, had accompanied General Whish's force to Mooltan.

enemy. This event led to the raising of the siege; but without the defection of the Rajah, the siege must have been given up, from our numbers being inadequate to carry on the duties of the trenches, and from the natural difficulties outside being far greater than we had expected to find them. Moreover, the enemy's numbers were far greater than we were prepared for; so that it was speedily discovered that our force was not adequate to push on the works in a vigorous manner, and at the same time control the operations and attacks of the enemy. This suspension of the siege will give great encouragement to the enemy, and the desertion of Shere Singh will no doubt be followed by the troops of the Durbar at Bunnoo, Peshawur, &c., &c. There is evidently the commencement of a nice little war in the Punjab.

"On the night of the 19th sent off 273 of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, followed by the 1st Native Infantry, to Umritzur, in order to get into Govindghur, if possible, without a fight." Govindghur was the fort of Umritzur, the ancient and sacred capital of the Punjab, so called from Govind, one of the disciples of Nanuk, and himself a great teacher and leader of the Sikh religion. At this place is the famous shrine dedicated to his memory; and as being the chief centre of religious fanaticism, the necessity for securing the fort at this juncture was obvious. "20th.—Heard of the entire success of the troops getting into the fort, and this morning (the 21st) of the infantry having got in also, and the Sikh troops

having been removed, so that the fort is in our own keeping, in which, I presume, it will remain. I hope this will satisfy the old lord."

Lord Gough lost no time in conveying, through Colonel Cureton, his unqualified approval of Colin Campbell's action in this matter, which "had relieved his mind of a load of anxiety,"—all the more so as it was evident, from the supplies, &c., found inside the place, that the measure had not been taken a moment too soon. At the same time Colonel Cureton informed Colin Campbell of the orders he had received to proceed to Ferozepore early in the ensuing month, and collect there the nucleus of a cavalry force, it being Lord Gough's intention at that time to assemble an army on the frontier, with the object of proceeding to Mooltan in command of such a force as would preclude any doubt of its strength being sufficient for the reduction of that place.

From this time until the beginning of November, Colin Campbell made no entry in his journal, the rapid march of events having thrown so much business on his hands, as to preclude his attending to matters of a private nature.

Early in October, Shere Singh had quitted Mooltan, and had marched with a force of 8000 men and 10 guns in a north-westerly direction along the Chenab, with the intention, it was presumed, of joining his father, Chuttur Singh, Governor of Hazarah. Elsewhere the revolt had spread. The Sikh troops in Bunnoo rose, and on the 24th October

the garrison at Peshawur followed their example—Major Lawrence with his family, and Lieutenant Bowie, having been obliged to seek refuge at Kohat, from whence they were delivered over as prisoners to Chuttur Singh. Attock had to be abandoned. Lieutenant Herbert, whilst escaping from that place, fell into the enemy's hands. Nicholson was fortunate enough to reach Lahore; whilst Captain Abbott, the only British officer left outside the capital, remained in the rugged country of the Hazarah, where he held out until after the final discomfiture of the Sikhs at Goojrat. Rebellion had also broken out in our own recently annexed province of Jullundur, giving ample occupation to Brigadier Wheeler and the troops under his command. In fact, the whole country had risen, with the exception of Lahore, which was threatened by the proximity of Shere Singh, and had to be carefully watched, both inside and out,—an attempt, which luckily failed, having been made to burn the bridge of boats across the Ravee within a mile and a half of the town.

In consequence of these events, Mooltan became the secondary object. Leaving the troops before that place to be reinforced from Bombay, the attention of the Government was primarily directed to the preparations for striking a decisive blow in the northern part of the Punjab, and for crushing Shere Singh, to whose standards crowds of disaffected Sikhs were daily flocking.

Although he had previously been given to under-

stand that there was a likelihood of his being employed in the campaign now imminent, it was not till the 1st of November that Colin Campbell knew for certain that his hopes in that respect were to be realised. By this time General Cureton, with the cavalry brigade, had reached Lahore, and had crossed the Ravee in support of Godby's brigade, which held the bridge-head on the right bank of that river.

On the 8th, Colin Campbell resumed his journal :

"Sir F. Currie is most anxious for an advance to the Chenab, in order to clear the Doab between that river and the Ravee. The military difficulties as regards this occupation are want of carriage and supplies, the commissariat being wholly unprepared to meet the wants of the troops for any forward movement upon the smallest scale. Received an order from the adjutant-general to form a strong brigade from the garrison of Lahore, and to advance with the former to the support of the force under the orders of Brigadier-General Cureton. Upon reference to the commissary-general, found that he could neither furnish the ten days' supplies which should accompany the troops, nor the carriage for its conveyance, supposing the supplies for a strong brigade for ten days were forthcoming; that he had merely sufficient carriage to move a wing of H.M.'s 53d or a couple of native corps. I referred the question to headquarters as to which I should take with me. Ordered to take the latter, the Commander-in-chief not deeming it advisable to take

from Lahore any portion of the 53d in the present state of the country. Selected the 36th and 46th regiments of native infantry ; and these two corps, after great difficulty about carriage, marched from Lahore on the 10th." Two days afterwards Colin Campbell joined Brigadier-General Cureton's camp at Dadur-sing-ki-killa, and took command of the troops in advance, with the temporary rank of brigadier-general.¹

" 13th.—My orders from the Commander-in-chief were to consult on all occasions with Cureton, who was in possession of his views and wishes ; to attack any irregular troops that might remain on the left bank of the Chenab ; but if Shere Singh should cross, that I was not to touch or approach him, or do anything to alarm him, but leave him until the arrival of the Commander-in-chief. On the 13th, Colin Campbell wrote as follows to Lord Gough : " I have had the honour to receive this morning your letter containing the copy of one from your lordship to the Governor-General, dated the 11th instant. I have read both these letters with the greatest attention. Your lordship may rest completely assured that your

¹ A second brigade of infantry, under Brigadier Eckford, with six guns, had crossed the Ravee and reached General Cureton before Colin Campbell left Lahore with the 36th and 46th Regiments. This brigade of Eckford's, 31st and 56th N.I., remained in charge of the camp at Saharun during the affair of Ramnuggur, all tents having been left standing, as it was his intention to return to the encamping-ground after the affair was over. Eventually the tents and baggage were brought to Ramnuggur on the 22d, under escort of these two regiments and the native troop of horse-artillery.

orders and instructions for my guidance, while in command of the troops in advance, will be most strictly followed and obeyed. My only desire is to obtain your lordship's approbation; and you may rely upon my using my best endeavours to succeed in this object, by following implicitly your instructions, and in acting to the best of my ability in carrying out the wishes and views of your lordship, so clearly defined in your letter now under acknowledgment. I need scarcely say to your lordship how truly glad and delighted I am to have Cureton here to act with me at this moment, and to be aided by his judgment and experience until your own arrival, or until relieved by a senior officer. My first step on arrival in camp yesterday morning was to consult with him, and to learn from him your lordship's views and wishes with respect to the proceedings of the force assembled here.

"According to Lieutenant Nicholson's report, Shere Singh is still opposite Ramnuggur. I feel confident that he will never venture to cross the river. There are, it is said, some three or four thousand recently-raised levies, with three or four guns, at Ramnuggur. I am told by Lieutenant Nicholson that the ford near to that place, as well as two others between it (Ramnuggur and Wuzeerabad), are now fordable for infantry — the deepest part, and that only for a short distance, in all of them, not reaching to the hip. The spies of Lieutenant Nicholson reported yesterday that the Bunnoo troops were still within three

marches of the camp of Shere Singh, hampered and delayed by having from 150 to 200 sick and wounded men to carry with them, and for the conveyance of which they were deficient of carriage. By the last accounts received by Lieutenant Nicholson from Peshawur, Chuttur Singh was still at that place. It is very clear that your lordship will be upon the Chenab, if not over it, some time before Chuttur Singh, with the Peshawur force added to his own in the Hazarah, can reach the Jhelum. Our force here appears to be well posted—equally convenient to move upon Ramnuggur or Wuzeerabad, should your lordship require a movement to be made upon either place, or upon any of the fords between the two places.

“I enclose a note I have just received from Wheeler. Your lordship will see that his force would be within six miles of the Ravee on the 11th. From the precautions he had taken to procure boats, I think it more than probable that he would effect the passage in a couple of days. He will be at Eminadab by the 15th at latest. I have ordered the 2d brigade of cavalry, with Cureton’s concurrence, to remain at Corria until further orders, as also the horse-artillery with that brigade.”

“*Journal, 17th.*—Marched from Dadur-sing-ki-killa to Saharun, near to Alkalghur, so as to be within reach of the enemy, who might remain on this side of the Chenab. Received orders from the Commander-in-chief not to disturb Shere Singh should he cross over from the right to the left or this bank of the river. Shere Singh was reported

to have crossed several of his battalions. The enemy were consequently in the situation in which the Commander-in-chief desired them to be left unmolested till his arrival."

"19th.—Enemy on the right bank. The people that came to this side are evidently nothing more than a mere look-out party. Desired to keep H.M.'s 61st, and to make arrangements for a flank movement upon Wuzeerabad, where it is proposed to cross a force under Cureton and myself."

"21st.—Lord Gough gave Cureton and myself permission to attack some infantry said to be on the left bank of the Chenab. On my way from headquarters, settled with Cureton to move the following morning without beat of drum or sound of bugle.

"22d.—The cavalry, consisting of Brigadier White's brigade, H.M.'s 3d Light Dragoons, 5th and 8th Light Cavalry, 12th Irregulars, with two troops of horse-artillery and one light field-battery; two brigades of infantry, consisting of H.M.'s 61st, 36th and 46th Native Infantry, commanded by Brigadier Hoggan, and 2d Bengal Europeans, with 70th Native Infantry, commanded by Brigadier Godby,—moved at 3 A.M. from our camp at Saharun, leaving tents standing, in charge of Brigadier Eckford's brigade, consisting of 31st and 56th Regiments N.I., and a troop of native horse-artillery. Cureton and myself had settled that we should return to our encamping-ground after the business had been concluded. The Commander-in-chief had promised to support our movement

by a forward move of either one or two of the brigades of the 2d division marching with himself to Ramnuggur. When my division was forming, the Commander-in-chief, with his staff and escort, came upon the ground, and virtually assumed the command of the operation. We moved in a single column : infantry in front, followed by the artillery, the cavalry bringing up the rear. The country a perfect bowling-green,—some portions cultivated ; and as the soil is light and dry, it is difficult to move the guns through it. As day broke, we formed a line of contiguous columns of battalions, with cavalry and artillery on either flank. Here the Commander-in-chief took a decided command and direction of the whole movement.

"The march was longer than we had expected. On passing to the right or eastward of Ramnuggur, we could see the enemy's position on the right bank of the river very distinctly. That bank is high and commanding, and completely overlooks the ground on this side, which is a dead flat, from the high ground, a ridge of low sandhills, on which Ramnuggur stands, to the margin of the river. In the rainy season, I should imagine, the whole flat must be covered with water. Some small parties of the enemy were observed to be hurrying towards the river. These, the Commander - in - chief directed, should be followed by the horse - artillery, supported by some of the cavalry. The battalions supposed to have been on this side—if ever there

were any in the position which had been described to us—had gone. The horse-artillery, in their eagerness to overtake the enemy, plunged down into the deep sandy bed of the river, and opened fire, immediately under that of the enemy posted on the high ground on the opposite bank, on some small parties of the enemy who were hurrying across the ford. In withdrawing from this too advanced position, an attempt was made to drag one gun and two waggons over a steep bank, against which they had been taken by their drivers. The bank was far too high to admit of a carriage being taken over it; and in this difficulty the gun, with the ammunition-waggons, were left. I came down at the moment the artillery were retiring; and seeing the gun in the difficulty, I spoke to Colonel Lane, who was retiring with his troop, when he replied that he had sent assistance to it. I proceeded to the gun with Captain Younger, Judge-Advocate of the division, and Lieutenant Tombs¹ of the Artillery, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General of the division. We stopped while two sets of horses were sent to try and remove the gun. But these efforts were ineffectual. The truth is, the gun could only be got out of the position in which it was by cutting down the bank, or by taking the gun to a considerable distance on either side of where it was placed—in doing which, our men would have been exposed to the fire of the whole of the enemy's

¹ The late Major-General Sir H. Tombs, V.C., K.C.B.

artillery, posted on the opposite bank, numbering 28 guns. I saw, after the first set of horses had departed, that the gun was not to be got away by such efforts as were being made; and I sent an officer, Captain Younger, to bring down two regiments of infantry in line, and to place them in a ravine a little way in rear of where the gun had been left, and where the infantry would have the gun on the spot where it had been left under their fire, in case the second effort of the artillery should fail. I saw I could do no good by stopping in a situation exposed to the fire of 28 pieces of artillery at point-blank range, and I accordingly went off with the intention of bringing down two regiments of infantry. On my way I met the Commander-in-chief, who disapproved of the measure. Whilst all this which I have been relating was being done, the enemy set up the most extravagant shouts of exultation from their whole army, and immediately sent across the whole of their cavalry to take possession of the gun. They came across very boldly and confidently; but they did not venture from the banks of the river, where they were charged by our cavalry, under the personal directions of the Commander-in-chief. These isolated fights of cavalry could lead to no positive result or advantage; for the enemy's cavalry were under the protection of their artillery, and could retire to the bed of the river, where they were under cover of musketry as well as of artillery fire.

"I spoke to Colonel Grant¹ about the disadvantage and evil of these isolated fights, and urged him to speak to the Commander-in-chief. I also met poor Cureton, for the last time as it turned out, and spoke to him about the uselessness of these duels between our regiments of cavalry and that of the enemy. While engaged in conversation with him to this effect, I observed the 14th Light Dragoons get in movement in direction of the enemy, and I observed that they were no doubt going to engage in one of these useless encounters with the enemy in the broken ground on the banks of the river. I begged him to go and look after them, to prevent their acting wildly or foolishly. He observed that the chief ought either to take the whole management into his own hands, or leave it to those whom he had made responsible. Thus we parted. I never saw Cureton again. He was an amiable and a truly good man, with much good sense and discretion, and an excellent officer of cavalry.

"Poor Havelock² of the 14th was also killed. . . . In the evening the troops were ordered to take up a line of an encampment immediately under the sandy ridge of low hills on which Ramnuggur stands. The night was very cold, and I had but little rest, being obliged to get up to look after pickets."

¹ Afterwards Sir Patrick Grant, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.; then Adjutant-General of the army in Bengal, and now Governor of Chelsea Hospital.

² Brother of the late Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.

“Friday, 24th.—Still at Ramnuggur. Baggage came up to-day. Sleeping in the open air with light covering is not agreeable.”

“27th.—Sent for by the Commander-in-chief, and offered the situation of adjutant-general [of the Queen’s troops, previously held by Colonel Cureton]. No desire for the appointment. Stated fairly and unhesitatingly my wish to get back to Europe.”

“November 30th.—Received an order yesterday afternoon to wait on the Commander-in-chief. Found there the other general officers of the army. The object of the Commander-in-chief in wishing to see us was to mention his intention of sending my division, with a brigade of cavalry and 28 field-guns, under General Thackwell,¹ to a ford midway between Ramnuggur and Wuzeerabad, to cross at that place, and, when over, to proceed to attack the enemy in their intrenched position opposite Ramnuggur.

“At half-past 2 A.M. my division,—consisting of H.M.’s 24th, the 25th N.I., and the flank companies of the 22d N.I., under Brigadier Pennycuick, C.B. ; H.M.’s 61st Regiment, and the 36th and 46th N.I., under Brigadier Hoggan ; with the 31st and 56th N.I., under Brigadier Eckford,—marched to join a cavalry brigade, three troops of horse-artillery, with a pontoon - train, two field - batteries, and two 18-pounders drawn by elephants.

“We had great difficulty in finding the place of rendezvous. Two brigades of infantry went astray,

¹ The late General Sir Joseph Thackwell, G.C.B., &c., &c.

but they fortunately reached the point in fair time. The cavalry had moved on, and their track was lost ; but, as daylight began to dawn, every portion of the force got into its place, and we all went onwards in great spirits. The movement was, in my view and in that of the general, a hazardous one—the placing a force under 7000 in a position in which they could not be supported, and where they might be opposed by 30,000.

"The country was perfectly level and tolerably well cultivated. After a march of fourteen or fifteen miles, we arrived at a part of the river which was guarded on the opposite bank by the enemy. It was the ford of Ranee-ke-Puttun ; and above this, about a mile higher up, was the ford at which it was intended the force should pass. Lieutenant Paton, Assistant-Quartermaster-General, was sent to examine it, and the approaches to it. His report was, that it was of this shape,



and breast - high in some places ; that the sand, through which the guns must pass, was very deep and heavy, and that the bullocks with the pontoon-train would certainly not be able to drag the pontoons through it ; and as he had not tried the ford personally, he could not tell whether the bottom of the ford was firm enough to bear horses. The enemy, moreover, were on the opposite side, ready to oppose our passage, and in such cover as to make it difficult for our guns to drive them from it. Besides, the bank

on the opposite side had a dark appearance, the sure sign of its being a quicksand. All these considerations made the general deem it hazardous to try and force a passage at a ford of which he knew so little, and he determined to go on to Wuzeerabad, about ten miles farther, where we knew there were some boats ; and the fact of there being boats at that place was a proof that there was no enemy on the opposite side, for at most places the banks are within match-lock-fire : so, had there been an enemy on the opposite bank, they would have obliged the boats either to come to them or to leave the place.


“ At about half-past seven or eight o’clock P.M. the head of the column (Pennycuick’s brigade) reached the bank of the river. There were fifteen or sixteen boats ; but the owners and hands of many had been taken away to show a ford at which the cavalry and baggage were to pass over. However, there were still some remaining ; and by dint of examination of the boats by Lieutenant Smith of the Engineers, several of the boatmen were discovered under the fore part of the boats. By ten o’clock H.M’s 24th Regiment, the 25th N.I., and flank companies 22d N.I., with 2 guns, were across the river. This secured the passage of the remainder. The night was very cold, and I had nothing but a small coverlet between Haythorne¹ and myself. The men, too, were without covering. By noon next day the whole

¹ His former major of brigade at Chusan, who had now joined him as A.D.C.

**SKETCH of the ACTION
at SADOO LAWALA or SADOO LAPORE.**

*between a part of the Sikh Army and the
Right Column of the Jinni of the Punjab
under the command of
M^G Sir J. Thackwell K.C.B. K.L.I.*

3rd Div. R.Y.S.



Unconventional Plan



force was across, the cavalry and the baggage having got across a ford. At two o'clock P.M. on Sunday, the 22d December, we marched ten miles through a highly cultivated country, and only halted long after dark."

"December 3d.—Marched at 6 A.M. Infantry in contiguous columns of brigades at open distance; cavalry on the flanks—the greater portion on the right flank, the one farthest from the river. The columns were halted by a misunderstanding of an order about eleven o'clock, when the corps were completed from the reserve ammunition to sixty rounds in pouch, and an issue of spirits was made to the Europeans with their breakfast. After this refreshment the troops moved forward close to the village of Langwala, when the general (Sir Joseph Thackwell) received a letter from the Commander-in-chief, to inform him that he had sent a reinforcement of the 9th Lancers and 14th Light Dragoons to join by the ford of Gurra-ke-Puttun, and that he was to wait at that ford, and not attack until these troops joined him.¹ The general immediately or-

¹ The allusion to the 9th Lancers and the 14th Light Dragoons having been sent to join Thackwell prior to the action is apparently a mistake. It would seem, on inquiry, that they were not ordered to do so until after Lord Gough heard of the action at Sadoolapore, and they only marched from their camp to the river opposite them on the day after the affair of Sadoolapore. But the Commander-in-chief had sent Thackwell reinforcements before the action, consisting of the Europeans and 70th N.I., under Godby; and, before the action commenced, a wing of the 56th N.I. and a wing of the 3d Irregular Cavalry, all under Colonel Jack, were sent by Lord Gough to the left rear of Thackwell's force, to cover Godby's crossing. It was for this

dered the troops to halt, observing that he had already come too far, and that we must wait until joined by the 9th and 14th, which he would go and look after. I asked him to allow me in the meanwhile to deploy and take up a position. He replied, ‘No. Remain as you are until my return.’ . . . Immediately after this conversation the general went to look after his reinforcement, and I rode to the front to reconnoitre. On riding some four or five hundred yards to the front of the centre, I saw several of the enemy’s horsemen; and, on proceeding a little farther, I observed in some ground, rather wooded and enclosed, to the right, a good many cavalry and infantry scattered over the ground. It was evident, from the numbers I saw of both arms, that a large body of the enemy were near at hand; and under this impression, I returned to the force, and directed the villages of Langwala, Khamoo-khan, and Rutta to be occupied each by a company of infantry as a precaution — for the force being divided into three inert masses, was not in a state of formation for troops to be when liable to be attacked at any moment. However, my orders were imperative. I was not to deploy, but to leave the troops in the formation in which they then were.

“Some two hours passed over, when the camp-followers were seen running in in great fright, and reinforcement, it is supposed, that Thackwell was anxious. They joined early on the 4th, before the force advanced from Sadoolapore, and many hours before the 9th and 14th, the two latter crossing the Chenab at Ramnuggur, and arriving late in the afternoon.

immediately afterwards followed the report of artillery, the shot of which came near our columns. At this time General Thackwell returned to the troops. Having, on his way back from the ford of Gurra-ke-Puttun, without finding the 9th or 14th, passed in front of the villages of Langwala, Khamoo-khan, and Rutta, and seeing companies of infantry in each of them, he ordered them to rejoin their corps. In anticipation that these villages would be held (for it was our true position), I had sent these companies to occupy them as a precaution, not having been allowed to take up the position with the whole force, that it might be secured to us, in case of the necessity arising for our occupation of it. The columns were immediately deployed. On the deployment being completed, the enemy were close to the villages; and as there were on our side of them large fields of sugar-canies, which were circular in form and would serve as admirable cover for the infantry, it was deemed advisable to retire a couple of hundred paces, so as to be out of musketry-fire from that cover. We retired accordingly in very perfect order; and, while free from the effects of musketry-fire from the sugar-fields, we obtained a beautiful open space, as smooth as a bowling-green, between us and the villages,—so that if the enemy had advanced to attack us, as we had expected they would, we had an open plain, on which to advance and attack them while debouching from the openings between the villages. The enemy, however, did not advance

beyond the villages, but took possession of them, and opened a heavy artillery-fire from some twenty or twenty-four pieces of artillery, while they attempted to turn our flanks by large bodies of cavalry.

“When the enemy were close to the villages, almost entering them, Sir Joseph Thackwell said, ‘We must advance and attack them.’ I replied, ‘That as they were advancing so cockily, we should allow them to come into the plain beyond the villages before we moved.’ When, however, the enemy halted at the villages and opened an artillery-fire, it was manifest to me that they had no intention of coming beyond that point; and I accordingly asked Sir Joseph Thackwell to allow me to attack them with my infantry, advancing in echelon of brigades from the centre, thus refusing both flanks to these attacks of cavalry, which were in truth feeble—for a few rounds from our guns repulsed each attack. He replied that he was afraid of his flanks. As the day advanced, I asked him a second time to allow me to attack, which he refused for the same reasons.¹

¹ In Sir William Napier’s ‘Life of Sir Charles Napier,’ vol. iv. p. 149, a letter from the latter is quoted, in which, referring to the operations in the Punjab in the winter of 1848, the statement, amongst others, is made that, on Thackwell being attacked by the Bunnoo troops, “our guns beat the Sikhs from their guns, and Campbell three times begged for leave to advance and take them, and then to charge. No! the Sikhs returned and carried off their guns in our sight.” Sir Joseph Thackwell, in a letter to Sir William Napier, of the 29th September 1857, published in the Appendix of the second edition, distinctly denies this. “The assertion,” he says, “that Campbell three times begged for leave to advance and take them (the guns), and then to charge (which I never heard of before), is totally unfounded in fact, for he never made any proposal to advance from the position which

Thus the day passed off in a cannonade from both sides. We lost some sixty-five or seventy men killed and wounded from cannon-shot. We slept on the ground, and next morning we found the enemy had moved off during the night in the direction of the Jhelum. We also advanced to the neighbourhood of Halum, meeting on our way the division of General Gilbert,¹ and the 9th Lancers and 14th Light Dragoons, which had crossed the Chenab at Ramnuggur. The baggage had not come up, and I again passed another night without cover, very cold and very uncomfortable."

This exposure resulted in an attack of fever, followed by bowel-complaint, which confined Colin Campbell more or less to his tent till the 10th January 1849, on which day the Commander-in-chief, with the 2d division of infantry and two corps of irregular cavalry, encamped within three miles in rear and to the right of the encampment of the 3d division.

had been taken up by the infantry, &c." I am not aware that Colin Campbell, who was engaged repressing the Sepoy Mutiny when this letter appeared, ever saw this denial. Sir E. Haythorne was not present when the conversation between Colin Campbell and Sir Joseph Thackwell took place; but a few minutes afterwards, Colin Campbell recounted to Haythorne the statement made in his journal, and on my joining him a fortnight later, Colin Campbell gave me the same version of it, describing it as a lost opportunity. The point cannot, therefore, be determined, both the actors being dead; though it is quite possible that Sir Joseph Thackwell, with his mind occupied with many matters on the occasion referred to, either did not understand or had forgotten Colin Campbell's proposal. It is only another instance of the many difficulties that attend the writing of contemporaneous history.—L. S.

¹ Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, commanding the 2d division of the army of the Punjab. He died a baronet and G.C.B.

“*Journal, 12th January.*—Marched: the infantry in two parallel columns to Dingee, directly to our right—country open and mostly cultivated; the cavalry and horse-artillery in one column on the left flank, covering the infantry,—all columns formed right in front.

“13th.—Dingee. The army moved forward, with a view of attacking the enemy, who had collected every man they could bring together in a position to cover the ford and boats in the neighbourhood of Russool. Their right, it was stated, rested on Moong, holding that village and two others between it and Russool, which is on the range of hills that begin to rise about half a mile to the westward, and run close to and in a line with the Jhelum up to the town of that name. The army marched in contiguous columns of brigades, in readiness to deploy at any moment. On approaching the village of Chillianwala,¹ fire was opened with jingalls from a mound rising above the general level of the surrounding plain. It turned out to be a mere advanced post, from which our heavy artillery speedily dislodged its occupants.

“The 5th (Pennycuick’s) brigade was deployed into line to attack this work, with the 7th (Hoggan’s) in support. I omitted to mention that the country

¹ Some important particulars of the share taken by the 3d division in the action of Chillianwala having been omitted from Colin Campbell’s journal, the deficiency will be supplied, in the form of notes, by extracts from his official despatch and a memorandum on the action, referred to *post*, p. 208.

from Dingee was one continuous jungle, open in some places, but such as would have disordered and broken a line formation to a considerable extent. We moved by our centre, where the heavy guns were placed, and which followed the track or road from Dingee to Chillianwala and Russool.

“On reaching Chillianwala I was directed to form line to the left of that village, my right resting upon it. Upon my left there were three troops of horse - artillery and Brigadier White’s brigade of cavalry. The ground upon which this force was formed was covered with wood dense and thick, as was also our front. Upon ascending a mud-pillar on the right of my division, I could observe the enemy’s position about half or three-quarters of a mile in my front. The 2d division was on the right of the heavy guns, with Brigadier Penny’s brigade somewhere formed as a reserve : the whole of the troops in line, without any portion in support or reserve save Penny’s brigade.¹

“On looking from the mud-pillar on the right of my division, I could perceive that the enemy occupied a position of some five or six miles, at least, in extent. This position was full of troops, with the whole of their guns, between fifty and sixty. Our heavy guns opened at the distance of 1800 yards, which immediately brought a reply from twenty or

¹ The troops piled arms, and camp-colourmen were called for by the quartermaster-general to mark out the camps, it being believed, both by divisional commanders and soldiers, that nothing more would be done on that day.—Mem., p. 4.


thirty of their guns in the centre of their position. This was about a quarter past one P.M.: About two o'clock I received an order to advance the division in line to attack the enemy in our front, who were not to be seen except from a height of fourteen or sixteen feet above the level of the ground on which we stood, owing to the trees and thick wood in our front. A battery (No. 5) of artillery, six 9-pounders, was placed between the brigades, and three guns on the left.¹ I was told by the staff officer who brought me the order to advance, that the three troops of horse-artillery on my left would support my advance.²

"The division advanced accordingly through the wood. I accompanied the left brigade.³ The wood

¹ The remaining three guns of No. 10 battery were detached to join the rear-guard (Brigadier Hearsey) early in the morning of the 13th, were with it the whole day, and took no part in the action.

² It is a fact worthy of record, and of great importance to the commander of the division, that instead of being supported on his immediate left by the 18 horse-artillery guns under Colonel Brind, as he had been twice informed he would be by his lordship the Commander-in-chief, the field-guns under Lieutenant Robertson, which had been placed by himself on the left of Hoggan's brigade, were taken from him by some unknown staff officer, for the purpose of aiding the horse-artillery, and did not again join him till the battle was at an end. These guns pursued a dangerous course, and were absolutely alienated from the duty which had been imposed on them by the Commander-in-chief, without the cognisance of the divisional officer under whom they had been placed. The name of the staff officer who so far forgot his duty as to give the order to Lieutenant Robertson is to this day unknown.—Mem., p. 6.

³ It was arranged between the brigadier-general and the late Brigadier Pennycuick, commanding the right brigade of the division, that the former should remain with the left brigade under Brigadier Hoggan—the brigadier-general considering this arrangement more



was thick in front of both brigades, but it offered many and more serious obstacles to the advance of poor Pennycuick's, the line formation of which was exceedingly disordered and broken, the companies in many places being obliged to reduce their front to sections ; whilst the regiments, during this state, were exposed to the fire of fifteen or eighteen pieces of artillery placed on a mound immediately in their front, from whence the advance of H.M.'s 24th and the other two regiments could be plainly seen, although the battery was concealed from the view of our men by reason of their being below it, and owing to the thickness of the jungle. H.M.'s 24th advanced at a rapid rate, and preceded the native corps on either flank. These corps, I am told, crowded in upon the 24th to escape the fire of the artillery, and by this means got mixed up with that regiment, adding much to their confusion. H.M.'s 24th continued their advance without firing a shot, though much disordered from the nature of the wood through which they had passed, as well as from their losses by artillery - fire. The enemy remained with their guns to the last ; and when Colonel Brookes and his officers and men stormed the battery,

advisable, as he could discern faintly in the distance that the enemy's right very much outflanked the British left. In considering the action of the 3d division, it is particularly necessary to bear this preconcerted arrangement in mind—the nature of the ground fought upon being such as to render it impossible that any commander could superintend the attack of more than one brigade. It will be necessary to distinguish very clearly between the respective attacks of the two brigades.
—Mem., p. 4.

they found, formed on slightly rising ground on each flank of the guns, large bodies of regular infantry, with a body of cavalry directly in rear of the guns. The infantry opened a deadly fire upon the 24th on its entering the battery, which obliged this noble corps to fall back—not, however, before they had spiked several of the guns. The cavalry immediately rushed forward as the 24th retreated, and cut down all wounded men. Brigadier Pennycuick, Colonel Brookes,¹ Major Harris, and 10 other officers, were killed at the guns, and Major Paynter, with 9 other officers, wounded, besides 203 non-commissioned officers and rank and file killed, and 266 non-commissioned officers and men wounded. The two native corps of this brigade, the 25th and 45th, lost, comparatively speaking, a small number, not having kept in line or gone so far forward as H.M.'s 24th. The colonel of the 25th told me that his men could not keep pace with the 24th in advancing. My own impression and belief, from what I saw myself of the conduct of the native troops when engaged, is that the real cause of their not keeping up with the 24th was the enemy's fire, and a want of sufficient inclination to approach it closely. This brigade, after being repulsed, retired to the ground from whence it originally advanced, and there remained.

¹ Colonel Brookes had been a brother officer of Colin Campbell's, having originally entered the 9th Regiment towards the close of the Peninsular war. Colin Campbell entertained sincere respect for Colonel Brookes as an officer and friend.

"The left, Hoggan's brigade, which I conducted, advanced without any great difficulty. I took care to regulate the rate of march of the centre or directing regiment (H.M.'s 61st), so that all could keep up; and consequently the brigade, consisting of H.M.'s 61st in the centre, 36th N.I. on the right, and 46th N.I. on the left, emerged from the wood in a very tolerable line. We found the enemy posted on an open space on a slight rise. He had four guns, which played upon us in our advance; a large body of cavalry in the immediate front of the 61st, and a large body of infantry immediately on their left, and opposite to the 36th N.I. The four guns were on the right of the infantry, and played upon the 61st and the 36th N.I. in their advance. The 36th N.I. went at the infantry, and were repulsed; while the 61st moved gallantly and steadily on the cavalry in their front, which steadily and slowly retired. As the 61st had nearly gained the ground on which this cavalry had stood, I desired the corps to open its fire to hasten their departure. [This fire was delivered as the troops advanced in line,—the manœuvre so constantly practised by Colin Campbell, and adverted to previously, *vide ante*, p. 102.]

"The fire put the cavalry to a hasty flight. About this time it was that the attack of the 36th had failed. . . . The enemy pushed forward two of their guns to within twenty-five or thirty yards of the right flank of the 61st and opened grape, while their infantry were completely in rear of the

right of the 61st. I immediately ordered in person the grenadiers of the 61st to be thrown back, and No. 1 company of this regiment to be thrown forward; and directed the commanding officer, who happened to be near me, to form the remainder of his regiment in the new direction. As soon as No. 1 company had wheeled forward and was in line with the grenadiers, I ordered these two companies to charge the two guns, and headed them in this exploit, which they performed in the most intrepid manner. As soon as these companies had taken the guns, they opened fire on the flank of the enemy in pursuit of the 36th N.I., and obliged them to desist and retrace their steps. In the meantime, the remainder of the 61st was formed upon the two right companies; and the officers of the 36th, with myself and other officers, tried to get the 36th to re-form upon the 61st, which we could not succeed in doing. The men were all talking together—many firing in the air, and all in confusion. During this halt for the completion of the formation of the 61st, the enemy advanced with two guns and fresh infantry, upon which the body that had attacked the 36th N.I., and had been driven back by the two right companies of the 61st, again formed. By this time the 46th N.I. had not formed on the 61st; but the confident bearing of the enemy, and the approaching and steady fire of grape of their two guns, made it necessary to advance, and charge when we got sufficiently near for that purpose. I gave the word to

advance, and subsequently to charge when near to the guns, heading the 61st immediately opposite the guns, as I had done in the former instance.¹ These two attacks gave the greatest confidence to the 61st; and it was evident that in personally guiding and commanding them in these two successful attacks under difficult circumstances, I had gained the complete confidence and liking of the corps, and that with them I could undertake with perfect certainty of success anything that could be accomplished by men.² I must here mention that a field-battery had advanced with us in the first instance between the two brigades, and three guns of another battery on our left; but the infantry outmarched the artillery, and our change of front to the right on the two right companies of the 61st speedily clouded the artillery, which did not join us until near the close of the day.

" After the capture of the second two guns, and dispersion of the enemy, we proceeded rolling up the enemy's line, continuing along the line of their position until we had taken thirteen guns, all of them at the point of the bayonet by the 61st. We finally met Brigadier Mountain's³ brigade coming from the

¹ This second charge of the 61st, before the 46th could move up upon the new alignment, was, in Colin Campbell's opinion, the most critical part of his operations during the day.—Mem., p. 9.

² "The 46th N.I., in its movement to form upon the left of H.M.'s 61st Regiment, was attacked by a large body of the enemy's cavalry, which it gallantly repulsed."—Extracted from Colin Campbell's official despatch of 15th January 1849.

³ The late Colonel A. S. H. Mountain, C.B., Adjutant-General Queen's troops.

opposite direction. During our progress we were frequently threatened by the enemy's cavalry, who had followed us, retaking the guns we had been obliged to leave behind us, our force not having admitted of our leaving a detachment for their protection.¹

"The Commander-in-chief came up late in the evening. There was a question of our remaining on the ground on which we then stood. His lordship appeared in doubt, and asked my opinion. He had ordered one brigade of General Gilbert's division, Brigadier Penny's, which had been in reserve during the day, and the remains of Brigadier Pennycuick's brigade, to encamp near the village of Chillianwala, and I respectfully suggested to his lordship that the safest and most prudent course would be to unite his force, and get it together in one body. We accordingly moved in the direction, as we supposed, of General Gilbert's camp.² I had ordered the engineer officer with me to take the bearing of Chillianwala before dark, and this precaution enabled us to move

¹ "During these operations," Colin Campbell reports in his despatch, "we were upon two or three occasions threatened by the enemy's cavalry on our flanks and rear, and obliged to face about and drive them off. The guns were all spiked; but having no means with the force to remove them, and it being too small to admit of any portion being withdrawn for their protection, they were, with the exception of the last three that were taken, unavoidably left on the field."

² The words "encamp" and "camp" used in this paragraph are misleading terms. There was no encampment, in the proper sense of the word. It was in the open ground near the village of Chillianwala that a portion of the army were at this juncture congregating, and where the whole force bivouacked for the night.

upon that village with confidence.¹ The fires of the enemy were in sight ; and but for this precaution in a dark night and thick wood, we might as easily have gone to their camp as to our own. The night was cold, and for some part of it wet. We were all, officers and men, without tents or other clothing than we had on : our horses were equally without covering or food, and we all passed an uncomfortable night. My wound was a deep sword-cut in the right arm, given me by an artilleryman of the enemy defending his gun, who first fired at me with his match-lock and struck me in the side, the ball having broken a double-barrelled pocket-pistol in my waist-coat-pocket, which interruption to the progress of the ball saved my life."

The day after the action, Colin Campbell wrote a short note with his left hand to his sister Alicia : "I am happy to inform you," he says, "that I escaped in the battle of yesterday with only a sword-cut of trifling consequence in the right arm. The muscles are not hurt to any extent ; for I can use my fingers as well as ever, and hope to write to you with my right hand in a few days, when you shall have some account of the part my own division took in the battle. It was a hard-fought one. The numbers of the enemy were fivefold greater than ours, and they had the advantage of a very strong

¹ Captain Haythorne, Colin Campbell's senior A.D.C., actually led the division to the bivouac ; for there was no light, and Lieutenant Irwin, the engineer officer, was unable to make out the points of the compass.

position. The portion of my division, which I conducted myself during the attack, was most successful ;—but enough for this day.”

On the 30th January he again addressed his sister as follows : “I am happy to inform you that the cut I received on the right arm on the 13th instant is closed, and I can now use the arm as well as ever. The fighting on the 13th was very severe. The enemy were strong in numbers and in guns, and in a favourable position. The troops I conducted myself were in a very critical situation during the greater part of the battle ; but they managed, by boldness and determined gallantry, to overthrow everything opposed to them : I should say H.M.’s 61st Regiment, which I led myself—for it was that corps which carried and overcame every difficulty. I had many miraculous escapes, for which I am duly thankful. The handle of my watch was broken by a ball. I had a pocket-pistol in my right waist-coat-pocket, which was broken to pieces by a ball, and my horse was wounded in the mouth. I got the sword-cut from an artilleryman of the enemy in charging some of their guns ;¹ but here I am,

¹ When Colin Campbell led the charge of the two right companies of the 61st after they had changed front, two of the enemy’s artillery-men fired at him from under cover of the gun nearest to him. One of these men, seeing he had failed in his object, rushed forward, sword in hand, and cut at Colin Campbell, inflicting the wound on his right arm mentioned in the text. These Sikhs were immediately destroyed by the grenadiers of the 61st Regiment. It was not till the following morning, when his junior aide-de-camp was assisting Colin Campbell to take off his clothes in his tent, that the latter became aware that he

thank God, safe and sound, and quite well. We are not to attack the enemy again until the force which we had at Mooltan arrives here. It is expected about the 14th of next month, when, I hope, we shall be able to bring this war to a conclusion. The loss of so many fine fellows, and that of my oldest and dearest friends, is very saddening. If it should please God to take me through this war, I hope my circumstances will admit of my return to England in the course of another year. I must say, however, that I never entered action with a lighter and happier heart

had been hit in another place. A bruise was then discovered below the lowest rib on the right side ; and on further examination, a hole was found in the right lower pocket of a waistcoat worked for him years before by a fair Northumbrian friend, who had made him promise to wear it during his aguish attacks, or on any occasion that he might deem useful. In the pocket of this waistcoat his aides-de-camp had, on the morning of the action, jokingly, and not without remonstrance from their general, placed a small pocket-pistol—the gift of a brother officer. The same shot smashed the ivory handle of the pistol to atoms—breaking, at the same time, the handle of his watch. But, humanly speaking, it saved his life ; for the ball hit him in a direction that, but for the intervention of the pistol, must have been fatal. Finding that the charger he had ridden was amiss and could not eat, he brought the animal into the tent shared by himself and one of his aides-de-camp. For forty-eight hours the horse remained there—not the most pleasant of companions in so confined a space—till at length Hope Grant, then commanding the 9th Lancers, brought his veterinary surgeon, and discovered the cause of the animal's inability to eat. It had been wounded in the mouth by a musket-shot, which had passed through both sides of the mouth, finally lodging in the curb-chain. This was the shot of the second Sikh artilleryman from behind the gun. The pistol is now in the possession of General Sir E. Haythorne ; the curb-chain, with the bullet flattened in it, in that of the writer of these pages.—L. S.

than upon the recent occasions, for I had you provided for."

Whilst Colin Campbell's account of the part he took in the action of Chillianwala is fresh in the reader's mind, it may not be out of place to record, at this stage of the biography, that the result of the battle, contrasted with the loss sustained in it, gave rise to much criticism in the Indian army. Rumours of all kinds were circulated and discussed in the Indian press—the disaster that befell Pennycuick's brigade being directly attributed to want of precaution on the part of its divisional leader. Colin Campbell, being impressed with the idea that a willing ear was lent to these reports at headquarters, took measures to controvert them; and after obtaining narratives from the chief of those who held subordinate commands in his division, he prepared a memorandum for private circulation, in which he refuted the charges brought against him—

1st, That Pennycuick led his brigade into action with unloaded muskets;

2d, That Colin Campbell did not properly employ his artillery;

3d, That he did not cover his attacks.

The first charge, which Colin Campbell regarded as "almost too puerile to require contradiction," was met by the assertion that "all proper precaution was observed by Brigadier Pennycuick in the arrange-

ment and disposition of his brigade at the commencement of the action.”¹

The refutation, however, of this and the other charges, will be best understood from the following letter, addressed by Sir Patrick Grant, the Adjutant-General of the Indian army, who served in that capacity during the Punjab campaign, to his father-in-law, Lord Gough :—

“CAMP, PESHAWUR, 2d February 1850.

“MY DEAR LORD,—I have had a very long and most interesting conversation with Sir Colin Campbell about Chillianwala, and he is most anxious that I should make you acquainted with the substance of it, and with the nature of the documents he has shown to me in the original. I can, of course, have no objection to do so. I told Campbell that I conceived he had not made the use he might have done of the artillery attached to his division—viz., No 5 light field-battery, and three guns of No. 10 (the other three were with the rear-guard). He has put into my hands a letter from Lieutenant Robertson, who commanded the three guns of No. 10 battery, in which he states that, after receiving orders from Campbell to advance with these guns in line with the skirmishers, a staff officer—who, he cannot say—rode up to him, and directed him to take his guns to the left and assist the horse-artillery; that he

¹ The writer saw Pennycuick's brigade load previously to the advance of the 3d division against the Sikh outpost on the mound.

did so, and did not again join the infantry until after Campbell had formed his junction with Mountain at the close of the battle. Campbell has in vain endeavoured to discover who the staff officer was. The artillery officers who were with those guns, Lieutenants Robertson and Heath, write that they do not know, and have been unable to find out his name. Thackwell writes that he sent no such order to the battery, and so does Brind, who commanded the horse-artillery. But the fact is undoubted that the guns were taken away as described, and that Campbell lost their services. Again, Major Mowatt, the senior artillery officer with No. 5 battery, acknowledges in writing that, when the advance of the division was ordered, Captain Haythorne, Campbell's aide-de-camp, rode up to him and communicated the brigadier's orders for him to advance his battery in line with the skirmishers whom Brigadier Pennycuick had, by Campbell's orders, thrown out to cover the front of that brigade (the right one of the division), and to 'open his fire as soon as he could get a good sight of the enemy.' This Mowatt did; but the rapid advance of Pennycuick's brigade carried them in front of the battery at the very commencement of the action, and rendered the battery next to useless. But this was not Campbell's fault, whoever was to blame; and I must say, all that he has shown to me completely removed the impression, which I frankly told him I had entertained, of his having neglected to avail himself of his artillery to the proper extent.

He is most anxious that you should know exactly what were his proceedings throughout the day; and when you have seen all he has placed before me in original (and he will send you copies by the next mail), I feel very sure that, with me, you will think he did his duty like a brave and experienced soldier, and with consummate judgment and skill. He has the highest respect for your lordship; and in the desire and earnest hope of retaining the good opinion of his old commander, he wishes you to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.— Believe me, my dear lord, affectionately yours,

“PATRICK GRANT.”

CHAPTER VI.

ENCAMPMENT NEAR CHILLIANWALA—FALL OF MOOLTAN—JOURNAL
 —ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS—RUSSOOL ABANDONED—STRENGTH OF
 SIKH POSITION—JUNCTION OF LORD GOUGH'S WITH GENERAL
 WHISH'S FORCE—ADVANCE TO GOOJRAT—ENEMY'S POSITION—
 BATTLE OF GOOJRAT—COLIN CAMPBELL'S SHARE IN THE ACTION
 —DEFEAT AND PURSUIT OF SIKH ARMY—COLIN CAMPBELL JOINS
 PURSUING FORCE—BEHAVIOUR OF SIKHS ON LAYING DOWN THEIR
 ARMS—ATTOCK—JUMROOD—COMMAND OF SIND SAGUR DISTRICT
 —LETTER REGARDING OPERATIONS—13TH AND 22D N.I.—K.C.B.
 —RECEPTION BY 61ST REGIMENT—APPOINTED TO PESHAWUR
 COMMAND—SIR C. NAPIER AT PESHAWUR—EXPEDITION TO KOHAT
 —COLIN CAMPBELL VISITS CASHMERE—ILLNESS—ADDRESSES SIR
 H. LAWRENCE ON SUBJECT OF KOHAT PASS—RESIGNATION OF SIR
 C. NAPIER.

THE day after the battle, the army encamped in the immediate vicinity of Chillianwala. In this position, which he strengthened with breastworks, Lord Gough determined to await the result of the final attack on Mooltan, and the reinforcements which would become available on the reduction of that fortress. The Bombay column having joined General Whish's force on the 21st December 1848, the attack was renewed six days later; and on the 22d January 1849 the place fell, Moolraj surrendered, and the besieging force forthwith commenced its

march to join Lord Gough. For many days nothing of importance was recorded by Colin Campbell in his journal. Much rain fell, causing great mortality amongst the cattle, and rendering the movement of troops, especially that of heavy artillery, wellnigh impracticable.

"Journal, 6th February.—Three or four days ago the enemy moved a large portion of his force from his right down upon the low ground at the spur of the hill, where he had joined the river by an intrenchment to the left of Russool, and as far as Pooran, which is close to the pass of that name. It was supposed by our headquarter people that the object of the enemy was precautionary and defensive, and not aggressive; but as we were expecting a large convoy from Goojrat, the Commander-in-chief became very uneasy for its safety. I looked upon the move of the enemy behind the hills, which screened the operations from our view, as intended for future offensive operations against our right flank and rear; but the Commander-in-chief thought otherwise, though a movement on our part to our right, to Khoree or Dingee, which I deemed prudent and advisable, especially as the enemy had moved the larger portion of his army to his left, could not be regarded as a movement in retreat. But the political officers were then averse to moving our position, as was also the Commander-in-chief; so that nothing was done. The convoy came in safely under a large escort the next day, and all apprehen-

sion or opinion of the necessity for a movement to our right, to meet and counteract that of the enemy to their left, appears to have been given up. On the 3d, we heard of the enemy clearing the Pooran pass; on the 4th, that he had a few troops on our side of the pass; and yesterday, that he had moved eleven or twelve regiments of infantry to this side of it, with twelve guns—the former being placed in front of a belt of jungle which covers the mouth of the pass, and the latter in rear of the jungle. There was a meeting of general officers, chief engineer, and Major Mackeson,¹ chief political authority, on the subject of our present position. Everybody condemned it as a bad one, the nature of the ground admitting of the enemy turning both our flanks and getting in our rear unseen by us, without our being able to prevent him—a movement he could effect at any moment. Major Mackeson urged strongly the move to Dingee, with a view to obtaining supplies and securing forage for our cattle, of which the possession of that place by the enemy would deprive us. An opinion, however, was expressed by Grant, the Adjutant-General, that we could manage to feed our cattle as we had done before, and that the enemy being now out of the pass, it would be as well to remain where we were until General Whish had joined or was near to us; that if the enemy moved upon Dingee, we could move and attack him; that he would not be likely

¹ The late Colonel W. Mackeson, C.B.

to move so far out of the pass with his guns. In short, no definite conclusion or determination was arrived at, and the party separated."

"*12th February.*—All the tents at Russool have disappeared. There do not appear to remain any but irregular troops, who are formed in line along the crest of their intrenched position at Russool. As the morning advanced, we could observe the enemy gradually retiring from his right along his rear at intervals. The movement to his own left was completed by mid-day. They retired very gradually, and diminished their numbers so slowly, that it was necessary to watch them very closely to be aware of their intentions. By three o'clock the whole had withdrawn from Russool, and our officers were riding amongst the works they had abandoned.

"*13th.*—Reports brought in that the enemy had detached four regular battalions, with eight guns, to the pass of Khurreean, and that Owtar Singh had gone with his division to Jhelum. In the evening we observed the fires of the picket in the pass of Khoree, very strong and numerous. Reports were also brought in by a spy of the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General Garden, that 400 infantry and 4000 cavalry had actually marched from the neighbourhood of Khoree for Goojrat, and that the report in the bazaar of the enemy was that the whole were to march to Goojrat.

"*14th February.*—Rode this morning to Russool, to look at the position and the works which the

enemy had abandoned. I never saw a stronger position ; nor did I ever see one so well improved by works so admirably arranged, and so well adapted for the purposes of defence. It was indeed most fortunate that we had not to storm this place, for most probably we should have failed ; and even had we been successful, our loss must have been frightful.

“ Heard of the enemy’s whole force, which had been encamped at Khoree, having marched from thence to Goojrat at four o’clock this morning, just as the moon rose. I heard a gun fired at three o’clock in the direction of their camp, which, it appears, was the signal to strike tents, and the whole army was off at four. They will plunder that rich country, and I have no doubt, if followed, will either take up a position behind Goojrat, with or without the sanction of Gholab Singh, and there give us battle, or, after plundering Goojrat of all its supplies, start off to Jhelum, and cross to the right bank of that river, where it may not be convenient for us to follow them this season.

“ *13th February.*—Marched this morning to Lussoorie—the whole force in a single column of route by the road of Mukhnawala, through the jungle, which was in many places very thick : distance about twelve miles. The object to be nearer forming a junction with the force of General Whish, while we should be nearer the Chenab, in case of the enemy venturing to cross for the purpose of pushing on to Lahore.”

"*16th February.*—Marched by Parowda to Sudalpoor. Country open. Enemy reported to be threatening to cross at Wuzeerabad. My own idea is, that this is a mere threat, with a view to get us to divide our forces, so that we may not have all our Europeans and guns in the battle which must take place in a few days, and which will decide in whose hands the empire of the East is to remain ; for that is the point at issue, and by the result of the approaching conflict will this point be settled. God grant that we may be victorious ! and if it should please Him to take me through with life in the coming fight, I will endeavour to get home during the ensuing cold weather, and there pass the few years that it may please the Disposer of events to assign to me in this world, in the society of the few persons still remaining whom I love most, away from details of military command, of which I have become very tired, and with which, when neglected by those under me, I find I have no longer the temper or patience to bear as I ought to do. I shall therefore be happy to have an opportunity of enjoying tranquillity in the retirement of private life, which I should have sought for long ere this, had my means or the circumstances of the times admitted of my indulging this long-wished-for happiness.

"*17th February.*—Marched, after daylight, from our encampment near Sudalpoor to Isharah. The enemy is said to be threatening to pass at Wuzeera-

bad. We are near the river (the Chenab), so that some part of General Whish's force, which has moved up the left bank to Wuzeerabad, may be in a situation to cross over to the right bank and join us."

"19th.—Moved to Koonjah, whither the political officers wanted to move some days ago, and which, most likely, would have brought on a general action before the Mooltan force had joined us. General Whish, with one brigade of infantry, joined last night, bringing with him 10 guns (horse-artillery); and, very late this evening, Brigadier-General Dundas,¹ with the Bombay division, including two European regiments (H.M.'s 60th and Bombay Fusiliers), detachment Scinde horse, and a troop and battery of artillery—12 guns. This division has marched upwards of sixty miles in the last three days.

"20th February.—Made another short move to our right and front to Shadeewal and towards Goojrat, with the object of bringing us nearer to the enemy's position, and to give the Bombay troops a little respite after their long marches, that they might be better fitted by rest for the day of battle, which, it is evident, will take place to-morrow. The position of the enemy was plainly to be seen from the top of a high house in Koonjah, and also in this village. Their camp seems to go all round Goojrat, and close to it; their cavalry, infantry, and

¹ Afterwards General Viscount Melville, G.C.B.

artillery in a sort of semicircle round the eastern and southern side of the town, at some distance from it. Their right was behind a nullah, said to be very deep, which makes a sudden bend at nearly a right angle, and runs in a tortuous manner down to the village of Shadeewal. Their centre and left were in the open plain, covered by three villages called the greater and lesser Kalra, which they occupied as infantry-posts to cover their centre and left, with their artillery in the intervals—their main body of infantry being in rear, and their cavalry massed on both flanks. The Commander-in-chief determined to attack the centre and left; whilst the British left should threaten the nullah, but not attempt to cross it until he should send further instructions.

“*21st February.*—Waited on the Commander-in-chief at daylight with the other general officers. He mentioned generally his plan of attack, adverted to in my journal of yesterday, without giving any detail of movement or disposition of the troops for the attack. I formed my two brigades, commanded by Carnegie and M‘Leod, in contiguous columns of regiments, with a very strong line of skirmishers in front; the artillery in line with the skirmishers. When we arrived within long range of the enemy’s guns we deployed into line. The Bombay column conformed in all respects to what I did on their right. In this order the artillery, twelve 9-pounders, in line with the skirmishers, and the infantry, in line close in rear, advanced, the whole of them

as at a review—the artillery firing at the masses of infantry and cavalry formed beyond the nullah, who gradually melted away under the effects of this fire, and took shelter in the nullah. As we advanced, an effort was made by some of the principal chiefs to bring forward their cavalry to attack the advancing line; but it was evident from my position, from whence the movement could be seen in flank, that the willingness was confined but to a few hundreds. These were in front, following their chiefs, who were leading. The horsemen in rear of this more willing body evidently went forward reluctantly. The infantry, who had taken shelter in the nullah, accompanied this movement in a very disorderly and tumultuous manner. These latter were in vast crowds. I caused the artillery of my division to be turned on the flank of this advance of the enemy, while the Bombay troop of horse-artillery fired direct to the front. This double fire in front and flank caused them to waver, and finally to give way. They retired across the nullah, some of the infantry stopping under cover of its banks, from whence I finally dislodged them by my own artillery, which enfiladed the nullah, and which was moved forward and placed in position for that object. I received orders to storm this nullah; but to have done so with infantry would have occasioned a very useless and most unnecessary sacrifice of life. And seeing that this end could be obtained by the use of the

artillery without risking the loss of a man, I proceeded upon my own responsibility to employ my artillery in enfilading the nullah ; and after succeeding in driving the enemy out of every part of it, I had the satisfaction of seeing the whole left wing of our army, including my own division, pass this formidable defence of the enemy's right wing without firing a musket or losing a man. This was a very great and exceeding satisfaction to me. We had too much slaughter of human life at Chillianwala, without due precaution having been taken to prevent it by the employment of our magnificent artillery. Having felt this strongly, and having expressed it to the Commander-in-chief in warm terms, I determined to employ this weapon against the enemy to the fullest extent, whenever we should again come in contact with them,—and I did so, accordingly, in the battle of Goojrat.

“The discomfiture of the enemy was complete. All arms, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, left the field in the greatest disorder and confusion. The rout of the enemy was too complete to admit of the reunion of any very large number of the enemy in anything like order.

“The army halted about a couple of miles beyond Goojrat, on the road to Jhelum and Bhimbur—a great mistake, in my opinion. The cavalry and some of the horse-artillery followed the enemy on the road to Bhimbur, and took seven guns which the enemy had been obliged to abandon. The

cavalry returned to Goojrat that night: another mistake.

“ 22d February.—Sent for by Lord Gough. Told I was to march to Dowlutanuggur with my division. Marched at 2 P.M. H.M.’s 9th Lancers and 8th Light Cavalry accompanied the division. Heard of nine guns having been abandoned by the enemy about twelve miles’ distance, and of two more at a farther distance. The first nine were sent for from headquarters; the last two were brought in by my division.”

“ 25th.—Returned by order to Goojrat. A force having been sent across the Jhelum after the main body of the retreating army, I concluded my fate would be to remain with the Commander-in-chief until the breaking up of the army of the Punjab, and that I should have no more campaigning in India.

“ 26th.—Went over the field of battle. A good many bodies: all Sikhs; very handsome men—many very old.

“ 26th February to 5th March.—At Goojrat. On the latter day received an order to replace Brigadier-General Mountain in command of the infantry division under Sir Walter Gilbert, in consequence of his having become unfit for duty from a wound in the hand by the accidental discharge of his pistol.

“ 6th March.—Goojrat. Started with Haythorne, Grant, and Anson, 9th Lancers, and Durand, Engineers, for Barwala, on the road to Khurreean. Took leave of

the 3d division in an order of the day. Sorry to part with men with whom I had fought in the field. The 61st—my favourite regiment—had already preceded me to join the force under General Gilbert, of which I was very glad. It is pleasant to serve with men with whom you have been engaged in the field. I knew I possessed the confidence of the men and officers of that corps."

"*15th March.*—On the road to Rawal Pindi, we passed the greater portion of the Sikh army with its chiefs, who had laid down their arms the day before. They were without food, and also without ammunition—not above five or six rounds per gun. The high priest, or Gooroo, who took the chair on the right of the general (Sir Walter Gilbert), after laying down his arms, said to him, in a loud and firm voice,—‘The injustice of the English drove me to take up arms. They confiscated my property in the Jullundur Doab, amounting to five lakhs annually. Poverty, starvation, and want of ammunition have obliged me to surrender. These wants have brought me here. But for these wants, we should have again tried the fortune of war. I do not regret what I have done; and I would do the same to-morrow if it were in my power.’ There was nothing cringing in the manner of these men in laying down their arms. They acknowledged themselves to have been beaten, and that they gave in because they were starving. They were without money, food, or ammunition. There was nothing offensive in their

manner in saying these things. Each man, as he laid down his arms, received a rupee, to enable him to return to his home. On receiving this money, numbers were seen to go to the bazaar to buy food, without which they had been for some days. The greater number of the old men especially, when laying down their arms, made a deep reverence or salaam as they placed their swords on the ground, with the observation, ‘Runjeet Singh is dead, or has died, to-day.’ This was said by all of them with deep feeling. They are undoubtedly a fine and brave people.”

Colin Campbell reached Attock in advance of his division on the afternoon of the 19th, having made a strenuous effort to catch up Sir Walter Gilbert, who had arrived there that morning. This he accomplished after a ride, in a hot sun, of upwards of forty miles—“thanks,” as he states, “to his own good horse, and his own constitutional capability of enduring any amount of fatigue.”

“*Journal, 17th March.*—Sir Walter Gilbert having ridden forward with his staff, the Afghans, who were opposite Attock engaged in setting fire to the bridge, loosened the remaining portion of it as he approached, and the boats floated down the Indus. The boatmen on the banks speedily collected them, and with the aid of some boats that were in the Cabul river, which empties itself into the Indus a few miles above Attock, the bridge was re-established late on the following night—the 18th.”

The following day Colin Campbell marched with his division to Peshawur, reaching that place on the 21st, and finally encamped within four miles of the fort of Jumrood, at the mouth of the Khyber Pass, through which the Afghans had retreated three days previously. The campaign was at an end ; but Colin Campbell was detained a short time at Peshawur, having been directed to inspect and report upon a site for a cantonment for the troops detailed for its garrison. There he remained till the first week in April, when he left for Wuzeerabad, at which post he had been given to understand he was to be stationed ; but on reaching Rawal Pindi he found an order directing him to remain at the latter place and assume the command of the Sind Sagur district, extending from the Jhelum to Attock.

Though the emoluments of the Sind Sagur command were the same as those of Wuzeerabad, the force stationed at the latter place was in number and quality far more important than that at Rawal Pindi, which consisted of one European regiment (the 53d), a battery of field-artillery, two regiments of native infantry, and a regiment of irregular cavalry ; but Colin Campbell reconciled himself to the inferior command on the ground that the war was at an end, and that the objects he had in view could as easily, if not more effectually, be accomplished at Rawal Pindi, as at a larger station during the short period he proposed to himself to remain in India. Here he shared with his friend Mansfield the Sikh com-

mandant's house, which he describes as being "without doors, and very deficient in accommodation;" but he was indisposed to put himself to the trouble of building, as he was uncertain how long he would be kept at Rawal Pindi.

The entries in his journal at this period are few, and made at uncertain intervals, owing, he admits, to idleness and the absence of anything to vary the monotony of his daily life. In the beginning of May, however, his old friend and esteemed commander, Sir Charles Napier, assumed command of the Indian army, and forthwith put himself in communication with Colin Campbell, whose opinion he sought on many points connected with the discipline and interior economy of the army of India.

In a letter written in June to one of his oldest and most attached friends,¹ Colin Campbell reviewed some of the incidents of the campaign just concluded : "Our recent operations here were carried on in a part of the country full of interest, from having been the scene of Alexander's movements on the banks of the Hydaspes (Jhelum), of his masterly passage of that difficult river in the presence of Porus and his army, who were watching him on the opposite bank, and of his victory over that monarch and his forces immediately afterwards. I was in that neighbourhood when your letter reached me, and I regretted

*¹ The Reverend J. C. Clutterbuck, Vicar of Long Whittenham, Abingdon.

much that I had not the pleasure of having you with me to go over the battle-ground and to accompany my division in pursuit of the portion of the Sikh army which held together after the battle of Goojrat, across that river at the ford at which Alexander had effected the passage, and which was the only one in that vicinity.

"The river at that point is very wide and very rapid ; in the latter respect it is so in all parts. There is a large island in the middle, which divides it into two streams of nearly equal breadth. Alexander believed this island to be the mainland or left bank of the river, from the appearance it presented from the opposite side, and was not a little surprised to find, on reaching the bank in sight, that only half his difficulty had been overcome, and that he had still another river, as it were, to pass before he could reach his enemy. He brought his force to the island, where it encamped, while preparations were being made to accomplish the passage of the second stream. In the same way we were constrained to make a double operation of the passage. We first crossed to the island, and from thence passed to the right bank. Like the force of Alexander, we were attended by natives with inflated skins, who saved such men and animals as were carried down by the force of the stream.

"I had the good fortune to be employed and present in every affair in which there was anything to do during the late campaign, including the pur-

suit of Dost Mahomed and his Afghans to the Khyber Pass.

"The Sikhs, as a nation, have been completely subdued, and, happily for the comfort of both parties, are perfectly sensible of their discomfiture and of the utter helplessness of their ever being able to contend with our power in this country. They are certainly a fine race of people, and unquestionably in single combat as fearless as any men in the world. They had acquired, under the instruction of French officers, no small amount of tactical knowledge, and being animated by the fierce fanaticism which the tenets of a proselytising and martial religion imparts, were found by our native infantry to be a more formidable and determined enemy to contend with, than any of the numerous peoples of the middle and southern portions of Hindostan with whom they had previously come in contact, and whom they had succeeded in subduing.

"After I had been some days in front of the Khyber Pass, and the flight of Dost Mahomed into his own country being undoubted, my division was broken up, and I was ordered to this place to make a cantonment, and to assume charge (military) of the district or portion of country between the Jhelum and the Indus. There are no Sikhs in this Doab, called Sind Sagur. The population is entirely Mohammedan. They are a quiet, docile, and industrious people, not in the least likely to give me any trouble during the time of my probable residence

amongst them. I confidently trust that my stay in this country will not be prolonged beyond the latter end of next year, by which time I hope to have realised the only object which could induce any one, I imagine, to stay in this climate—the saving of a little money.

“The climate of this place is reported to be healthy during the months of August and September, when fevers and dysentery prevail very much amongst the natives; but the sun burns very fiercely in these regions during the summer months, and as tents are our only covering at this moment, the heat is scarcely durable. The thermometer stands in my tent at this moment (2 P.M.) at 106°. It is, in fact, like living in a caldron. We are busy building houses and sheds under which to place our tents to keep off the rays of the sun. . . .”

In the middle of July an event of a serious and disagreeable nature, requiring the exercise of great firmness and discretion, engaged Colin Campbell’s attention. The affair arose out of the refusal of some of the sepoys of the 13th and 22d Native Infantry, stationed at Rawal Pindi, to accept the cantonment rate of pay, which was of a lower amount than that which they had been receiving in the field. There was clear proof that the combination existing between these two corps extended to other stations, and the matter at one moment assumed so critical an aspect that, in the event of certain contingencies, Colin Campbell was authorised to call on Sir Henry Dun-

das, commanding at Peshawur, for aid in the maintenance of discipline. Sir Charles Napier, writing on the 19th July, informs Colin Campbell of his views of the case, and adds : " Now for the real points. If they (the sepoyes) and others reject kindness, trust to numbers, and grow insolent and really mutiny, it will not be confined to your station, and so unfortunate a matter must be put down by force. I cannot, at this distance, give you any orders : each commander of a station must act according to circumstances and the dictates of his ability and courage. Remember, should any misfortune occur, that your retreat would be on Peshawur, where three European regiments and the Bombay native regiments would meet you. I do not apprehend any mutiny, but merely remind you of this, as Jhelum would not help you, and Wuzeerabad is too far. However, suppose the worst to happen, I think the 53d would settle every difficulty, as the 98th did at Newcastle. Now, as then, you would be an ugly customer with a British regiment at your back."

Happily the sepoyes came to reason without the necessity of using force. Their manner of doing so will be best understood from Colin Campbell's own statements. Writing to Sir Charles Napier on July 26th, he says : " Your orders sent through Sir Walter Gilbert, for Dundas to reinforce me with certain troops, in case I should require their aid, arrived here in the middle of the night by express ; and your private letter of the 21st, adverting to that order,

reached me late in the afternoon of yesterday. I cannot tell you how warmly I appreciate your kind consideration, in sending me so speedily instructions for my guidance, so plain and distinct that I could not err, and which provided for every contingency that could possibly arise. The combination amongst the men of the two corps, 13th and 22d Regiments, gave way to fear on the 18th—the day before your prescription for bringing them to their senses was despatched from Simla. I never anticipated the possibility of anything like an attempt on their part at active resistance with a European regiment in the same cantonment. I am quite sure, had they held out until your letter of the 19th arrived, that the moment they became aware of the authority you had given me to discharge every man who should refuse to take his pay, every one of them would have yielded at once. It was altogether a mere bit of bullying on their part, which they expected would have the effect of frightening the Government into compliance with an unjust demand, and which they knew to be so perfectly well. But supposing the very improbable case of their offering resistance to your orders, or that they had taken the bit between their teeth and had broken out into mutiny, depend upon it that, with the 53d, I had more than enough to bring these gentlemen, and many more besides, to their senses; and this, too, they knew perfectly well. Without their European officers, and in a bad cause, they would have been easily quieted. Thank

God, there was no occasion for any such necessity. I have made Dundas aware of all that has been passing here. I did not forward to him your order, although I told him privately that you had given me authority to ask him for assistance, should I have required it. The combination lasted from the 13th to the 18th (six days), when they became afraid and came forward and asked for their pay. I did not hear of the bad feeling which has been exhibited, until after Captain Nisbett had read his speech to his regiment, and had sent the corps back to its lines on the morning of the 13th. The great point to accomplish, as it appeared to me then and afterwards, was the prevention of any language of an irritating or intemperate nature, likely to bring on a crisis before I received your orders, and which would also have had the effect of adding to the embarrassment of Government, and of making the settlement of the question more difficult. Nothing of this kind has taken place. You have the simple detail of their insubordinate conduct from the night of the 12th, when No. 6 Company assembled without leave after tattoo, and declared their determination not to receive their pay, if subjected to the reduction of the marching batta, until the 18th, when the combination for this bad and mutinous object yielded to the fear of punishment. I have not presumed at any period to offer any suggestion as to the nature or amount of punishment they may deserve, for the sake of discipline, because I do not

know these people well, and you do, and have had experience in such affairs, and in their settlement before this. I would beg to bring to your notice, however, the fact, which I learned three days ago, that these two corps have been quartered together almost constantly for the last five years. As soon as the season will admit of their marching, I think it would be advisable to separate the 13th and 22d."

Notwithstanding Colin Campbell's successful management of this delicate matter, which had elicited his chief's unqualified approbation, his conduct did not escape misrepresentation in other quarters; for he notices in his journal an attack made upon him by one of the Indian newspapers, to the effect that he had ordered out the artillery and threatened to fire upon the men, and that the men had replied, "Fire!" when he shrank from doing so. To this was added some offensive remarks upon "his want of decision, which had been prejudicial to the Commander-in-chief (Lord Gough) during the campaign"—observations which he characterises as "not only wholly without truth, but groundless and full of malevolence."

Just at this time he received the notification of his promotion to the second grade as Knight Commander of the Bath for his services in the recent campaign, and with it a kind note from Sir Charles Napier, conveying his congratulations and the remark that "no man had won it better," and a hope that "he would long wear the spurs."

A short time previously Sir Colin, who had been in correspondence with Lord Saltoun,¹ in the interest of Hope Grant, his friend and comrade in the Chinese expedition, explained to the latter the reasons of his action.

"RAWAL PINDI, June 20, 1849.

"MY DEAR GRANT,—

I am so glad I wrote about you to the dear old Lord, for I could tell him the truth, which you could not do, or would not like to do, as the subject would be personal, and of your own merits and hard fortune.

"I have nothing to tell you of from this stupid place. If they will only give us *one* year—not less—of batta, I shall be able to think of leaving this country. I neither care, nor do I desire, for *anything else* but the little money in the shape of batta to make the road between the camp and the grave a little smoother than I could otherwise make it out of the profession; for I long to have the little time that may remain to me to myself, away from barracks and regimental or professional life, with the duties that belong to it in a time of peace.

"I must confess that I have great pleasure in having Sir Charles Napier for my chief. I know him well, and admire him as he deserves; for he is a man, my dear Grant, after your own excellent heart,—honest,

¹ See *ante*, page 113.

upright, truthful, fearless, and good ; and, with these qualities, gifted with a clearer and more comprehensive mind and understanding than any man I know in our profession.

“God bless you, dear Grant. I hope to see you a lieut.-colonel, and that my next letter will be addressed to you as such.—Always most sincerely yours,

“C. CAMPBELL.”

The same gazette which announced Sir Colin's new honour included the name of Hope Grant, promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Therefore Sir Colin addressed him.

“RAWAL PINDI, July 24, 1849.

“MY DEAR GRANT,—I have delayed replying to your most kind note, in the confident hope, which I am delighted to say has been fully realised, of being able to congratulate you on your promotion, and I do so with all my heart. It is the most important step in the service for an officer to obtain ; for none —save it be an aid-de-camp to the sovereign, and that is not now probable, considering your service-career—can hereafter pass over you ; and this feeling is one of exceeding comfort to the mind of a soldier who is without much interest, and can lay no other claim to consideration than what his own merits and services (however distinguished and devoted they may have been) are likely to command ; for these are not always sure to make such an officer be con-

sidered, if interest, in opposition, should step in with her own favourite in her hand. The latter, I fear, would carry the day.

“They have made me a K.C.B. I may confess to you I would much rather have got a year’s batta, because the latter would enable me to leave this country a year sooner, and to join some friends of my early days whom I love very much, and in whose society I would like to spend the period which may yet remain to me to live between the camp and the grave.

“The day I leave this country will terminate my military career.

“You would have been glad to see the promotion of dear and good Haythorne. God bless you, my dear Grant.—Believe me most sincerely yours,

“C. CAMPBELL.”¹

It had been Sir Colin’s wish to proceed during this autumn with Sir Henry Lawrence, then presiding at the Board of Administration of the Punjab, on a visit to Cashmere, and leave had been obtained for this purpose; but at the last moment Sir Henry Lawrence found he could not leave Lahore, which caused the postponement of the trip. Sir Charles Napier had willingly accorded Sir Colin permission, being of opinion that “the more a man commanding

¹ The above letters have already been given in the Appendix to ‘Incidents in the Sepoy War,’ but they are so characteristic of the writer as to render any apology for their reproduction in these pages superfluous.

a division sees of a country the better, when it does not interfere with his other duties ; ” but he was equally pleased to hear that the tour had been given up, because he did not like September trips, alleging as his reason that “ wherever there is a marsh there is a fever, and these fevers are uncommonly awkward chaps to deal with, especially if one took him (Sir Colin) by the nose in Cashmere.” As it was, Sir Colin suffered from a return of his old enemy in September—rather a violent attack—producing as a matter of course a return of home-sickness, the more pronounced as, in the middle of the fever, he learned from headquarters that Sir Charles Napier would leave India in March, and he was very desirous of getting away, if possible, at the same time.

“ *Journal, 2d October.*—Received a letter to-day from Sir Charles Napier to say that it was likely I should be sent to Peshawur to replace Dundas. I am sorry for this. As I cannot get away I should have been very glad to remain where I am. My ambition has long evaporated.”

“ *10th October.*—Received a note from Sir Charles Napier, dated the 1st, asking my opinion whether the force at Lahore could not be reduced. I said ‘ Yes,’ and gave my reasons ; but the question can only be decided by the civil Government, for they alone can tell what amount of force an insurrection either at Lahore or elsewhere can parade against us, and no correct opinion upon such a subject can be given without this knowledge.”

Since his assumption of the command at Rawal Pindi, Sir Colin had drawn the emoluments of a first-class brigadier ; but on receiving his pay-bill on the 1st October, he found the auditor-general had only allowed him the amount for the second-class appointment, and had deducted the difference—no inconsiderable amount. Alluding to it in his journal, he remarks : “ I must try and get it back again, and if I do not succeed it will not put me out a bit. I am thankful to be beyond deeming such a loss a misfortune of any moment ; ” a proof that he had become easier in his circumstances, and that having achieved independence by the freedom from all liabilities, he cared not for the accumulation of money. The matter was eventually arranged in his favour.

Having been directed to inspect the 1st battalion 60th Rifles, stationed at Peshawur, Sir Colin proceeded thither in October. Whilst there he accepted an invitation to dine with the 61st Regiment, which formed part of the garrison.

“ *Journal, 17th October.*—Dined in the evening with the 61st. On entering the square in front of the large house (formerly occupied by General Avitabile) in which the men are quartered, I observed the front of the building to be illuminated with small lamps, and by the aid of this light I could perceive a guard of honour ready to receive me. This was the grenadier company, which I had led on three or four occasions at Chillianwala, and the whole of the men in their undress all round. As

the company presented arms, the men standing round cheered long, continuously, and most heartily. The reception was a most flattering one, and the highest a soldier could receive from a body of his comrades, whom he had led and commanded in the field. The reception of the officers at their table was not less cordial and complimentary. Altogether, the whole proceeding of these men and their officers was most gratifying."

"*20th October.*—Completed my fifty-seventh year of age this day. The desire to enjoy repose from the daily routine of the service grows faster and faster upon me. My dislike to the little annoyances of station or garrison command daily augments, and I dislike the endless official letter-writing. Moreover, the disinclination to private letter-writing is equally increasing upon me. I am only fit for retirement. Found a letter from Sir Charles Napier to me. He will leave in March if no outbreak takes place in this country to detain him. Of an outbreak there is no chance. He told me I should not have leave if such an event were to take place."

"*25th November.*—Received to-day a general order desiring me to proceed forthwith to Peshawur to relieve Dundas in the command of that district—a far higher and more important command than I hold at present, but it may interfere with my return home, and on this account I regret the move, which has come so suddenly upon me."

Sir Charles Napier had by this time reached

Lahore on a tour of inspection, and was about to hold an investiture of the Bath, to which, however, he was unable to summon Sir Colin, owing to a force having been sent from Peshawur to punish one of the border tribes on the frontier of the Yoosufzai.

“*Journal, December 14th.*—Received yesterday the official report from Colonel Bradshaw, 1st battalion 60th, of his attack on the village of Suggon. Forwarded it, with a letter of commendation from myself to the Deputy Adjutant-General of the division. No dead or wounded left by the enemy, which makes me fear their loss has been trifling, if any at all, and this may embolden them still to hold out against the payment of revenue.”

“*Tuesday, 18th.*—Colonel Bradshaw, with his force, attacked the villages of Pullee, Zormundai, and Sharkanee, which were occupied, as also the surrounding heights, by some 8000 or 10,000 armed people. They are evidently fighting for their independence, and freedom from our rule and control. The lesson given them on the last occasion by our troops will, I hope, deter them from any future attempt to oppose our authority, and thereby save the troops the necessity of proceeding against them.

“*Wednesday, 19th.*—Forwarded yesterday copy of Colonel Bradshaw’s account of his affair at Pullee, Zormundai, and Sharkanee. With the commencement of this affair I had nothing to say. It had been determined upon, all arrangements made, troops detailed and commander named before my arrival.

It has terminated favourably, and I hope the example made will deter these people from giving us any future trouble during my command at Peshawur."

One portion of Colonel Bradshaw's report referring to the destruction of certain villages by the troops elicited the marked disapprobation of the Commander-in-chief, who could not tolerate the idea of "British troops destroying villages and leaving poor women and young children to perish with cold in the depth of winter." His mind, however, was much relieved by the result of an inquiry made by Sir Colin, who ascertained that the measure emanated from the political and not from the military authority. Sir Colin's views were in entire accordance with those of his chief in this matter; and in his subsequent operations against the hill tribes, it will be seen how repugnant to his nature was the destruction of villages and crops which, by direction of the civil authority, he was required to enforce.

"*Journal, 27th.*—Dined with Major Vicars at the mess of the 61st; afterwards went to a play performed by the men. On entering the theatre the band played the complimentary tune, and when it had ceased the whole of the men in the theatre cheered most heartily. These honest cheers from the soldiers of the 61st, whom I had led in a hard-fought battle, but with whom I was otherwise unconnected, were exceedingly gratifying."

"*Journal, February.*—The Commander-in-chief

arrived on the — instant. I was truly rejoiced to see Sir Charles Napier again. On the — I assembled for review the following troops : Two troops horse-artillery—12 guns ; two field-batteries —12 guns ; three regiments of cavalry—one regular, two irregular ; three regiments H.M.'s infantry—1st-60th, 61st, and 98th (which latter corps had reached Peshawur from Lahore a short time previously) ; three regiments native infantry—31st, 70th, and 71st. The General made a speech to the troops, and, amongst others, complimented the 98th in nearly the following terms : ‘The 98th, too, are very old friends of mine, and I am delighted to hear of the high state of order in which the regiment is at present. Ten years ago I presented their colours to them, and received a reprimand from the Commander-in-chief, the lamented Lord Hill, for having, after an inspection, reported that I considered the 98th Regiment in better order, than almost any regiment I had seen since the days of Sir John Moore. He said I had no right to draw comparisons, and he was right—for all that that great and good man said was right ; but it was a fault of which I was not ashamed.’ Then turning to the regiment, he added : ‘I have watched your career with great interest ever since, and felt great pleasure in hearing of your services in the campaigns in China. I was grieved to hear of the great loss the regiment has sustained, but what is passed is a thing that cannot be helped. I see you before me

now a healthy body of men, thank God for it! and fit for anything.'

"The review went off well. Sir Charles Napier told some of the regimental commanders they were not as quick as they might be, but all the staff told me and others, that they had seen no review like it in their tour of inspection."

"*8th February.*—Information was received from Lieutenant Pollock, Assistant - Commissioner at Kohat,¹ that the Afreedees occupying the mountain-range between this and that town, and through which the road runs between the two places, had assembled in numbers unexpectedly, and had fallen upon the seven or eight sappers employed in making the road at the further end of the defile passable for guns, and killed these men. This party had for protection a strong guard of irregulars under Lieutenant Pollock; but the Afreedees appear to have surprised the guard with the sappers, and to have killed some of them. Application was made by Colonel Lawrence² for a force to proceed against these mountaineers; and accordingly, on the 7th, a general order was issued by the Commander-in-chief directing me to prepare a force similar to the one which had been employed in the Yoosufzai, with such augmentation for guarding the pass through which the force was to be moved, and until its return, as I might deem neces-

¹ Major-General Sir F. R. Pollock, K.C.S.I.

² Lieutenant-General Sir G. St P. Lawrence, K.C.S.I., C.B., at this time Commissioner at Peshawur. See *ante*, p. 178.

sary. I accordingly directed the following troops to be prepared for that purpose: 2d troop 2d brigade Horse Artillery (Bengal), 9-pounders; 15th Irregular Cavalry; 200 rank and file H.M.'s 60th Rifles; 200 do. H.M.'s 61st Regiment; 200 do. H.M.'s 98th Regiment; 23d Regiment Native Infantry; 31st Regiment Native Infantry."¹

The operation, which extended over several days, and was conducted under the personal direction of the Commander-in-chief, was entirely successful,—the object of clearing the pass and reinforcing Kohat having been attained, not, however, without some loss,² in consequence of the determined resistance offered by the mountaineers to the passage of the column while advancing and returning through a long and difficult defile flanked by formidable precipices, which had to be scaled and cleared under a constant fire of matchlocks. The baggage, which was reduced to a minimum, was placed in the centre, so that the head and tail of the column were free to act in repelling the attacks of its active enemy. The punishment inflicted on the mountaineers consisted in the burning of certain villages, under the direction of the civil authority.

Sir Charles Napier in his general order, on the

¹ The 1st Punjab Cavalry and 1st Punjab Infantry, which were to reinforce Kohat, accompanied the force through the pass, and remained at Kohat. The latter corps did a good deal of skirmishing in going through the pass, and had a number of casualties.

² The loss of the British force amounted to 19 killed, including one officer, and 74 wounded.

return of the force to its cantonments, complimented Sir Colin on the part he took in the expedition, especially on the fact that, in the forcing of this defile, thirteen miles in length, not a single article of baggage had fallen into the hands of the Afreedees, so notorious for their dexterity in plundering. Before leaving Peshawur, Sir Charles Napier gratified Sir Colin by confirming the appointment of brigade-major at Peshawur on Lieutenant Norman, adjutant 31st N.I., who for some time had been acting in that capacity, and had shown conspicuous gallantry in assisting in the rescue of the wounded from the heights.¹

Whilst Sir Charles Napier was still at Peshawur, Sir Colin was called upon to perform a pleasant duty in connection with the 61st Regiment. Sir Henry Dundas, at the half-yearly inspection of the regiment, having recommended the restoration of the services of sixty soldiers forfeited by desertion, in consequence of their gallant conduct in the Punjab campaign, the Duke of Wellington had supported, in very strong terms, the request that her Majesty's prerogative should be exercised in favour of these men. The application had been graciously entertained, and it fell to Sir Colin's lot to read to the regiment assembled on parade, by Sir Charles Napier's express order, the Duke of Wellington's opinion of the case, as set forth in the following

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir H. W. Norman, K.C.B., C.I.E., Member of the Council of India.

extract of a letter from Sir John Macdonald, Adjutant-General of the army, to the War Office :—

“ I am commanded to request that you assure the Secretary at War, that nothing in the whole history of the British army ever was more distinguished, than the conduct of the 61st Regiment throughout the late campaign, but more particularly at the battle of Chillianwala, where the conduct of the regiment was the admiration of the whole army, and, under all the circumstances of the case, his Grace the Duke of Wellington anticipates the ready concurrence of Mr Fox Maule on this occasion. I am to observe that the cases of three or four of these soldiers are such, as may appear to render them probably less deserving than others, but that the grant of the proposed special mark of favour, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, renders it, in the Commander-in-chief’s opinion, inexpedient that the effect of the boon should be weakened by an exception on that ground being made in any of these cases.”

It was with great regret that Colin Campbell saw his chief depart for Simla, “ having,” as he records, “ had exceeding pleasure in his society, and being much gratified by his kind manner to him upon every occasion.”

Within a fortnight after the return of the expedition from Kohat the Afreedees attacked the detachment of troops that had been posted in the tower on the summit of the pass. The officer commanding at Kohat communicated, however, with the Afreedee

chiefs, and succeeded in withdrawing the detachment, under cover of his main body, without a fight. Propositions were made by the Commissioner at Peshawur to Sir Colin to wait till the crops were ripe, and then execute another raid, blow up the towers, and carry out the work of destruction more effectually than had been done on the late occasion. Sir Charles Napier was opposed to this policy, and desired Sir Colin not to send a man without his orders. In case, however, of the troops at Kohat being in danger, he was instructed to march to their assistance, but not to destroy crops. This precaution proved to be unnecessary, for the force at Kohat was not molested, the Afreedees having dispersed quietly to their homes, as soon as the removal of the detachment from the tower had been effected. An arrangement was subsequently made with this tribe to keep the pass open.

Sir Colin was now enabled to turn his undivided attention to the measures requisite for the better housing of the troops in cantonments, and to other matters conducive to their efficiency and comfort. Every morning he might be seen at daylight visiting the works, or transacting business with the heads of departments. Not unfrequently he would make a personal inspection of the rations of the European troops, exhibiting the same interest in all that affected the rights and wellbeing of the soldiers, as he had ever shown when in regimental command. His relations with the officers in command of the

troops of the Company's service were of the most pleasant character, and he was ever anxious to consult them before taking measures or issuing orders affecting their corps.

Hearing from Sir Henry Lawrence that he was about to visit Cashmere with Lady Lawrence, Sir Colin seized the opportunity of proceeding thither to meet them. Early in June, accompanied by three of his brother officers, he left Peshawur, picking up on the way Major Keiller, then in command of the 2d Punjab Irregular Cavalry. Crossing the Indus at Ghazi, at which point the river enters the Peshawur valley, the party proceeded by Torbela through Hazara to Mozufferabad, situated at the junction of the Jhelum and Kishen-Gunga, and thence by the bridle-path, carried along the steep heights that form the right bank of the Jhelum, to Baramula, at which point the valley of Cashmere is entered. Sir Colin made copious notes of each day's journey, describing with minute accuracy the distance, the nature of the country, and its practicability or otherwise for the march of troops, conveyance of artillery, &c., &c. In one entry he remarks: "The true frontier of Cashmere to be defended, on this side, is from the entrance into it by Mozufferabad, and from that point itself, for a very small force accustomed to hill warfare would very effectually retard the advance of an enemy from that direction. The road will not admit of more than one man abreast. The heights which overhang them are precipitous, and would be

very, very difficult to crown ; and supposing this to have been done, it would be necessary to proceed slowly, to allow of the road in rear being made passable for provision-animals and ammunition. As to baggage, that must not be thought of while fighting our way from Mozufferabad to Cashmere. With Sir Charles Napier as Commander-in-chief I should be well pleased to be employed in such a war, and to command the advance, but I know of no other officer, under whom I would desire or seek to hold such a command."

The Maharajah of Cashmere, Gholab Singh, received Sir Colin with marked attention, sending his son, Ranbhir Singh, the present ruler, to meet him as he approached the capital, and conduct him to the garden appropriated to Sir Henry Lawrence, who did not arrive till some days later. The short time Sir Colin remained in Cashmere was devoted to complimentary visits exchanged between the Maharajah and himself, a review of troops, entertainments given by Gholab Singh, a trip to the lake, and an inspection of some of the shawl manufactories. After a few days' enjoyment of the society of Sir Henry and Lady Lawrence, Sir Colin, who was deeply impressed with the beauty of the scenery, and much gratified by the attention he had received, started again for Peshawur. The heat and fatigue of the return journey, which was performed under a scorching sun, laid him prostrate with fever. Though a sharp attack, he soon threw it off, not, however, with-

out exciting the apprehensions of Sir Charles Napier, who became very uneasy regarding him, and suggested his removal to Simla, or to the Murree hills, with the remark that “no one in India could be more anxious about him than his own Commander-in-chief”—no idle compliment, since in repeated letters he had informed Sir Colin that, in case the latter vacated the Peshawur command, “there was no one upon whom he could lay his hands to replace him.”

A few weeks after his return to Peshawur, Sir Colin’s attention was again called to the unsatisfactory relations existing between the Afreedees and the British authorities on the subject of the free passage of the Kohat Pass. Lieutenant Lumsden,¹ the Deputy Commissioner, had recommended to the Lahore Government the proposition made by the tribes to renew their former friendly relations with us. This policy was cordially endorsed by Sir Colin. The information he had collected with reference to the country inhabited by the tribes occupying the district of Teerah, in the vicinity of the Kohat Pass, led him to the conclusion that an attempt to subjugate these people would be an enterprise requiring serious consideration. His views he embodied in a long letter to Sir Henry Lawrence, with whom he had previously discussed the matter in Cashmere. One of the chief difficulties, in his opinion, lay in the approach to Teerah, “the nearest route to which from Peshawur,” he remarked, “is not by Kohat, as I believed, and mentioned to you in Cashmere, but

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir H. B. Lumsden, K.C.S.I., C.B.

by the bed of the branch of the Bara river, from which this city and cantonment (Peshawur) is supplied with water. It is full of large stones and rocks, and impracticable for artillery, save mounted on elephants; and this rough road is necessarily overhung and commanded throughout by high ground, very difficult of access. . . . The movement of a column of troops with its encumbrance of baggage and stores through a pass such as the Khyber or that of Kohat, the extent and difficulties of which are known, is an affair of not very difficult management; but the movement of a body of our troops, with its baggage and ammunition, in the interior of these mountains, which are without roads, is an undertaking of a more responsible character, where every man is armed and an enemy." The opposition of the Afreedees, judging from what he saw in the recent expedition to Kohat, he reckoned of little account; "but they are not to be overtaken; they fly before you faster than you can follow, and a retreat is open to them even into Afghanistan. . . . I scarcely think one could manage in such a country to drive them into a corner, even by the employment of two or three columns, because it is their practice, I am told, to abandon their mud-houses or huts, which they occupy during the summer months in the Teerah districts, and remove with their oxen and families to the lower slopes of the hills on this as well as on the Afghanistan side of the range, and inhabit caves, which they dig in the sides of the hills. When alarmed they send off their women,

mounting the aged and sick on their cattle, and hide the little grain they possess, the men taking to the hills to oppose those by whom they have been disturbed." Sir Colin was of opinion that "to effectually reduce these hill-people immediately in our front to our rule, or at any rate to afford a fair chance of doing this, operations should be undertaken, at the same time, from both sides of the range of hills which they inhabit, when one party would be able to drive them upon the bayonets of the other party; but then, before any such plan can be carried into effect, we must first establish ourselves at Candahar and Cabul, unless the Dost, which is not very likely, would come to our aid from his side."

The difficulties attending the operation, and the probably insignificant result of them, led him to believe that Sir Henry Lawrence would "be glad to take advantage of the opening the Afreedees have afforded by their petition to Lumsden to accept their terms, if the security they have offered for their future behaviour is at all to be depended on. . . ." ¹

In December Sir Charles Napier resigned the command of the army of India, to Sir Colin's great regret, and was succeeded by Sir William Gomm,² an old brother officer of the 9th Regiment in Peninsular days.

¹ The proposition made by the Afreedees having been accepted by the Board of Administration at Lahore, matters remained quiet on the Kohat frontier.

² The late Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm, G.C.B., Colonel of the Coldstream Guards and Constable of the Tower.

CHAPTER VII.

JOURNAL—GOVERNOR-GENERAL VISITS PESHAWUR—TEMPORARY COMMAND OF DIVISION—RAID OF MOMUNDS—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD DALHOUSIE—ORGANISATION OF FRONTIER DEFENCE—SIR COLIN'S SCHEME APPROVED—IRRUPTION OF MOMUNDS—SIR COLIN MOVES OUT AGAINST THEM—CONSTRUCTION OF FORT MICHNI—ROAD MADE—FORCE RETURNS TO PESHAWUR—VIEWS ON DEFENCE OF FRONTIER—FRESH TROUBLES WITH MOMUNDS—AFFAIR OF PANJ-PAO—DIFFERENCE WITH BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION—SIR COLIN PRESSED TO ENTER SWAT—DECLINES WITHOUT ORDERS FROM COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE OOTMAN-KHEYLS—PRANGURH—ISKAKOTE—DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES IN RANIZAI—LETTER TO SIR H. LAWRENCE—RESIGNATION OF COMMAND—SIR WILLIAM GOMM'S REGRET—GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S REPRIMAND—LETTER TO SIR WILLIAM GOMM.

“Journal, 3d January.—Another year begun and I am still in the East. Stern duty and obligations to fulfil towards others have kept me here, and not any liking or inclination of my own. But these, thank God, are very nearly completed, and I may soon, I hope, think of doing what may be agreeable to my own feelings, without any detriment to the interests of those who are beholden to me.”

Early in March the Governor-General paid a visit to Peshawur. His arrival was anticipated by Sir

Colin with considerable anxiety, in consequence of a vacancy having occurred in the Sirhind division, to the temporary command of which he felt it was not unlikely he might be nominated, by reason of his seniority. His apprehensions on this score, however, were set at rest during his first interview with Lord Dalhousie.

“*Journal, 1st March.*—Rode to Boorhan, where I put up with John Lawrence, and afterwards waited on Lord Dalhousie, who received me very civilly and kindly. He told me he could not spare me from this frontier. I replied that it would be more agreeable to me to remain at the advanced post of the army, in the subordinate position of brigadier, to being removed to a command with a higher title and additional emolument for a temporary period. His lordship told me I should not suffer on that account, and that he would manage, so that I should not be a loser.”

Lord Dalhousie was as good as his word ; and as a further mark of his confidence he wrote to the Duke of Wellington and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, expressing his desire that Sir Colin might be left at Peshawur as a divisional commander. To this end the troops west of the Jhelum were placed under his orders, and remained so till towards the end of the year, when Major-General Godwin, who had served with Colin Campbell in the 9th Regiment in the Peninsula, arrived from England, and assumed command of the vacant division.

The presence of the Governor-General on the spot enabled Sir Colin to obtain a decision on many points, which the requirements of a new and important station like Peshawur urgently needed. At the same time Lord Dalhousie availed himself of the opportunity to discuss personally many other important matters affecting the policy to be adopted towards the frontier tribes, the establishment of a movable column with suitable equipage, &c., on which reports were called for. His departure, therefore, left Sir Colin with his hands full. Nevertheless he grappled with the work in good earnest, leaving himself little time for private correspondence or attention to his journal, which for many months to come was practically neglected.

In the middle of April news reached Peshawur that one of the Momund tribes inhabiting the country to the north of Peshawur, between the Swat and Cabul rivers, had repeated their aggressive conduct, and had made an irruption into British territory.

Lord Dalhousie, indignant at these proceedings, put himself in direct communication with Sir Colin, in order that no time should be lost in concerting measures for the punishment of the offenders. Under the impression that a reprisal was practicable, he expressed his wish that a force should be sent against the Momunds, and an effectual blow struck. The feasibility of the expedition he left to Sir Colin's judgment, being assured that his actions would be governed by prudence, and that whatever was under-

taken would be done thoroughly. In case of Sir Colin deciding to attack the Momunds, Lord Dalhousie desired that their punishment should be "as severe as was consistent with humanity," and that they should meet "the fate they had designed for others." He further suggested that the attack, in order to be as effectual as possible, should partake of the nature of a surprise. The details of the expedition he left to Sir Colin, but the responsibility of the instructions, which he had sketched, he took upon himself. The Commander-in-chief was at the same time informed of the Governor - General having directed these proceedings.

Having taken counsel with Lieutenant Lumsden, commanding the corps of Guides, Sir Colin proceeded, on the 24th, with that officer to Muttah, the village in Doaba (the delta formed by the Swat and Cabul rivers) which had been the scene of the raid committed by Nawab Khan, the Momund chief, and the people of Pundiali, and having reconnoitred the ground and obtained such local information as was available, he returned to Peshawur. In his report of the 27th he informed the Governor-General that "Pundiali is the name of a high table-land, distant about five *coss*¹ from Muttah in the interior of the hills. It is of some extent, being some two *coss* in depth and one in length, and watered by a mountain-stream, which runs through the middle of it. There are only two approaches to Pundiali from this

¹ *Coss*, a measure of distance—1 *coss*=2 English miles.

valley (Peshawur) : one from Shubkudur, and the other from Muttah. These approaches are mere footpaths through the hills, quite impracticable for guns, and barely wide enough to admit of the passage of a laden mule." He then continues : " I went yesterday morning with Lumsden to get as close a view of the country as possible. We went into the hills about a quarter of a mile. I never before saw such a jumble of rough, rugged, and irregular hills. If your lordship were to take a sheet of stiff writing-paper and crumple it in your hands, the paper in that form would convey to your lordship a better idea of the broken and rugged surface of this hilly country, than any description I could give you. The same kind of ground extends to the summit, upon which the table-land of Pundiali is situated ; and there is no approaching this place from this valley, save by the path leading direct from Muttah or by the one from Shubkudur, which is represented as equally difficult and much larger.

" The country I have been describing to your lordship is exactly adapted to the independent kind of fighting to which these hillmen have been practised from their youth, and which they so well understand. Your lordship will observe that their retreat need not be otherwise than deliberate, from the endless amount of caves which the nature of the ground affords, and the impossibility for troops not accustomed to exercise in the hills to advance rapidly over such a rugged country.

" Supposing no greater number of men to be employed in resisting our march over this ground than was stated to have accompanied Nawab Khan on his last visit to Muttah—viz., about 400—and the defence made to be of only ordinary firmness, your lordship will see that a certain, though not a great, loss must be incurred by troops forcing their way through such a country. It is in returning, however, from the table-land of Pundiali through this difficult country to our own valley that we should sustain greater loss, for these mountaineers follow troops when retiring with wonderful boldness and determination.

" I beg your lordship to understand that I do not conceive there would be anything like what I should consider difficulty in forcing our way to Pundiali, destroying the houses of its inhabitants, with the crops now on the ground, when they are sufficiently ripe to admit of their being burned—which will not be the case for the next twenty days—as well as in retracing our steps afterwards without the slightest risk to the safety of the force as a military body; but your lordship having now been made aware of the nature of the country, and of the distance to be passed over, will not fail to perceive that such an operation is not to be accomplished without a certain loss, which might be greater than your lordship in the first instance anticipated, and of the probability of which I had no idea, until the information obtained from the headman of the village of

Muttah, and my own examination of the ground yesterday made it apparent to me.

"The wheat crop in the valley near to Muttah will not be ready for cutting for the next ten days, for in the hills it is always ten days later. If it should be advisable to visit Pundiali, the proper time to leave this for that purpose would be about the 14th or 15th proximo. By bridging the Cabul river with our pontoons, Muttah may be reached in two marches, and the third day would bring us to the table-land of Pundiali. There will be abundance of time between this and the 14th or 15th proximo to learn your lordship's decision upon the information respecting Pundiali which I have had the honour to submit to your lordship in this letter.

"Supposing your lordship should deem the loss we might possibly incur in this expedition to be greater than the object to be attained is worth, and that your lordship should consider it sufficient for the present to prevent the Momund chief, Nawab Khan, and his followers molesting for the future Muttah, or any of the other villages of the frontier in that neighbourhood, I think this might be in a great measure effected by the following arrangements, should they meet with your lordship's approval.

"I would propose to establish permanently a bridge over the Cabul river with our pontoons at the place where the ferry is at present. That place is seven miles from this cantonment. It is far from the hills, and a company would hold the bridge in

safety. Besides the vast convenience which a permanent bridge would afford to the people of the country, and where the same amount of toll could be exacted by the civil authorities as at present, I think the effect in the hills would be great when it became known that the Cabul river had ceased to be an obstacle to the march of troops at any moment, day or night, to Doaba.

“I would further respectfully propose to place the command at Shubkudur under a selected officer, and to invest him with greater discretionary power than is given to the officer whom the roster turns up quarterly for duty at that post, and to increase the cavalry of his detachment to 150 sowars, so that he might patrol with a considerable body twice or thrice weekly along the frontier villages between the Swat and Cabul rivers. It might be advisable that all the native village authorities should be required to communicate with him, and he might be intrusted with limited magisterial powers.

“When it was known that this officer had received these increased powers, and it was observed that the frontier was regularly patrolled, these hill gentlemen would not venture with the same confidence to a distance from their hills of four to six miles, as they have done on one or two occasions lately. Under any circumstances, the detachment now at Muttah must be kept there for the present.

“These arrangements will occasion neither inconvenience nor trouble, and would, I think, add con-

siderably to the security of our frontier between the Swat and Cabul rivers."

It will be observed that in this report Sir Colin advocated no particular scheme, leaving it to the Governor-General to decide as to the choice of either offensive or defensive measures.

Lord Dalhousie elected the latter, assigning as his reasons the nature of the country described by Sir Colin, which led him to fear that an advance beyond Muttah might be attended with loss. Moreover, as the Momunds had been twice repelled in their raids, the establishment of a post at Muttah might have a deterrent effect upon them. His lordship determined to try the experiment; though, had they committed any real damage he would have acted at once against them. This policy might lay him open to the charge of timidity, but he would rather incur that reproach than needlessly risk the lives of the troops merely for the sake of obtaining a character for vigour. In the same letter, Lord Dalhousie expressed his general concurrence in the suggestions made by Sir Colin.

The organisation of a complete system of frontier defence from the borders of Scinde to the valley of Kohat having been provided by means of the Punjab irregular force acting under the Board of Administration, the attention of the Government was now directed to that portion of the north-western frontier comprised in the valley of Peshawur, and occupied by troops of the regular army. With this object in view, Lord Dalhousie put himself in confidential

communication with Sir Colin, of whose local experience he was anxious to avail himself, in order that he might, with greater advantage, bring the subject before the Commander-in-chief. By the time the military authorities had called for a report, Sir Colin was prepared with a plan, which he had worked out in conjunction with Lieutenant Lumsden, on whose judgment in all matters relating to the frontier tribes he placed implicit reliance. The general idea consisted in the establishment of a line of posts extending from Attock along the foot of the Khuttuk hills, round the whole of the Peshawur valley, and through the Yoosufzai country to the Indus. At certain salient points between the northern entrance to the Kohat Pass and the Swat river it was proposed to erect fortified posts, to be held by detachments of regular troops detailed from the garrison at Peshawur, which was to be regarded as the base of an offensive-defensive system. For the purpose of patrolling and of mutual support, roads were to be made between the several fortified posts; and to facilitate the lines of communication, bridges were to be thrown across the Cabul and Swat rivers. Along the line of the Khuttuk country, and in rear of the dilapidated fort of Jumrood, near the entrance to the Khyber Pass, it was recommended to establish police posts for the purpose of intercepting thieves and marauders. Finally, the country between the Swat and Indus rivers was to be watched by detachments of the Guide corps posted at certain points

recommended by Lieutenant Lumsden. The scheme met with the unqualified approval of the Commander-in-chief, and was adopted in all its essential points by the Supreme Government.

Previous to submitting his report, Sir Colin, whose health had been causing him some anxiety during the summer months, paid a visit to Rawal Pindi, from which station he returned to Peshawur early in September, having derived considerable benefit from the change. Shortly after his return, a rumour reached him that the headmen of the Kohat Pass and those of the Juwaki Pass near the Khuttuk country, were combining to shut both passes, with the idea of forcing the British Government to pay some remuneration to the latter people for a free passage through this defile. Commenting on the confirmation of this rumour in his journal, Sir Colin remarks: "I foresee a good amount of petty and troublesome warfare on this frontier for some time to come. If the passes be closed against us, we must only retaliate by preventing either being used as highroads for traffic, as they are at present. By placing troops opposite the mouth or entrance of these passes on either side, we shall effectually prevent the trade carried on by these people in bringing salt from the mines south of Kohat to this valley, including Peshawur and all the countries to the west and north of this, such as Swat, Buneyr, &c. This system of retaliation will tend more effectually to annoy them and bring them to reason than the

overthrow of their mud dwellings, which cannot be effected without much loss of life and expenditure of money."

This threatened combination came to nothing; but trouble was brewing in another quarter. On the 1st October, the Momunds of Independent Michni—the same who had given offence in the spring of this year, and who had for some time past shown symptoms of disquietude—made an irruption upon certain villages in British territory. The Governor-General having decided upon the immediate adoption of hostile measures, Sir Colin was instructed to inflict summary punishment upon the offenders. Lord Dalhousie further repeated privately his desire to relieve Sir Colin of any personal responsibility as regarded the punishment he was about to inflict on the offending tribe, bearing in mind that, as it was intended to confiscate such portion of the Michni territory as was situated in the plains, any property that hereafter might be useful to the people who would eventually occupy them under British rule, should, if possible, be exempted from destruction.

Accordingly, on the 25th October, having assembled a small force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, about 1200 in all, calculated with great nicety in reference to the sickness of the troops in cantonments and the large number required for daily duty therein, Sir Colin marched out of Peshawur and encamped on the left bank of the Cabul river, where he was joined by five companies of the Guide corps

under Lieutenant Lumsden. Considering the distance from Peshawur to the upper end of Michni,—thirty odd miles—too long to be marched by troops which were still feeling the effects of the summer heat,—Sir Colin was anxious to give them breathing-time; besides which, he had another reason for approaching the scene of action with deliberation. “It seemed to me,” he notes in his journal, “most desirable that the Deputy Commissioner Lumsden should have ample time and opportunity to speak to the people of Michni, and the latter the same advantage for reflection and consideration of the conditions he intends to offer them—viz., that the cultivators of the soil shall be allowed to retain their lands, paying our Government the proportion of the revenue we require from the people in our own territories, but that certain headmen of villages, with the chief man of the district, must leave Michni for ever. That is to say, those of them who were active in their enmity towards the villagers in our territory on their border, and whom they deprived of water, more particularly in assailing them and burning their crops in the beginning of this month. To drive the whole population of Michni, occupying some twenty-six or twenty-seven villages, into the hills, could only produce the effect of forcing them to seek for food and support in the plundering of our villages close to the hills. I question whether people would be found to occupy the Michni lands. Their lives would not be worth a night’s purchase against

the attacks of the original proprietors, and no amount of protection which we could afford would secure them from being attacked nightly. Lumsden's views—those of common-sense—are the most prudent and the best: punish those of the leading men who have shown enmity or have done injury to those we are bound to protect, but leave the cultivators of the soil upon the land unmolested."

On the force approaching the point where the Naguman and Adozai branches of the Cabul river bifurcate, the villages of Dubb, the inhabitants of which had been principally concerned in the recent violation of British territory, were found to be deserted. These villages, together with their flanking defences, consisting of mud towers which commanded the river and surrounding country, were destroyed by the Guides under cover of parties sent forward to occupy the several ranges of hills situated between the camp and scene of operations. During the work of destruction a desultory but harmless fire was maintained by the mountaineers; and on the completion of each day's work the force retired slowly and deliberately to the camp in the plain, no height being vacated until the one in rear was occupied in skirmishing order by the troops in support. "It is pleasing to think," Sir Colin records in his journal, "that while engaged in duties in which no soldier can take pleasure, no lives were lost on either side. God knows, the rendering two or three hundred families homeless is a disagreeable task

enough to have executed, without adding loss of life to this severe punishment."

His next care was to select a site for a fort at Michni, the construction of which was forthwith commenced by the troops, in accordance with the plans approved by the Governor-General for the protection of the frontier. The garrison of Shubkudur was strengthened; the old buildings along the banks of the Adozai, as well as the villages of Panj-Pao, were levelled; in addition to which, a road was opened between Michni and Shubkudur, and a regular system of patrolling established.

It is not to be supposed that the former possessors of the annexed territory regarded these proceedings with complacency. The British camp was at first kept on the alert by frequent night attacks, and on two different occasions considerable bodies of the Momund tribes, who had assembled in hostile combination, were routed. One of these gatherings is thus described by Sir Colin :—

"*Sunday, December 7th.*—Sadut Khan, with his following, came out suddenly from the gorge in front of the camp occupied by the detachment of H.M.'s 61st. They occupied the heights to the right and left of the pass in groups or bodies, according to the nature of the ground. Their numbers were not less than 4000, or I should be nearer the mark were I to say 5000. As Major Fisher¹ was out with a party

¹ Commandant of the 15th Irregular Cavalry. He subsequently lost his life by the hands of his own troopers in the Sepoy Mutiny.

of his corps protecting camels, whose return might be much molested in case the Momunds advanced, I immediately moved out with two guns, a troop of the Guide corps, and two companies of infantry—one of the 61st and one of Guides. I felt certain that my short advance to a height about midway between camp and the bottom of the hills on which they were formed, would intimidate these gentry, and allow Major Fisher to return unmolested ; while some improvements, which I had ordered upon seeing the enemy, were being made in camp, such as throwing up a parapet for our little force to form behind, in case the enemy attempted to attack us. The guns made two or three good shots with shells, which would inform the footmen on the hills, who were screaming and brandishing their swords, against what sort of weapons they had to fight. I remained until the sun had gone down, and all our outposts had been taken up for the night. We were not followed by a man. On arrival in camp I directed each corps to be divided into two bodies or companies, one-half to be placed in a line of skirmishers behind the parapet, with one man of each file to act as a sentry ; the whole being relieved by those in reserve after two hours, and this relief to be continued every two hours during the night. Subsequent intelligence told us that the whole force had gone back to Reygmaina. I think this coming out was for display ; but their confidence is evidently founded on their numbers, and in the expectation of

further assistance. If I mistake not, we have upset a hive, and the hornets it contained will not settle in a hurry. Want of food may oblige them to break up before very long ; but if they receive the expected assistance from the Bajour ruler, and can manage to hold together, they will bother us a good deal."

After a time the combination appeared to have ceased, owing, it was supposed, in some degree to the alienation from the main body of the Alumzai, a considerable section of the Momund tribe, in consequence of their being permitted by Captain James,¹ the Deputy Commissioner, to retain their lands on certain conditions. In the meantime the fort of Michni was completed, a garrison was placed in it, instructions drawn up with great care were issued for the guidance of officers on outpost duty, and as the general measures adopted for the defence of the frontier had progressed sufficiently to admit of the withdrawal of the field-force to Peshawur, it re-entered cantonments on the 15th February 1852.² With all that had been done by the force, the Governor-General, both in his public and private communications, expressed his entire satisfaction.

Before, however, quitting the field, Sir Colin sub-

¹ The late Major H. R. James, C.B.

² Sir Colin did not return direct from Michni to Peshawur, though some of the force did. He moved to Panj-Pao in January for the purpose of levelling the villages of that name, and here an encounter took place between a party of the enemy and some cavalry under Lieutenant Hughes (now Lieutenant-General Hughes, C.B.), in which the Momunds suffered severely.

mitted to the Commander-in-chief, in the form of a confidential communication, his views regarding the defence of the frontier.

The letter, dated "Camp, near Miankheyl, February 4, 1852," ran as follows:—

"I have the honour to address your Excellency privately on the experience I have gained during my residence in camp, towards the north and north-west of the Peshawur district. My own ideas have been much modified in consequence, and I think I should fail in duty to yourself were I to neglect to lay before you what is not generally appreciated with reference to military safety. When I first moved into the field during last autumn, I had already advanced opinions on the general defence of the valley, their basis being the information which had reached me from various quarters. Since that time I have discovered that information to have been in all cases scanty, and in many absolutely incorrect. For instance, I was first told that Pundiali was a single village, then that it was a group of three or four. It is now ascertained to be a district containing no less than thirteen villages—viz., two on a table-land and eleven on the margin of surrounding eminences; and instead of the turn-out of armed men which may be expected from three or four villages, it is also ascertained that from thence and Kumall¹ upwards of 1400 matchlocks would be arrayed for defence, without counting

¹ Kumall is about six *coss* from Pundiali, and its people would infallibly turn out for the defence of the latter if attacked.

the rest of the tribe, the most warlike portion of which—the Alumzai—having a strength of 3000 fighting men, lies immediately beyond, one coss from Kumall—that is, about a march from Pundiali. But in making our calculations, we must count not only the whole of the tribe, part of which may be subject to our assault, but also hillmen from far and near. Your Excellency will observe that although the hill chiefs may have a difficulty in inducing large numbers of their followers to tempt the dangers of the plains in satisfaction of the ambition or avarice of their superiors, the case assumes a totally different aspect when we commence an attack on them. We should doubtless then see great numbers all moved by one strong principle of action, a principle having greater force with the lower orders than with the chiefs themselves. The hills, besides being very deficient of water, are of such a nature that, except in certain high roads or passes, the employment of artillery cannot be looked to.

“The vast number of hostile mountaineers must be met by infantry only, when, as would be the case in these Momund hills, we should turn off from the great passes, such as those of the Khyber and Kohat. How strong must be the force of infantry for such an undertaking in a country where the defenders, from their agility and warlike habits, are at least equal, if not superior, to many of the assailants, it is hardly necessary for me to remark; but I would particularly dwell on the distinction I have drawn

between the comparatively easy enterprise of forcing a pass and that of spreading troops over the rugged and precipitous slopes of mountains, where the want of numbers and a mountaineer's activity is not atoned for by the aid of artillery.

" This is best illustrated by a remark lately made by Colonel Mackeson¹ (the Commissioner) in conversation on the best mode of reaching Lallpoora, in the justice of which I fully concur—viz., that as the Khyber Pass affords a passage for guns, it would be more prudent to force that pass than to attempt an expedition by any other route which does not present such a facility: there, moreover, being much reason to doubt the existence of a due supply of water—that great difficulty experienced by all strange troops when moving along hill-tracks.

" Your Excellency is aware that a strong division moved under General Pollock, and was thought to have accomplished no ordinary exploit when the Khyber was passed under that officer. Yet it is the opinion of Colonel Mackeson, who knows this country, and Lallpoora itself, that through the same pass lies the practicable road to molest the residence of the Momund chief, Sadut Khan. I did not take part in the conversation alluded to, and it is far from my wish to make Colonel Mackeson responsible for any opinion or remark he may have hazarded in ordinary conversation; yet it so entirely coincides with my own views that I think myself justified in

¹ Vide *ante*, page 214.

quoting it, as illustrative of what I have wished to advance.

"I have always been of opinion that the present force at Peshawur is sufficient for defensive purposes, and includes the furnishing of certain small posts with garrisons, and the occasional presence in the field of such a small detachment for operating at the foot of the hills, on the interior line of defence, as that now with me. But I would respectfully submit that there is no force here sufficient to furnish detached columns in the hills, strong enough to maintain communications and carry on a mountain war, whether it be one of posts or of expeditionary nature.

"At this very moment the Peshawur garrison is harassed in consequence of the absence of my small force, consisting of 1000 infantry and 400 cavalry. Only last week there was an alarm, and the civil authorities deemed it prudent to enjoin precaution on the military commanders, causing guards and patrols to be doubled. The rich district of Khuleel, which has hitherto formed no bad cover for the front of the cantonment, cannot be expected to be so for the future, its Urbabs having been seized and deported to Lahore.

"After well weighing all these various considerations, it certainly would be imprudent for any divisional commander to incur the great hazard of penetrating the mountains, even for a short distance, without the most specific orders on the point.

"From my remarks at the beginning of this letter, it is evident that, till very lately, we have been groping in the dark, and that the mountain screen has concealed the means of the tribes.

"In conclusion, I would beg to state the opinion I have arrived at regarding raids into the mountains for what is called punishment. The fact is, the so-called punishment exists only in the report. It is true, villages may be hastily fired, and those who have done the deed may retreat with the satisfaction of having accomplished their orders with or without loss, although the necessary retrograde movement is always considered as a signal success by our opponents. But in three days the burnt village is again occupied, the inhabitants having lost nothing but the roofs of their huts, all their property having been conveyed carefully away, to the last seed of grain, before the appearance of the invaders.¹ A real punishment has taken place in the affair of Michni by the annexation of land. The enforcement of such punishment in the hills would entail a constant war of posts, and an army to cover communi-

¹ The experience of frontier officials has shown that Sir Colin rather underrated the effect of his various operations. In nearly every case the people punished by him behaved very well for a long time afterwards: even those whom the Sikhs with their larger forces had found untamable. This was notably the case with the Ranizai people after Sir Colin's expedition of 1852. All the agreements entered into by these people in 1852 were fulfilled; and when some of the leaders who had signed the compact were killed in an internal feud, after a long interval, a deputation from Ranizai reached the British authorities to explain that, although these men were dead, the tribe still adhered to its engagement.

cations. Yet there is no reality of punishment in any other course, whatever may be said to the contrary; and if not prepared to incur the necessary expenditure, there is but one alternative—viz., to preserve the peace of the valley by rigid attention to the interior line of defence.

“ I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on the Momund tribes, drawn up by Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, at my instance. It is founded on information only obtained within the last few weeks, and is the first approach to accurate knowledge of the Momund tribes, with which we have been engaged in partial hostility for some months. It shows very clearly that I have not overrated the numbers of fighting men, their readiness and power for intercommunication, if attacked, and the difficulty of their country.”¹

Scarcely had Sir Colin settled down to his ordinary work in cantonments before he learned that the arrangements made with the Alumzai section of the Momund tribe had been annulled by order of the Governor-General; and a few days later a requisition was made by the Commissioner for a body of troops to proceed to the Ranizai valley, situated N.W. of the frontier of Yoosufzai, to punish the inhabitants of the former for harbouring some runaways from British territory. Whilst the column was preparing to march, Sir Colin warned the Commissioner of the


¹ The total number of fighting men, as given in this memorandum, is estimated at 19,700 men.

possible danger of leaving the Doaba open to Momund aggression during the contemplated operations in Ranizai ; and, as a measure of precaution, a column of 500 European infantry, with guns and cavalry in proportion, was placed in readiness to move from Peshawur in support of the outposts on the Momund frontier. As it happened, the necessity for the employment of these reinforcements did not arise ; but after the column had left for Ranizai, the Commissioner addressed the officer in temporary command at Peshawur in terms of alarm about the designs of the Momunds, particularly with regard to a probable attack on the bridge of boats on the Cabul river, which post was reinforced the same evening. On the column entering Ranizai it was found that a simple demonstration was sufficient to meet the object the Commissioner had in view ; though, had it been otherwise, the instructions of the Commander-in-chief positively forbade a further movement without reference to him.

The column had no sooner re-entered Peshawur than fresh troubles were reported from the Momund frontier. The tribes were represented to be gathering to such an extent as to necessitate the reinforcement of the outposts, whereupon the infantry in Shubkudur were doubled. Not satisfied with this, Sir Colin proceeded thither on the 15th April, taking with him two horse-artillery guns and 150 sowars (troopers of native cavalry) ; whilst, as an additional measure of precaution, H.M.'s 53d Regiment, then

EXPLANATORY SKETCH OF THE ENGAGEMENT
on the Heights of
PANJ PAO
on the 15th of April 1852

Between a British force under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell K.C.B.
consisting of two H.A. guns and 260 Sowars, and the combined Momund Tribes
amounting to above 6000 men under Saadut Khan et Lalpoora.



Reference

- A.A. Momund Force moving towards and threatening Muttah.
- B. British Force attacking the Enemy.
- C. Second position of the British checking the movement on Muttah.
- D. Position of the British at the close of the evening.
- E.E. Momund position on the return of the British towards Shubkudder.

Scale of Miles
0 ½ 1 ½ 2 ¾ 3 ¾ miles

forming part of the Peshawur garrison, was held in readiness to be transported on elephants to the possible scene of action. He was just in time to meet and defeat Sadut Khan on the heights of Panj-Pao the following day. In his official report of the 17th April he thus describes this spirited affair : " About 3 P.M. on the 15th instant the hillmen debouched from the Reygmaina direction, in numbers certainly not less than 6000 matchlock-men and about 80 sowars. These people then moved along the foot of the great range of hills immediately in front of Shubkudur in very fine order, their cavalry and a crowd of matchlock-men coming across a table-land, the summit of which overhangs the ruined villages of Panj-Pao. The direction of the movement was towards Muttah. Before displaying a single soldier, I allowed this movement to become quite pronounced. I then issued from the fort with two guns 2d troop 1st brigade Bengal Horse-Artillery, under Lieutenant Mackinnon ; 87 troopers 7th Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Saunders ; and 179 sowars of the 15th Irregular Cavalry, under Lieutenant Hicks.

" The enemy's cavalry, with a crowd of matchlock-men, then occupied the edge of the table-land, thus screening the movement towards Muttah. Having dispersed this party with a discharge of artillery, I crossed the low hills at a gallop, and established the guns in rear of the people, whose movement has been described. I was confident that this was the most certain method of averting mischief from Muttah.

“ The practice of the two guns was very good, and the enemy soon began to shake in their purpose and to forsake the table-land. I followed them, and they showed great dexterity in availing themselves of the ground to avoid the artillery-fire. Their masses were now broken. The pursuit lasted for about a mile and a half, being brought to a termination by some low ravines, which were strongly held within half musket-shot of the hills.

“ The wonderful rapidity and determination shown by the enemy, when, on account of the approaching darkness, I deemed it prudent to retrace my steps, was very admirable. The guns were hardly limbered up, the gunners had actually not mounted, when a shout ran down the whole line, and swarms rushed forward, taking advantage of every accident of ground, which shows that few equal them in individual action in a broken country. They evidently thought their own time was now come ; but the guns were instantly unlimbered and double charges of grape checked their wild but really gallant attack, when we consider that these mountaineers had been for two hours exposed to a cannonade to which they had no means of reply. I then retreated across the table-land at a foot’s pace, the guns taking up successive positions at every 300 yards, and keeping up a fire of grape. I thus avoided loss and preserved the most perfect order ; while I have reason to believe that, at this juncture, the enemy suffered heavily.

“ I had sent for the infantry from the fort, think-

ing they might be useful in passing the ruined village of Panj-Pao; but I did not find it necessary to employ them. The action was, on our side, one of artillery, the duties of the cavalry having been restricted by me to covering the guns in the face of the very large body opposed to us. . . . The report of yesterday, that the enemy were on the point of dispersing in consequence of their defeat, is, I am happy to say, amply confirmed to-day.

“The result of the affair I have described is, I need not say, very gratifying to me, and the more so, as it confirms the opinion I have been bold enough to express to his Excellency—viz., that our business here is to bridle the frontier with a strong cordon, reinforcing it at times if necessary, but refraining from attempts to penetrate the hills, where the mountaineers have such advantage of ground and personal activity, to meet which we can alone trust to our best troops, and where artillery cannot be brought into play.”

When forwarding, a few days later, to his former aide-de-camp, Haythorne, a copy of this despatch, he adds: “I assure you that you cannot picture to yourself a more beautiful practical field-day than the one I have described. I was on the top of the Shub-kudur keep with my glass. I saw them form first under the distant range, then send forward their cavalry and a vast number of matchlock-men across the table-land to the edge of it, immediately over-hanging Panj-Pao. Some horsemen and footmen got

down below the latter amongst the ruins. At the same time, large heavy masses moved down upon Muttah. I waited until these masses were fairly committed in movement, and well on the way towards Muttah, when I sallied out with my little party, having made up my mind to force the body immediately over Panj-Pao, which served as a screen to the movement of the masses on their way to Muttah, and to take the latter in rear, knowing that if I could do this rapidly with my two guns, although my means were small, I should give them a check, which would be very dangerous to the best of troops, and could not but be decisive with such gentry as I had to deal with when in an open country. I carried out the manœuvre at a gallop, the result being as I anticipated, and as I have described in my report. The whole gathering, which has cost friend Sadut a month to collect from far and near, broke up and dispersed the next day; and I doubt men again coming from a distance to aid another such attempt, after having seen their large numbers routed by the handful opposed to them. I think it will give your friendly and honest heart pleasure to hear that 'your old gentleman' had such an opportunity of getting a fair blow at our friends, and of his having succeeded in sending it home."

Before the Board of Administration were aware of the defeat and dispersion of the gathering under Sadut Khan, that body addressed Sir Colin, urging him to act on the offensive against the Momunds.

This he declined doing, on the ground that the urgency no longer existed, and that he was not prepared to execute operations of such importance without the most exact and definite orders from the authority to which he was responsible, except on very extraordinary or dangerous occasions. This reply met with the Commander-in-chief's unqualified approval, to which, however, the Governor-General declined to assent.

Just at this time the Commissioner represented that the tribe of the Ootman-Kheyl had assisted one Ajoon Khan in the murder of a native official in British employ at Charsuddah. Sir Colin immediately offered to take measures for the punishment of these offenders, whose villages are situated on the margin of the hills in the British territory of Hushtnuggur, and on ground favourable for the use of artillery. Whilst the column was preparing to move out, and a bridge was being thrown across the Swat river, orders reached the Commissioner from the Board of Administration for the invasion of Swat, a large and independent territory situated to the north of Ranzai, from whence it is entered by the Mullakund Pass,—the reasons for this projected operation being the alleged complicity of the Padshah and Akhoond, the secular and spiritual authorities of Swat, in the above-mentioned murder. At the same time, the Commander-in-chief was requested by the Board of Administration to issue instructions in accordance with their views. During the Commissioner's absence

in the district of Abazai, Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, who had been intrusted with the inquiry into the charge against the rulers of Swat, waited on Sir Colin, and informed him that he had come to the conclusion, not only that the Padshah was guiltless of the alleged complicity in the murder at Charsuddah, but that the evidence went to show that he had exerted himself to prevent his own subjects passing the border, and that Ajoon Khan had returned from Swat, having failed in obtaining assistance from that quarter. Captain James further stated that he had communicated the result of his inquiries to the Commissioner, and, to obviate any chance of misunderstanding, had addressed the Board of Administration in a demi-official form to the same effect.

Sir Colin thereupon deemed it his duty to acquaint the Commander-in-chief with the information thus voluntarily tendered by the Deputy Commissioner, in the belief that, even should the Commander-in-chief have issued his orders, involving the march of a large body of troops in the extreme heat then prevailing, he might retract them on ascertaining that the charge against the rulers of Swat, the sole ground for the adoption of hostile measures against them, had been disproved.

When at Abazai, the Commissioner pressed Sir Colin to enter Swat. His reply was that the matter was in the hands of the Commander-in-chief, and that he could only repeat what he had so often

urged upon the Commissioner, his inability to transgress his proper limits in the Peshawur valley, having on a recent occasion received the most express instructions to the contrary. Sir Colin was at great pains to assure the Commissioner that his opposition did not arise from any desire to interfere with the latter's policy, but because the sanction of the Commander-in-chief to the undertaking, which arrived on the 10th May, had been obtained solely on the allegations against the rulers of Swat, which had been declared by the officer charged with the investigation to be groundless. He was further strengthened in this resolution in consequence of a letter from the Board of Administration authorising the Commissioner to refrain from entering Swat, "should there be any reason to doubt the complicity of the Swatees in the outrage committed by Ajoon Khan."

The Commander-in-chief approved of the determination not to invade Swat under the circumstances reported to him, leaving it to Sir Colin's discretion to act as the course of events might dictate.

The column, assembled on the left bank of the Swat river, consisted of a troop of horse-artillery (six guns), two 8-inch howitzers, two 9-pounders of a field-battery, a company of sappers and miners, the 2d Irregular Cavalry, H.M.'s 32d Regiment, the 28th Native Infantry, the 66th or Ghoorka Regiment, and the Guide corps—in all, 2450 strong. In addition to Norman, his brigade-major, Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield, of H.M.'s 53d, joined the force, placing

his services at Sir Colin's disposal during the ensuing operations. On the 11th May the column proceeded to destroy the group of villages called Nowadun, belonging to the Ootman-Kheyl tribe, which had assisted Ajoon Khan in the Charsuddah murder. The villages were deserted; and beyond some skirmishing with the advanced pickets of the Guides, the enemy offered but slight opposition. The troops retired without loss, after destroying the villages and a large amount of grain.

At the conclusion of the operation, Captain Coke, with 500 rank and file of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Lieutenant Hughes, joined Sir Colin after a forced march from Kohat—a most welcome addition to his force.¹

The column next proceeded against Prangurh, regarded as the stronghold of the Ootman-Kheyl. This is a large village, with its rear resting on high hills and flanked by spurs and lower heights. Here the enemy had made preparations for defence, the

¹ The extraordinary march of this reinforcement, under their gallant leader Coke, deserves special mention. The troops marched at 2 A.M. on the 8th May from Kohat, and reached Peshawur, a distance of thirty-seven miles, the same day. On the 9th they reached the Cabul river only to find the bridge of boats swept away, and it was the evening of the 10th before all were across. They marched during the night, halting for two hours at Shubkudur; and finding on their arrival at Abazai that Sir Colin had left, they pushed on and joined him, having, in order to reach the latter place, marched more than forty miles in about eighteen hours.

place being surrounded by good walls, and the adjacent enclosures being crowded with men. On the enemy opening fire on the advanced-guard, Captain Coke's Punjabees, the 66th Ghoorkas, and the infantry of the Guides advanced to the attack under cover of the artillery, H.M.'s 32d Regiment and the 28th Native Infantry being held in reserve with the guns. In the words of Sir Colin's official report, "The village was carried at a run, the enemy retreating to the hills behind, whence these inimitable skirmishers drove them from rock to rock, far up the side of the high mountain, rendering the destruction of the village easy and safe. The artillery made good practice, effectually aiding the skirmishers. The desultory fight then lasted till the object for which the Commissioner's requisition had been received was effected—the destruction of the village and grain. Of the latter, a large quantity which had been stacked in a supposed place of safety high up the mountain was destroyed by our skirmishers. Considering that no less than ten pieces of artillery opened on this devoted village, it must be owned its people made a gallant defence. But for our guns we should have sustained a very heavy loss, the works and flanking defences alluded to being formidable. As it is, the number of the wounded show how the villagers held their ground as soon as the skirmishers had driven them beyond the range of artillery. The troops retired about 11 A.M., covered by

a strong rear-guard, in extended order, without further loss.”¹

Whilst the burning and sack of Prangurh was taking place, two letters to Ajoon Khan—one from the Padshah and another from the Akhoond—were picked up in Nowadun, the contents of which evinced distinct hostility on the part of the rulers of Swat towards the British Government. On these letters being pronounced authentic, Colin Campbell withdrew his opposition to the Commissioner’s views, concluding that unless prohibited by an absolute veto from the Commander-in-chief, the invasion of Swat must take place.


The column next proceeded to act against Shakote or Iskakote, a village of Ranizai, whither it had been reported large bodies of men, including many Ghazies or fanatics, were hastening from Swat to defend the valley. This being a dependency of, and paying revenue to, the latter, was regarded by the Swatees as their territory.

“Iskakote,” according to Sir Colin’s official report, from which the following extracts are given, “is placed between a very deep and broad nullah and the mountains. This nullah sweeps round in an area from what was the left of our camp, and the march lay along the chord of it. About an hour

¹ The number of casualties on the British side were :—

		Killed.	Wounded.
Nowadun,	0	5
Prangurh,	3	15
Total,	. .	3	20

EXPLANATORY SKETCH
 of the attack and defeat
 of the Swat Tribes in position at
ISKAKOTE,
 by a detachment of the British Troops under the command of
 Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, KCB



Reference

- A. Tribes of Swat numbering about 5 or 6000 in strong position near Iskakote
- B. British Column advancing towards Iskakote
- C. British Force attacking the Enemy's position
- D. A portion of the British Force after pursuit

Number of Rank & File present in action
at Iskakote 18th May, 1862.

Infantry 445, Cavalry 2241, Total 2686
Ordnance 5 six pdr. 2 nine pdr. Guns.
1 three pound Howitzer

Scale of Yards

400 300 400 500

after daylight, when two miles had been accomplished — Iskakote being two more distant — the enemy were discovered on our side of the nullah, stretching in continuous line to the village, which was their left, the ground they held on the margin of the nullah extending for about a mile and a half.

“The troops were then formed in lines of columns at quarter distance in the direction of the line of march, cavalry being sent to the left to watch the enemy’s extreme right. The advance then took place by regiments from the right in open columns, the design being to break the enemy’s centre with the horse-artillery, and attack their whole left, which was on their line of retreat. This was accordingly done, and a sharp cannonade took place on the centre of their position from Captain Baldwin’s troop, which, however, they stood with great firmness, availing themselves of the broken ground for protection.

“The two leading regiments—the Guides and 66th Ghoorkas—wheeled left into line and stormed the nullah, whilst the two 9-pounders opened fire, one to the front, and one towards the village. This attack was supported by the light company of H.M.’s 32d Regiment, and on the left by Captain Coke’s regiment of Punjab Infantry. This was very well done by the troops, the first assailants having to encounter a heavy fire, maintained with much determination. A company of the Ghoorkas was

engaged in hand - to - hand fight—a party of the enemy having actually charged into the centre of them.

“The horse-artillery guns now rapidly changed position and galloped to the edge of the nullah, which they enfiladed with great effect, whenever they could fire without injuring our own people. The two 9-pounders, as soon as they could be spared, moved rapidly to the right, took position opposite the village, and a large burial-ground at right angles to it, which were both full of people—H.M.’s 32d covering the guns, and the 28th Native Infantry being kept in hand so as to act in any direction. The fire of these guns was sharp and telling, and they advanced closer and closer as the general attack on the nullah showed itself to be successful. The enemy then broke up, a large body swarming up the hills to the rear of the village, and another making for the Mullakund Pass. The 9-pounder guns practised against the hills, the 6-pounders going in pursuit up the valley. Great slaughter had been committed on the enemy with a comparatively trifling loss on ours. Large numbers of bodies were found in various spots; and three miles from the scene of resistance, the Guide cavalry, directed at my request by the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson, sabred a considerable crowd striving to make its escape. The pursuit was so rapid that this had happened before the 9-pounders had succeeded in clearing the opposite

hills, although no time was lost by the fugitives in that direction.

“This action, though fought against hillmen and amidst the difficulties of a nullah of extraordinary steepness and width, with broken and strong ground in its neighbourhood, was essentially one of the plains and not of the mountains. The artillery had full scope, as had the cavalry. This circumstance accounts for the considerable results and the very heavy chastisement we were able to inflict on the crowds opposed, who could not have been less than 6000 in number. They showed great resolution, and held the nullah in a manner which excited our admiration.

“Arrangements were now made for the destruction of a very large village, numbering some 600 houses, many of which appeared to be of much pretension. It was thoroughly burned, as well as the uncut crops around.

“Two other villages higher up the valley having been destroyed, the force returned to its original camping-ground at Shergurh.”

Besides the destruction of villages in the Ranizai valley, the strong village of Eroshah, nine miles from camp, was destroyed on the 22d May, and the village of Dobundee, about four miles from camp, on the 24th. On the 25th the force marched to Likpani, and coerced the British village of Sunghow, the headmen of which were fined, and a great moral effect produced by the subsequent march of the

force through Loondkhwar before returning to Peshawur.

No veto upon the invasion of Swat having been laid down by the Commander-in-chief, Sir Colin sought to obtain from the Commissioner exact particulars regarding the resources of that country, and the amount of resistance that might be expected. The question of supplies presented no difficulty so long as the communication with Peshawur was preserved. Not so that of carriage. It was now announced that the camel-carriage with the force must be changed for bullocks, elephants, ponies, and mules, the camels from the plains of India being pronounced unsuitable for service in the mountains. Though great exertions were made by the civil authorities to obtain the necessary animals from the Peshawur valley, the inefficiency of such hastily collected carriage, for the conduct of difficult operations in the mountains, was too patent to admit of dispute. Moreover, Sir Colin had come to the conclusion, from the opposition he had met with in the affair at Iskakote, and his subsequent reconnaissance of the Ranizai valley, that the number of his infantry, which at no time exceeded 3200, would require an addition of 2500 men; and that, having regard to the protection of his rear and communications, on ground unsuitable for cavalry, he could not proceed with the invasion of Swat till he had obtained these reinforcements from below. To a proposal to bring up H.M.'s 22d Regiment from Rawal Pindi the

Board of Administration demurred, meeting it with a counter-proposal to further denude Peshawur, to which neither the Commissioner nor Sir Colin would assent. Eventually the latter offered to storm the Mullakund Pass and enter Swat for two or three days without baggage, as the Commissioner had previously given it as his opinion that even this operation would produce a good effect; but the offer was made under protest, Sir Colin regarding it as a half measure, which would entail great loss of life without corresponding results. This proposal not being accepted, and the increasing heat rendering it unadvisable to keep the troops exposed till the arrival of the reinforcements, which could not be expected before the middle of June, the Commissioner acquiesced in the advisability of the force returning to Peshawur, a strong detachment being left under Lieutenant Lumsden as a measure of precaution. During this discussion, involving a lengthy correspondence, the force was not idle, being daily employed, at the Commissioner's request, in the destruction of some fifteen villages in the Ranizai valley. The column accordingly re-entered cantonments on the 1st and 2d June.

In the meantime Sir Colin, finding himself in antagonism to the Government, had come to the determination to resign his command. In a private letter to Sir William Gomm of the 26th May he thus communicates his intention: "I have very maturely weighed the whole affair, and have come to the conclusion that I should be wanting in what is due to

myself, were I, after what has passed, to continue in this command. I hope that no official inconvenience may arise from my determination; but there is a limit at which a man's forbearance ought to stop. That limit has in my case been reached, and I sincerely hope you will agree with me in opinion, that I am about to pursue the only course worthy of one who, during a long service, and more particularly in the conduct of this not very easy command, has spared no personal exertion to carry out the objects for which the orders of Government have been received—orders in the execution of which there has not been a single case of failure or delay."

Three days later he unburdened his mind to Sir Henry Lawrence as follows:—

“CAMP, GULTAIE, 29th May 1852.

“MY DEAR LAWRENCE,—I should have answered your very kind letter on its receipt, but really my time has been so fully taken up with field services, and a very laborious correspondence, that I could not have written more than a brief note, which would not have satisfied me.

“In the first place, I am sure you will believe me when I say that there is no one thing in the whole world which would so grieve me, as that our friendly intercourse should be broken up. I have never forgotten, and I never shall forget, the heartiness of your first welcome of me, and my feelings towards you have ever been the same. It was matter of real

regret to me that you should have thought that I made allusion to you in an expression in my letter about your political officers. It would have been improper, and offensive to the last degree, and I assure you I was but illustrating the position I had taken, referring generally to those young men who achieved much distinction at the commencement of the last Punjab campaign.

"The whole of the Swat affair has been a fatality. In the first place, there was the business of the evidence, which was put so plainly to me by James, that I considered myself bound to represent it to the Commander-in-chief. When that was settled, on reaching the Ranizai valley, we for the first time discovered that the ground did not admit of mere cavalry posts to cover the rear and maintain the communications. I was for the first time informed by the Commissioner that the whole carriage of the force must be changed from camels to bullocks. He now says that he knew it all along, and would have told me had I decided on going to Swat before the receipt of the orders of the Commander-in-chief. It is a pity he did not let me know before we left Peshawur. Now, at more than the eleventh hour, all having been finally settled by the Commissioner and me, and the separation of the force having commenced, I hear to-day from the Commander-in-chief that a wing of H.M.'s 22d Regiment is put at my disposal. Brigadier Breton (commanding at Rawal Pindi), however, does not put the wing in movement, but again

refers to me. In consequence, therefore, of the loss of time, though acutely sensible of the responsibility I am incurring, and really sorry at being the instrument of thwarting your views and those of your Board, I have determined not to call up that regiment, but to adhere to the arrangement concluded yesterday with the Commissioner—viz., to return to Peshawur, strengthening Lumsden with a detachment, including two guns, and to hold everything ready to act at once against the Mullakund, should there be an attempt to break the peace. I shall desire Breton to keep his people ready, and in such case move out with every available man, so as to be in Ranizai when the 22d should be on the Indus.

“I do hope that you and your brother will, if you have ever entertained it, disabuse yourselves of the idea that I have been actuated by feelings of opposition towards the Board. Before the late powers given to you, and the new instructions¹ to me, my orders from the Commander-in-chief were positive and exact not to pass the limits of the valley. Since then, what I can only call a fatality has placed me in a state of apparent antagonism towards you. . . .

“But, my dear Lawrence, I cannot go on longer in my present position, and I intend to get out of it immediately. . . . I have put a restraint upon myself, of which at one time of my life I should not

¹ By a recent order of the Supreme Government, the Board of Administration had been authorised to invest the Commissioner at Peshawur with full authority to call on the officer commanding for troops to meet and punish aggression beyond the frontier.

have been capable; and I feel that it is safer for me, and better for the public service, that I should not have longer to continue the effort. Remember me to John: he must not quarrel with me."

For some time previously Sir Colin had been made aware by the Commander-in-chief of the Governor-General's dissatisfaction, which awaited him on his return to Peshawur, in the shape of a formal censure. He was told that he had manifested "over-cautious reluctance" in moving out against the marauders from Swat in March, notwithstanding the Commander-in-chief's strenuous endeavours to convince the Governor-General that his conclusions were based on an imperfect correspondence. In the same despatch Sir Colin was informed that the Governor-General regretted that, in the previous year, he had surrendered his judgment regarding a movement for the punishment of the Momunds to the Brigadier's doubts and objections; whereas, as has been previously shown, all that he had done was to submit a report distinctly asserting that there was no military danger in the course proposed.

On the 3d June, the day after the troops had re-entered cantonments, Sir Colin resigned his command in the following letter to the Adjutant-General:—

"I have the honour to request that you will have the goodness to bring to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I have deferred sending the enclosed application till now on public grounds.

"The Doaba frontier is unmolested, and there is

every reason to believe that the arrangements now made for the guard of Yoosufzai and Hushtnuggur, after the late operations beyond the frontier, will ward off all danger of further trouble or alarm for a long time to come. Such is the opinion of Lieutenant Lumsden commanding the Guide corps, who has had permanent charge of these districts, as well as my own.

“The communications for the support of the advanced posts are now daily advancing towards completion, the direct road, twelve miles in length through Khuleel to Michni, having been made. A swing-bridge is about to be constructed at its terminus, the pontoons being now in course of transmission thither up the Cabul river. It will be made immediately.

“The bridge of boats at Nowshera will remain, by order of the Commissioner, the commandant at Peshawur being thus enabled to support the outposts of Hushtnuggur and Yoosufzai, without fail, in forty-eight hours after giving notice.

“The establishment of these posts with the connecting bridges and roads is, in fact, the completion of the plan adopted by the most Honourable the Governor-General last year. It is now only approaching its proper development, and it is only now we can look for its proper results.

“It is not only my opinion, but it is that of every one I have talked to on the subject, including some natives of rank and intelligence, that till such system

of posts and communications was fairly carried out, it was impossible to look for safety of life or property in exposed districts, where our predecessors, the Sikhs and Dooranees, used to maintain large bodies of horse and foot soldiers.

"Under all these circumstances, the designs of his lordship being now nearly completed for the interior line of defence—in the arrangements for which I had the honour of being consulted—the border being quiet from Michni to Yoosufzai, I trust his Excellency will not think I have anticipated the date when it is necessary to consider my health, which has long been in an unsatisfactory state, in preference to the public service.

"During many months I have been necessarily subject to unceasing exposure, and in the course of a service of eleven years in the East I have never sought relief from the climate by visiting the hills or elsewhere.

"I have the honour further to request that his Excellency will favourably consider this letter as containing my formal resignation of the command at Peshawur, and forward it with that view to his lordship the Governor-General, it being the unanimous opinion of the medical officers I have consulted that my stay in India should not be protracted beyond the earliest season for travelling down the country."

The Commander-in-chief, in signifying his approval of the return of the force to cantonments,

expressed at the same time his great concern at Sir Colin's resolution to resign his command, endeavouring to dissuade him from it on the ground that the state of affairs on the frontier might occasion further necessity for the employment of troops, and because "he did not know how to replace him." On receiving, however, the official application for Sir Colin's resignation, he gave him to understand that, though lamenting his departure, he could not be surprised at his resolution to quit the country. The fatigue of body and mind he had undergone, and the vexations to which he had been exposed, sufficiently accounted for it. Fully endorsing the course Sir Colin had followed in reference to the requisitions of the Board of Administration, Sir William Gomm offered to write to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, to whom he had been communicating by every mail the proceedings on the frontier, in order that the Horse Guards might understand the reasons which prompted the step Sir Colin had taken. He also gave him to understand that he might expect further expressions of dissatisfaction from the Government, from which he himself had not been exempted.

Simultaneously with the receipt of Sir William Gomm's letter, the decision of the Governor-General on the correspondence which had arisen with reference to the movement against Swat, reached Sir Colin. He was informed not only that he had "transgressed the bounds of his proper province," but that "he had placed himself in an attitude of direct and pro-

claimed insubordination to the authority of the Governor-General in Council.”¹ In his reply, he expressed his regret that such strong expressions should have been used regarding his conduct, and his painful surprise that, after a life of unswerving military subordination, he should be accused of the reverse. Wholly disavowing disrespect to the head of the Government, “the idea of which never entered his imagination,” he concluded with these words: “Were I to continue in the command at Peshawur, it would be my duty to follow scrupulously the orders and instructions of his lordship, lately communicated, regarding the power now given to the Commissioner by the Board of Administration, to require the troops to proceed anywhere beyond the frontier without orders from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief. This will, however, devolve on another officer, who will be relieved from the very doubtful situation in which I have been placed, where my great anxiety has been—as I can say with the most perfect sincerity—to carry out the views of Government according to the military rules of conduct to which I have been accustomed.”

At the same time Sir Colin answered the Commander-in-chief’s letter of the 16th:—

“I am exceedingly obliged to you for your very kind offer to address Lord Fitzroy Somerset on

¹ The expressions of dissatisfaction here alluded to arose from Sir Colin’s reference to headquarters of the Board’s request to act against the Momund hillmen after he had defeated Sadut Khan. *Vide ante*, pp. 280, 281.

my behalf about the late occurrences. It is very important to me, indeed, that my motives should be understood at the Horse Guards after the expressions used by the Governor-General—which I am precluded from answering, except with the utmost submission, however conscious I may be that I have incurred his lordship's displeasure by strict attention to the principles of subordination in which he has declared me to be wanting. I trust that the official answer I have this day sent may seem to show that some regard for subordination, and respect towards the representative of the Sovereign, will ever be sufficient to prevent me from displaying feelings of resentment, which cannot but be excited in the bosom of any man by the application of such expressions. As you are aware, my dear General, my motives all through have been directed by the consideration of what is expected from a military subordinate to his superior. When I was formally told that what had caused the orders you dictated (as shown by the despatch of the Governor-General) had ceased to have any existence, I supposed that it was only due to you that you should have time to reconsider them before allowing them to be carried out on other pretexts.

"It was, I may say, the extreme attention to the wishes of the superior, from whom I was hitherto bound to receive orders (excepting the Governor-General, of course), that has now caused me to be accused of insubordination.

"This is the point which I wish to have laid before his Grace the Duke of Wellington, since, while bowing, as in duty bound, to the decision of his lordship, I feel that you would have had the strongest ground of complaint against me had I, under the peculiar circumstances, acted otherwise than I have done. I find fault with no one. What has arisen is the result of a system which has hitherto prevailed in our armies, and it is not for me to say whether it is inconvenient or not. But I may be permitted to remark, that until the late instructions of Government, which have given the local Commissioner power to carry war beyond the frontier, the commander of the troops to be so employed being told to wait for no orders from his Commander-in-chief, it was impossible for me to have acted otherwise according to my instructions; and, I believe, I should have been liable to trial—at all events to the severest reprimand—had I done so. If you will kindly explain to Lord Fitzroy the dilemma which has brought on me the displeasure of Government, and consequently my resignation, I shall be indeed obliged to you. I shall never forget your great kindness and support during these transactions."

CHAPTER VIII.

LETTER FROM SIR CHARLES NAPIER — SIR COLIN'S REPLY — COMPLIMENT OFFERED BY OFFICERS OF THE COMPANY'S SERVICE — LEAVES PESHAWUR — VISITS DUGSHAI — PROCEEDS TO ENGLAND — SIR CHARLES NAPIER — SELECTED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN TURKEY — EMBARKS — COMMAND OF HIGHLAND BRIGADE — VARNA — PROMOTION TO MAJOR-GENERAL — EMBARKS FOR CRIMEA — LETTERS RECOUNTING BATTLE OF THE ALMA — DEFENCE OF BALACLAVA — LIPRANDI'S ATTACK — SIR COLIN'S SHARE IN IT — INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL VINOY — HIGHLAND BRIGADE CONCENTRATED AT BALACLAVA — MEASURES FOR ITS DEFENCE — GENERAL ORDER REGARDING 93D HIGHLANDERS.

WHILST the column was on its way back to Peshawur, Sir Colin had the satisfaction of receiving from Sir Charles Napier the following interesting letter, which, though humorous in its irony, illustrates very forcibly the danger of undertaking expeditions into the mountains without the preparation and forethought demanded in the conduct of a grave military operation :—

“1 HOBART PLACE, April 18, 1852.

“MY DEAR CAMPBELL,—I must write to you, though I am too much engaged to say much ; but I am so angry at the attacks upon you in the Indian

newspapers that I cannot resist saying to you that I firmly believe, had you not commanded, some disaster would have befallen the force. Be perfectly assured your whole conduct of the troops in that ill-judged expedition was excellent. They abuse you for not marching upon Lalpoora and Pindyalah, or some such name. Why, what could you have done if you had ? Why should you march on these places ? What could you have done when you got there ? March on to some other two places, and so on, into the heart of Central Asia!!! and then—laid down your arms ! You never could have got there. March to top of hill No. 1; lose some men ; get there. Enemy waiting on top of hill No. 2 ; go there ; more men killed and wounded ; more provisions gone ; large hospitals ; long way for the ‘tommy’¹ to follow. Enemy on No. 3 ; march there ; more killed ; more difficulty ; live on half ‘tommy.’ Enemy as well as ever on No. 4 ; march again ; men down ; hospital large ; animals scarce ; ‘tommy’ coming up ; empty belly till he arrives ; report in camp, ‘tommy’ intercepted. Enemy defying on top of hill No. 5 ; empty bellies ; follow him in good wind ; but enemy off to top of hill No. 6. News confirmed, ‘tommy’ cut off ! Can’t move a peg towards enemy. No grub ; legs weak ; retire to try and meet fresh ‘tommy.’ Now every pass must be carried at the point of the bayonet, whilst the rear-guard is over-powered with a hot pursuing enemy. Every wounded

¹ The soldier’s term for bread.

man lost. Carry the pass ; but no grub, no strength, no heart. All boasters, all criers out for ‘dash,’ for decided measures, down in the mouth. No pluck. Anonymous writers and newspapers funkings the worst of all. No spirit left, because no strength ; and a surrender and massacre of course become necessary. From this you have saved your column, and therefore you are abused by the newspaper correspondents. The papers say you went against your will on that expedition : I hope so ; for had you ordered it I should have been disappointed. It was a foolish, ill-judged, and most unmilitary operation, and I said all along that the Government were lucky in having a real soldier to command it, and save their army. You have done so, and I think you have every reason to be proud of having, like a wise commander, conducted an ill-judged operation in a masterly manner.—Believe me to be, my dear Campbell, yours sincerely,

C. J. NAPIER.”

This letter drew from Sir Colin the following reply :—

“ PESHAWUR, June 10, 1852.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,—I cannot say what a comfort your letter has been to me, amid annoyances which have caused me to resign my post at Peshawur. I have not yielded to the ignorant clamour of the press ; but to the treatment I have received from Government, after having worked for it with all the zeal of which I am capable.

"I should think it impossible for people not on the spot to comprehend what is dignified by the name of our frontier policy. I will give you a short sketch. As you are aware, this border has from time out of mind been subject to plunder from the hill-men. For two years no precautions were taken by us. Then suddenly the actions of individual plunderers were made to assume the appearance of organised and combined hostilities, and an animus was attributed to the native population, for which certainly there was no ground, in spite of our want of precaution. Accordingly, an expedition was planned for the annexation of the lands of the Momund tribe in the plain of the valley, while a system of outposts was at the same time ordered.

"Thus, in point of fact, we were the aggressors, and punished to starvation a very populous tribe for the deeds of a few individuals, which, in default of precautions, we could not but look for as certainties.

"When the first expedition returned to Peshawur in February, the outposts, which had been intrusted to me for arrangement, were complete; and without committing the troops to action in the hills, advantage had been taken, whenever the desultory enemy showed himself in force, to send him back with discomfiture. The tribe had been divided by the able management of Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, lately under you in Scinde, and there was no more to fear from it; but the Governor-General annulled the negotiations, which had divided the

tribe against itself, and its whole strength was again combined against us. Luckily I was on the spot, and having previously well reconnoitred some table-land, where the leader showed his force, signally defeated him with a mere handful of men.

"In the meantime, however, I had been attacked by the press, by the Board of Administration, and, finally, by the Governor-General, for not invading these people in their hills, on my own responsibility, though I had neither means nor orders to do so.

"The Governor-General attributed to me what he called an 'over-cautious reluctance,' though he had never given me the slightest hint before of dissatisfaction, but had written to me in terms of praise, both privately and publicly. He also said that, on a previous occasion he had 'yielded to my doubts and objections,' which were nothing but my military report on the contingencies of a plan he proposed, and which report he called for and acted on. And now he wishes to make me responsible for his own conduct, because I furnished that report, which contained neither advocacy nor recommendations of any kind, but merely a statement of emergencies, which, according to the best of my belief, might and would ensue. This, of course, was too much.

"Lately I have been called on to undertake another expedition based on precisely the same ground—namely, wholesale punishment of districts—because, from want of the commonest prudence, two

cases of inroad and murder have occurred. This was effected ; but as the stream gathers volume in its progress, so did the desire of the Board of Administration for more punishment increase, and I was ordered with my insufficient means to attack the country of Swat in the middle of May, which, according to the road followed, is five marches from Peshawur, the entrance into it lying over a mountain pass nearly, if not quite, 2000 feet high. The expedition, planned in haste and carried on in a hurry, though it might have succeeded, still had elements of disaster, from deficiency of means to cover the communications, and utter want of equipment for mountain warfare. I deemed it my duty, in spite of the ominous words of 'over-cautious reluctance,' to remonstrate against such an invitation of misfortune, at the same time that, in the face of political wisdom (although I was not allowed to avow it), I considered the whole plan based on the most cruel injustice. Finally, the Board of Administration, while it sought to confer such responsibility on me, to whom the execution of the design was intrusted, refused the responsibility of ordering up the reinforcements which, in my opinion, could alone have made it a safe undertaking. This was not only my opinion, but also that of Coke and Lumsden, who, though young men, are, as you know, able and enterprising soldiers, and have an experience of what the hillmen can dare to attempt and do, to which I can hardly lay claim. In consequence, I

point-blank refused to carry out the project of invasion proper, but offered to storm the pass and go in without baggage, the men carrying provisions for three days.

“When I made this offer, in consequence of what had on a former occasion been suggested by the political Commissioner, I did it under protest, as its execution would have entailed a certain loss of life, to which no results from such a half measure could be commensurate. Whether it was that he saw the folly of the crude design, or shrank from the responsibility, now that it was fairly lodged on him, he declined the proposal, and I marched towards cantonments. Three days afterwards, letters came from the Commander-in-chief, authorising the reinforcement; but as this could not arrive for at least a fortnight—no slight feat in the month of June to European or native troops—I did not change the plans I had adopted, but on my responsibility stopped its coming, left a strong detachment for the protection of the border, and re-entered cantonments. The Commissioner agreed in the expediency of this.

“I have no doubt that, for these transactions, although the little campaign has been very successful, both in execution and results, I shall again feel the point of his lordship’s pen. Fortunately I have Sir William Gomm strongly with me, and throughout from the commencement he has given me the kindest support, and treated me with a friendship for which I shall ever be grateful. His views agree

precisely with yours and mine. At this moment they have actually put the force at Peshawur at the disposal of the Board of Administration, without reference to him. I do not envy the man who may succeed me here. I must say I think it dangerous that the wholesome check of reference to the head military authority, hitherto laid on the ordering of troops beyond the frontier, has been removed from the Board of Administration. It happened in my case that the Board ordered two different invasions of very populous tribes dwelling in high mountains at opposite sides of the valley in less than a fortnight—the troops at the disposal of the commander at Peshawur being nicely calculated in number to operate on the interior line of defence, and there being no means of carrying their provisions, should they once leave the plains.

“ My resignation and request for immediate leave of absence must have reached headquarters yesterday, and I shall pass the next three months in repose at Murree—the first I shall have enjoyed since embarking for China in 1841. I then propose to reach Bombay some time in November or December. I hope to have the great pleasure of meeting you in the spring, and of personally thanking you for what has been my only source of gratification for some months—the expression of approval from one whose opinion is to me almost like the Creed.

“ I recommended a plan of mountain equipment, to be always in readiness at Peshawur, in April 1851.

The Governor-General approved of it. The result was a query to the commissariat officer at Peshawur on the price of ponies.¹

¹ The danger of operating in the mountains with a force not specially equipped for such a service was strikingly exemplified by the check experienced by Sir Neville Chamberlain in the autumn of 1863, when he attempted, with a column of about 5000 men, provided with carriage hastily collected and ill organised, to reach Sitana, a mountain stronghold, by the Umbeylah Pass. Halting at the inner end of the pass, within two miles of the exit into the Chumla valley, for his guns, stores, and baggage, which took four days to reach him—the length of the actual pass being about nine miles—he found himself obliged to assume a defensive attitude, in face of the determined opposition offered by the various tribes who had combined to arrest his progress. Chamberlain, who had been wounded, was succeeded in the command by the late General Sir John Garvoe. At the expiration of fifty-four days, during a portion of which time there was a great deal of hard fighting, resulting in a loss of 36 officers and 1000 men, the column succeeded in breaking through the enemy's line and effecting the object of the expedition. Its final success was greatly owing to the exertions of Major James, the Commissioner of Peshawur, of whom Sir Colin had a very high opinion, and who returned to India when operations were at a stand-still. Being ordered at once to Umbeylah, he succeeded, by his influence over some of the chieftains, in weakening the opposition, and thus rendering the military operations comparatively less difficult.

Taught by this experience, the Indian Government, having occasion to operate five years later against the independent tribes of Hazara, organised a force of between 6000 and 7000 men, the largest proportion being Europeans, on the principle of extreme mobility, there being an absence of all baggage except that required for the commissariat and ordnance trains. The troops traversed eighty miles of rugged country, bivouacking for three weeks, without injury to their health, and experienced no check, moving with freedom, and forcing the passes leading to the crest of the Black Mountain, 10,000 feet high, with little resistance and trifling loss, owing to the covering fire of the mountain train, which was carried on mules.

One very important result of Sir Colin's remarks about the want of proper equipment of the troops under his command for mountain warfare was the formation of an organised battery of mountain artillery, called the Peshawur Mountain Train. Up to that time the Indian

"I feel great joy at my approaching independence. After the termination of the first Momund campaign the attacks of the press commenced. I wrote the Commander-in-chief a letter, of which I send you a copy, containing the experience I had gained.¹ This very letter excited the wrath of the Governor-General, to whom it was sent at my instance.—Yours sincerely,

C. CAMPBELL."

His resignation was the cause of a friendly demonstration on the part of a portion of the Peshawur garrison, which, on account of the quarter whence it came, was particularly agreeable to the feelings of Sir Colin. He thus alludes to it in a letter to Major Haythorne of the 30th June: "I think you will be pleased to hear that I had paid to me yesterday what I cannot but conceive a very great compliment. I was waited upon by Colonel Troup,² Major Platt,³ and Captain Jackson,⁴ of the 2d Irregulars. They had been deputed by the officers of the

army had no regularly organised mountain artillery at all, and this Peshawur Mountain Battery (still so called though merged in the Punjab Frontier Force) was the forerunner of the several British and native mountain batteries gradually formed, and which have been of such great service in our various frontier campaigns, and more recently in Afghanistan.

¹ *Vide ante*, p. 270.

² Then in command of the 66th Ghoorka Regiment. Now General Hugh Troup.

³ Major Platt, commanding the 23d Native Infantry, killed in the mutiny at Mhow in 1857.

⁴ Captain G. Jackson, commandant of the 2d Irregular Cavalry, now Major-General, Bengal Staff Corps.

Company's service at Peshawur to invite me to dine with them before my departure, the guests to meet me to be the field-officers of the Queen's corps. They told me that the wish on the part of their brother officers was unanimous. For me to accept such an honour, great and flattering as it was, on giving up this command, would be, I thought, contrary to the spirit of H.M.'s regulations, and I therefore, with the utmost respect to the officers of the station, begged to decline it. While I did so, I begged them to believe that I accepted the intention of the professed kindness with the warmest feelings of gratitude, and that the remembrance of it hereafter would ever be a source of real pleasure to me. Besides a cordial feeling of dislike to being brought forward upon such public occasions, I felt at once that to accept the invitation at this moment would lay me open to remarks by those who were not friendly to me. . . . It was very civil and kind, emanating, as it did, entirely from the officers of the sister service."

In the meantime satisfactory reports were received from the frontier. The Michni Momunds expressed their anxiety to reoccupy their lands on the payment of a stipulated rent, whilst the Ranizai and Swatees not only made no attempt to retaliate, but manifested a desire to remain at peace.¹ This was most

¹ For many years the people of Ranizai gave no trouble whatever; and in more than one official document this expedition has been referred to as showing the excellent and lasting result arising from a properly conducted punitive expedition against hill-people who, prior to the expedition, had given serious trouble.

cheering news to Sir Colin, justifying as it did the opinion he had already expressed to the Commander-in-chief, that "the troops had done sufficient for the peace of the border, now that the plans adopted by the Governor-General for its efficient protection had been carried out."

On the 25th July Sir Colin resigned his command, leaving for Murree, then a recently established hill-station near Rawal Pindi, whither he had been recommended to proceed on medical certificate.

Subsequently to his leaving Peshawur the official acknowledgment by the Government of India of the services of the troops engaged in the recent operations came to hand. The despatch, after rendering due tribute to the troops, recorded the Governor-General's regret "that any incident should have occurred to censure any portion of Sir Colin Campbell's conduct," but "acknowledged in the most ample terms the ability, the personal intrepidity and activity, and the sterling soldierly qualities, which this distinguished officer had displayed in the military command of the troops at Peshawur upon every occasion upon which they had taken the field."

Sir Colin having, on the resignation of his command, reverted to his original position as senior Lieutenant-Colonel of the 98th Regiment, was free to carry out his long-wished-for plan of returning to England. He remained at Murree, deriving much benefit from its climate, till the end of October, when he proceeded to Dugshai, where the 98th Regiment

was stationed; and after inspecting it and paying a short visit to Simla, he left for Bombay, *via* Ferozepore. Smarting under what he conceived to be the undeserved censure of the Governor-General, who had supported the policy of the Board of Administration, he could not make up his mind, when passing through Lahore, to offer himself as a guest at the Residency; but that there had been no renunciation of friendly relations with those from whom he had experienced so much kindness is evident from the following letter of Sir Henry Lawrence, written on the 19th December:—

“LAHORE, December 19th.

“MY DEAR CAMPBELL,—I was very sorry to find you had passed through Lahore without putting up with us. It was my own fault for not having answered your kind letter, which I fully intended to have done, but put it off from day to day, as, I am sorry to say, I do many other things, particularly my letters to friends, for work seems rather to increase than lessen at Lahore. This line, however, is to beg that you will run over, if but for a day. My wife will be very glad to welcome you at Christmas; and if you come, the Fordyces will do so too. I can help you half-way from Ferozepore to Lahore if you require a conveyance. We should be very sorry if you left India without shaking hands.—Yours very sincerely,

HENRY LAWRENCE.”

Sir Colin, however, did not accept the invitation, and left Ferozepore for Bombay direct, finally reaching England in the first week of March 1853.

Shortly after his return home he vacated the command of the 98th Regiment, and retired on half-pay. Though his means were not large, they were amply sufficient for his wants, whilst he experienced the satisfaction of feeling that he was free from all indebtedness, and was in a position to provide, in an increased degree, for the maintenance of his father and sister. The greater portion of 1853 was spent in visits to his friends, Sir Charles Napier being one of the first to accord "his fellow-criminal," as he facetiously called him, a hearty welcome. But the pleasure anticipated from a renewal of personal intercourse with his beloved and honoured chief was not destined to last many months. Sir Charles Napier's health was rapidly failing, and in August of this year Sir Colin claimed the mournful privilege of following his remains to the grave.

He did not long enjoy the repose which had been the cherished dream of his existence during his eleven year's absence from England. The occupation of the Danubian principalities by Russia in 1853 had led to the alliance of France and England in defence of Turkey; and when, early in the following year, the Western Powers determined to collect a force in the Levant, Sir Colin was one of the first officers selected for employment—a satisfactory proof

that the circumstances under which he resigned the Peshawur command had not operated to his disadvantage. In a letter of the 11th February to the writer of these pages, he thus mentions the fact: "I saw Lord Hardinge yesterday, who told me he intended me to command one of the two brigades of infantry of the line which are to compose the force to be sent to Turkey, provided the nomination should meet with the approval of the general officer to command the force, and that the command had been offered to Lord Raglan. I sought an interview with the latter. He told me that the command had not been offered to him. That his name, he believed, had been suggested by Lord Hardinge to the Duke of Newcastle, who would bring it before the Cabinet this afternoon. His manner, though civil, was far more serious than usual. He did not say whether he would accept the command or not. My impression is that he will be likely to refuse the command of so small a force. At any rate, I cannot yet consider what Lord Hardinge said to me as decisive of the question of my getting the command of one of the brigades."

Two days later he wrote to say that it was quite certain that he was to command a brigade, and that "he considered himself most fortunate in being employed under such a chief."

Accompanied by Major Sterling,¹ who had been appointed his brigade-major, and by Captain Shad-

¹ The late Colonel Sir A. C. Sterling, K.C.B.

well,¹ 19th Regiment, as aide-de-camp, he embarked at Woolwich on the 5th April. On the 25th of that month he reached Constantinople, and, pending the arrival of Lord Raglan, was appointed provisionally to the command of a brigade consisting of the 7th Fusiliers, 23d Fusiliers, and 33d Regiment. On the 4th May he wrote from Scutari to Colonel Henry Eyre: "Lord Raglan arrived here two days ago, and is now busy in organising and getting into working order this force, which is not yet entirely assembled, nor can the whole be brought together before the end of this month. The formation of the regiments into divisions and brigades has already taken place. I have been appointed to the Highland Brigade, consisting of the 42d, 79th, and 93d regiments. The two former corps have not yet arrived, and the 93d are still at Gallipoli. My brigade, with the Guards, forms the first division, under the Duke of Cambridge. In any other division I should have been the senior brigadier-general, while in the first division I am the junior, Bentinck² being my senior officer. The manner, however, in which the proposition was made to me by Lord Raglan was so kind and civil in its nature, that I could only feel pleased and flattered in going wherever he chose to place me."

It was not till the second week in June that the Highland Brigade was completed by the arrival of

¹ Lieutenant-General Shadwell, C.B.

² The late General Sir Henry Bentinck, K.C.B.

the 42d Regiment. Proud, very proud, was Sir Colin of the troops committed to his charge; nor was it long before they in their turn became sensible of the good fortune which had placed them under an experienced commander, who, though exacting the strictest discipline, stoutly maintained their rights, and by his knowledge of the service and the ready interest he manifested in all that concerned the soldier's welfare, quickly won their respect and goodwill. Most fortunate, too, did he consider himself in finding in the officer commanding the 42d¹ the son of his old friend and patron Sir John Cameron of the 9th. It was not only a delight to Sir Colin to recall the past, and recount to the son the stirring deeds of the father, but he regarded it as a great privilege to be able to avail himself of Colonel Cameron's long experience at the head of a Highland regiment in many matters touching the management of his brigade.

In the meantime, in conformity with the plan of operations agreed upon by the Allied commanders, the French and English armies were being gradually concentrated in the neighbourhood of Varna, whence an advance was intended to be made for the relief of Silistria, as soon as sufficient carriage had been collected to enable the movement to take place. But on the 25th June—ten days after the arrival of the first division at Varna—news reached the Allies that the Russians had raised the siege and were in retreat

¹ General Sir Duncan A. Cameron, G.C.B.

across the Danube. All fears of further aggression on Turkish soil were speedily removed by the withdrawal of the Czar's forces from Wallachia and Moldavia.

On the 10th July the long-expected brevet, which included Sir Colin's name, was published to the army. He thus alludes to it in his journal : " My name appeared in the orders of yesterday as a major-general, after a service of forty-six years and one month. This rank has arrived at a period of life when the small additional income which it carries with it is the only circumstance connected with the promotion in which I take any interest." But this honest expression of his feelings was not incompatible with the heartiest zeal in the performance of his duties. In the sickness that fell upon the English army towards the end of July, Sir Colin set a bright example to all under his command in his endeavours to preserve the efficiency of his brigade, though he himself was by no means exempt from suffering.

The preparations for the intended expedition to the Crimea having been completed, the Highland brigade embarked at Varna in the last days of August.

On the 3d September he wrote from the steam-transport Emu, in Varna Bay, to Colonel Henry Eyre—

" I embarked the day before yesterday, and this evening the whole will be on board. It is said we

are to sail to-morrow for Baljik, in the first instance, where the troops of both nations (France and England) are to rendezvous, and from thence to proceed to the Crimea, for the invasion of which, it is now announced in orders, the Allied forces are destined. Up to the present time a subordinate officer like myself knew nothing of the intentions of the Commander-in-chief. Lord Raglan has maintained such silence and secrecy that, with the exception of Sir George Brown, who has performed all and every kind of duty belonging to the chief of the staff of an army, and his military secretary, who must copy his confidential correspondence, not another officer in the army knew our destination till two or three days ago. . . . It is happy for the army that we have a commander so wise and discreet, and you may rely upon it that we shall succeed in taking him successfully through any operation he directs us to undertake. I am happy to say that my brigade has suffered less in proportion to its numbers than any other brigade in the army."

His journal, which, since his departure from England for China in 1841, Sir Colin had kept up with more or less regularity, was laid aside during the period he was engaged against the hill tribes in 1852, and during his sojourn in England in 1853. It was resumed, though in a fitful manner, in 1854, and was finally dropped a few days before the Allies landed in the Crimea. It contains few entries that would serve to illustrate this period of his career,

which is the more to be regretted, as the letters he wrote from the Crimea were very limited in number, and few of them are forthcoming.

The passage of the Allies across the Black Sea, their landing at Old Fort, and their subsequent advance to the Alma, are familiar matters of history, and have been treated in such detail in the eloquent pages of Mr Kinglake's work, and by other writers, as to render it superfluous to dwell upon them in this volume. Two letters, however, from Sir Colin, narrating his share in the battle of the Alma, have been preserved. The first, addressed to his sister the day following the action, gives but a slight sketch of his proceedings, and was written "for the information of his dear friend Gledstanes, to whom, and to none other, she was charged to show the note, with his love and affectionate remembrance, being assured that he would learn with pleasure the fine courage exhibited by the young Highlanders; and that his old and truly attached friend was supposed to have made a disposition and an attack of importance, which led to results of considerable advantage." He thus concludes his letter: "My staff escaped unhurt, both greatly pleased with the result of our first battle. I lost my best horse—a noble animal. He was first shot in the hip, the ball passing through the sabretasche attached to my saddle, and the second ball went right through his body, passing through his heart. He sank at once, and Shadwell kindly lent me his horse, which I immediately mounted. You

will see, my dear Alicia, that our first battle went off well. I am writing on the ground, which I find most inconvenient."



The second letter was addressed to Colonel Henry Eyre, from the camp, near Balaklava, on the 28th September, two days after the accomplishment of the celebrated flank march from the Belbek.

"The account of the passage of the Alma and action fought on the left bank, on which the Russian army was very strongly posted and intrenched, will have reached you before this can arrive in England.

"The First Division formed the extreme left of our army, and was in immediate support to the Light Division. My brigade was on the left of the Guards. The Alma itself is not of any width, and is fordable in most parts; but the bottom, through which it flows, is covered with vineyards and garden enclosures, all of which were under the fire of the enemy's batteries. Their guns were of large calibre, and quite overpowered the fire of our 9-pounders.

"When the Light Division was ordered to advance, we (the First Division) followed in close support. In a gigantic gorge, immediately in front of the Light Division, the enemy had made a large circular redoubt, protected on each side by artillery on the heights above and on either side, covered on its flanks and its front by a direct as well as an enfilading fire. This artillery was supported by numerous and large masses of troops near their guns, and also by other large masses in rear on the inward slopes

*Admire of the
HIGHLAND BRIGADE
up the left side*



of the heights on which they were posted. These heights extended far to the enemy's right, with an open valley without bush or tree to afford cover or protection from their fire down the slope to the bank of the river, on which we had to form and to advance to the attack after crossing.

"The vineyards and garden enclosures in the narrow valley through which the river runs, completely broke the formation of the troops. They passed through in a disorderly manner necessarily; but the left bank being high, I was enabled to collect my right regiment (the 42d) in a goodly number under its cover. . . .

"On gaining the summit I observed a large portion of the Light Division advancing to attack the redoubt, which was a good deal to the right of my right regiment. . . . I hastened the formation of my own right regiment, for the other two were still struggling through the difficult bottom from which I had emerged. . . .

"The 42d continued its advance—followed, as I had previously ordered, by the other two regiments (93d and 79th) in echelon, forming in that order as they gained in succession the summit of the left bank of the Alma: On gaining the heights, we found the enemy, who had retreated from the redoubt, attempting to form upon two large masses of troops that were advancing over the plateau to meet the attack of the 42d. The men were too much blown to think of charging, so they opened fire while

advancing in line,¹ at which they had been practised, and drove with cheers and a terrible loss both masses and the fugitives from the redoubt in confusion before them.

"Before reaching the inner crest of these heights, another heavy mass of troops came forward against the 42d, and these were disposed of in the same way as the two first we encountered. I halted the regiment on the inner crest of the heights, still firing and killing more of the enemy as they were descending the inner slope of the heights we had gained, as I have described, when two large bodies came down from the right of the enemy's position direct on the left flank of the 42d. Just at this moment the 93d showed itself coming over the table of the heights, and attacked these bodies, who did not yield readily. The 93d, whom I had great difficulty in restraining from following the enemy, had only time to inflict great loss, when two bodies of fresh infantry, with some cavalry, came boldly forward against the left flank of the 93d, when, thinking (as in the case of the flank attack on the 42d) of the dispositions I should make to meet it, the 79th made its appearance over the hill, and went at these troops with cheers, causing them great loss, and sending them down the hillside in great confusion.

¹ This manœuvre, unauthorised by regulation, Colonel Cameron had derived from his father, Sir John Cameron, who, during the Peninsular war, had reduced it to a system. Colin Campbell constantly practised his own regiment in it, and, under his guidance, the 61st made it tell with terrible effect at Chillianwala.

"The Guards during these operations were away to my right, and quite removed from the scene of this fight which I have described. It was a fight of the Highland brigade.

"Lord Raglan came up afterwards and sent for me. When I approached him I observed his eyes to fill and his lips and countenance to quiver. He gave me a cordial shake of the hand, but he could not speak. The men cheered very much. I told them I was going to ask the Commander-in-chief a great favour—that he would permit me to have the honour of wearing the Highland bonnet during the rest of the campaign, which pleased them very much; and so ended my part in the fight of the 20th instant.

"My men behaved nobly. I never saw troops march to battle with greater *sang froid* and order than those three Highland regiments. Their conduct was very much admired by all who witnessed their behaviour.

"I write on the ground. I have neither stool to sit on, nor bed to lie on. I have not had off my clothes since we landed on the 14th. I am in capital health, for which I have to be very thankful. Cholera is rife among us, and carrying off many fine fellows of all ranks.

"Dear —— will be grieved and broken-hearted about her nephew,¹ who was killed just at the close of the action. He was a great favourite with every

¹ Lieutenant Walsham, R.A.

one, and he is much and deservedly regretted. I have not the heart to write to her about her loss just at present.

“ Give my kindest regards to your dear wife, and also to the boys, for whom I will bring a *souvenir* from Sebastopol. I could not carry anything from the Alma, my horse having been shot, and the only one I had to ride had to carry his own clothing and food, besides my own.

“ In haste.—Ever yours, my dear Eyre, most sincerely,

C. CAMPBELL.

“ I have not time to read over this scrawl. My love to all our friends in the North.”

On the 2d October the Highland brigade, leaving the 93d at Balaklava to disembark shot and shell, moved to the plateau of the Chersonese, taking up its position with the Guards in rear of the Light Division. Here Sir Colin remained till the morning of the 14th, when he was summoned to headquarters, having been designated for the command of the troops in front of Balaklava. The exposed situation of that port, which had become the base of the English operations, had from an early date engaged Lord Raglan’s attention, and measures were already in progress to strengthen the position by means of batteries and field-works, on a plan submitted by Captain Stanton and approved by Lord Raglan. After receiving the latter’s verbal instruc-

tions, Sir Colin, accompanied by Colonel Steele,¹ the Military Secretary, proceeded to Balaklava to inspect the lines, meeting on his way the Admiral (Sir E. Lyons), who expressed in no measured terms the relief he felt at finding the rear of the English army intrusted to such competent keeping.

The defences of Balaklava consisted of a double line of works. On the interior line, at the extreme right of the Balaklava heights, a declivity situated on the eastern side of the harbour, and at the point where the road leading along the southern coast of the Crimea crosses the ridge of hills, a series of batteries, connected by a continuous trench, had been erected. These works extended to the chapel of St Elias, near the road leading from Balaklava to the Traktir bridge across the Tchernaya. Near this chapel, a battery manned by a small detachment of Royal Artillery had been established. A battery (No. 4) for seven guns had been constructed in front of Kadiköi; and behind this village, on the western side of the Balaklava and Traktir road, was another battery of five guns. The front of this position extended for a distance of about three miles. For the defence of the heights, a body of Royal Marines about 1200 strong had been landed from the fleet, and were encamped on the extreme right of the position; whilst for the service of the batteries there was disposable a weak detachment of Marine artil-

¹ Now General Sir Thomas Steele, K.C.B., commanding the forces in Ireland.

lery, quite inadequate to the purpose. In the lower ground the 93d Highlanders, together with Barker's battery of the 3d division, were encamped in front of Kadiköi, besides whom there was available, in case of necessity, a small proportion, 100 or so, of the provisional battalion that had been formed for temporary duty at Balaklava, out of detachments of the least efficient soldiers of every regiment serving at the front. The batteries at Kadiköi were efficiently manned by seamen from H.M.'s ships Niger and Vesuvius.

The outer line of works consisted of a chain of redoubts placed on the crest of the low range of hills separating the valley of Balaklava from that of the Tchernaya, and from about 2000 to 2500 yards in front of the inner line. These redoubts, which had been commenced on the 7th October, and were still unfinished, were of very slight profile, and were destined to be armed with 12-pounder iron guns, and to be garrisoned with Turks, eight battalions of whom, about 4700 strong, under the command of Rustem Pasha, an active and intelligent officer, were placed at Sir Colin's disposal. In addition to the troops above mentioned, the cavalry, under Lord Lucan's separate command, numbering some 1500 men, occupied the western portion of the plain of Balaklava beneath the plateau of the Chersonese, and maintained the connection between the inner and outer line of works, as well as with the main body of the army before Sebastopol.

The chief defect of this position lying in the great distance between the outer line and its supports, did not escape Sir Colin's observation ; but the point which he regarded with much greater anxiety was the extreme right of the inner line, which could be approached from the hills to the eastward by the narrow rib or ledge that connects them with the Balaklava heights. This was the key of the position ; and although the narrowness of the approach forbade the attack of troops with any but an extremely limited front, he was from the first impressed with the extreme importance of strengthening this part of the position, and of enjoining on the troops intrusted with its defence the exercise of the greatest care and vigilance.

As soon as he had finished the examination of the position, he lost no time in hurrying forward with his accustomed energy the measures of defence, which it had become necessary to complete, as already there existed unmistakable symptoms of the proximity of the enemy's forces. For a few days he was enabled to count on the assistance of Major Nasmyth, of Silistrian fame, whom Lord Raglan had sent to Balaklava to perform the duties of Assistant Quarter-master-General ; but that officer, already failing in health, was shortly obliged to go on board ship and proceed to Scutari. His place was then taken by the writer of these pages.

With the self-reliance which had enabled him on so many previous occasions to meet pressing exigencies,

cies, Sir Colin vigorously applied himself to the work cut out for him. The first to rise, he was the last to lie down, though engaged on his legs or on horseback every hour of the day in the superintendence of the different working-parties, encouraging the diligent, rebuking the indolent, besides visiting at early dawn and nightfall, not only his own posts, but those of the cavalry. When going the rounds of the latter he was not unfrequently accompanied by Lord Lucan, himself a sympathiser with hard work, who, though Sir Colin's senior in rank, accepted with deference the views of the experienced old soldier, whose counsel he was not backward to seek; so that, notwithstanding the independence of their respective commands, the most confidential and happy relations existed between them.

It was not till the evening of the 21st that the armament of the redoubts was completed, and even then there were only guns sufficient to place in four of them. The two westernmost redoubts were unarmed.¹ In the interval the Allies had opened fire on Sebastopol, whilst the constant increase of the enemy's troops in the direction of Tchorgoun led to the conclusion that an attack upon Balaklava was

¹ Doubts having been expressed regarding the number of guns in the redoubts, it may be as well to mention that three were placed in No. 1, the easternmost or "Canrobert's redoubt," and two in Nos. 2, 3, and 4 respectively, making nine in all. This statement is made on the authority of the staff officer to whose lot it fell to superintend the disembarkation and placing of these guns in position, in which duty he was aided by Captain P. G. Pipon, R.A.

imminent, the more so as several reconnaissances in force had been made by the Russians between the 18th and 21st, and in such force on the last-named day, that, in consequence of the reports received at headquarters, a considerable reinforcement had been despatched from the plateau to Sir Colin, which returned as soon as it had become evident that no attack was intended. It was an anxious time ; and though Sir Colin felt that he could hold Balaklava against any but an overwhelming force, he was keenly sensible of the inherent defects of his position, and of the responsibility which its maintenance with the scanty means at his disposal entailed upon him. Nevertheless he put a bold front on matters, which were hastening to a climax ; and having satisfied himself that he had taken every precaution possible with the limited means at his disposal, he made his reports to headquarters in an assuring though far from boastful tone, and calmly awaited the development of events.

On the evening of the 24th, Rustem Pasha communicated to Sir Colin information, which had reached him through a spy, of such a nature as to leave no doubt in Lord Lucan's mind and his own that the Russians would attack the next day. It proved to be correct ; for at daybreak of the 25th, the Russian field-army under Liprandi debouched from the hills in the vicinity of Tchorgoun, and advanced to the assault of the Turkish redoubts.

It consisted of 25 battalions of infantry, 34 squad-

rons of cavalry, and 78 guns, amounting in round numbers to 24,000 men, its immediate object being the capture of the redoubts forming the exterior line of defence, and the forcing of the camp of the 93d Highlanders, as well as that of the Turks at Kadiköi. Sir Colin, who had been in the saddle since daylight, witnessed, in company with Lord Lucan, the enemy's advance, and no time was lost in reporting the circumstance to headquarters. The cavalry mounted and moved to the scene of action ; whilst the 93d, and the other troops guarding the inner line of defence, stood to their arms and awaited the development of the enemy's movements. The attack was directed against Nos. 1, 2, and 3, or the easternmost redoubts, covered by the fire of 30 guns. To such overwhelming odds and such a fire the Turks shortly succumbed ; and though Lord Lucan with his cavalry, assisted by Maude's 6-pounder battery, made a show of supporting them as long as it was safe to do so, their resistance in No. 1 redoubt, though desperate for the moment, was short-lived. So shallow was the ditch, and so slight was the parapet of the redoubt—notwithstanding as much time and labour as were available had been expended upon them—that the Cossacks were soon seen riding into the work and completing the discomfiture of its garrison, which abandoned it,—not, however, before the three guns had been spiked under the direction of an English artilleryman, one of whom had been placed in each of the armed redoubts. The loss of No. 1 redoubt

entailed the successive evacuation of the others, and soon the Turks were in rapid flight, making for Balaklava, but ultimately formed on either flank of the 93d in front of Kadiköi. The time was now come for Sir Colin to act, and what he performed shall be narrated in his own words : “ When the enemy ” (so runs his official report) “ had taken possession of these redoubts, their artillery advanced with a mass of cavalry and their guns ranged, to the 93d Highlanders, which, with 100 invalids, under Lieutenant-Colonel Daveney, occupied very inefficiently, from the smallness of their numbers, the slightly rising ground in front of No. 4 battery. As I found that round-shot and shell began to cause some casualties among the 93d Highlanders, and the Turkish battalions on their right and left flanks, I made them retire a few paces behind the crest of the hill. During this period our batteries on the heights, manned by the Royal Artillerymen and the Royal Marines, made excellent practice on the enemy’s cavalry, which came over the hill in our front. One body, amounting to about 400, turned to their left, separating themselves from those who attacked Lord Lucan’s division, and charged the 93d Highlanders, who immediately advanced to the crest of the hill on which they stood, and opened their fire, forcing the Russian cavalry to turn to their left ; after which they made an attempt to turn the right flank of the 93d on observing the flight of the Turks who had been posted there. Upon this the grenadiers of the

93d, under Captain Ross,¹ were wheeled up to their right, and fired on the enemy, and by this manœuvre completely discomfited them."

The main body of the Russian cavalry, from which that portion of it which had been repelled by the fire of the 93d detached itself, now advanced against the English Heavy Cavalry brigade; and whilst the head of it was engaged in close encounter with our dragoons, Sir Colin made Barker² (commanding the field-battery attached to Sir Colin's force) open two of his guns on the centre and rear of the Russian horsemen, specially directing him to use round-shot, and not shell, as being more effective under the circumstances.

Owing to the confident bearing of the 93d under his guidance, Sir Colin and those about him were enabled to witness with undivided attention the course of the struggle that now ensued. After an interval of breathless suspense, the English troopers conspicuous amongst whom by their tall bearskin-caps and grey horses were the Scots Greys, could be detected forging their way through the grey-coated mass of the Russian squadrons. Yet another moment and the enemy's column was observed to waver, then break, and shortly the whole body turned and galloped to the rear in disorder. Thereupon the 93d gave vent to their feelings in a round of ringing cheers, which reverberated along the lower end of

¹ The late Colonel Ross, C.B.

² The late Colonel Sir George Robert Barker, K.C.B.

the valley, and was prolonged by the troops on the heights of Balaklava, during which Sir Colin rode forward to the Scots Greys, and, in a few telling words, expressed to them his admiration of their gallantry. He then joined Lord Lucan, to whom he offered his hearty congratulations on the successful issue of this glorious feat of arms.

Lord Raglan, on satisfying himself that the Russians were attacking in earnest, had, at an early hour, directed the 1st and 4th divisions to march from the plateau to Sir Colin's assistance, whilst in addition to this reinforcement the 1st French division descended into the valley, and, together with the eight squadrons of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, formed up on the left of the English infantry going eastward. These troops arrived on the ground indicated about 11 A.M., by which time the enemy, showing no inclination to advance towards Balaklava, whereby he would have exposed himself to a powerful flank attack, had assumed a defensive attitude. Of the nine guns placed in the Turkish redoubts seven had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and these he was occupied in removing when Lord Raglan, desirous of interrupting this proceeding, gave the directions which led to the famous but disastrous charge of the Light Cavalry brigade.

This closed the day's proceedings as far as any more fighting was concerned, though some desultory firing was maintained on either side, which ceased altogether about 4 P.M., the result being that the

Russians remained in possession of the three eastern-most redoubts, thereby necessitating the abandonment of the remainder, so that the defence of Bala-klava was thenceforth restricted to the works on the Marine heights, and the batteries covering the gorge of Kadiköi and the approach to the port. As the day drew to a close, the brigade of Guards and the 4th division returned to their camp on the Chersonese, leaving the 42d and 79th Highlanders once more under the command of their own brigadier. These regiments took up a position for the night on the low ground between the camp of the 93d Highlanders and the foot of the Marine heights. At the same time, by direction of General Canrobert, the 2d brigade of the French 1st division, under General Vinoy, was detached from Bosquet's *corps d'observation*, and moved to the high ground overlooking the gorge of Kadiköi, for the purpose of assisting Sir Colin in the defence of his position, now rendered very critical by the contiguity of the enemy's forces in such preponderating numbers.

It was a happy accident that brought Vinoy and Sir Colin into communication with each other. Alike soldiers of fortune, they possessed many points in common. There was no great difference of age between them, Vinoy being eight years Sir Colin's junior. They had each served long and uninterruptedly; both had had much experience in war. From the moment they met they seemed to understand one another, and as Sir Colin fortunately was

able to converse fluently in Vinoy's tongue, there was no difficulty in the interchange of their ideas. Moreover, as Sir Colin had invariably entertained a chivalrous respect for the military qualities of the opponents of his youth, his relations with his French comrade promised to be not less cordial by reason of the substantial reinforcements which the latter had so opportunely brought to his aid.

At nightfall the 93d retired from the position they had occupied during the day into No. 4 battery, where Sir Colin remained with them, in momentary expectation of an attack. Half of the men were posted behind the parapet, whilst those not on guard lay down with their loaded muskets under their blankets, so as to be ready in case of emergency. Rustem Pasha was also there, much dejected at the defeat of his troops, but Sir Colin was the first to sympathise with him in his misfortune. This he was enabled to do without the assistance of an intermediary—Rustem Pasha, who had been educated at Vienna, being a proficient in the French language. A marked exception to the general body of the English officers, who were loud in their condemnation of the Turks, Sir Colin had from the first regarded their isolated position in the redoubts as fraught with danger; and though he conformed, as in duty bound, to Lord Raglan's instructions, in completing and arming the works on the plan submitted by the engineers, he would himself have preferred to have left them unarmed, and to have sim-

ply posted the Turks behind them. At any rate, such a course would have prevented the loss of the guns. Sir Colin was too well versed in his art to refuse credit to the Turkish soldiers for their gallant but ineffectual attempt to hold Canrobert's redoubt under almost desperate circumstances.

It was an anxious night. Throughout the whole of it Sir Colin was up and about, showing himself to his soldiers, and reminding them in solemn accents that, “happen what might, it was the duty of every one to stand, and, if need be, die at his post. That he would be with them,” &c. With the 42d and 79th posted in the low ground to the right of No. 4 battery, and with a detachment from Vinoy’s brigade prolonging the Highlanders’ line of posts to their left, so as to cover the gorge of Kadiköi, he took every precaution to meet the enemy’s attack in that direction : but he did not conceal his anxiety about his extreme right ; and the more so because, as evening approached, the Russians were observed moving troops along the high ground above Kamara, in the direction of the Marine heights, for which contingency Colonel Hurdle,¹ commanding that portion of the lines, had been duly warned. Great, however, was the relief when, after a prolonged suspense, daylight appeared, revealing no change in the enemy’s position.

Balaklava was beleaguered, and it had become a

¹ Major-General Sir Thos. Hurdle, K.C.B., Colonel Commandant, retired full pay, Royal Marines.

question in Lord Raglan's mind whether to hold or abandon the place. He therefore rode down to Kadiköi on the 26th, and meeting Sir Colin and Sir E. Lyons at No. 4 battery, discussed the question. The conference eventuated in the determination to retain Balaklava as the port of supply, without which the Commissary-General represented his inability to feed the army. Sir E. Lyons was also strongly in favour of its retention. To this end the port was cleared of all such vessels and stores as were not required at the moment, and the *Sanspareil* line-of-battle ship was brought into the harbour, the upper end of which was quite denuded of shipping. The seamen already landed for the service of the batteries were reinforced, as were also the Turkish battalions, and Sir Colin was instructed to defend Balaklava with the means placed at his disposal. Even when Lord Raglan had done all in his power to make the lines secure, he informed the Minister of War that "he would have been more satisfied if he could have occupied the position in considerably greater strength."¹

Previously to Lord Raglan's visit Sir Colin had moved the 42d and 79th Highlanders inside the lines of the Balaklava heights, in which they took

¹ *Vide* Kinglake, vol. v. p. 29. The three regiments of the Highland Brigade, together with the provisional battalion for service in Balaklava, and the Marines on the heights, did not furnish more than 3358 infantry. To these must be added the seamen and artillerymen serving in the batteries. Vinoy's brigade amounted in round numbers to 2200 men.

up a position immediately behind the intrenchments overlooking the valley; the 42d on the left, the 79th on their right. Thus the Marines were enabled to turn their undivided attention to the maintenance of the extreme right or key of the position. The low ground between the heights and the battery was watched by four battalions of Turks, exclusive of non-combatants, about 2600 strong, whilst four others, numbering some 1300 effective men, were encamped on the heights in alignment with the 42d and 79th Highlanders.¹

Every effort was now made to enlarge and strengthen the works, under the able direction of Lieutenant Elphinstone² of the Engineers, whose relations with Sir Colin were, from the first moment of their association, of the happiest kind. In front of No. 4 and the other batteries, *trous de loups* and *abatis* were constructed, and the armament of the lines

¹ In a note written to Sir Colin on the 26th, Colonel Cameron informs him: "With the assistance of the Pasha, whom you were kind enough to send, I have got the Turks into position—the two Arab battalions to the right of No. 1 battery towards the Spur, supported by the two companies of the 93d eighty paces in their rear, and the two remaining Turkish battalions between the 42d and No. 3 battery. The two companies of the 42d which were on the right of No. 3 battery I have placed in reserve behind the right of the 79th and left of the Marines.

"Sir John Burgoyne, who reconnoitred the position this morning, expressed his opinion that our force here is too small. The fact is, that when we occupy the trenches we stand in very loose single file, and no reserve but the four companies I mentioned above, and the 100 invalids."

² Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, V.C., K.C.B., C.M.G.

was increased till it numbered thirty-seven guns of various calibres, from the 6 - pounder to the 32-pounder gun, and from the 12-pounder to the 8-inch howitzer. A systematised watch was also kept on Liprandi's force by means of spy-glasses from No. 4 battery, from the camp of the 42d, and from that of the Marines, reports being made of any change detected in the enemy's movements, which, if deemed of sufficient importance, were collated and sent to headquarters. The night of the 25th and the following day were the types of those that succeeded them for many weeks to come. Never did Sir Colin display greater activity. Considering that the physical exertions he underwent during the day, and the necessity for vigilance at night, put rest in the ordinary acceptation of the word out of the question —for it was only at odd intervals during the day, when he was satisfied that the enemy would not attack, that he snatched a little sleep—it was a matter of astonishment to the younger men about him how he bore it. In spite, however, of the mental strain imposed upon him by the responsibility of his command, now that the retention of Balaklava formed such an important feature in the operations before Sebastopol, he was cheerful, though he did not pretend to conceal his anxiety from those in his confidence. As an instance of this, he persistently refused to enter Balaklava when pressed to do so on more than one occasion by a member of his staff.

"No," he said; "I have sufficient anxiety in my front without wishing to add to it by seeing what I have behind me."

As an agreeable episode amidst his cares and occupations, he had the gratification of promulgating to his troops, a few days later, a general order conveying a compliment to himself and the 93d for the part they had played on the morning of the 25th. It was dated the 29th, and ran as follows: "The Commander of the forces feels deeply indebted to Major-General Sir Colin Campbell for his able and persevering exertions in the action in front of Bala-klava on the 25th instant; and he has great pleasure in publishing to the army the brilliant manner in which the 93d Highlanders, under his able directions, repulsed the enemy's cavalry. The Major-General had such confidence in this distinguished regiment that he was satisfied that it should receive the charge in line, and the result proved that his confidence was not misplaced."

CHAPTER IX.

IMPROVEMENT OF DEFENCES—INTERRUPTIONS—BATTLE OF INKERMAN—RUSSIAN FORCE IN TCHERNAYA VALLEY—REINFORCEMENTS—HURRICANE OF 14TH NOVEMBER—EFFECTS OF WEATHER—MORTALITY AMONGST TURKS—SIR COLIN'S ANXIETY—WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIANS ACROSS THE TCHERNAYA—SIR COLIN AMONGST HIS TROOPS—LABOUR OF ALLIED TROOPS ON FATIGUE SERVICE—COLONELCY OF 67TH REGIMENT—WINTER—SIR COLIN'S RELATIONS WITH GENERAL VINOY—PRESENTS FROM SCOTLAND TO HIGHLAND BRIGADE—VISIT OF SIR H. KEPPEL—LETTER FROM SIR J. BURGOYNE—INCREASED VIGILANCE—ABORTIVE EXPEDITION OF 20TH FEBRUARY—LETTER TO COLONEL H. EYRE—APPREHENSIONS OF ATTACK—RECONNAISSANCE—VOLUNTEERS—SIR COLIN'S OBJECTIONS TO THEM—SIR COLIN'S DISAPPOINTMENT ON DEPARTURE OF KERTCH EXPEDITION—1ST DIVISION LEAVES BALAKLAVA—DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN—SIR COLIN IN THE TRENCHES—HIGHLANDERS DETACHED TO KAMARA—LETTER PREVIOUS TO ASSAULT OF 8TH SEPTEMBER—OFFER OF COMMAND AT MALTA—LETTER TO COLONEL EYRE—DETERMINATION TO QUIT THE ARMY.

THE weather still continuing fine, advantage was taken of every available hour to strengthen and improve the defences. Though Sir Colin was indefatigable in his exertions to accomplish this object, he had many difficulties to encounter. His troops were at that time unaccustomed to the use of the spade and mattock, and strangers to the shelter-trench exercise,

now so wisely constituting an integral portion of the soldier's instruction. More than this, there was an apparent unwillingness, originating in the fine courage of his troops, to fight behind cover. When on one occasion he reasoned, as he was wont, with some working-parties of the 42d and 79th Highlanders for not making greater progress with the deepening of the ditch in their front, he was met with the rejoinder, "If we make it so deep we shall not be able to get over it to attack the Russians." Amongst other additions to the defences a dam was constructed to flood the low ground between No. 4 battery at Kadiköi and the foot of the Marine heights, by means of the rivulet which, winding through the vineyards, covered this part of the position. It was further strengthened with *trous de loups* and *abatis*. No pains were spared to render the eastern approach to the Marine heights as difficult as possible. A deep cutting, strengthened with an oaken *fraise*, was made across the Baidar pathway. At the end of it, towards and some way down the valley, a treble line of *trous de loups* was constructed. In the other or southern direction it extended to the cliffs above the sea. This cutting was commanded by a battery situated 200 yards above it, and was exposed to musketry-fire from a loopholed trench, connected by a covered-way with the heights above, to which a safe retreat, in case of necessity, could be made. To meet the contingency of the lines being forced, a square redoubt was eventually constructed on the

highest point of the position, and was armed with six heavy guns.

There were, however, manifold interruptions to the trench-work, occasioned by the menacing attitude of the enemy, who was observed to be turning his attention towards the eastern portion of the lines of Balaklava. On the 2d November he made a reconnaissance in that direction, and tried the range from the opposite hills with some 32-pounder howitzers. The projectiles, however, fell far short of the Marine heights. These movements demanded corresponding action on the part of Sir Colin's troops, who had, for the moment, to exchange their intrenching tools and working dress for their arms and accoutrements. At the same time, intelligence reached the Allies of the continuous arrival of fresh reinforcements for the Russian army ; and this, coupled with many other circumstances indicative of increased activity on the enemy's side, betokened the probability of an approaching crisis. All this time Sir Colin had established his headquarters in No. 4 battery, though his tent, together with those of the 93d Highlanders, remained standing in front of that work.

Early in the morning of the 5th November the Russians delivered their attack on Mount Inkerman, directing it against the right of the English besieging force. Through the grey fog, consequent on the drizzling rain, which had been falling since the previous day, the enemy's troops were discerned from

the Balaklava lines forming soon after daybreak in battle array opposite the plateau of the Chersonese, and extending in a long line far down the Tchernaya valley, with their left resting on Kamara and threatening Balaklava. This was the force under Prince Gortschakoff, who had moved from his headquarters at Tchorgoun with the intention of distracting the attention of the Allies from the main point of attack, and of seizing the opportunity of ascending the Sapouné heights, supported by the powerful mass of cavalry at his disposal. Though it was soon evident to both Sir Colin and Vinoy that the movements of the enemy in their front were not directed against Balaklava, their anxiety was none the less trying by reason of the prolonged suspense they endured in listening for so many hours to the sound of the conflict raging on the neighbouring plateau, without receiving any intelligence of the course of the struggle. Nor was it till a late hour in the afternoon that they learned authoritatively that fortune had favoured the Allies, and that the Russians had experienced a signal defeat.

Gortschakoff withdrew at the close of the day to Tchorgoun without striking a blow, his force resuming at nightfall the original position taken up by it on the 25th October. The necessity, therefore, for vigilance on the part of the defenders of Balaklava was not diminished. On the contrary, the frequency of apprehended attacks proved very harassing to the handful of troops occupying such extensive lines;

for it may without exaggeration be asserted that the duty imposed upon them was that of a continuous picket, every hour that could be spared from guard during the day being employed in the works, every soldier not in the works lying down at night with his rifle by his side, to meet the contingency of a night attack. After one of these alarms on the 12th November, the troops on the Marine heights received a welcome addition to their numbers in the shape of a battalion of Zouaves, 500 strong. A few days previously the left wing of the 2d battalion Rifle Brigade had been placed at Sir Colin's disposal, so that the combined reinforcement constituted a material acquisition of strength in that part of the position, which he still continued to regard with the greatest anxiety; for should the enemy succeed in establishing himself on the Marine heights, Balaklava would be lost. The movements amongst the enemy's troops which caused several of the alarms at this period, were traceable to the presence at the Russian field-army of the two young Grand Dukes—Nicholas and Michael—who had reached Sebastopol on the eve of Inkerman. At the time, it was evident to those who kept the look-out from the English position that some persons of consideration were amongst the Russians, and were occupying themselves with a keen inspection of the lines of Balaklava. This surmise was confirmed by the reports of deserters, several of whom, including even some from the garrison of Sebastopol, escaped by way of the Kamara outposts.

On the 9th November the weather began to break, rain fell heavily, and it continued more or less stormy till the morning of the 14th, when a hurricane, bringing havoc in its train, burst over the heads of the contending armies. It came from the southward, levelling all the tents. Sir Colin, and those with him, first sought shelter in a house in Kadiköi ; but he found the distance so inconvenient, that he returned and took possession of a wretched stable at the end of a farmhouse adjoining No. 4 battery. The gale continued all day, and wound up towards its close with a heavy snowstorm. The wind blew more or less violently during the night, but the 93d were enabled to pitch their tents. The Marines and Rifles on the upper heights were out all night, exposed to fearful cold, and unable to cook or procure anything to eat or drink. But the damage done to the shipping outside the harbour and along the coast was nothing short of disastrous. Several transports, moved into deep water just outside Bala-klava harbour, with stores and supplies, were totally lost. Amongst them the magnificent steamer Prince, which had brought out the 46th Regiment, went down with upwards of 200 souls, all the warm clothing for the troops, and several hundred tons of ammunition. The men-of-war off the port—amongst others the Retribution, with H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge on board—had narrow escapes. Off the Katcha some thirteen transports were wrecked.

In consequence of the bad weather and the unmis-

takable approach of winter, the siege operations for the moment were practically in abeyance. At intervals, however, the cannonading on the part of the Russians was very severe, especially at night, on which occasions the troops defending the lines of Balaklava stood to their arms, whatever the weather might be.

In every matter affecting the wellbeing of his troops, Sir Colin set the example of activity and earnestness. To facilitate the cooking of the men's meals, he obtained, through the good offices of the Turkish commander, some large coppers from Constantinople, which proved an inestimable boon. At the same time, he kept a watchful eye on the Commissariat issues; and when the fuel hitherto procurable ran short, he took measures to obtain a supply from that department.

In the meantime, wet and exposure had begun to tell heavily on his troops, particularly on those occupying the extreme right and most exposed part of the lines. The effective number of the Marines alone was reduced by no less than 300 in the course of a few days—no light matter, considering they mainly contributed to hold the key of the position. The mortality among the Turks, great from the first, was daily augmenting; but in the last days of November a reinforcement of them, 1200 strong, made good the deficiency. On the 28th November, Sir Colin, upon whom the incessant work was beginning to tell, consented, not without reluctance, to

occupy a small house 150 yards from the battery. In this, having sent for his baggage, which had been lying for some time in the harbour, he dressed and wrote in comparative comfort. Nevertheless he still adhered to the practice of sleeping in a tent contiguous to the work, so as to be quite handy in case of an alarm. Such was his anxious temperament, that he could not rest tranquil for a moment in the house. A man coughing, a dog barking, or a tent flapping in the wind, was sufficient to startle him ; and he would be up several times in the night, even when there was no alarm, visiting the pickets and guards in the battery. After taking possession of this house it was his custom to receive the officer in command of the company of French infantry which assisted every night in covering the front of the approach to the gorge of Kadiköi, by which means he became personally acquainted with most of the officers of Vinoy's brigade, and in conversation with them learned numerous details of interest in connection with the operations of the French besieging force. Between Vinoy and himself a warm friendship had already sprung up.

The weather at the close of November and for the first few days in December had been unusually wet and tempestuous, so much so as to put a stop to the incipient attempts made by Sir Colin to cover his troops. The sick-list was increasing, and the prospect for the winter was, to say the least of it, discouraging, when a sudden and unexpected move-

ment of the Russian field-army put a new complexion upon matters at Balaklava. Upon the night of the 5th December, Sir Colin's attention was drawn to some bright fires burning in No. 3 redoubt. The atmosphere was foggy, and it was thought that some of the enemy's huts had accidentally caught fire ; but with the appearance of daylight it was discovered that the 16 guns which so long had formed such ostentatious and unwelcome objects at the foot of Canrobert's hill, had disappeared. Shortly afterwards it became evident that the infantry had retired, and the Cossacks were observed setting fire to the huts vacated by the Russians, who had withdrawn across the Tchernaya to Tchorgoun, leaving a large body of Cossacks on the left bank of the river to guard the Traktir bridge, and to watch the Woronzoff road and the approaches leading to the above-mentioned village.¹ For the first time, that night Sir Colin lay down with his clothes off in the house ; but even with a roof over his head he was restless, and such was the tension of his nervous system from the continuous strain imposed upon him by the long weeks of anxious watching, that the officer who shared the same room with him was roused in the middle of the night by his chief jumping up and shouting, "Stand to your arms ! "

Though the immediate front of the English posi-

¹ The cause of this withdrawal is stated by Todleben to have arisen from the flooded state of the Tchernaya, rendering the Russian communications difficult, and the position of the troops on its left bank dangerous on account of its practical isolation.

tion was freed from the presence of the force which had threatened it so closely for such a length of time, the Russians could be seen from the Marine heights occupying Tchorgoun in considerable numbers, and throwing up redoubts on the right bank of the Tchernaya. As their object was unknown, and the distance of Tchorgoun did not exceed three hours' march, Sir Colin, so far from relaxing his vigilance, seized every opportunity of strengthening the lines, and of providing by increased watchfulness against the contingency of a sudden movement on the part of the enemy, whose position was as well suited for offensive as for defensive purposes. With the return of a few days' brighter weather, Sir Colin was enabled to resume his daily inspection of the works.

Those who accompanied him on these occasions did not fail to observe the spirit with which Sir Colin, by his physical and mental energy, appeared to have inspired the troops serving under his orders. It was something more than a mere blind adherence to routine which caused them to vie with each other in their endeavours to gain his approbation, bestowed in a ready and hearty manner in all those cases where he thought it was deserved. Everything seemed to come under his observation; but his watchful energy was very different from that restless fussiness which is so often mistaken for it and made to take its place; and perhaps nothing marked this distinction more than the fact that his presence was

always hailed with pleasure by the officers and men of the various nationalities of which his command was composed.¹

The command of the 4th division being disposable by the return to England of General Bentinck, who had been wounded, and there being also a probability of a vacancy in that of the 1st division, Lord Raglan deputed his military secretary to offer Sir Colin the option of the immediate command of the 4th division, or that of the 1st, contingent on the Duke of Cambridge quitting the army. Sir Colin was flattered and touched by the compliment paid to him by the chief whom he regarded with such loyalty and devotion ; and though reluctant to part from his Highlanders, whose confidence he felt he had gained, he made no choice, leaving it to Lord Raglan to decide in the manner which his lordship might consider most beneficial to the service. The result was that he remained in charge of the position at Balaklava.

In the intervals of fine weather, such of the Turkish troops as could be spared from the lines were employed, some in unloading ordnance stores and in the performance of various duties at Balaklava, others, in lieu of transport animals, carrying fascines and platforms to the front. Such was the demand for their services, that Sir Colin frequently interfered when

¹ Notes by Major-General G. G. Alexander, C.B., at that time in command of the detachment of Royal Marine Artillery employed on the heights of Balaklava.

he deemed the requisitions upon them unreasonable. In him the Turkish soldiers found not only a protector, but an active promoter of their interests ; for it was owing to the representations of the English general that authority was granted for the issue of working-pay to these parties, each man receiving his daily quota direct from the hands of one of Sir Colin's staff officers—a boon which Osman Pasha, the Turkish commandant, from an overstrained feeling of etiquette, did not long permit them to enjoy. As the weather improved towards the end of December, similar parties from both Vinoy's and Sir Colin's brigades were provided, for the purpose of assisting in the transport of fascines, platforms, and provisions, a depot of which latter had been established near Lord Raglan's headquarters. If any rivalry existed between the two friends it was a legitimate one, having its origin in the desire to contribute what lay in the power of each to the furtherance of the object common to both.

As Christmas approached the weather improved, but the state of the ground from the heavy rains was such as, through the want of a road and a more effective system of transport, to render the feeding of the troops at the front a matter of great difficulty. In this respect those in the Balaklava lines, from their proximity to the port, enjoyed an inestimable advantage. Mules and horses were beginning to arrive, but not in sufficient numbers to relieve many of the already overtaxed soldiers of the addi-

tional fatigue of carrying up their rations from Balaklava. Shot and shell were being transported by large fatigue-parties furnished daily by Vinoy and Sir Colin ; and such was the necessity for labour of this description, that the 18th Regiment was detained, on its arrival at Balaklava, for the purpose of carrying up and increasing the store of provisions at the depot. Nevertheless, in spite of the manifold hardships to which the English army had been and was still exposed, its prospects were brightening. Reinforcements, too, were gradually arriving,—amongst other regiments the 71st Highlanders, who were located at Balaklava, and formed a valuable reserve to Sir Colin's force.

On Christmas-day he received the notification of his appointment to the colonelcy of the 67th Regiment. At the same time, it was decided that he should succeed the Duke of Cambridge in command of the 1st division.

Since the retirement of the Russian field-force across the Tchernaya, the troops in the lines of Balaklava had been kept less on the *qui vive* than formerly, though none of the precautions previously taken were neglected. There were, however, occasions when, in consequence of warnings from headquarters, or reported movements of the enemy, every preparation was made to receive him. An attack was expected on the 18th December, the Russian Feast of St Nicholas; but the day passed over without any sign of action from the direction of Tchorgoun.

January 1855 was ushered in with snow and frost, and by the 4th, winter had fairly set in. Wooden huts were arriving in numbers at Balaklava, but none could be conveyed to the plateau, every available animal being required for the carriage of provisions to the front, to meet the contingency of the route between Balaklava and the front being blocked by snow. The transport of shot and shell was stopped. Even artillery-waggons were employed for the conveyance of fresh meat, scurvy having made its appearance amongst the troops, and every exertion was made to increase the Commissariat depot in process of formation. All this time Sir Colin was furnishing large parties to assist in this service. Furthermore, as a means to facilitate communication, Vinoy had already commenced with his troops the making of a road from Kadiköi, by the cavalry camp at Karani, to the front. Such was the severity of the weather that, on the night of the 3d, thirteen of the Turks were frozen to death in the trenches at Balaklava; and by the middle of the month, Rustem Pasha reported that the Turks had lost upwards of 2000 men since they had joined Sir Colin's command. As soon as sufficient provisions had been collected at the depot, the transport of shot and shell was resumed by large parties from Vinoy's and Sir Colin's commands. Their relations by this time had become very intimate, not a day passing without their meeting to consult on the best method of promoting the service

in which they were conjointly engaged; and when, in consequence of some consignment from England or France, or an accidental purchase in the harbour, one was fortunate enough to be able to offer the other something more appetising than the ordinary service ration, the exchange of social amenities, in which the respective staffs participated, was sure to follow. Towards the end of January Sir Colin enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing nearly all his troops huttied, in consequence of which he was enabled to spare more men for the transport of stores and provisions, and to render assistance to the overworked soldiery engaged in the siege, whose privations he could appreciate, and whose enduring fortitude was the constant theme of his sympathy and admiration. In the meantime great changes had been effected at the port of Bala-klava. Under the judicious management of Major Mackenzie,¹ assisted by Captain Ross, of the 93d Highlanders, in both of whom Sir Colin reposed implicit confidence, the measures for the embarkation of the sick, and the landing of troops and stores, had undergone considerable ameliorations. There was a general turn-out of sutlers; and with the appointment of a commandant² to supervise the discipline of the place, Sir Colin was enabled to concentrate his energies upon many important matters requiring attention in his own lines.

¹ The late Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie, C.B., accidentally drowned on Dartmoor when performing his duties as Assistant Quartermaster-General, Horse Guards, during the autumn manœuvres, 1873.

² The late Major-General Harding, C.B.

At this period he received many donations of warm clothing for distribution amongst his brigade, accompanied by letters from Scotchwomen as well as Scotchmen indicative of the hearty enthusiasm which had been aroused amongst all classes in Scotland on behalf of their compatriots in the Crimea, and of the admiration with which his successful leading of the Highlanders was regarded in the country of his birth. To all these he returned answers couched in modest terms as regarded himself, but accepting with gratitude the compliment which he felt was honestly due to the troops he had the good fortune to command ; for no soldier could be more keenly sensible than he was, of the valuable account to which such enthusiasm could be turned as a lever for stimulating the national feeling, which had borne such good fruits up to this period of the campaign.

On the last day of January, Captain Keppel,¹ in command of the St Jean d'Acre, an old and valued friend of Sir Colin, paid a visit to Kadiköi. He had arrived straight from England, having left society in a state of dejection, consequent on the gloomy reports of the condition of the army that had reached London from the Crimea. He therefore expressed unqualified surprise at finding Sir Colin in such good spirits, and looking at matters in a brighter and much more hopeful light than he expected. Even in the worst times of that weary winter the experi-

¹ Admiral of the Fleet, the Hon. Sir H. Keppel, G.C.B.

enced old soldier had never taken a desponding view of matters. He was quick to recognise Lord Raglan's difficulties, and to see that the work cut out for him was not rendered the less onerous by the fact of England having embarked in such a serious operation as the invasion of the Crimea, after a peace of forty years' duration, with her army reduced in numbers, the administrative services calculated only for home and colonial requirements, and a total deficiency of that organisation which can alone insure success in war. In spite of the murmurs and complaints, which Sir Colin never suffered in his hearing without rebuke, he felt confident that ultimate success would crown the endeavours of the Allied armies. Above all, he had unbounded confidence in Lord Raglan, whom he served with single-hearted devotion. No commander ever possessed a more loyal subordinate.

In a letter to Sir Colin of the same date, Sir John Burgoyne¹ addressed him from headquarters as follows : "I am sure you will excuse me for writing to you on the subject of Balaklava as connected with our general state of affairs. There is a degree of positive information that the two young Russian princes have been sent back to do something, and there is reason to believe that the enemy is bent on mischief. We ought to have no reason to fear them.

¹ The late Field-Marshal Sir J. F. Burgoyne, Bart., G.C.B., at this time commanding Royal Engineer charged with the direction of the siege operations of the English army.

For our own security we are much better off than we were at and before Inkerman. They cannot have received much reinforcement since then, and it is quite impossible that their field-army, and more particularly its artillery, can move much in the present state of the country and season; but they seem to be irritated into a determination to be enterprising, and two of the Emperor's sons would not come here to sit with their hands before them. One deserter said that Liprandi was on your side, and that they meant to attack Balaklava: it was hardly likely they would make known such intentions, and that was probably the talk among the soldiers. Spies have been detected (though not caught) who had visited our (British) trenches and batteries, and last night a very vigorous sortie was made on the French. Altogether, however, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert are on the *qui vive*, and wish to be prepared everywhere against some vigorous attempts upon us: they know not where. Now we British have only three points at all vulnerable—our batteries on the right and left, and Balaklava. The two first I am really very anxious about; they are very weakly guarded, and a long way from support, and we cannot afford to protect them by stronger guards. This defect has hitherto been made up by the energy of the parties holding them, and I hope this will continue; but I am constantly preaching to the generals of division the arduous charge they have upon them, and the necessity for great vigilance and rapid

vigour. We are anxious about Balaklava rather from the vast importance of the stake than from any doubt of its capabilities of resistance, and we feel great confidence in its being under your charge. I do not find that the enemy make any show against it, nor could they well at this season bring up a considerable force and much artillery to make the attempt openly. The only danger therefore, is, that if they can, by bullying and showing a few Cossacks around, keep you pretty closely shut up, they might get up some 8000 or 10,000 men pretty near you unobserved, and try and surprise you by a vigorous rush during the night, or a little before daylight in the morning. Their possession of the town and shipping for one hour is frightful to contemplate." After counselling the necessity of vigilance, and giving a preference to patrols rather than stationary posts as the best means of guarding against attack, Sir J. Burgoyne recommended a collateral advance upon the flank of the attacking body as a powerful means of opposing a night assault, and concludes thus: "Being well on the alert, however, so as not to be taken by surprise, is the great thing, and not to neglect due precaution because the enemy appears to be at a distance."

In consequence of this warning Sir Colin redoubled his vigilance, taking the same precautions as when Liprandi was in his front, and exerting all his energy in preparations for an attack. Before the end of the first week in February the Highland brigade was

completely huttèd ; and though the force was still on the alert, large fatigue-parties were daily supplied for the carriage of shot and shell to the front, as soon as Sir Colin, who was invariably up before daylight, had personally assured himself that the enemy was quiescent. This apprehension of an attack continued more or less for several weeks to come. In the meantime both Vinoy's road and the railway had made considerable progress, and every advantage was taken of the fine weather to improve the works, which had suffered from the rains and frost.

Though in the month of December the French cavalry had made two unimportant reconnaissances across the valley of Balaklava and in the direction of Tchorgoun, on which occasions they were supported on their right flank by a corresponding movement of parties of infantry from Sir Colin's position along and over the parallel ridges abutting on Kamara, no serious operation was undertaken by the Allied commanders against the enemy in this direction till the third week in February. In accordance with directions contained in a confidential memorandum of the 19th February, Sir Colin was instructed to support with the Highland brigade, the 71st Regiment, and a force of artillery specially detailed, the movement on the following day of a considerable body of French troops under General Bosquet, with the design of surprising, if possible, and overpowering the Russian troops stationed on the right bank of the Tchernaya behind the bridge of

Traktir. A detachment of English cavalry was likewise ordered to assist in the operations. At 2.30 A.M. the troops marched from their respective cantonments to the appointed rendezvous, a short distance on the Balaklava side of Canrobert's hill; not without difficulty, however—for the night was pitch-dark, and snow was falling, and it froze hard, with a cutting wind from the northward. The force being assembled at the appointed hour, advanced in a direction between Nos. 1 and 2 Turkish redoubts, and there hitting on the Woronzoff road, proceeded along it, surprising the Cossack vedettes on the look-out close to the ruined post-house. But that Sir Colin and Colonel Cameron, who were leading, were a little too much in advance of the front section of the 42d Highlanders, the Cossacks would have been taken; for they allowed the English officers to approach them closely, and did not retire until, receiving no answer to their challenge, they wheeled about and disappeared in the gloom. Sir Colin then placed two of his battalions on the hill immediately overlooking the left bank of the Tchernaya, and commanding within musket-shot the bridge leading to Tchorgoun; the remainder of his force being formed on the right of the Woronzoff road, looking into the valley through which it runs to Baidar. The troops were established in this position by 5.30 A.M. As day broke the Russians could be detected manning their batteries on the hills overhanging Tchorgoun, and supporting them with bodies of infantry, detach-

ments of which were also observed near the redoubt at Traktir bridge. They, however, made no sign of offensive action. In this position Sir Colin remained till 8.30 A.M. Finding no French in the valley, he was preparing to retrace his steps, concluding that the expedition had been countermanded, when the arrival of several staff officers from headquarters confirmed his conjectures ; for it turned out that the messenger charged with the counter-orders had lost his way, and had been unable to reach Sir Colin's headquarters.

Simultaneously Vinoy appeared with his brigade. He had heard at daybreak from an officer of Sir Colin's staff, who had also lost his way in the dark, that no countermand had reached Kadiköi ; whereupon, unsolicited and on his own responsibility, he turned out his brigade and hurried to his friend's support. Those who were present will not forget the hearty cheers raised by the troops of the Allied brigades as Sir Colin rode forward and warmly grasped Vinoy's hand in acknowledgment of the generous and soldier-like spirit that had prompted the latter to come to his aid under circumstances which, in his isolated position, might possibly have proved, at least, embarrassing. Certain it is that Lord Raglan was relieved of great anxiety when he learned that Sir Colin had resumed his position at Balaklava without any casualty in his force.

Two days later Sir Colin wrote to Colonel Henry Eyre : "I do not deserve that you should ever

write to me again, for having allowed such a long time to pass over without writing you a line, were it only to thank you for the many very kind letters you have had the goodness to write to me. Yet a day has not arrived without the desire and intention to make up for this omission and seeming neglect before it closed. But each day brings some little event demanding watchfulness in the extended position I hold, with the enemy's vedettes close to us, and a considerable force within two and a half or three hours' march, so that when I leave the end of the line—where I live—to visit the intermediate and farther points, the day is gone before I get back; and then, although I have nothing to do with Balaklava or its authorities,¹ or the troops quartered or camped near to it, whenever a general officer is required to preside at a court of inquiry or investigations of any kind, I am placed upon such duties as the officer nearest at hand; and in this way weeks and months, I may say, pass over without my having a little convenient moment to devote to the pleasure of writing to my friends. We have gone through some hardships, it is true, but nothing to justify the statements of officers that appear in the newspapers. Doubtless there is merit in the courage that may be exhibited by officers in a hard fight during a sunshiny day, and which may bring a campaign to a termination; but the people of Eng-

¹ He had at this time been relieved, at his own request, of the supervision of the details at Balaklava.

land have a right to expect a courage and endurance on the part of the officers of the army, which shall not yield to the discomfort unavoidable in a campaign carried on during the winter months, and that any little inconvenience they may be put to shall be borne without the croaking and moaning they publish to the world through the means of letters to their friends. . . . Although not under fire like the troops in the trenches, our night duties have been equally severe, and a vigilance observed and enforced as strict as that demanded in the trenches. I never had off my clothes to sleep from the time of landing in this country until the first week of last month, when the diminution of the force in my front justified my giving myself the indulgence for about a fortnight. I have never enjoyed better health or more pleasant sleep during the time I have been speaking of than when luxuriating in the too comfortable bed I occupied at your house at Brighton. I am disgusted with the attacks that have been made upon dear Lord Raglan. God pity the army if anything were to occur to take him from us! With regard to the siege, our work and other operations connected with it have been retarded by the inclemency of the weather, by a want of transport for the removal of our guns and stores from Bala-klava, and, I may say, by the impossibility of bringing up the means of every kind necessary for such an undertaking from that place to the lines in front of Sebastopol, through the deep clayey country with-

out roads, which intervenes between the two points. All these difficulties will yet be overcome by the steadiness and calm perseverance of our good friend Lord Raglan, and the charming goodwill of the troops, which nothing can surpass. We get on famously with our friends the French, which is a happy circumstance. . . . I am glad to have been made a lieutenant-general in this country on account of the additional pay, for I found that of the major-general, with the field allowance of that rank, quite inadequate to cover the current expenses of my wretched establishment. As for the rank itself, I care little about it."

The 1st division having been reunited in the last week of February by the arrival of the Guards from the front at Balaklava, Sir Colin resumed the command of all the other troops in and about that place, with the exception of the cavalry. Notwithstanding the improved health of the troops, the duty in the lines pressed heavily upon them ; for though the steady progress of the railway and the additions to the transport-train had diminished the necessity of fatigue-parties for the carriage of stores to the front, the continued apprehension of attack necessitated the troops being frequently on the alert, and in the intervals much labour was demanded of them in cleansing the numerous camps, and in the application of the various sanitary measures required in anticipation of the approaching hot weather. Five months had now elapsed since Sir Colin's force had

occupied the lines of Balaklava. At the expiration of that period, such had been the care and labour bestowed upon them, that it would have seemed to require far greater enterprise than the force so long in front of them had hitherto shown, to attempt to carry them. Not only was the position many times stronger than when it was first beleaguered, but the reserves upon which Sir Colin could reckon in the middle of March had increased in the same degree. When he contrasted the existing with the former state of the position, he remarked that for a great part of the time “he had held the lines by sheer impudence.”

Amongst other visitors to the lines at this period was General Canrobert, who was greatly amused on hearing that an unusual noise, which a few nights previously had caused a general turn-out, was traceable to the presence of innumerable frogs in the low ground between the heights and Kadiköi. He did not, however, let the opportunity slip of complimenting the troops and their commander for the vigilance they displayed in keeping such a good look-out,—as the soldiers remarked, they had learned to sleep with one eye half open and the other half shut. By the end of March the measures adopted by Sir Colin for the sanitary improvement of Balaklava and its lines were wellnigh completed, enabling the available labour at his command to be employed on the making of gabions with the brushwood obtainable from the heights contiguous to his position.

On the 1st April he had the gratification of receiving from Lord Raglan the following note: "I have great pleasure in sending you the extract of a despatch from Lord Panmure having reference to the movements of the troops on the 20th February; and it is no little satisfaction to me to see that the punctuality and precision with which the movements of the troops under your command were conducted on the morning of the 20th February have attracted the attention of her Majesty's Government, and been viewed by her Majesty with the most gracious approval." The extract ran thus: "I have likewise to notice the proposed expedition on the 20th ultimo, and it is deeply to be regretted that a plan so well conceived should have unfortunately been frustrated by the sudden and severe snowstorm which set in at the time. The soldier-like precision and punctuality with which Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell and the troops under his command executed their part in the intended plan of operations, as well as the able manner in which he retired when he found that it was abortive, have merited the warmest admiration; and I have received her Majesty's commands to express to you her approval of this gallant officer's skill and energy. The voluntary advance of General Vinoy in support of Sir Colin Campbell's retrograde movement, though not required, exhibits the spirit of cordiality which exists between the Allies, and is extremely gratifying."

Between this and the 9th April, when the Allies

again opened fire upon Sebastopol, Sir Colin and his troops were kept constantly on the *qui vive*. The statements of deserters were unanimous that an attack on the rear of the Allies was intended. Liprandi, it was rumoured, had made his appearance at MacKenzie's farm, where the Russians had been observed throwing up extensive works ; and this, combined with the frequent appearance of apparently high personages, who were observed to occupy themselves with a close examination of the lines, as well as the activity of the troops in the direction of Tchorgoun, confirmed the impression that the enemy was contemplating a diversion, and that his efforts would probably be directed against Balaklava. Three Turkish battalions of Omar Pasha's force, which had recently arrived at Kamiesch, were sent to the heights to replace the battalion of Zouaves which had been there since the middle of November, their departure being signalised by many manifestations of goodwill on the part of the Highlanders and the other British troops who had shared with them the duty of guarding Balaklava through the winter. It was also in contemplation that Omar Pasha should relieve General Vinoy ; but when it was decided that he should remain, Sir Colin informed Lord Raglan that "his French comrade was worth a brigade in himself." Whilst in this state of suspense Sir Colin resumed his former habits, sleeping in his clothes, and setting as usual an example of indefatigable vigilance.

The second bombardment of Sebastopol ended without the delivery of the contemplated assault ; and though the apprehended attack upon Balaklava resulted in nothing, the enemy managed to keep its defenders on the alert up to the end of the third week in April, when a reconnaissance with two Turkish divisions and a portion of the Allied cavalry was made by Omar Pasha, accompanied by Sir Colin, towards Tchorgoun and in the direction of the Baidar valley.

Occasions of this kind never failed to attract the presence of numerous amateurs, who were glad of the opportunity to exchange the monotony of camp-life for what appeared to them to be a legitimate source of amusement. Such an unauthorised proceeding on the part of officers was certain to provoke Sir Colin's displeasure. Indiscriminate volunteering he regarded as objectionable ; indeed, on the subject of volunteering generally he held decided views. His established creed was, that the proper and most honourable place of a regimental officer on any service was his own regiment, in which all are volunteers ready to undertake any duty they may be called upon to perform ; and that the time for him to volunteer any further service was when, on arriving under the cannon's mouth, his commander invited him and his comrades to set an example in any special service of danger. All other volunteering with respect to regimental officers he considered objectionable in creating jealousies and unsettling officers' minds, and

therefore injurious to discipline, besides opening the door to favouritism in the matter of promotion, to the disadvantage of their regimental brethren. This opinion he fortified with the authority of some of the ablest commanders under whom he had served. Even when it became necessary to supplement the staff, Sir Colin considered it preferable to have recourse to the half-pay list, so as to leave the regiment intact.

On the 3d May a joint expeditionary force under the chief command of Sir George Brown sailed from the Crimea with the design of operating against Kertch and the Straits of Yenikalé. In the English portion of the force were comprised the 42d, 71st, and 93d Highlanders, the left wing of the 2d battalion Rifle brigade, together with Barker's battery and 700 Marines. Those who have traced Sir Colin's career thus far can picture to themselves the feelings of mortification with which he saw the greater portion of the Highland brigade separated from him to proceed on a service in which he was unable to participate. Lord Raglan, with his accustomed kindness, endeavoured to soothe him by explaining that he could not be spared from the position he had charge of; but he felt the disappointment keenly. It so happened that General Canrobert recalled the expedition a few hours after it had sailed, and the troops were disembarked; but three weeks later, when General Pelissier had succeeded to the command of the French army, it finally left for its destination.

In the meantime the Sardinians appeared on the scene. Disembarking at Balaklava, they at first encamped in the vicinity of Karani, Sir Colin rendering what assistance he could to forward the requirements of this compact and well-equipped little army. In this way it was not long before he had established friendly relations with General della Marmora, their commander, whose soldierly qualities he was quick to recognise. On the 22d the expedition left for Kertch; the 79th, which had been suffering from fever, being now in a condition to accompany the other regiments of the Highland brigade. Their place on the heights was taken by the Guards; but three days later a combined force of French, Turkish, Sardinian, and British troops advanced to the left bank of the Tchernaya and took up a position extending from the Fedioukine heights to the slopes, which, descending from Kamara, abut upon that river near its confluence with the Chouliou. A body of Marines was posted in advance of the extreme right of the Balaklava heights to watch the Varnoutka valley, whilst another detachment held the high ridge overlooking Kamara. Thus the position of Balaklava, which had been hemmed in since the 25th October, once more had breathing-room, and all anxiety for its safety had become a thing of the past.

On the news of the success of the Kertch expedition reaching the Allied headquarters, a reinforcement, composed of the 72d Highlanders, fresh from England, and which had not yet landed in the

Crimea—the 63d, and detachments of the Highland brigade recently arrived from England, were despatched to Sir G. Brown. Sir John Campbell¹ accompanied them for the purpose of taking the command of one of the brigades. As this only tended to aggravate Sir Colin's susceptibilities, and as his presence at Balaklava was no longer requisite, he determined to change the current of his thoughts, and with this object obtained leave to proceed to the front. There, as the guest of Sir William Eyre,² commanding a brigade of the 3d division, whose professional abilities he estimated at a high value, he occupied himself in the examination of the works, visiting the advanced trenches, both French and English, and making himself acquainted with the progress of the siege in its minutest details. Here he remained until the return of the Kertch expedition; and on the 16th June the 1st division, once more united under his command, moved to the front, taking up its encampment in rear of the 4th division.

On the occasion of the unsuccessful assault on the Malakoff and the Redan on the 18th June, the 1st division, which had been appointed to act as a grand reserve to the English column of attack, was not engaged. Thenceforth it took its regular tour of duty in the trenches.

¹ The late Major-General Sir John Campbell, Bart., who fell at the attack on the Redan, 18th June 1855.

² The late Major-General Sir William Eyre, K.C.B., who died in command of the forces in Canada, on the 8th September 1859.

The unexpected death of Lord Raglan on the 28th June occasioned a painful shock to Sir Colin. With a temperament sensitive as his, the loss of an old and valued friend, who for a long series of years had never failed to extend to him consideration, and who, since they had been associated in the present campaign, had treated him with marked confidence, would naturally have excited the liveliest feelings of regret; but when he regarded the event from a public point of view, and reflected that Lord Raglan had passed away just as the crisis of the struggle was impending, Sir Colin could look upon his death in no other light than that of a calamity. He was deeply affected. Nevertheless, at the invitation of Lord Raglan's military secretary, he hastened to headquarters to look for the last time on the features of the beloved chief, whose fortunes he had followed with such unswerving loyalty—those features which, except for the pallor of the countenance, were unchanged, and as amiable in death as in life.

As far back as the commencement of April it had been the practice to employ a general of the day, instead of the week, to superintend the duty in the trenches. Though divisional commanders were exempted from this call, Sir Colin took advantage of the trench duties being supplied divisionally, instead of, as heretofore, by detachments from the various regiments forming the respective attacks, to place himself upon the roster, and take his regular turn with his division—being desirous of omitting

no opportunity of enforcing strictness amongst his own troops, and of setting in his own person an example of discipline and regularity in the method of carrying out the duties in the trenches. This practice he continued to follow until forbidden to do so by an order from headquarters. No reason was assigned, nor was he able to fathom the motive which prompted its issue. Rightly or wrongly, however, he regarded it as an unmistakable sign of the tide setting against him.

A few days previously he had received notice of his advancement to the Grand Cross or highest grade of the Bath, in acknowledgment of the services he had rendered in the campaign.

For a long time Sir Colin had fondly cherished the hope that his own division, which, owing to its immunity from losses in the trenches for so many months, was now thoroughly efficient, would be called on to play a prominent part in the final assault on Sebastopol. Numerically it was strong. The deficiencies in both brigades had been made good, and the Highland brigade, since its return from Kertch, had been reinforced by the addition of the 72d Regiment. Its *morale* was all that could be desired. If the Highlanders could not boast of the glory which attached to their comrades of the Guards for their heroic conduct at Inkerman, they at any rate felt that they had accomplished successfully what hitherto they had been called upon to perform, and that between them and their leader a confidence

had been engendered which augured well for success in the hour of trial. Believing, therefore, that advantage would be taken of the efficient condition of his division, Sir Colin, in conjunction with Colonel Cameron, the senior officer of the Highland brigade, had sketched out a plan for adoption, in case he were called upon to conduct the assault. Cameron was to head the 42d with a rush, whilst Sir Colin followed with the rest of the division in close support; and in this manner, pressed forward by the remainder of the troops of the respective attacks, he hoped that a lodgment would be effected and maintained by the weight of numbers in the rear. For weeks before the 8th of September, Sir Colin spoke of this scheme as the best chance of success.

His dream was not destined to be accomplished. The Highland brigade was about to be separated from the Guards and formed into a division, to be increased hereafter by the addition of other Scotch regiments. On the 27th August, eleven days after the repulse of the Russian field-army by the French and Sardinians holding the line of the Tchernaya, the nucleus of the new Highland division, consisting of the 42d, 72d, 79th, and 93d Regiments, was ordered down to Kamara to lend support to the Sardinian troops in case of attack from the east and north-east, as well as to cover the approaches to the Marine heights in the event of the enemy making a demonstration from the direction of the valley of Varnoutka on the position held by the Turkish

troops. Here it remained till the 8th September, on which day it was moved up to the front to act as a reserve to the troops about to be employed in the final assault.

Writing at 2.30 A.M. on the morning of that day, to one of his staff officers absent from sickness, Sir Colin remarks: "The assault takes place at 12 (noon) to-day. The French are to attack the Little Redan and Malakoff, and when established in the latter, the 2d and Light divisions are to storm the Great Redan, and at the same time the French on the left attack the Bastion du Mat and the Bastion Centrale. The 3d and 4th divisions to be in reserve between the two attacks; that of the 2d and Light divisions and those of the French on the left. Our brigade here to be in the third parallel, in reserve to the 2d and Light divisions and Guards in the ravine behind our brigade. I hope it will all succeed. I imagine the assault has been determined on earlier than was intended, in consequence of our ammunition running short. I have given you all my news of the siege. General Simpson told me yesterday he was desired by Lord Panmure to offer me Malta. I desired him to thank his lordship for the offer, but that as long as we remained in presence of the enemy, I would prefer to remain where I was, unless it was desired that I should leave this army, which he warmly declared was not the case."

Three days after the assault Sir Colin wrote to Colonel Henry Eyre from Kamara, enclosing for his

perusal a letter for his old friend Seward. In this letter he gave a detailed narration of the part he and his troops took on that occasion. "On the 8th" (so ran the account) "I was ordered with the Highland brigade to march from this to the front, to form the second reserve to the troops destined to assault the Redan, composed of the 2d and Light divisions. These troops formed their own immediate supports and reserves. The French were to attack the Malakoff; and upon success attending this attack, our troops were to move forward to the attack of the Redan. The French were within twenty yards of the margin of the counterscarp: they had made, besides, two galleries of approach to the ditch, which they filled with men ready to move out; and they had constructed a bridge, which they had placed on wheels or slides, by which it could be moved forward and be placed across the ditch, capable of admitting three men abreast. The salient of the Malakoff had been well battered and made accessible. The signal of advance was made at noon. In a moment the salient of the work was covered with men. The French flew across the small space intervening between their works and the ditch, and got into the Malakoff in strength without a shot being fired: the bridge being placed across the ditch, they hurried over by that passage, as well as through the two galleries, and in crowds over the glacis into the ditch; and there having been no resistance in getting in, though plenty afterwards in the attempt of the

enemy to drive them out, they rapidly ascended the Malakoff at the salient. When this success was assured by the introduction of strong reinforcements, they (the French) attacked the line of works which covered the Malakoff with the Karahelnaia creek at the top of the harbour. The division of General Dulac was employed in this service, and failed. The obstacles prepared were many and difficult to be overcome. The ditch was deep and the scarp hardly injured, and the front of fire which the enemy could offer to the advance of the French was extensive, whilst the salient of the Malakoff could not afford even space at that point to resist a few defenders, had an attempt been made. Moreover, the attack on the Malakoff was a complete surprise ; and as all the other attacks were to be contingent on the success of the one on that work, the enemy in every other part of their defence were fully prepared and in readiness for resistance. We were in the habit of calling the line of work attacked by Dulac's division the Little Redan. Had the French succeeded there, they would have pushed along the margin of the harbour towards its mouth, have passed in rear of the Great Redan, attacked by our troops, which would have involved the necessity of the enemy abandoning that work or submitting to be taken prisoners, and would have enabled the two English divisions appointed to the attack of that work to move forward and join the French below, marching along the margin of the harbour to the neighbourhood of

the bridge which the enemy had thrown across the harbour recently, for the purpose, as we now know, of facilitating their retreat. This, they saw, had become inevitable from the proximity of the French to the Malakoff, the key of their whole position in front of Sebastopol, and their defence of the harbour on its southern side.

"And now a little word about our own attack on the Great Redan. It was made on the salient, which had been well battered. The column was to be preceded by 40 ladders, and the work to be entered by escalade. The attack of such a formidable work was to be made at noonday, the troops appointed for its defence being fully prepared by the previous attack on the Malakoff, the adjoining work, and with which it was connected! Was it to be supposed that such a work, defended by Russian soldiers, could be carried by 40 men presenting themselves on the ramparts from 40 ladders, even allowing that we had succeeded in bringing the whole 40 to the scarp of the work and placing them against it?—a most impossible event under the fire of artillery and musketry to which our troops would be exposed in passing over the distance of upwards of 200 yards which intervened between our advanced parallel and the ditch? The troops in advance went on boldly and well under a heavy fire of artillery from works which enfiladed them in their advance, slid down into the ditch, and placed several ladders against the face of the work near the salient; for

in that neighbourhood alone was the work injured. Strange to say, the enemy, in the first instance, did not defend the top of the scarp at that point, but were formed behind a gabion defence, which they had thrown across the work behind the salient. The leading men and some officers managed to scramble up the face of the battered scarp at that point, and some 40 men and officers actually got in, and were killed inside; but these bolder men were not closely supported, and gave way. Those who followed—indeed the whole portion forming the advance (1000 men)—came forward well, filled the ditch and face of the work close on either side of the salient; but there they remained without moving forward over the crest of the work, from whence they were shot down unresistingly, giving way at last in confusion, and retiring in precipitation to the trenches. Why and wherefore this attack failed must be reserved for another letter,¹ for this has been made already very long, if not too much so, to afford you amusement. Had the attack on the Great Redan succeeded, the enemy, holding the Little Redan, must have retired from thence, for their retreat to the bridge would have been seriously compromised, if not rendered impossible. The retreat of the enemy from the Little Redan, had it then taken place, would have enabled the French in the Malakoff, and those employed in the neighbourhood of that work, to have moved down upon the line of retreat to the

¹ This second letter, if it were ever written, is not forthcoming.

bridge in rear of the whole of the troops employed by the enemy in the defence of the works on their right and immediately covering the town. To have taken 10,000 or 15,000 prisoners would have been a glorious termination to this wonderful siege.

"I took the defence of the trenches with the Highland brigade upon the withdrawal of the troops employed in the assault on the afternoon of the 8th. I was sent for, while posting my men in the advance and placing my pickets in front of our advanced parallel, by the Commander-in-chief, to desire me to make preparation to assault the Great Redan the following day with the Highland brigade, supported by the 3d division under General Eyre. I did not get back from the Commander-in-chief to my post until after eleven at night, when several explosions of a gigantic character were made at short intervals —evidently the magazines of different batteries along the lines of their defences. At one moment an explosion of a formidable description would be made on the left; shortly after, one or two in other directions,—and this was continued along the extensive line of their defences throughout the night at slight intervals, in different places, with an occasional explosion in the town. Evidently all these explosions were systematically made to deter the advance of the Allies until daylight, with a view to cover the retreat of their troops, and to save them from molestation during the darkness of the night while that operation was being effected; and in this they

perfectly succeeded : for as the day dawned, but few troops remained in the town, which they began to fire from the side nearest to their land defences, gradually setting fire to all and every ignitable building in rear towards the harbour, and thus offering a barrier of fire to the advance of either French or English ; and when all the houses in Sebastopol were in full blaze, so strong as to be impossible to arrest the flames, they began to remove their bridge, evidently for fear of being prevented by artillery from taking it away, leaving their steamers to take off the troops which had been left in the town to effect its destruction by fire. The large ships had been sunk during the night, keeping merely the few steamers which remained to them, and which had rendered such service in the transport of men, materials, and provisions across the harbour, and everything requisite for maintaining the place to the last moment. These steamers will be destroyed by us, if they do not save us that trouble, which I think likely to be done at once. These same Russians, it must be acknowledged, made a noble defence ; and surely never was an operation in retreat from a difficult position so wonderfully well managed—carried on, as it was, in face of a powerful army, and without any loss whatever, while the withdrawal of the troops from their defences, which they had held so long, through the town and across a single bridge, aided, however, by four or five steamers from the south side of the harbour, was being effected. I

cannot conceive anything more perfect or more complete in every detail than the mode and manner in which they accomplished the retreat and withdrawal from Sebastopol, and transport of their troops across the harbour. I found the Great Redan abandoned at 1 A.M.¹ I dared not occupy it, from the numbers of explosions taking place all around, before daylight; but while the enemy fired every magazine along the line of their defences, they did not touch their magazines in the Great Redan,—an act of great humanity! for the whole of our wounded who remained in the ditch and our trenches would have been destroyed. Indeed some of our wounded were carefully dressed and placed in safety, before the Russians left the Redan, from the fire of our own shells, which were directed against the interior of the work after the attack had failed."

Sir Colin having had leisure to reflect on the offer conveyed to him by General Simpson on the eve of the assault, was unable to view it in any other light than as an indirect attempt to remove him from the army. As he remarked, his antecedents, which must have been known to the military authorities at home, were such as might have precluded the supposition that he would voluntarily quit the scene of action whilst the assault was still pending, and whilst there remained the slightest probability of his sharing with

¹ This had been ascertained by a patrol of the 93d, sent forward by General Cameron's orders, Sir Colin not being in the trenches at the time.

his Highlanders their fortune in the field. For this reason he felt he might have been spared the indignity which the offer of the command at Malta at such a juncture implied. Nevertheless, as the season of the year justified the belief that the Allied commanders would make an effort to follow up the success which they had obtained by the retirement of the Russians from the south side of Sebastopol, Sir Colin determined to keep his own counsel and await the course of events. His resolution, however, was taken to quit the army as soon as he felt he could do so with honour. By the departure from the army of Sir George Brown and Sir Richard England, after Lord Raglan's death, and by the return home of Sir H. Bentinck towards the middle of October, Sir Colin became, by virtue of his standing, second in command. Rumours were already rife of General Simpson's desire to vacate the position of Commander-in-chief, so that the ground was cleared for Sir Colin's succession, in case the system of seniority were adhered to. Under no circumstances had he contemplated the probability of such an event. The tone of the press was unmistakable in its leaning towards the employment of a younger man; and so far from the chief command being an object of ambition in his eyes, Sir Colin more than once mentioned to those in his confidence that, under the circumstances, he should regard his elevation to it as the greatest calamity that could befall him. Notwithstanding General Simpson's emphatic

disclaimer, he had arrived at the conclusion not only that there was no probability of his being named for that post, but that, judging from the offer that had been made him, his presence with the army was no longer desired by the Minister of War. Why, then, he reasoned, was he not told so in direct terms ? To any such wish of the Minister he would have cheerfully conformed, as in duty bound ; but the endeavour to get rid of him in the manner proposed was distasteful to the feelings of the honest and simple-minded old soldier, who in this spirit resented it.

CHAPTER X.

PREPARATION FOR WINTER QUARTERS — TERMINATION OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS—SIR COLIN LEAVES THE CRIMEA—LETTER OF LORD PANMURE—INTERVIEW WITH LORDS PANMURE AND HARDINGE —VISIT TO WINDSOR: ITS RESULTS—ANECDOTE AT LORD PALMERSTON'S TABLE—HONOURS CONFERRED BY GLASGOW—LETTER FROM PARIS—RETURN TO THE CRIMEA—PEACE—DESCRIPTION OF POSITION OF RUSSIAN FIELD-ARMY—FAREWELL ADDRESS TO HIGHLAND BRIGADE—GLASGOW—COMMAND OF S.-E. DISTRICT—EVIDENCE REGARDING PURCHASE SYSTEM—INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INFANTRY—PROCEEDS TO BERLIN—REFUSAL OF COMMAND OF CHINA EXPEDITION — INSPECTION OF DEPOTS — ANECDOTE — OFFERED THE COMMAND IN INDIA—JOURNAL—CALCUTTA.

OWING to the uncertainty attending the plans of the Allied commanders, it was not till the 4th October, by which time the other portions of the army had made some progress with their arrangements for the winter, that it was decided where the Highland division should be located. Indeed, it was not till two days later that the second and newly formed brigade, of which the 72d Highlanders constituted the nucleus, was completed by the transfer to the Highland division of the two battalions of the Royal Scots. The original kilted brigade had already been augmented

by the arrival of the 92d Highlanders from the Mediterranean.

There was much to be done : the ground had to be cleared of brushwood and levelled ; the hutting materials to be brought from Balaklava, a distance of five miles ; roads to be made, and hospitals as well as commissariat stores to be established ;—in a word, much to be accomplished necessitating the exercise of all the energy which Sir Colin, by no means deficient in that quality, could bring to bear upon it. By the 8th of November all the troops were under cover. How it was accomplished can be understood from the testimony of one who took part in the work. “I have no hesitation in saying,” writes Lieutenant-General Parke,¹ “that I have ever considered the fact of having commanded a regiment in the division under that great soldier Lord Clyde, better known to us all as ‘Sir Colin,’ during the whole time the 72d Highlanders were in the Crimea, as the most fortunate circumstance in my military career. The example he set us all of every military quality, pre-eminently that of care and forethought in everything appertaining to the welfare of all those under him, can never be forgotten. One instance in particular do I especially recall to my memory. In the autumn of 1855 the Highland division was encamped in the valley near Kamara and Vernoutka, leading to the southern shores of the Crimea, but we were still under canvas. Sir Colin having heard of

¹ At this time Major commanding 72d Highlanders.

the arrival of a ship laden with huts in Balaklava, rode at once to headquarters and made application for them. ‘No transport available’ was the answer ; and he was informed that there was no possible means of conveyance to his division, but that if he could obtain transport, and overcome this difficulty, his application might be entertained. Sir Colin returns direct to the camp, orders out all his regiments in fatigue-dress, and marches them down to Balaklava. His object soon became known, and the Highlanders made short work of carrying the huts, piece by piece, on their shoulders back to their camp, captain and subaltern all sharing alike in the work with right good will. Tents soon disappeared, being replaced by comfortable wooden huts, to the astonishment of many at headquarters.¹ This is only one instance among many of Sir Colin’s constant and anxious care for the health and comfort of his men, repaid on their own part by a devotion and confidence in him as their general, which only those who had served under him could realise.”

With the termination of the combined expedition to the estuaries of the Bug and Dnieper at the end of October, the active operations of the Allies were brought to a close. It was clear that nothing more would be attempted before the winter set in ; and as the nomination of General Simpson’s successor (it

¹ The Commander-in-chief paid a visit to the Highland camp on the 24th October, and after expressing satisfaction at the arrangements, remarked that it was far in advance of all the others.

was known he had resigned) was expected to reach the Crimea early in November, Sir Colin, who had by this time secured the comfort of his troops in their winter quarters, conceived he might, with justice to them, carry out his intentions hitherto confided to General Cameron and a few others in his intimacy.

Having obtained leave of absence to England, and made his preparations, he sent, on the 3d November, for the officers commanding the regiments of his division to announce his departure and to take leave of them. They were taken by surprise ; and amidst their regrets, which deeply moved him, and with a promise that he would issue a farewell order to the division as soon as his resignation was completed, he proceeded to embark. His friend Vinoy, who for his success at the assault on the Malakoff had been promoted to the command of a division, rode down with Sir Colin to Balaklava, and saw him on board ship. General della Marmora was also there to bid him farewell.

Three days after Sir Colin's departure, the despatch announcing Sir William Codrington's nomination to the chief command reached the Crimea. With it came one also from the Minister of War to Sir Colin. This he crossed in the Bosphorus, and consequently did not become aware of its contents until his arrival in London on the 17th November. Writing two days later to a member of his staff, he says : " I saw Lord Panmure on Saturday, the day of my arrival. He sent for a copy of a letter he had

forwarded to my address in the Crimea. This letter contained an appeal to my patriotism of the strongest nature, so far as words go, to induce me to accept a command under Codrington.¹ He told me,

¹ The letter, dated 22d October, ran thus: “General Simpson having expressed a wish to be relieved from the arduous duties imposed upon him as Commander-in-chief of her Majesty’s forces in the East, her Majesty has been graciously pleased to comply with his request. In consequence of the return to England of Sir H. Bentinck, the vacant command would, in the course of rotation, have devolved upon you as next senior officer; but as her Majesty’s Government deem it advisable to depart from the principle of succession by seniority on the present occasion, and to place at the head of the army an officer younger in years, and somewhat junior in rank to yourself, I feel that it is due to the energy, zeal, and ability with which you have performed the duties of your division, not to let you learn by general orders or camp rumour the decision which has been arrived at by her Majesty’s Government, and which this mail conveys to General Simpson. In selecting Sir William Codrington for the command of the army, it is far from the intention of her Majesty’s Government to disparage in the least degree your distinguished services, or your high professional character, or to cast the slightest shade over the laurels which you have so bravely and so gallantly won; and in proof of this, I beg to say that, it being the intention of her Majesty’s Government to alter the present organisation of her Majesty’s forces in the Crimea, and to divide them into two army-corps, placing at the head of each a general officer of ability and reputation, I have to express my earnest hope that you will accept the command of one of these corps, of which that noble Highland division, with which your name will be so honourably and historically associated, will form a part. I ask this, moreover, because I feel assured that such a proof of public spirit will not only raise you still higher in the estimation of your country, but exhibit an example to the army, the importance of which I cannot overrate. I need not remind you that noble instances have occurred of senior officers consenting to waive personal considerations and to serve under their juniors placed in superior command; and I can safely affirm that in every instance the men who have made such sacrifices of personal claims, and have shown such high-minded patriotism, have been rewarded by the respect of their honourable brethren in arms, and by the approbation and esteem of all classes of their fellow-countrymen. Such will assuredly be your lot should you follow the examples to which I have referred.”

on my not making any reply, to take the letter with me, and to make my decision known to Lord Hardinge for his information. I have just come from Lord H. I spoke to him distinctly, as if speaking to yourself, and informed him of the utter want of value in my eyes of the flummery contained in the letter of the Minister of War, who had, six or eight weeks before, when the siege was being carried on, proposed to me to go from duty with a division in the field to become schoolmaster to the recruits in Malta, and that I had come home to ask his lordship to accept my resignation. If her Majesty should ask me to place myself under a junior officer, I could not perhaps refuse any request of hers. . . . I believe I astonished Lord Hardinge by the facts I stated to him, and by their plainness. . . . Lord H. tried to persuade me that older officers and higher in rank than myself had consented to serve under junior officers, and he instanced his own case at the battle of Ferozeshuhur in accepting command under Lord Gough, and related the compliment paid to him in the House of Lords by the Duke of Wellington for having done so. I looked him straight in the face, and said to him: 'My lord, the army in India knew, and every officer and soldier in the whole army knew, that your lordship took that step to save the army, and that your lordship did save the army in consequence. The cases are not parallel.' He made no reply. . . . I am to go to Windsor to-morrow

for two days. By the mail after that visit my fate will be decided."

The gracious reception accorded to him by the Queen and the Prince Consort struck a responsive chord in Sir Colin's heart. It completely dispelled all angry feeling from his mind, and in a true spirit of loyalty he expressed to her Majesty his readiness to return to the Crimea, and "to serve under a corporal if she wished it."¹

It was a happy circumstance, and of good omen for Sir Colin's future, that he returned to England at this juncture, for it enabled those in authority to form, by means of personal intercourse with him, a true estimate of his character, and to correct sundry false impressions regarding him which had reached England in the shape of rumours from the Crimea. One instance, furnished on the authority of the late Lord Sandhurst, to whom Sir Colin related the circumstance, may be noted to show how in an important particular the Ministry had been misled regarding him. Sir Colin, when dining with Lord and Lady Palmerston, sat on one side of the former;

¹ *Vide note, vol. iii. p. 381, 'Life of the Prince Consort,' by Sir Theodore Martin.* In the draft of a letter to Lord Panmure found amongst Sir Colin's papers, but which, in consequence of his interview with her Majesty, was not sent, he remarks that, "had actual operations been in progress he would have submitted without a word to any arrangement made by the Minister of War;" and adds, "General Simpson will tell your lordship that when it was in contemplation to place General Markham (commanding the 2d division) over my head, active operations then going on, I told him I would obey a corporal, if called on, rather than make a difficulty."

Madame Persigny, the wife of the French ambassador, on the other. In the general conversation which took place, Sir Colin talked to the ambassadress in her own language, across Lord Palmerston, who, on hearing this, exclaimed in a tone of surprise, “Why, Sir Colin, they told me you could not speak French.”

A few days after his visit to Windsor, Sir Colin sat, at the Queen’s request, for his photograph; and by her Majesty’s special desire, conveyed to him through General Grey, “the gallant and amiable old soldier was asked to have it taken in the uniform he wore at the Alma and Balaklava.”

Glasgow, too, proud of Sir Colin’s connection with it, and eager to do him honour, resolved to confer upon him the freedom of the city; and a subscription, to which there were 6000 contributors, was raised for the purpose of presenting him with a sword. Uncertain, however, as to the time of his departure for the Crimea, he was compelled to decline for the moment the invitation to receive these honours in person.

Writing from Paris to Colonel Henry Eyre, on the 25th January, Sir Colin informs him: “We are to have peace—at least the French seem to have made up their minds on the subject, and our ambassador (Lord Cowley) seems to take the same view. . . . I leave this on Tuesday next, the 29th, for Marseilles, and from thence for Constantinople on the 31st. I hope to be in the Crimea about the 10th proximo, and to be again on my return here the moment the

preliminaries of peace have been signed. The organisation of the corps, of which they propose to give me the charge, will then no longer be necessary, or my presence with the army desired, and I therefore conclude I shall be allowed to come away. I have never seen Vienna, or any part of southern Germany or Italy, and I think of taking a wandering tour through these countries before I return to settle down in some little house in a convenient quarter in London. The French are mightily pleased with the Crimean medal given to them by the Queen ; and the officers, who have received, in addition, the Order of the Bath, are very proud of the latter. The distribution of these distinctions will have a good effect on the army and in the interior of France, where the peasantry still regard England as the real enemy of their country. That feeling will be much diminished, if not removed, when the soldiers return to their homes wearing the English medal. I was presented to the Emperor and Empress, and invited to a ball by the latter, where I saw much of the beauty of Paris, but not half so many charming faces as one used to see at the balls in the north of England. I was present also at the investiture of several general and other junior officers with the Order of the Bath by our ambassador, as the representative of her Majesty. The ceremony was conducted with great dignity. There was a magnificent dinner afterwards. The whole thing went off well, evidently to the high satisfaction of all the Frenchmen.

. . . . My friend, General Vinoy, has arrived from the country. It has been a great pleasure to me to see him before I leave."

On his reporting himself at headquarters, Sir Colin found that the *corps d'armée*, to take the command of which he had consented to return to the Crimea, and in anticipation of which he had been promoted to the local rank of General, had not been organised; and further, that it was not the intention of Sir William Codrington to nominate the troops to compose it, until the eve of the army taking the field. To meet the difficulty, it was arranged to place the Highland division once more under his orders, with the understanding that it should constitute the nucleus of the corps to be formed hereafter. So he once more took up his quarters at Kamara, "determined," as he wrote to Eyre, "to accommodate himself to all that might happen, and that nothing should disturb the cordiality that should prevail between himself and the general officer under whose orders he was to serve." In the interval the Conference at Paris had paved the way for a cessation of hostilities. An armistice was arranged at the end of February, and on the 2d April peace was proclaimed to the Allied armies.

Whilst awaiting his orders to return to England, Sir Colin took the opportunity of examining the position held by the Russians on the north side of the Tchernaya. In a letter to Colonel Henry Eyre, of the 11th April, he thus records his impressions: "I visited yesterday the Russian position in our

front, from the place called Mackenzie's farm to the 'Fort du Nord.' The troops which have occupied that position (it is dreadfully exposed) must have suffered greatly in every way, from the badness of their huts and the difficulty of getting provisions to the ground in question. They confess to great losses from typhus and dysentery, the former particularly, which still prevails; and all rejoice in the termination of the war. The position is only accessible in one or two places, and the defences at these points are so formidable that I scarcely think an attack direct in front would have been successful; and if it had, the loss would have been so great as to have run the risk of crippling the army for operations in the spring, while we should have experienced equal if not greater difficulty in bringing provisions to our army than the Russians themselves. Marshal Pelissier's idea to leave the Russian army in that exposed position to all the inclemency of the winter, and to the want of provisions, which the badness of the roads and deficient transport would certainly produce, together with the sickness and disorganisation which would follow, was the wisest plan to pursue. We have remained close to our resources of every kind during the winter, and the result has been that our men have improved in discipline, while their health has been admirable during the whole period. The Russians go out of their way to show their preference for the French and their opinion of the superior military qualities of our Allies to our-

selves. The older officers of the French army have noticed this, and laugh at the attempt to disunite us. The attempt is so general on the part of all ranks of the Russian army, that we are satisfied they must have received orders from their Government to exhibit this feeling."

The time having arrived for Sir Colin's departure for England, he assembled the 42d, 79th, and 93d Highlanders, and took leave of them in the following words: "Soldiers of the 42d, 79th, and 93d! old Highland brigade, with whom I passed the early and perilous part of this war, I have now to take leave of you. In a few hours I shall be on board ship, never to see you again as a body. A long farewell! I am now old, and shall not be called to serve any more, and nothing will remain to me but the memory of my campaigns, and of the enduring, hardy, generous soldiers with whom I have been associated, whose name and glory will long be kept alive in the hearts of our countrymen. When you go home, as you gradually fulfil your term of service, each to his family and his cottage, you will tell the story of your immortal advance in that victorious echelon up the heights of Alma, and of the old brigadier who led and loved you so well. Your children and your children's children will repeat the tale to other generations, when only a few lines of history will remain to record all the enthusiasm and discipline which have borne you so stoutly to the end of this war. Our native land will never forget

the name of the Highland brigade, and in some future war that nation will call for another one to equal this, which it can never surpass. Though I shall be gone, the thought of you will go with me wherever I may be, and cheer my old age with a glorious recollection of dangers confronted and hardships endured. A pipe will never sound near me without carrying me back to those bright days when I was at your head, and wore the bonnet which you gained for me, and the honourable decorations on my breast, many of which I owe to your conduct. Brave soldiers, kind comrades, farewell!"

The address, delivered with much feeling, was received with manifest emotion by the troops, who regarded the separation from the chief, they had learned to regard with affection, as final. Little could they forecast the future, or imagine that they were so soon to be again associated with him in another and far different field, demanding a renewal of the same qualities which had on this occasion called forth the gratitude of their commander.

On his return from the Crimea, Sir Colin made arrangements to proceed to Glasgow and receive in person the honours which, as stated previously, had been offered him by his fellow-townsman in November of the preceding year. In responding to the speech of the Lord Provost, Sir Colin spoke briefly and with much feeling. "It was," he remarked, "upwards of half a century since he left his native city, and he valued highly and gratefully the manner in

which he had been received, as well as the great honours conferred upon him." The late Sir Archibald Alison, Sheriff of Lanarkshire, whose guest Sir Colin was, handed him the sword; whereupon the latter desired that the Highland brigade should not be forgotten on this occasion, and said "he owed his honours to the position he held as its commander." Next evening he was entertained at a grand banquet in the City Hall, and here, as elsewhere during his visit, he was welcomed with enthusiasm. Whilst at Glasgow he received several addresses from Scotch societies.

In July of this year Sir Colin was appointed to the command of the South-eastern District, and had already entered on his duties at Dover, when he was removed thence to succeed the Duke of Cambridge in the post of Inspector-General of Infantry, on the appointment of his Royal Highness to the chief command of the army, in consequence of the resignation of Lord Hardinge. So ready an acceptance of employment may appear inconsistent with the desire so frequently repeated in his correspondence and journal to seek the rest and retirement which he had so long promised himself; but the real motive for acceding to the wish of the authorities originated in the desire to enable an officer who had served with him in the Crimea to fulfil the period required for his promotion by further employment on the staff.

During the same month he appeared before a Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the

purchase of commissions in the army, of which the Duke of Somerset was President. Sir Colin's evidence showed that he regarded the system of purchase with but little favour, though he admitted that, in consequence of not having given sufficient attention to the subject, he was not prepared to recommend a substitute. His views tended towards a higher standard of education, and to the principle of the selection of officers.

In December 1856 Sir Colin was selected by the Queen to proceed to Berlin, as her Majesty's representative, for the purpose of delivering personally to his Royal Highness the Prince of Prussia (the present Emperor of Germany) the ensigns of the Order of the Bath, on his appointment as an Honorary Member of the Military Division of the First Class, or Knights Grand Cross. He fulfilled the mission to her Majesty's satisfaction, having experienced a cordial reception from the Prussian royal family.

He had not been engaged many months with the duties of his new appointment, before the offer was made to him, in March 1857, of the command of an expedition about to be sent to China, with which country the relations of England had for some time been in a critical state. This offer he felt bound to decline, on the score of age, long service, and liability to fever and ague, after so many years exposure to such attacks in tropical climates. When, however, it was announced that the choice of the Government had fallen upon Lord Elgin, as the

diplomatic head of the mission, he repented of his decision ; and his journal, which he resumed at this period, contains many proofs of his regret at seeing an expedition depart, which, to use his own words, “he might and ought to have commanded.”

It was fortunate that when he was in this frame of mind the routine of his official duties necessitated the active exercise of his mental and bodily powers. After visiting the depots in the south of England, he proceeded to Ireland, and thence to Scotland, returning to London in the first week in June. His journal during this period is mainly confined to the entry of copious and minute notes connected with the inspection of the various depots, and affords abundant proof of the conscientious manner in which he endeavoured to represent to the authorities the condition in which he found the troops. It was during this tour that the following incident occurred, showing Sir Colin’s retentiveness of memory, as well as the intimate knowledge which officers bred in the school of Sir John Moore possessed of the men serving under their command. It is given on the authority of the gentleman to whom Sir Colin related the circumstance : “ While,” he said, “ I was inspecting the depot at Chichester, I noticed that an old man, evidently an old soldier, though in plain clothes, was constantly on the ground, and apparently watching my movements. At the end of the inspection, as I was leaving the barrack-yard, he came towards me, drew himself up, made the military salute, and with

much respect said, ‘Sir Colin, may I speak to you ? Look at me, sir ; do you recollect me ?’ I looked at him, and replied, ‘Yes, I do.’ ‘What is my name ?’ I told him. ‘Yes, sir ; and where did you last see me ?’ ‘In the breach of St Sebastian, badly wounded, by my side.’ ‘Right, sir.’ ‘I can tell you something more. You were No. — in the front rank of my company.’ ‘Right, sir.’ I was putting my hand into my pocket to make the old man a present, when he stepped forward, laid his hand on my wrist, and said, ‘No, sir ; that is not what I want ; but you will be going to Shorncliffe to inspect the depot there. I have a son in the Inniskillings quartered at that station, and if you will call him out, and say that you knew his father, that is what I could wish.’”

At the Oxford commemoration of this year the honorary degree of D.C.L. was conferred upon Sir Colin. For the six weeks after his return to London there is a blank in Sir Colin’s journal, which was not resumed till the 11th July. During this interval grave news had been received from India. It was known that portions of the native army had shown undoubted signs of disaffection, and though no details of the terrible massacres perpetrated by the sepoys at the commencement of the revolt had yet reached England, the public mind had become disquieted at the ominous gathering of the storm which was about to burst, and which ere long shook the Government of British India to its foundations.

"*Journal, July 11th, Saturday.*—A private note from Romaine,¹ received this morning, informs me of news of General Anson's² death having arrived that morning by telegraph. In going down to the Horse Guards about 3 P.M. I was overtaken by General Storks, who informed me that Lord Panmure wanted to see me. When admitted to his lordship, he informed me of the intelligence received that forenoon of the death of General Anson at Kurnal, on the 27th May, by cholera, and of the disappearance of 30,000 sepoys from the ranks of the Bengal army, and of the accounts generally from India being unfavourable. Thereupon he made me the offer of the command in India. I accepted the offer at once, and expressed my readiness to start that same evening if necessary. It was settled that I should proceed the following morning. Went with Lord Panmure to the Duke of Cambridge. Before going to the latter, I had settled that my dear friend Mansfield³ should have the offer made to him of chief of the staff. His lordship proposed the situation of military secretary; but that, I told his lordship, was not worth his acceptance, and I pressed for the appointment of chief of the staff being offered to him, with

¹ W. G. Romaine, C.B., at this time Secretary to the Admiralty. He was on terms of the greatest intimacy with Sir Colin.

² General Anson, Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

³ Colonel Mansfield, at this time holding the appointment of Consul-General at Warsaw, afterwards Lord Sandhurst, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., who died in 1876, after having filled successively the position of Commander-in-chief in the East Indies, and of the forces in Ireland.

the rank of major-general, and the pay allowances, &c., of that appointment in India. The Duke of Cambridge approved of Major Alison¹ going with me as military secretary, and Sir David Baird and Lieutenant Alison as aides-de-camp.²

“Sunday, 12th July.—Waited on the Duke and Duchess of Argyll at 8.30 A.M. Both very kind to me. The Duke asked me to write to him. Called afterwards on Lord Panmure. I must say that, in all my communications with his lordship, his manner has ever been most fair and gentlemanlike and straightforward. He promised to send me the necessary authority to assume command in India upon arrival, and this document came to me in the evening. From Lord Panmure I went to the Duke of Cambridge, by whom I was taken to take leave of his mother and the princess his sister, and subsequently to Buckingham Palace, to wait on her Majesty. Nothing could be more gracious or kind than the Queen’s whole manner; and her expressions of approval of my readiness to proceed at once were pleasant to receive from a sovereign so good and so justly beloved. . . . Started after dinner for the station at London Bridge. Never did a man proceed on a mission of duty with a lighter heart and a feeling of greater humility, yet with a juster sense

¹ Now Major-General Sir A. Alison, Bt., K.C.B., Deputy Quarter-master-General, Horse Guards, and head of the Intelligence Department.

² Lieutenant Frederick Alison, the younger brother of Major A. Alison.

of the compliment that had been paid to a mere soldier of fortune like myself in being named to the highest command in the gift of the Crown. My sister had been made independent—a great comfort to my feelings—and I left England on terms of friendship with all I cared for in any degree at home. Started at 8.30. P.M., bidding adieu to London with a confident hope of return to England to pass a little time with the few friends that may be left to me.

“*July 13th.*—Reached Paris at —. Found dear Vinoy at the station, and also Colonel Claremont. The latter to inform me that Lord and Lady Cowley had ordered breakfast for myself and party at an hotel on the Boulevard leading to the station of the Marseilles railway ; but as I had begged Madame Vinoy to meet me, and she had prepared breakfast for me, and had also invited General Cler of the Imperial Guard to meet me, as also Vinoy’s great friend, General Camou, to be of the party, I made my apologies to Lady Cowley, and accompanied Vinoy to his quarters in the Place Royale to breakfast, where I met those I have mentioned, besides Loysel, his young staff officer. Accompanied to the station by Vinoy, Cler, Loysel, and then took leave of these excellent people.”

On the morning of Tuesday the 14th, Sir Colin reached Marseilles, and immediately embarked on board the Vectis, which had her steam up.

“*Journal, Aden, July 28th.*—Heard at Suez of

Grant¹ having been brought from Madras to command the Bengal army. Saw his general order or address to the troops (sepoys) of that Presidency. Besides being very clever and justly looked up to as the best officer of that army, his selection and nomination to the command was a wise and politic measure. He was considered by the Company's officers at home as the fittest man, and the only one possessing any influence with the Bengal sepoy. He has had his try with them and has signally failed. Had he not been sent for, and had the opportunity not been offered him, it would have been stated at home by all Indian authorities and admirers of the high-caste sepoy, that, if advantage had been taken of his influence and high reputation with the sepoys of his own army, the mutiny would have been stopped and the men called to a proper sense of their duty. Newspapers from India, and men from thence on their way home, told us here that many additional regiments of infantry, and some regular as well as irregular regiments of cavalry and some batteries of native artillery, had mutinied since Grant's arrival, showing that the disease was beyond the power of remedy or arrest by any officer of the Bengal army, or other authority of that Residency. It was wise and prudent on the part of the Governor-General to have made the trial; for had he not done

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, K.C.B., commanding the forces in the Madras Presidency—afterwards G.C.B. and G.C.M.G.; now Governor of Chelsea Hospital.

so, the scream would have been raised loud and general by all the officers of the Bengal army at home in blame of the omission, and to his non-employment the continuance of the mutiny would have been ascribed.

“Intelligence from India very unfavourable. Delhi not only had not fallen, which did not surprise me, but little chance of it until reinforcements to a large amount had joined the force before the place. Accounts of additional regiments and battalions having mutinied.”

“*6th August, Point de Galle.*—Heard of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, from the effects of a wound; and of Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpore—two of the very best officers for a difficulty to be found in any army. The first a rare person. I had always looked forward to his advice in all questions connected with the sepoys, and distribution of the army, after the mutinies should have been disposed of and order in some degree restored, as far as the defeat and the dispersion of the enemy, now in the field against us, had been effected; for he possessed, in my opinion, more enlarged and more sound views upon all Indian questions than any one I am acquainted with in India. Poor fellow! He was too noble and good a man to fall in a skirmish such as the one he engaged in.”¹

¹ Sir H. Lawrence’s death was caused by the explosion of a shell in the Residency two days after the affair at Chinhut.

On reaching Madras he was met by his old friend Balfour,¹ at that time Inspector-General of Ordnance in the Madras Presidency, and taken by him to wait on Lord Harris, the Governor. During the drive, Sir Colin commented on the measures he proposed adopting for the repression of the mutiny. These views he repeated to Lord Harris, as well as to his old comrade and friend Marcus Beresford, acting as Commander-in-chief of the Madras Presidency. Before leaving Madras he showed Balfour a confidential memorandum of the operations he proposed to conduct. These comprised three separate movements, so as to combine the advance of two columns from the Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively, in co-operation with the great central movement, which he proposed to direct in person.²

“Journal, August 13th, Government House, Calcutta.—Landed with General Grant, who came on board to see me. Waited on Lord Canning, who received me most kindly. His lordship invited me to Government House, with my military secretary, Major Alison. He informed me of the defection of three regiments at Dinapore; and, as I understood from Grant afterwards, the defection of these corps”

¹ Now General Sir George Balfour, K.C.B., R. Art., M.P., who had served in the Chinese Expedition with Sir Colin, and who had been the first consul appointed to Shanghai.

² It so happened that Colonel Mansfield, when passing through London on his way to India to take up his post of chief of the staff, was consulted by the Government, and submitted to it a plan based on the same principles as that indicated by Sir Colin Campbell.

and the trouble it occasioned, led to the sending of General Outram to Allahabad. . . . Upon the whole, I gathered from Grant that, until a force could be collected at Allahabad of sufficient amount—two or three or four regiments, with artillery, irrespective of the garrison necessary for the security of that place—he considered he would be more useful as Commander-in-chief here, than as the chief of an isolated point, the communications of which with Calcutta were cut off. I think so too; and, however annoying, here I must remain for the present."

CHAPTER XI.

ASSISTANCE AFFORDED BY SIR P. GRANT—REVIEW OF THE SITUATION —SIR COLIN COMMUNICATES WITH SIR JAS. OUTRAM AND HAVELOCK—EFFORTS TO PRESS FORWARD REINFORCEMENTS—PREPARATIONS FOR RECEPTION OF TROOPS AT CALCUTTA—LABOUR IN DESPATCHING THEM TO THE FRONT—BULLOCK-TRAIN—LETTERS TO SIR P. GRANT, SIR JOHN LAWRENCE, AND GENERAL WILSON—SIR COLIN CONGRATULATES GENERAL WILSON ON FALL OF DELHI —FIRST RELIEF OF LUCKNOW RESIDENCY—SIR JAS. OUTRAM'S POSITION—MARCH OF GREATHED'S COLUMN THROUGH THE DOAB —LETTER FROM SIR JOHN LAWRENCE—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—SIR COLIN LEAVES CALCUTTA—NARROW ESCAPE FROM CAPTURE — REACHES CAWNPORE — DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION — LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE — LEAVES CAWNPORE — MR KAVANAGH — PLAN OF ATTACK — REVIEW OF RELIEVING FORCE.

To find Sir Patrick Grant at Calcutta, and to learn the progress and details of the mutiny from the lips of perhaps the highest authority in the country on all matters concerning the native army of Bengal, was a piece of good fortune of which Sir Colin eagerly availed himself. From this officer he received the most cordial assistance, and by means of a memorandum, containing the number and distribution of the disposable troops, as well as a detailed statement of the commissariat, ordnance, and trans-

port arrangements in progress, which Sir Patrick Grant had, with considerate kindness, placed in his hands on landing, he was enabled to form a just estimate of the situation—one as unpromising and difficult as can well be imagined.

Of the vast territories situated in the north-west of our Indian empire, the Punjab was the only province which at this time remained in possession of the British power. With a vigour and fearlessness of responsibility which has won for him imperishable renown, Sir John Lawrence had encountered the danger at the outset, by the destruction of such sepoy regiments as had revolted, and by the disarmament of the remainder. Depending on his own resources (for assistance from any other quarter was hopeless), he had improvised a fresh army, levied from the populations subjected to his rule, and having by these means insured the tranquillity of his own province, was straining every nerve to break the neck of the rebellion, by pressing forward all his available reinforcements to succour the small British force engaged with overwhelming odds before the walls of Delhi. The only communication between that place and Calcutta was *via* the Indus and Bombay, the latest accounts from the besieging force being of the 18th July.

With the exception of the station of Meerut, and the fort of Agra, to the latter of which a British garrison had betaken itself after sustaining a reverse in the field, the entire country between Delhi and

Allahabad, including the province of Rohilkund and the Doab, a territory comprised between the rivers Jumna and Ganges had fallen into the hands of the enemy. In the kingdom of Oude all vestige of British rule was extinguished, save at Lucknow, in the Residency of which city a small mixed force, European and native, together with a large number of women and children, had taken refuge. Intrenched there as they best could, they had, since the 1st July, held their own against the innumerable hosts by whom they were beleaguered. Though Scindiah, the principal chieftain of the semi-independent states, continued firm in his allegiance, and still retained authority over his own troops, and though the Gwalior contingent had not yet revolted, the rebellion had extended itself over the greater portion of Central India, at some stations in which terrible outrages had been perpetrated by the mutinous sepoys. On the 16th July Cawnpore had been retaken by Havelock, who, it was known, had at this time crossed the Ganges, and had advanced to the succour of Lucknow, but of whom no intelligence had reached Calcutta since the 4th August. Great anxiety was felt for him and his very small force; and, to add to the suspense, the communication between Allahabad and Calcutta was temporarily interrupted by the movement, along the Great Trunk Road, of the native regiments which had recently revolted at Dinapore. Fortunately the fort of Allahabad, with its magazines of warlike stores,

situated at the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges, had been preserved. It was a point of the highest strategical importance, as it formed an admirable base for the operations now in progress for the relief of Lucknow, as well as those to be undertaken hereafter for the recovery of our lines of communication with Delhi and Agra. Allahabad could be reached from Calcutta in two ways: 1st, By the river, a distance of 809 miles, to accomplish which a steamboat requires from twenty to thirty days. As, however, the fall of the river in autumn renders the navigation unreliable, this means of communication could not be depended upon for many weeks longer. 2d, By the Great Trunk Road, a distance of 503 miles. This last route, however, was rendered shorter in time by the completion of the railway from Calcutta to Raneegunge, a distance of 120 miles. The principal posts along the extended river-line were held by fragments of the small European force available in the lower provinces, each detachment consisting of portions of several regiments, so that there was no complete battalion at any one point. This arose from the fact of the troops having arrived in driblets, which were immediately sent off, without reference to the corps to which they belonged, to the point where assistance was most needed. To endeavour to concentrate these several detachments at the regimental headquarters was Sir Colin's first object.

Sir James Outram, who, on his return from the command of the Persian expedition, reached Calcutta

on July 31st, had left it again on the 6th August for the upper provinces, to assume the combined command of the Cawnpore and Dinapore divisions. Together with this military appointment, he was re-invested with the powers of Chief Commissioner in Oude, an office he had relinquished fifteen months previously, and in which he had been succeeded by Sir Henry Lawrence. Colonel Robert Napier of the Bengal Engineers accompanied him as chief divisional staff officer.

A week before Sir Colin's arrival, H.M.'s ship Shannon, having on board Lord Elgin in diplomatic charge of the expedition to China, had reached Calcutta. She was followed three days later by H.M.'s ship Pearl. These vessels, which were placed at the disposal of the Governor-General by Lord Elgin, had brought with them a portion of the 90th Regiment; and a substantial reinforcement, composed of the headquarters of that corps, the 5th Fusiliers from the Mauritius, with some artillery and other detachments, was already on its way up the river to succour Havelock, who had entered Oude with only 1500 men, 1200 of whom were Europeans, with ten guns imperfectly manned and equipped. This important object, however, was for the moment frustrated by the authorities along the river-line arresting these reinforcements in their upward movement for local objects, and for the pursuit of the mutineers who had revolted at Dinapore and Bhagulpore.

Havelock, after two attempts to advance on Luck-

now, had for a second time fallen back upon his position at Mangalwar. Most reluctantly had he adopted this course; but the serious diminution of his force by losses in action and sickness left him little hope of overcoming the obstacles which intervened between his position and Lucknow, and of reaching that city in sufficient strength to admit of his attacking it with any prospect of success. It was known that Nana Sahib was at the head of a large force twelve miles distant, in a position to intercept, on his advance, his communications with Cawnpore. The possible movement of the Gwalior contingent towards the Jumna, so as to threaten his rear, also weighed upon him, though, as it turned out, that body did not commence its March till late in September. Lastly, his hopes of an early reinforcement by the 5th and 90th Regiments were shattered by the announcement from Sir Patrick Grant that, in consequence of the mutiny at Dina-pore, there was no immediate prospect of their joining him. Havelock was therefore constrained to retire on Cawnpore; but in order to cover his retreat he struck a blow at the enemy, for the third time, on the 12th August, enabling him to recross the Ganges on the following day without molestation. Four days afterwards he moved out from Cawnpore and defeated a body of the rebels at Bithoor.

Having assumed command of the army on the 17th August, Sir Colin's first act was to communicate by telegraph with Sir James Outram, and express

to him the hope that, after "Eyre's¹ signal success at Jugdeespose," the 5th and 90th, or at least one of these regiments, would be enabled to proceed to their original destination. The message concluded with these words : "It is an exceeding satisfaction to me to have your assistance, and to find you in your present position."

On the same day he wrote to Colonel Napier : "I am delighted to find you where you are at present, and most thankful for my own good fortune and that of the service in having the benefit of Sir James Outram's and your assistance, exactly in the situation where the abilities and sound judgment of both will be of the greatest value. I have sent him a long message by electric telegraph to-day, a copy of which I enclose, in case of any injury to the line between this and Dinapore, and consequent interruption of our communication with you by that means. If Sir James can spare from his division the 5th or 90th, to go forward to Allahabad, we shall find ourselves in a situation to send assistance to Cawnpore for the defence and security of that post. We received intelligence last night of the decision arrived at by Havelock after his affair with the enemy on the 5th instant, at Busseerutgunj. It is most distressing to think of the position in which

¹ Major Vincent Eyre, Bengal Artillery, now Major-General Sir Vincent Eyre, K.C.S.I., C.B., Royal Artillery, who, after his gallant relief of the stout little garrison of Arrah, had attacked and defeated Koer Singh in his stronghold at Jugdeespose on the 12th August.

our poor friends are placed at Lucknow ; but with the very small force under Havelock's command, and in the presence of such numbers of troops as he had opposed to him, and the whole population of Oudh arrayed in arms for the defence of their villages, he must have lost his little detachment in attempting to force his way through such numbers and difficulties as he had to encounter and surmount, before he could reach the walls of Lucknow. By a letter to Grant from Colonel Neill at Cawnpore, Havelock was to have recrossed the river to that place on the 11th."

To Havelock he addressed himself as follows : "I have received your despatches by telegraph of the 6th instant and of the 12th instant, reporting the successful result of the attack made on the enemy by the force under your command on those days respectively.

"The sustained energy, promptitude, and vigorous action by which your whole proceedings have been marked during the late difficult operations deserve the highest praise ; and it will be most agreeable to me to make known to his lordship the Governor-General the sense I entertain of the able manner in which you have carried out the instructions of Sir Patrick Grant.

"I beg you to express to the officers and men of the different corps under your command the pride and satisfaction I have experienced in reading your reports of the intrepid valour they have displayed

upon every occasion they have encountered the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and how nobly they have maintained the qualities for which British soldiers have ever been distinguished—high courage and endurance.

“I entirely concur in the soundness of the view you have taken of your position in your telegram of the 6th instant from Mangalwar, and of all the reasons which influenced you to defer for the present active operations.”

In the meantime, no stone had been left unturned by Sir Colin to press forward the troops so inopportunely diverted from their original purpose. By dint of unremitting toil and the exercise of all the energy and tact at his command, the difficulties were at last overcome, and the gratifying news reached Calcutta that the reinforcements had resumed their movement to Allahabad. No less welcome was this intelligence to Havelock, whose urgent representations for assistance had been thus happily anticipated. Failing this assurance of succour, he had come to the resolution of falling back upon Allahabad. Open to attack on his front, flank, and rear by numerous bodies of the enemy, his position at Cawnpore had become extremely critical. He was losing five or six men daily from cholera; his hospital was crowded with sick and wounded; and so reduced was his column that, of the force which had accompanied him into the field, but little more than half remained effective.

With the views expressed in Havelock's appeal for reinforcements, Sir Colin expressed his entire concurrence. "I agree," he remarks in a telegraphic despatch of the 23d August, "in all that you say about your position, and from the moment of my arrival here felt your being made strong at Cawnpore to be of the first importance. The detention of this regiment (the 90th) and other detachments by the local authorities at different points while on their way to Allahabad, I deeply regret. I have no artillery. . . . Captain Peel, R.N., with 500 sailors and ten eight-inch guns, with ammunition, left this on the 20th instant for Allahabad." A few days later he was able to inform Havelock that a column under Colonel Fischer, composed of a wing of the 53d Regiment, a Madras field-battery (six guns), and the 27th Madras Native Infantry, had left for Raneegunj, whence it was to march along the Great Trunk Road to Benares, and thence to Allahabad.

Having satisfied the urgent requirements of the moment, Sir Colin set to work to prepare for the reception and despatch, in a fit state to take the field, of the reinforcements expected at Calcutta. Those diverted from the Chinese expedition were the first due, to be followed after an interval of some weeks by the main body from England. The amount of labour involved in this task may be inferred from the fact that nearly everything had to be improvised on the spot. The great arsenal of Delhi, on which in ordinary times a Bengal army mainly depended

for its field equipment, had fallen, with all its stores, into the hands of the enemy. A similar fate had befallen Futtehgurh, the seat of the gun-carriage manufactory ; and Cawnpore, which was wont to furnish the saddlery and harness for the army, could no longer be looked to for a supply of these articles. Calcutta could do little or nothing to meet the exigencies of the occasion. Rifle-ammunition, guns, gun-carriages, harness, tents, boots, flour, &c., were either not forthcoming or deficient in quantity. For the cavalry and artillery there was not a single horse available, and the local transports had been wellnigh exhausted.

Thanks, however, to Sir Colin's characteristic energy, and the vigour which he infused into the several departments, a foundation was laid of the measures required for the collection of the stores and supplies, without which it would have been impossible to put an army, however small, into the field. These, as soon as ready, were forwarded to Allahabad.

As the river had commenced to fall, it became necessary to adopt means for the rapid and continuous transit of troops to the front. This was accomplished by the use of covered waggons, in which small parties of men were conveyed by bullocks, changed at regular stages, along the line of road from the railway terminus at Raneegunj to Allahabad, arrangements being made by the commissariat for the supply of rations to the troops at

specified points where they halted to cook and eat them.

The chief of the staff not having yet arrived from England,¹ the burthen of initiating and supervising this mass of detail devolved upon Sir Colin, ably seconded by his military secretary ; but this labour was materially lightened by the cordial assistance rendered to him by Lord Canning, whose guest at Government House he had been since his arrival at Calcutta, and with whom he enjoyed the privilege of being in constant personal communication.

Whilst thus engaged, Sir Colin having occasion to write on the 5th September to Sir Patrick Grant at Madras for a supply of Enfield ammunition, the last round of which had been sent to Allahabad, adds : “ We have good news from Lucknow. The enemy, it would appear, had established themselves in a house which they had loopholed, and from which they maintained an incessant fire of musketry, causing our brave garrison not only much loss, but making it felt to be difficult to move or show themselves within the entrenchment. Lieutenant Anderson ran a gallery up to and underneath this loopholed house, formed a good large mine, and blew up the house and its occupants. The explosion and loss of life would appear to have caused great alarm, which was taken advantage of by the garrison to make a sally, in which they spiked a large gun, the cause of much annoyance, and contrived to bring in

¹ He reached Calcutta on the 10th of September.

at the same time some bullocks—a very seasonable supply to the poor garrison, whose stock of food was being rapidly reduced.

"On the 2d instant a reinforcement of some 1259 non-commissioned officers and men of the 5th and 90th, including Eyre's battery, had arrived at Allahabad. There had been sent forward to Havelock all the effective artillerymen from Allahabad—replaced by the invalid artillerymen from Cawnpore—all of the garrison that could be spared, besides some small detachments gathered together from different places on the way up. The whole were to move forward by forced marches on their way to Cawnpore, where everything would be prepared for crossing the river on their arrival. Outram has behaved very handsomely to Havelock. He is to join the latter in the movement upon Lucknow in his capacity as commissioner and as a volunteer, leaving to Havelock all the glory of effecting the relief of the place and its brave garrison,¹ and I have now a confident hope that it will be accomplished.

¹ In the following order Sir Colin, with true soldierly feeling, expressed his sense of the magnanimity which had prompted Sir James Outram to this noble act :—

"Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a Commander-in-chief to publish and confirm such an order as the following one, proceeding from Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

"With such a reputation as Major-General Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can well afford to share glory and honour with others; but that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made with such disinterested generosity in favour of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oudh.

"Concurring, as the Commander-in-chief does, in everything stated

"They are sending out the Royal Artillery to India without guns, merely men, relying upon finding batteries with their equipment complete and ready for the men on their arrival. They will be disappointed in their expectations. I expect two companies from China in a few days. They are also coming without guns. I propose to send them to Allahabad, where there are two 9-pounder batteries complete, except in extra or spare waggons. They were sent up in July by you. The third has been broken up or interfered with in some way. A detachment (about 182 non-commissioned officers and men) of the military train corps arrived here from China a few days ago. I found that 120 of the number had been in the cavalry. It occurred to me that they would make a right good little body of cavalry if placed on the horses of the 8th Madras Light Cavalry,¹ and this is being done. . . . To

in the just eulogy of the latter by Sir James Outram, his Excellency takes this opportunity of publicly testifying to the army his admiration for an act of self-sacrifice and generosity on a point, of all others, which is dear to a real soldier.

"The confidence of Major-General Sir James Outram in Brigadier-General Havelock is indeed well justified. The energy, perseverance, and constancy of the Brigadier-General have never relaxed throughout a long series of arduous operations, in spite of scanty means, a numerous and trained enemy, and sickness in his camp. Never have troops shown greater or more enduring courage than those under the orders of Brigadier-General Havelock.

"The force and service at large are under the greatest obligations to Sir James Outram for the manner in which he has pressed up the reinforcements to join Brigadier-General Havelock in the face of much difficulty."

¹ This regiment having refused to embark for service in Bengal, their horses had been taken from them and sent to Calcutta.

get rid of the variety of authorities, town-major, deputy adjutant-general, deputy quartermaster-general, and I don't know how many others, that a commanding officer of H.M.'s troops is referred to on first arrival, and all living at the distance of miles from each other, I have got Lord Canning to appoint a disembarkation officer, who will attend upon the troops on their arrival, give them information, and see to their care and comfort in every way. He will be invested with the authority of all the departmental officers, and thus save an infinite deal of trouble to the troops and myself. At least I hope so."

Desirous of renewing his old terms of intimacy with Sir John Lawrence, and of keeping him informed of the means at this time at his disposal in Bengal, Sir Colin addressed him on the 12th September : "I have delayed writing to you in consequence of the very numerous calls on me, my staff being anywhere in India but Calcutta. My whole time has been taken up in attention to details, from which in other circumstances I should have been relieved. . . . On my arrival here I found officers of every rank anxious to be sent at least as divisional commanders, and at the head of small columns independent of all control. The troops which have come in from time to time have been sent up the country by detachments, without regard to the *ensemble* of regiments. This circumstance—which, from the emergency of the case, it was, I assume, impossible to avoid—I am now

trying to remedy. I send you a copy of a return I have caused to be drawn up, by which you will see how the European force in Bengal is broken up, and how impossible it is to gather together a sufficient column of men for any purpose whatever till our reinforcements arrive in October." . . . Next giving an account of the measures to reinforce Havelock, in terms almost identical with those expressed in his letter to Sir Patrick Grant, he proceeds : "At Delhi things are much as I expected. Whatever might have been our hopes and wishes to the contrary, it is an incontrovertible fact that hitherto the so-called besieging force has never been in sufficient strength to attack with a will, with due regard to the safety of the camp and ordinary military considerations. I have so little reliable information on the nature of the position, the feeling in the town, and the state of the health of the troops, that I dare not venture an opinion as to what is or is not in the power of General Wilson.¹ But I hope to have a good report, and that the last success we have accounts of, since the arrival of his reinforcements under Brigadier-General Nicholson,² has been followed by increased confidence on our side and an early prospect of decided results. More we cannot

¹ On the death of Sir H. Barnard, and the retirement of General Reed, the command of the force had devolved upon Brigadier-General Wilson, afterwards Sir A. Wilson, K.C.B.

² These had reached the camp before Delhi on the 14th August, and on the 25th Nicholson gained an important victory over the enemy at Nujuffghur.

hope, for we must make every allowance for the difficulties of the general.

“ Such, my dear Lawrence, is the amount of my intelligence, which is scanty enough. I have looked with anxious eye to the Punjab since the trouble began, and I can only be thankful that Government was lucky enough to have you in that country to meet the storm.

“ I cannot close this without turning for one moment to the memory of your gallant and lamented brother Henry. To you the loss is irreparable ; but all who knew and respected his great worth as a man and a public functionary, have but one feeling of deep and lasting sorrow and regret. But he died nobly in the execution of his duty.”

Whilst using every effort to push forward all the available reinforcements to swell Outram’s numbers, Sir Colin experienced the mortification of hearing that the column under Colonel Fischer had been interrupted in its upward movement, in consequence of the alarm occasioned by the revolt of the Ramgurh battalion, and the movement of bodies of mutineer soldiery in proximity to the Great Trunk Road in the province of Behar. In the bitterness of his disappointment he telegraphed to Outram : “ With all his anxiety to reinforce you, his Excellency’s efforts are interfered with at every moment by the civil authorities ;” but in the same message assurance was conveyed that a small column, including two guns of Madras horse-artillery, a company of

Madras sappers, and a detachment of H.M.'s 53d Foot, was being organised, and would proceed to join him as soon as possible.

To General Wilson he sent on the 23d a few words of encouragement, the first that had reached Delhi from any military authority for many weeks : "I must delay no longer to congratulate you on the manner in which the force under your command has conducted itself and upheld the honour of our arms. I appreciate all your difficulties and the grounds on which you have decided not to risk an attack, the success of which might not be perfectly certain. I have just seen your report of the 22d August to the Governor-General, and I quite enter into your reasoning, although I forbear for the present from expressing an opinion upon a very difficult question, with the whole bearings of which I am necessarily unacquainted. But, my dear General, you may count on my support and help in every mode in which it may be possible for me to afford them. I am sorry that our forces are so scattered, that I see but little chance of our meeting for some time to come. Including the latest arrivals, there are some 14,000 at my disposal, including Lucknow, the force under Outram and Havelock operating for its relief, the garrisons of Calcutta, Allahabad, and Cawnpore, and twenty other posts along the Ganges and Trunk Road, with all the great cities, which have to be watched very closely, and about which the civil authorities are anxious. Our great reinforcements will begin to

come in about the middle of next month (October), and great exertions are being made to push them as far as Allahabad by rail and bullock-train. There the force will be equipped as a marching body ; but much remains to be done in the way of carriage, commissariat, &c., on which it is not necessary for me to enlarge. I want Norman¹ very much, and whatever headquarter staff is available.”²

With the arrival of the substantial reinforcements under Nicholson, a new era dawned on the fortunes of our gallant little force in front of Delhi. All apprehension for the safety of its line of communications with the Punjab was dissipated by the signal defeat of the enemy at Nujuffighur on the 25th August. The *morale* of the troops was raised to the highest pitch, and every preparation was made to prosecute the siege in real earnest on the arrival of the long-expected siege-train, which reached camp on the 3d September. On the 14th the assault was delivered ; and on the 20th, after a stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy, attended by severe loss on our side, conspicuous amongst which was that of the gallant Nicholson, Delhi, the head and heart of the rebellion, was once more in the occupation of a British garrison. The happy news reached Calcutta on the 26th. In a letter to General Wilson

¹ His former Brigade-Major at Peshawur, who had been Assistant Adjutant-General of the army throughout the siege of Delhi, during the greater part of which he performed the duties of Adjutant-General also.

² There is reason for suspecting that this letter did not reach its destination until after Delhi had been taken.

of the 29th, Sir Colin wrote: "Pray accept my hearty congratulations on your brilliant success. I have received your account up to the 16th. The determined character of the resistance you have encountered in the town is an unmistakable answer to the unprofessional authorities who would have tried to hurry you on to a rash attack before your military judgment was satisfied of the sufficiency of your means. This is another subject, and perhaps not the least cause for congratulation, and I offer it most heartily. I grieve much over your loss, which was inevitable. I trust Nicholson still lives. Pray remember me to him if he does."

Outram left Allahabad on the 5th September, reaching Cawnpore on the 16th with a reinforcement of 1449 men. By these means the disposable force for the relief of Lucknow was raised to 3179. Outram having with singular disinterestedness carried out his chivalrous intention of waiving his rank in favour of Havelock, who had so long and strenuously laboured to effect the object in view, the latter made immediate preparations for crossing the Ganges. This operation was effected on the 19th. Defeating the enemy at the old position of Mangalwar, and again at the Alum Bagh—a walled pleasure-garden, situated on the Cawnpore road two miles short of Lucknow—Havelock halted on the 24th to make his arrangements for the final struggle. Leaving his sick, wounded, and baggage in charge of a detachment in the Alum Bagh, he advanced on

the 25th, and, after encountering numerous obstacles and a murderous fire which entailed a heavy sacrifice of life, he forced his way through the suburbs, and with great difficulty effected a junction with the garrison of the Residency.

The position of Outram, on whom the command now devolved, proved to be one of great embarrassment. His hopes of a reaction in the city, on which he had reckoned, were disappointed. The garrison had been reinforced. Opportune succour had reached the Residency at a critical juncture, for the mining operations of the enemy were in full activity, and the strength of the garrison was becoming too feeble to counteract them. The fidelity of the native troops had been tried to the uttermost. Doubtless a catastrophe had been averted ; but the withdrawal of the original garrison with all its encumbrances to Cawnpore, on which the Government had reckoned as the result of Havelock's operations, was found to be impracticable. Carriage there was none—such as had accompanied the column having been left behind at the Alum Bagh, the communication with which was closed. Had any been available, the risk of exposing a heavy convoy to the resistance experienced by the troops on their advance through the city forbade the attempt. The problem of supplying 2000 additional mouths from a commissariat already presumed to be failing, added to the difficulties of the situation. Outram, after due consideration, arrived at the conclusion that he had no

alternative but to remain where he was until a force of sufficient strength could be sent to relieve him.

Thus were the sanguine expectations raised by Havelock's advance scattered to the winds. Little doubting of its success, Sir Colin had communicated to Outram, on the 28th September, his intention of proceeding shortly to Cawnpore, in order to put himself at the centre of the troops. "No advance," he stated, "will take place without me, even if it be made with only a single regiment. With the communication open to Delhi, Agra, and the Punjab, it is absolutely necessary for me to get into the right place for directing the movements of the army, and restore something like *ensemble* to them."

As regards the restoration of the lines of communication referred to in this despatch, Sir Colin, as will be seen hereafter, had taken too sanguine a view. The fall of Delhi had not yet produced this result. So far from being able to leave Calcutta, his presence there was more than ever necessary to quicken the action of the departments engaged in pressing forward the troops and supplies. But even though Sir Colin was working at high pressure, the task of collecting the scattered detachments of infantry in movement along the Great Trunk Road, and the forwarding to Cawnpore of a properly equipped force in sufficient numbers to justify an advance upon Lucknow, required so much time that it became a question whether Outram could hold out till their arrival. All the available field-

artillery was shut up in Lucknow, and neither the horses nor the men intended for the batteries about to be organised at Allahabad had reached that place. The scanty supply of carriage and stores was, moreover, a matter of pressing difficulty.

In the meantime, whilst every nerve was being strained to assist Outram from below, intelligence was received that substantial succour was approaching him from the opposite direction. Such welcome news gave a happy turn to the state of affairs, and encouraged the hope that his relief might now be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. On the fall of Delhi, General Wilson had sent in pursuit of the rebels a column under Colonel Greathead,¹ consisting of two troops horse-artillery—so reduced by service as not to be able to bring more than five guns each into the field—one horse field-battery, a detachment Punjab sappers, H.M.'s 9th Lancers, the remains of the 8th and 95th Foot—barely 500 effective men—three squadrons Punjab cavalry, a squadron of Hodson's newly-raised Horse, and the 2d and 4th Punjab infantry,—in all, 1800 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 16 guns. Proceeding down the Doab, Greathead defeated the Jhansi brigade and other rebels at Bulundshuhur on the 28th September, and, continuing his triumphant course, beat various bodies of the mutineers at Malagurh and Allygurh. Having failed to overtake the main

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel of the 8th Foot, now Lieutenant-General Sir E. H. Greathead, K.C.B.

body of the fugitives, who had crossed the Jumna at Muttra, and anticipated him by making their way through the Doab into Oudh, he changed the direction of his column towards Agra, in response to urgent applications for succour which had reached him from that place. He reached Agra after an unusually long forced march on the 10th October, but had barely pitched his camp before he was attacked by the Indore brigade and a large body of mutineers from Mhow. The rebels paid dearly for their temerity. Quickly recovering themselves from their first surprise, our troops, notwithstanding their exhausted state, met the attack with vigour, and after a sharp engagement utterly routed the enemy, killing many of their numbers, and capturing 13 guns and a great quantity of baggage and stores in the lengthened pursuit which followed. From Agra, Greathed marched to Mynpooree, where he recovered some treasure ; and after a successful affair at Kanouj, in which he captured three guns, he proceeded by alternate forced and single marches down the Doab, reaching Cawnpore on the 26th October. On the way he was joined by Hope Grant, who assumed the command.

The arrival of this column was of priceless value to Sir Colin at that moment. The absolute want of cavalry, and his deficiency in field - artillery, had hitherto sorely weighed on him. The column was also well provided with carriage, a hardly less valuable acquisition. Now he had to hand the elements wherewith to organise a field-force of such strength

and character as would justify the commencement of operations at an early date.

The extension of the original position held by the garrison of the Residency was the immediate consequence of the succour brought to it by Havelock's columns. This was accomplished by means of sorties, and the destruction of some of the enemy's nearest batteries. The investment had become a blockade. From Outram a communication had been received dated the 7th October, in which he stated that "by eating his horses and gun-draught bullocks he would be able to subsist for a month." Less anxiety was felt for the post at the Alum Bagh. The enemy had apparently concentrated his attention on the garrison in the Residency, leaving the communication between Cawnpore and the Alum Bagh open. Taking advantage of this, Colonel Wilson, commanding at Cawnpore, had sent a convoy of ammunition, escorted by 300 men, to the Alum Bagh. The convoy reached this post, deposited the ammunition, and leaving half the escort behind it as a reinforcement, returned to Cawnpore with the baggage unmolested. Under orders from Calcutta, a small additional reinforcement with a further supply of provisions were thrown into the place.

In a letter to one of his former staff, written early in October, Sir Colin sets forth the reasons of his detention at Calcutta: "We are sending forward the men by bullock-train, which takes up about 90 daily. The men take their knapsacks and

blankets with them; ammunition, 60 in pouch, and a reserve of 100 rounds. They travel day and night, halting only for two or three hours in the middle of the day at the staging bungalows on the road. Bedding I hope to find for them at Allahabad. But we are deficient in everything. Carriage and the supply of food collected there is very, very scanty. But were I to enter into anything like such details as would enable you to form a correct idea of the starved state of everything necessary to prepare and fit a force for the field, it would take up more time than I have at my disposal just now.

"When I can manage to have a couple of regiments at Allahabad disposable for field-service, irrespective of the garrison of the fort, I join them instantly. Here I am of use in pushing forward everything wanted in front,—men, horses—very few of the latter—food, ammunition, &c. I have infused a little vivacity into the Quartermaster-General's department at Calcutta since my arrival.

"I am delighted with Lord Canning. He has never looked black at any event which has occurred. He is such a nice person to do business with. Very clever and hard-working, and gets through an amount of it which few could accomplish; and, with the highest courage, so simple and gentlemanlike: and so firm and decided with all these admirable qualities, that I cannot be too thankful for the good fortune which has placed me under such a chief."

On the 30th October, Hope Grant, at the head of

the Delhi column, reinforced by several companies of the 93d Highlanders and some infantry detachments, marched into Oudh. He encountered no opposition until after leaving Bunnee bridge on the 2d November, when he met and defeated an advanced party of the enemy, capturing one gun. Being strictly enjoined not to commit himself in any serious operation before the arrival of the Commander-in-chief, he halted at Buntera, six miles from the Alum Bagh, with the garrison of which post he established communication, removing the sick and wounded to Cawnpore. As the reinforcements and supplies reached that station they were pushed forward and concentrated at Buntera.

The letter addressed by Sir Colin to Sir John Lawrence on the 12th September, and quoted above, elicited the following reply, the delay in its receipt being fully accounted for by the difficulty experienced in communicating with the Punjab at this period :—

“LAHORE, October 15, 1857.

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—Many thanks for your kind letter of the 12th ultimo, which only reached me four days ago. I should have written to you long ago, but that I had little hope of my letter ever reaching you.

“We have, indeed, had a terrible storm; and it is, I am persuaded, only by the mercy of God that a single European is alive on this side of India. At

one time I began to think that all must be lost. We have now, so far as I can judge, weathered the gale; but until the troops arrive from England, our position must continue to be precarious.

"Your return shows great weakness; but by this time I anticipate that the remainder of the China force will have arrived, and henceforward troops will probably be arriving weekly. Delhi and Lucknow having fallen, all will go smoothly with common prudence. The mutineers, deprived of their guns and material, and with no supplies of ammunition and money, will gradually melt away. Already the political horizon is clearing, and my chief anxiety is now for the frontier, where we are very weak, owing to so many of our old Punjab regiments being away and the European regiments being so sickly.

"I will endeavour to have a return drawn up showing our available means in the Punjab—that is, down to the Jumna, but exclusive of the army in Delhi. In the meantime I can give you a general idea. We have six regiments of European infantry, but the three at Peshawur only muster 1100 effective men. Including H.M.'s 52d, now on its way back from Delhi, which musters 262 fighting men with artillery, we have probably upwards of 5000 European soldiers. I have six of my eleven old Punjab corps, all on the frontier. I have raised sixteen regiments of Punjab infantry, most of whom are, of course, young soldiers. Two of them are in the

north-west—viz., one at Meerut and one at Hissar; the others, with the police battalions, help the Europeans to hold the country and guard 19,000 Hindostanee soldiers. Besides this, I have five corps of Punjab cavalry, two of whom are in the north-west. The others are, or rather were, a source of some apprehension, as half the men were Hindostanees. Since Delhi, however, fell, I think they may be trusted, so long as they have not to act against their brethren.

“The most pressing subject at present with us is the disposal of the Hindostanee troops. When the reinforcements from England arrive, some might be intrusted with their arms; but the majority are, in my mind, utterly useless and dangerous. For the last three months they have only been kept from joining the mutineers at Delhi by sheer force. We have had the rivers guarded and the guns planted, with the disaffected men encamped on the plain, where all they might do could be seen. Even the best regiments among the Hindostanees require weeding.

“In the north-west all is progressing as favourably as we could hope for. An irregular force from this recovered Sirsah, Hansi, Hissar, and Rohtuck. All the rest of the country round Delhi has been cleared by the movable column. The upper portion of the Gangetic Doab—that is, Saharunpoor, Meerut, Mozaffurnuggur, Bulundshuhur, down to below Allygurh—seems also safe. The insurgents and fanatics all disperse and disappear as the mutineer

soldiery are driven away. This morning we heard of Colonel Greathed's success before Agra. This will keep Gwalior quiet, from which quarter great danger was to be apprehended. I think that Furukhabad will soon be cleared of insurgents. There will then only remain in the upper provinces Gwalior, Rohilcund, and Oudh.

"Gwalior may, I think, lie over for a time. So long as the movable column does not leave the Doab or go below Mynpooree, I should say that the Gwalior troops will not pass the Chumbul. If they do, that column, reinforced by the 3d Europeans in Agra, should be able to settle them. Rohilcund, I think, may also lie over for a time; and as to Oudh, you will know much more about it than I can tell you. I only know that Havelock has done nobly. In fact, he and his troops have exceeded all our hopes and expectations. I was rejoiced to see that Outram did not supersede Havelock.

"With a couple of fresh European regiments at Peshawur, and an equal number above Cawnpore to help Greathed's force, which is numerically small and a good deal worn, I think all would be pretty snug.

"I have suggested that the Guides and Coke's corps (the 1st Punjab Infantry) return to the Punjab. The men are anxious for the move, and they will do good on their return by disseminating the news of our success. In their place I will gradually send down a wing of the Belooch regiment, 400

strong ; a corps of Sikh cavalry, 560 strong, which I have lately raised ; and two regiments of Punjab infantry—the one new, the other old. This would give from 1000 to 1200 men extra to the north-west.

“I am anxious, directly that matters will admit of it, to see a commission of able officers assemble, with the view of concocting some good scheme for a new native army for Bengal. Unless this be done we shall only glide back into the old rotten system—perhaps into something even more dangerous. It strikes me that there is some danger that our officers, in their horror of John Pandy may go into the other extreme, and make too much of John Sing. We can no more rest our trust on the Punjabee than on the Hindostanee. We cannot do without a native army, but our aim should be not to have it in the least degree larger than is absolutely necessary ; and above all, our European force should be so large and so well placed and commanded as to render resistance hopeless.

“I will not write more, but content myself with asking pardon for inflicting so long a letter on you. I will send a copy of it by Agra and Cawnpore, as it may possibly reach you sooner than the original will by Bombay.

“My brother’s death has indeed been a great calamity. There were few, perhaps none, who would have proved more useful with his counsel and experience, than he. As you say, he died nobly in the

discharge of his duty, and I hope and believe that he was prepared to die.—Yours very sincerely,

“JOHN LAWRENCE.”

The time had now arrived when Sir Colin considered his presence in the field had become necessary. His last act in Calcutta was to explain in the following letter to H.R.H the Duke of Cambridge the reasons which had led him to this conclusion :—

“GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA,
27th October 1857.

“SIR,—I have the honour to inform your Royal Highness that I am about to leave the Presidency and transfer the headquarters of the army to Cawnpore.

“My reasons for taking this step are, that I feel my presence is wanted in the midst of the troops, now that, from the improvement of our communications, it may be hoped that something like *ensemble* may be restored to the army of the country.

“My stay has not been without its fruits. Every preparation has been made that was possible for the reception of the reinforcements from England, and a very complete system has been organised under the authority of the Right Honourable the Governor-General for their despatch to the front.

“My endeavours have been constantly directed to the urgent necessity of concentration, and the prevention, as far as it has been possible, of the dispersion of the slender forces which have been as

yet at my disposal. If I have not been so successful in this matter as I could have wished, I beg your Royal Highness to believe that it has happened from no want of exertion, but as a consequence of the urgent, I may say inexorable, demands of the immense districts lying between Calcutta and the scene of actual operations in the field.

"It has appeared to me, also, that in considering the difficulty attendant on the relief of General Outram, it would have been undesirable to have intrusted the duty to another officer.

"The means immediately disposable are very scanty, and, owing to the state of the country—the people hanging back in all directions—we have the greatest difficulty in securing even an insufficient supply of carriage, food, and camp-followers. All this will improve as soon as the weight of our power is felt in Oudh; but in consequence of the enormous distance to be traversed by the troops coming up in support, we are compelled at present to operate with only half the force which has been considered by Sir James Outram necessary for his relief.

"As the reserves which are at sea close up, this will eventually be remedied, and the rebellious provinces will, as a matter of course, be subdued. For the present, therefore, during the existence of real difficulty, I have considered that it would be unwise to leave the direction of the operation to any one else, as I may be able to economise and concentrate our means more than would have been in the power

of a subordinate officer, and consequently to insure a greater chance of success.

"I leave Calcutta this evening, having sent orders by telegraph to Cawnpore to continue the reinforcement of the post at the Alum Bagh by the advance of the 93d Highlanders and of Colonel Greathed's column. I hope to be at Cawnpore by the 4th proximo, when I shall join the troops and take command of them for the relief of Sir James Outram.

"I have made up my mind not to hazard an attack which would compromise my small force. A road must be opened by heavy guns, and the desperate street-fighting so gallantly conducted by Sir James Outram and General Havelock—the only course open to them—must, if possible, be avoided in future. Short as the time is, there must be no undue haste on my part.

"The immediate move of the reinforcements above mentioned to the Alum Bagh, is in consequence of the belief entertained by Sir James Outram that the presence of troops moving towards Lucknow in the province of Oudh may produce an effect on some of the chiefs by whom he is now surrounded, and so indirectly procure him supplies. Time is what we want.

"I enclose a memo. of the means at hand, which, though stated roughly, owing to want of exact returns, is tolerably accurate. Also a copy of Brigadier-General Havelock's last despatch on his brilliant action of the 25th ultimo.

" Now that I am on the point of leaving Calcutta, I would beg, with the greatest respect to the Governor-General, to record the deep sense of the obligation I entertain towards his lordship. Our intercourse has been cordial, intimate, and unreserved. I cannot be sufficiently thankful for his lordship's confidence and support, and the kindly manner in which they have been afforded, to my great personal satisfaction. One at a distance, and unacquainted with the ordinary mode of transacting business in this country, can hardly estimate the gain to the public service which has thus been made. But I allude principally to my own feelings of gratification.—I have the honour to be the very grateful and obedient humble servant of your Royal Highness,

" C. CAMPBELL."

On the night of the 27th, Sir Colin, attended by the headquarter staff, left Calcutta by rail for Ranee-gunj. Continuing thence his journey by carriage-*dâk*, he proceeded up the Great Trunk Road, and narrowly escaped capture by a party of mutineers who crossed his route between the Sone and Benares. In a letter written a few days afterwards, one of Sir Colin's party describes the adventure, which occurred with a body of the 32d Native Infantry near Mohuneea : " These men, who had mutinied at Deoghur, had escaped the parties sent out to intercept them, and were crossing the road at right angles to our course, on their way to Rhotas-ghur,

when we came right upon them. — and I were in the leading carriage, and had stopped to change horses, when the people came out and told us not to go on, as the road close before us was occupied by the sepoyes. I would not believe them, when they said, ‘There they are on the elephants;’ and on looking at them from the roof of my carriage through my opera-glass, I saw distinctly enough that the men on the nine elephants crossing our course were the mutineers. We immediately got our pistols and swords out, and — went back to stop Sir Colin, who was in the next carriage to us, about a quarter of a mile in the rear. I kept watching them with my glass, and learning from the people about their numbers and course. They were about 1000 yards from me, but crossing the road. The people said that there were about 350 or 400 of them, with many elephants, and showed me their line of march. A bend in the road and a field of sugar-cane concealed their men on foot, but I saw their men on the elephants quite well. As soon as — got Sir Colin stopped, he ordered me back, and we went back some 100 yards, and had a long examination of them with our glasses, till Sir Colin discovered some 25 horsemen turning the corner of a wood on our right, when he with great reluctance told us to go back; and now a most amusing scene took place. Sir Colin, —, and I, who were the last, went back, halting every short distance, and watching their course; but, as generally happens, the alarm spread

through our little column of six carriages, and quite a panic ensued in the rear. One carriage was abandoned by its owners, and got upset. Two officers got upon country ponies, barebacked, and galloped off to the nearest detachment, which was coming up about ten miles in rear; and except our two carriages, it was a regular rout. Sir Colin all the time as cool and quiet, tracing their course on the map, as if they were 100 miles off. Fortunately the mutineers had not the least idea who we were, and kept on their own course without molesting us; and we went back to Jahanabad, where was the nearest detachment, and returned under its escort in the evening, remaining with it for some hours till we passed the dangerous part and learned that our friends had passed on, when we pushed forward as usual. We counted twenty elephants with the mutineers. It was the narrowest escape for Sir Colin possible."

At Allahabad, where he halted one day, intelligence reached him that Outram was prepared, if absolutely necessary, to hold out on further reduced rations till near the end of November—a most satisfactory announcement, as it afforded Sir Colin a few days to complete his arrangements. He reached Futtahpore, an intrenched post midway between Allahabad and Cawnpore, on the 2d November, a few days after some infantry detachments and the Naval brigade escorting the siege-train, together with a large convoy, had attacked, and, after a severe and perilous encounter, beaten a large body of

mutineers at Khujwa, some twenty miles to the left of the Great Trunk road. Sir Colin arrived at Cawnpore on the following morning. Here he remained a few days to forward the engineer park, and to superintend various measures indispensable to the commencement of operations.

The circumstances under which he was compelled to initiate the campaign placed him at a serious disadvantage. Allahabad was secure; but his line of communications from thence to Cawnpore, which had now become his secondary base, was threatened by the Gwalior Contingent and other bodies of rebel infantry, who were known to be concentrating at Calpee, situated on the Jumna, forty miles from Cawnpore. In the upper Doab, Bulundshuhur and Allygurh had both been reoccupied; and a certain amount of order and security for travellers had been re-established in the tract lying between Delhi and Agra, a distance of upwards of 150 miles. The country, however, between Agra and Cawnpore had relapsed into the possession of the rebels as soon as Greathead's column had passed through it. To restore the lost line of communication throughout this province required time and means, neither of which were at Sir Colin's disposal. In short, the urgent cry for succour which reached him from Lucknow overbore every other consideration. Until the relief of the garrison was accomplished, the first step towards the re-establishment of authority in the revolted territories could not be undertaken in a deliberate and

scientific manner. It was therefore out of his power to secure his base and line of operations previous to his advance on Lucknow. The exigencies of the case would not admit of a strict adherence to the principles which regulate the conduct of an ordinary military operation. Sir Colin had no alternative but to accept the risk of leaving Cawnpore open to the contingency of an attack by superior numbers,—trusting, on the one hand, to the well-known and dilatory movements of the enemy; and, on the other, to such an energetic execution of his own design as would enable him to effect his purpose and retrace his steps in time to avert the danger to which that post was exposed.¹

His presence at Cawnpore was the signal for renewed activity, in pressing forward to the camp at Buntera the various detachments and stores as they arrived from Allahabad. To strengthen the post of Cawnpore was of primary importance, as it covered the 'bridge of boats, the sole line of retreat of the force about to operate on Oudh.

The following letter to the Duke of Cambridge shows the measures he adopted towards this object; and records the grave view he entertained of the critical operation he was about to conduct:—

“CAWNPORE, 8th November 1857.

“SIR,—I have already had the honour to announce

¹ As the sequel proved, this calculation failed by about forty-eight hours.

to your Royal Highness from Calcutta my intention to go to Cawnpore.

"Having, *en passant*, made some arrangements at Allahabad, I reached this place on the 4th. As I am about to start to-morrow to join the troops in the field in Oudh, I believe I should fail in my duty to your Royal Highness were I not to send a brief sketch of our position here, and what is to be expected from the force between this and the Alum Bagh. All accounts from Lucknow show that Sir James Outram is in great straits. The whole country has arisen around him, and the most trifling supplies cannot be obtained from the country for Brigadier Grant's force, which is encamped about ten miles from the Alum Bagh. I mention the latter fact to show more exactly how the case stands. I move myself with a month's supply for all hands, fighting men and followers. On the other side, our communications are threatened by the Gwalior force, numbering 5000 men, with 16 heavy guns, 24 field-guns, and an immense store of ammunition. The Nana Sahib crossed the Ganges yesterday; his followers, together with the *débris* of regiments which have gathered from various parts, are, as it appears, bound for Calpee, and will swell the Gwalior body to about 10,000 men. I have placed General Windham¹ in command at Cawnpore, where he is engaged in adding to the defences, which I found very miserable and defective on my arrival. He is ordered, in case of

¹ The late Lieutenant-General Sir C. A. Windham, K.C.B.

an advance upon Cawnpore, to show the best front he can, but not to move out to attack, unless he is compelled by the threat of bombardment. His garrison will consist of 500 British soldiers, 550 Madras infantry and gunners; and if he is seriously threatened—of which, of course, I shall have instruction—he will be further strengthened by some of the detachments which will be in the course of arrival during the next week. If the Gwalior force make for Futtehpore, where there is an open intrenchment held by 400 Madras N.I. and two field-guns, that force will either close on Cawnpore or retreat on Lohunda, the railway terminus, forty-two miles from Allahabad, which will be further strengthened by the detachments whose progress forward to me will be interrupted by the presence of the Gwalior force on the Great Trunk Road. Having thus, as far as lies in my power, provided for the communications and the safety of the scattered parties, my object is to extricate the garrison from Lucknow. This I will do if it can be accomplished with the ordinary military risk. But I am sure your Royal Highness will agree with me in thinking that there are larger interests pending than even that great object, and that I must watch over the safety of the small body of troops with which I begin this undertaking, as the foundation on which all our combinations for meeting an enemy in the field and the restoration of government depends throughout the provinces. Nothing

shall be left untried which I consider justifiable, such considerations as I have now stated being kept well in view; and I trust I shall succeed. But whatever the public may say at first, if the devoted garrison were to fall from want of food in consequence of such necessary precaution, I feel certain of the support of your Royal Highness, in consideration of the difficult alternatives between which I shall have had to make my choice; and I am convinced that my resolution is a right one."

Early on the morning of the 9th, Sir Colin left Cawnpore, escorted by a detachment of cavalry and horse-artillery, left behind by Hope Grant, and reached the camp at Buntera after a forced march of thirty-five miles. Sir Colin informed his old friend of his intention to place him in divisional command of the force, reserving to himself a general superintendence of the operations. Here a halt was made for two days to enable the engineer park, the siege-train, and some detachments to close up. The interval was devoted to the maturing of the plans. Several communications, written in the Greek character and rolled up in quills, had already reached Sir Colin from the Residency by the hands of native spies. Amongst other documents was a carefully-prepared memorandum by Sir James Outram, forwarded through Major MacIntyre, the senior officer at the Alum Bagh, and containing his recommendations regarding the line to be taken by the relieving force.

On the morning of the 10th, Mr Kavanagh, a European in the employ of Government, who had volunteered to act as guide and to afford the relieving force information, arrived in camp. Disguised as a native scout, he had left the Residency the previous night, and after encountering numerous perils by the way, threaded the enemy's lines and accomplished his purpose in safety—an enterprise of consummate daring, which won for him the Victoria Cross and other substantial rewards from Government. Adhering to the plan which had been worked out in Calcutta, Sir Colin determined to give the city a wide berth by making an extended movement from the Alum Bagh to the right upon the Dil Khooshah; thence to advance upon the Martiniere and the line of the canal, and from that point to continue the movement along the right bank of the Goomtee, should a reconnaissance of the ground admit of its practicability; to seize the barracks and the Secunder Bagh from the open ground; thence, under cover of batteries to be opened on the Kaiser Bagh, the key of the enemy's position, to carry the intermediate buildings, and after effecting a junction with the Residency, to withdraw the garrison. By this plan it was believed that many dangerous obstacles to be found in the suburbs would be obviated, and the co-operation of the garrison's fire upon the enemy's works secured.¹

¹ As regards the direction of the advance *via* the Dil Khooshah and

To prepare Outram for the abandonment of the Residency, Sir Colin sent him the following message, written in the Greek character, by the hands of a native scout:—

“HEADQUARTERS, 10th November, Tuesday.

“I am here with a very weak force, deficient in all essentials. I have not ammunition for more than three days' firing; but I have come to hand out the wounded, women and children, and garrison. I have not means to attempt anything more, and I shall be thankful to effect this. I shall blow up the Residency. My communications are threatened from Calpee, where the Gwalior Contingent, with forty guns, sixteen of which are heavy, are swelled by remnants of many regiments under Koer Singh to about ten thousand men. They must be dealt with. You must make your arrangements for getting every one clear of the Residency when I am able to give the order, abandoning baggage, destroying guns, but saving the treasure. Until the wounded and women are in my camp, the real business of the contest can-

the Martiniere, Sir Colin's and Sir James Outram's views were in accord. It was in the method of approaching the Secunder Bagh and the barracks that they differed. Sir James Outram recommended the canal bridge, or the canal a little below it, to be crossed, and a way made through the suburb to the road leading to the barracks and the Secunder Bagh; whereas Sir Colin preferred to keep to the more open ground near the river, and thus avoid the contingency of committing his troops to a struggle in the streets of the suburb.

not go on, and all the efforts of Government are paralysed. The first regiments from England cannot be at Cawnpore before the 20th instant at the earliest. Mr Kavanagh arrived here this morning in safety with the native guide. We shall move from this on the 12th instant."

A further message, written and conveyed in the same manner, was sent to Outram on the 11th, stating that the Commander-in-chief intended leaving the Alum Bagh on the 13th instant, that he hoped to be in occupation of the barracks and the Secunder Bagh on the 14th instant, and to carry out the women and wounded on the 16th. It is doubtful if either of these messages reached their destination.

The force having been organised in brigades, was reviewed that afternoon. Sir Colin addressed each corps severally, and took the opportunity of thanking the troops from Delhi, who had borne themselves so stoutly through the dangers and fatigue of the campaign from its commencement. To most of them he was personally a stranger, though one of the troops of horse-artillery had formed part of the force he commanded against the hill tribes in 1852. Amongst, however, the reinforcements from England, there was one battalion whose reception of Sir Colin was in marked contrast with that of the other corps. Conspicuous for their magnificent appearance, both as regards number and *physique*, the 93d High-

landers showed, by the enthusiastic welcome they accorded to their beloved chief, that the "recollection of dangers confronted and hardships endured" in common with him was fresh in their memories, and that he might count on their confidence in him in the future, as he had done in the past.

Orders were issued that evening for the advance on the following morning.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

